巴菲特致股东的信（2015年）⑨生产力提升与社会繁荣

Productivity and Prosperity

生产力提升与社会繁荣

Earlier, I told you how our partners at Kraft Heinz root out inefficiencies, thereby increasing output per hour of employment. That kind of improvement has been the secret sauce of America’s remarkable gains in living standards since the nation’s founding in 1776. Unfortunately, the label of “secret” is appropriate: Too few Americans fully grasp the linkage between productivity and prosperity. To see that connection, let’s look first at the country’s most dramatic example – farming – and later examine three Berkshire-specific areas.

前文我曾告诉过你，我们在卡夫亨氏的合作伙伴3G 资本是如何根除低效，从而提升每小时的单位产出。美国自1776 年建国以来，生产效率的提高一直是生活水平大幅改善的秘诀。不幸的是，这"秘诀"知道的人还真不多：美国很少有人能完全理解生产力与繁荣之间的关联性。要了解这种关联，我们先来看看美国最引入注目的实例：农业，然后再来看看伯克希尔的3 个特殊投资领域。

In 1900, America’s civilian work force numbered 28 million. Of these, 11 million, a staggering 40% of the total, worked in farming. The leading crop then, as now, was corn. About 90 million acres were devoted to its production and the yield per acre was 30 bushels, for a total output of 2.7 billion bushels annually.

1900 年，美国有2800 万劳动力。其中1100 万人口从事农业，惊人的占40%。与现在一样，当时的主要农作物是玉米。约9 千万英亩种植玉米，每英亩产量为30 蒲式耳，年总产量为27 亿蒲式耳(1 蒲式耳=35.238升)。

Then came the tractor and one innovation after another that revolutionized such keys to farm productivity as planting, harvesting, irrigation, fertilization and seed quality. Today, we devote about 85 million acres to corn. Productivity, however, has improved yields to more than 150 bushels per acre, for an annual output of 13-14 billion bushels. Farmers have made similar gains with other products.

后来，人们发明了拖拉机以及其他各式各样的农具，使农业生产力有了革命性的进步，种植、收割、灌溉、施肥、选种等流程的效率皆大大提升。如今，美国约8500 万英亩种植玉米。虽然面积并未增加，然而生产力的提高将产量提高到每英亩150 蒲式耳以上，年产量为130-140 亿蒲式耳。其他农作物的产量提升也不相上下。

Increased yields, though, are only half the story: The huge increases in physical output have been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of farm laborers (“human input”). Today about three million people work on farms, a tiny 2% of our 158-million-person work force. Thus, improved farming methods have allowed tens of millions of present-day workers to utilize their time and talents in other endeavors, a reallocation of human resources that enables Americans of today to enjoy huge quantities of non-farm goods and services they would otherwise lack.

然而，产量的提升只是故事的一部分：农作物产量的大幅增加，伴随着劳动力数量的急剧减少。如今仅有300 万人口在农场劳作，仅占1.58 亿劳动力总量的2%。由此可见，农业技术的进步解放了成千上万的工人，让他们得以将时间和才智投入到其他工作，人力资源的再分配使如今的美国人得以享受琳琅满目的非农商品和服务，如果不是生产力的提高，人们的生活只能停留在男耕女织时代。

It’s easy to look back over the 115-year span and realize how extraordinarily beneficial agricultural innovations have been – not just for farmers but, more broadly, for our entire society. We would not have anything close to the America we now know had we stifled those improvements in productivity. (It was fortunate that horses couldn’t vote.) On a day-to-day basis, however, talk of the “greater good” must have rung hollow to farm hands who lost their jobs to machines that performed routine tasks far more efficiently than humans ever could. We will examine this flip-side to productivity gains later in this section.

回顾过去的115 年历史，我们意识到，农业创新是多么有益，不仅仅对农民，更广泛的说，对我们整个社会都有益。如果我们扼杀了生产力的提高，就不会有现在的美国。(幸好被淘汰的马儿们不会投票)。然而，在日常生活中，对于那些失业的农场工人们大谈科技的美好无异于对牛弹琴，因为机器运行的效率远超人类。下面我们进一步讨论生产力提高导致的失业问题。

For the moment, however, let’s move on to three stories of efficiencies that have had major consequences for Berkshire subsidiaries. Similar transformations have been commonplace throughout American business.

