巴菲特致股东的信（2014年）④保险业务

Insurance

保险业务

Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation. That industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Though that purchase had monumental consequences for Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself.

让我们先来看看伯克希尔的核心业务保险业，自1967 年以来，保险业务一直是不断驱动我们扩张的引擎。当时我们以860 万美元的价格收购国民保险公司及其姊妹公司国民火灾海事保险公司。虽然这笔收购对于伯克希尔的意义深远，但过程十分简单。

Jack Ringwalt, a friend of mine who was the controlling shareholder of the two companies, came to my office saying he would like to sell. Fifteen minutes later, we had a deal. Neither of Jack’s companies had ever had an audit by a public accounting firm, and I didn’t ask for one. My reasoning: (1) Jack was honest and (2) He was also a bit quirky and likely to walk away if the deal became at all complicated.

我的朋友JackRingwalt 是这两家公司的控股股东，他来到我的办公室表示希望出售公司，15 分钟后我们就达成协议。杰克的两家公司都没有接受过公共会计师事务所的审计，我也没有对此做出任何要求。我的理由是：1)杰克是个诚实的人；2)他有点古怪，如果收购过程过于繁琐，他可能就会放弃交易。

On pages 128-129, we reproduce the 11⁄2-page purchase agreement we used to finalize the transaction. That contract was homemade: Neither side used a lawyer. Per page, this has to be Berkshire’s best deal: National Indemnity today has GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) net worth of $111 billion, which exceeds that of any other insurer in the world.

合同是自制的(参见完整年报的128 页)，双方都没有律师到场。这是伯克希尔最成功一笔交易，今天国民保险公司GAAP 账面价值达到1110 亿美元，超过了世界上任何一家保险公司。

One reason we were attracted to the property-casualty business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

我们被财产意外险吸引的一个重要原因是其独特的财务特性。保险公司提前收取保费，然后支付赔偿金。在极端情况下，比如工伤赔偿，支付时间可能长达数十年。这种先收钱后赔钱的模式可让保险公司拥有大量现金，我们称之为浮存金，这些资金最终会支付到保户手中。同时，保险公司可以使用这些浮存金为自己投资。虽然单笔的保单和索赔有进有出，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模和保费收入维持一个相对稳定的关系。所以，随着我们业务扩张，我们的浮存金规模也在增长。浮存金是如何增长的如下表所示：

Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and our new commercial insurance operation are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. This strength is a key pillar in Berkshire’s economic fortress.

浮存金进一步的增长将难以实现。从好的方面来看，GEICO 和我们新的商业险业务几乎肯定都会保持良好的增长速度。国民保险再保险业务的保单减少导致浮存金下降。但即便我们的浮存金下滑，其速率也会十分平缓，每年下滑不会超3%。保险业务的特性决定了我们拥有的现金资源肯定可以满足短期的偿付需求。这个优势是伯克希尔长盛不衰的关键。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费收入超过了运营费用和最终偿付总额，我们将获得承保收益。这增加了我们的保险浮存金产生的投资收入。当获得这种利润时，我们就可以享受免费资金的使用，更棒的是，我们持有还获得了额外收益。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it frequently causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates our country is now dealing with causes earnings on float to decrease, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of the industry.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人满意的结果。这导致了激烈竞争。竞争常常让整个财产保险行业遭受巨额承保损失。这个损失实际上就是保险行业为持有浮存金而支付的成本。尽管保险公司享受着浮存金带来的好处，但和美国其他行业的公司相比，动态竞争几乎会确保保险公司将保持净有形资产回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。美国长期的低利率让浮存金获得的投资收益减少，因此加剧了行业的利润下滑问题。

As noted in the first section of this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for twelve consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $24 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. That message is given at least lip service by all insurers; at Berkshire it is a religion.

正如在报告第一部分所述，伯克希尔现在已连续12 年实现承保盈利。这一期间我们税前收益合计240 亿美元。展望未来，我相信我们将在大多数年份继续实现承保盈利。这是我们保险经理人每天关注的焦点。他们知道浮存金是有价值的，但其好处可能被糟糕承销结果淹没。虽然所有的保险公司都会在口头上传达这点观点，但在伯克希尔这是一种信仰。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $22.7 billion to more than six million claimants in 2014 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float.

那么浮存金将如何影响我们的内在价值？当我们计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金的总额被作为负债减掉，就好像我们明天就要将其全部支付而无法补充一样。但将浮存金严格视作负债是错误的。它应该被视为一个循环基金。我们每天都要支付过去的索赔和相关费用，去年就向600 万索赔人支付了227 亿美元的巨额费用，这减少了我们的浮存金。但同样肯定的是，我们每天都在承保新的业务，收取的保费又增加了浮存金。

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities are treated as equals, however, under GAAP.

如果我们的循环浮存金没有成本且可以长期持久(我相信会是这样)，那么这种负债的真正价值会显著低于会计上的账面负债。因为新的业务会替代旧的索赔，因此欠下的每1 美元永远都不会从公司消失，这跟持有明天就将付出而无法收回的1 美元截然不同。然而根据GAAP 准则这两种类型的负债被认为是完全相同的。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

我们在收购保险公司时产生了155 亿美元的"商誉"资产，这增加了账面价值，并部分抵消了这一被夸大的浮存金负债。这种商誉体现了我们为保险公司获得浮存金能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的收购成本与实际价值无关。举例来说，如果一家保险公司蒙受了长期大额的承保损失，那么无论其原始取得成本如何，账面上的任何商誉资产都应被视作是毫无价值的。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Under present accounting rules (with which we agree) this excess value will never be entered on our books. But I can assure you that it’s real. That’s one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，伯克希尔并不是这样。查理和我相信，我们保险公司商誉真正的经济价值远超其历史账面价值。如果我们收购拥有类似商誉的保险公司，我们很乐意为类似质量的浮存金支付费用。根据目前会计准则，这种超额价值永远不会记入报表。但我可以向你保证这是真正存在的。这就是我们认为伯克希尔内在商业价值远高于其账面价值的一个巨大的原因。

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Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

伯克希尔吸引人的保险经济模式之所以存在，都是因为我们拥有一批杰出的经理人。他们经营着纪律严明的承保业务，拥有难以复制的商业模式。让我来向你们介绍几个主要业务的运营情况。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

首先，浮存金规模最高的是由阿吉特·贾因管理的伯克希尔再保险集团。阿吉特对别人不敢兴趣或没有资本承受的风险提供保险。他的运营结合了能力、速度和果断。更重要的是，他的思维方式在保险界独一无二。然而，他从来没有将伯克希尔暴露在与我们资源不相称的风险之中。

Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities in a market that might well have gone into shock. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, if not facing insolvency.

事实上，我们在避免风险上远比其他大多数大型保险公司要保守。举例来说，如果保险业因某种特大灾难而遭受2500 亿美元的损失，这一损失大约为保险业经历过最大损失的3 倍，伯克希尔作为一个整体，由于其众多的收益来源，依然将实现可观的利润。我们也将保持现金充沛，并将在一个已经陷入动荡的市场中寻找大量的机会。而其他的主要保险或再保险公司即使不面临破产，也会出现严重亏损。

Ajit’s underwriting skills are unmatched. His mind, moreover, is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment. Last year I told you about his formation of Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly welcomed by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. Previously, we had written only a few specialized lines of commercial insurance.

阿吉特的承销能力无人能及。他的大脑是一个创意工厂。他一直在寻找新的业务线加入目前的产品组合中。去年，我向你们介绍了他建立的伯克希尔特种保险公司(简称"BHSI")。这将我们带入了商业保险领域。我们在该领域立刻获得了美国主要保险经纪和企业风险经理的欢迎。以前，我们只承保了几种特种商业保险业务线。

BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. During 2014, Peter expanded his talented group, moving into both international business and new lines of insurance. We repeat last year’s prediction that BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years.

BHSI 现在由PeterEastwood 领导。他是一位富有经验的保险商，在保险行业广受尊重。在2014 年，Peter扩大了他的人才团队，进军国际业务和新的保险业务线。我们重复去年的预测，BHSI 将会成为伯克希尔的重要资产，将在未来数年承保数十亿的业务量。

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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有另一个强大的再保险公司通用再保险，该公司由TadMontross 管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

本质上，一个稳健的保险公司需要遵守四大承保纪律，它必须：(1)理解所有可能保单发生损失的风险；(2)谨慎的评估风险发生的可能性及其可能造成的损失；(3)设定合理的保费。平均而言，保费需要高于可能发生的损失及运营费用的总和；(4)如果在无法获得合适保费的情况下愿意放手。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司都遵守前三条规则，却忽视了第四条。他们无法放弃竞争对手正在积极争取的业务。老话说："别人都这么做，我们也必须这么做"，这个问题在许多行业都会招致麻烦，但保险行业尤为突出。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.

Tad 遵守了这四条戒律，而这体现在了他的业绩表现上。在他管理下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金表现一直好于零成本，我们预计这种情况仍将保持。我们对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务尤其满意。自我们1998 年收购该公司以来，该业务就一直稳定增长且保持盈利。

It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.

我们购买通用再保险后不久，它受到一些问题的困扰。这让不少评论员(包括我自己)一度认为我犯了一个巨大的错误。这一天早已过去。通用再保险现在是块宝石。

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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 64 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 53 years of service in 2014. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony.

最后还有GEICO 保险，由Tony Nicely 运营管理，他18 岁就加入公司，到2014 年已为公司服务53 年。Tony 在1993 年成为公司CEO，之后公司一直表现亮眼。没有比Tony 更好的经理了。

When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.

当我1951 年第一次听说GEICO 的时候，我被该公司相对于其他保险巨头巨大的成本优势震惊了。当时我就明白，GEICO 将获得成功，因为它理应成功。没人喜欢买车险，但几乎所有人都爱开车。因为对大多数家庭来说购买车险是一笔重大支出，而节约对家庭来说很重要，所以只有低成本的保险公司才能提供这些。事实上，至少40%阅读这封信的人可通过在GEICO 投保省钱。所以暂停阅读，登录GEICO.Com 或拨打800-368-2734。

GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2014 at 10.8% compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. Our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. The gecko, I should add, has one particularly endearing quality – he works without pay. Unlike a human spokesperson, he never gets a swelled head from his fame nor does he have an agent to constantly remind us how valuable he is. I love the little guy.

GEICO 的成本优势是该公司能够年复一年持续扩大市场份额的主要原因(1995 年伯克希尔刚收购GEICO 的时候，它的市场份额是2.5%，而2014 年我们的市场份额达到10.8%)。GEICO 的低成本创造了一条竞争对手无法逾越的护城河。我们的吉祥物"Gecko"不知疲倦地告诉美国人GEICO 如何为他们省钱。我不得不说，Gecko 有一个特别讨喜的品质，即它无薪工作。不像其他任何人类代言人，他从不被自己的名誉冲昏头脑，也从不提醒我们它干得多么出色。我喜欢这个小家伙。

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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Indeed, over the past decade, they have earned $2.95 billion from underwriting while growing their float from $1.7 billion to $8.6 billion. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

我们除了拥有的三大保险公司，我们还有其他一些规模较小的公司，它们的大部分专注于保险行业的一些细分领域。总体而言，这些公司成长非常好，稳定地创造着承保盈利。过去十年中，他们从承保业务赚得了29.5 亿美元收益，同时浮存金从17 亿美元增长到86 亿美元。查理和我都非常珍视这些公司和他们的经理人。

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Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future should certain unwanted events occur.

简单来说，保险业是销售承诺。"客户"现在付钱，保险公司承诺，如果未来某件不希望发生的事情发生了，就向客户付钱。

Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by people in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay, even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives, is all-important.

有时候这些承诺可能几十年都不会兑现(想象20 多岁的人买的人寿保险)。因此，保险公司履行承诺的意愿和能力都很重要，即便是在付款期遇上了经济危机。

Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by certain of the world’s largest and most sophisticated P/C insurers, who wished to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long-lived liabilities. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” these liabilities – most of them potential losses from asbestos claims – to a reinsurer. They needed the right one, though: If a reinsurer fails to pay a loss, the original insurer is still on the hook for it. Choosing a reinsurer, therefore, that down the road proves to be financially strapped or a bad actor threatens the original insurer with getting huge liabilities right back in its lap.

伯克希尔在履行承诺方面无人可比，这一点在近几年已被世界上各个最大最资深的财产保险公司认可。他们都希望从规模巨大、时间超长的负债中摆脱出来。也就是说，这些保险公司希望将这些负债"割让"给再保险公司，其中大多数都是石棉索赔造成的潜在损失。不过，他们需要一个好的再保险公司：如果一个再保险公司不能履约，原保险公司就要为此承担责任。因此，如果一个再保险公司自己陷入财务困境，或者其不良行为导致到原保险公司重新承担巨额债务。

Last year, our premier position in reinsurance was reaffirmed by our writing a policy carrying a $3 billion single premium. I believe that the policy’s size has only been exceeded by our 2007 transaction with Lloyd’s, in which the premium was $7.1 billion.

去年，我们承保一个保费高达30 亿美元的保单，这奠定了我们在再保险领域的龙头地位。我相信这个保单只逊于我们自己在2007 年拿下的Lloyd's 的保单，其保费高达71 亿美元。

In fact, I know of only eight P/C policies in history that had a single premium exceeding $1 billion. And, yes, all eight were written by Berkshire. Certain of these contracts will require us to make substantial payments 50 years or more from now. When major insurers have needed an unquestionable promise that payments of this type will be made, Berkshire has been the party – the only party – to call.

事实上，据我所知历史上只有8 笔财产意外险保单的单笔保费超过10 亿美元。没错，全都是伯克希尔承保的。其中有些合约要求我们50 年甚至更久之后赔付大额款项。当大型保险公司需要这种类型的赔付承诺时，伯克希尔是唯一能兑现的公司。

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Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.

伯克希尔优秀的经理人，卓越的财务实力，和许多受护城河保护的商业模式，在保险业中是独一无二的。这些优势组合是伯克希尔股东的巨大财富，长远来看会为股东们创造更大的价值。