不过，现在让我们先来看看对伯克希尔子公司效率提升产生重大影响的三个实例。这类改变在整个美国商界已经是司空见惯了。

● In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the American workforce totaled 44 million. About 1.35 million workers were employed in the railroad industry. The revenue ton-miles of freight moved by Class I railroads that year totaled 655 billion.

1，1947 年二战刚结束不久，美国劳动力总数为4400 万，约135 万工人供职于铁路行业。当年一级铁路货运量总计6550 亿吨英里。

By 2014, Class I railroads carried 1.85 trillion ton-miles, an increase of 182%, while employing only 187,000 workers, a reduction of 86% since 1947. (Some of this change involved passenger-related employees, but most of the workforce reduction came on the freight side.) As a result of this staggering improvement in productivity, the inflation-adjusted price for moving a ton-mile of freight has fallen by 55% since 1947, a drop saving shippers about $90 billion annually in current dollars.

到了2014 年，一级铁路运输量为1.85 万亿吨英里，增长了182%，而雇员人数仅为18.7 万，相比1947 年减少了86%。(其中部分变化涉及客运人员，但大部分减少的劳动力是货运人员)。鉴于生产力的惊人提高，净通胀调整后，每吨英里的货运成本自1947 年来降低了55%，这一降幅每年为托运人节省约900 亿美元。

Another startling statistic: If it took as many people now to move freight as it did in 1947, we would need well over three million railroad workers to handle present volumes. (Of course, that level of employment would raise freight charges by a lot; consequently, nothing close to today’s volume would actually move.)

再来看另一组令人震惊的数据：如果现在货运雇员规模停留在1947 年的水平，我们将需要300 多万的铁路工人来处理现在的货运量。(当然，如此多的人工成本将大大提高运费，货运量也很难发展到今天这般规模)。

Our own BNSF was formed in 1995 by a merger between Burlington Northern and Santa Fe. In 1996, the merged company’s first full year of operation, 411 million ton-miles of freight were transported by 45,000 employees. Last year the comparable figures were 702 million ton-miles (plus 71%) and 47,000 employees (plus only 4%). That dramatic gain in productivity benefits both owners and shippers. Safety at BNSF has improved as well: Reportable injuries were 2.04 per 200,000 man-hours in 1996 and have since fallen more than 50% to 0.95.

1995 年，当时Burlington Northern 铁路与Santa Fe 铁路合并，成立了我们的BNSF 铁路公司。1996 年是这家新合并公司第一个完整营运的年份，4.5 万名员工完成了4.11 亿吨英里的货运量。2015 年货运量增长71%达到7.02 亿吨英里，雇员人数仅增长2%达到4.7 万人。生产力的提升不但惠及铁路公司，也惠及托运人。同时，BNSF 铁路的生产安全性也得到了提升：1996 年上报的因工受伤人数为2.04 人/20 万人工时数，而今下降了超过50%，仅为0.95 人/20 万人工时数。

● A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies – the kind dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver’s seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine – except for the consumer.

2，一个多世纪前，人们发明了汽车，围绕着它形成了一个为汽车及其驾驶者提供保险的行业。最初，这项业务是通过经营火灾保险的传统保险代理机构进行的。这种以代理机构为中心的运营模式，包含高额佣金和其他承销费用，这些费用约占保费的40%。当时，实力雄厚的地方代理机构处于主导地位，因为它们代理着多家保险公司，而且在佣金谈判时，它们可以让保险公司之间进行价格竞争。因此卡特尔式的定价开始盛行，除了消费者以外，所有相关企业都表现良好。(Cartel 定价是指，多个具有竞争关系的经营者为牟取超额利润，以合同、协议或其他方式，共同商定商品或服务价格，从而限制市场竞争的一种垄断联合。)

And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses – moves that permitted lower prices – and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner’s insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting expenses of about 25%.

随后，一些美国人的聪明才智开始发挥作用: 来自伊利诺伊州Merna 市的农民G. J. Mecherle 提出建立一支专属销售队伍只销售自家保险产品的想法。他的公司命名为州立农业互助保险公司(State Farm Mutual)。该公司降低了佣金和运营费用，这些措施使得保险价格得以降低，并很快成为一家强大的保险公司。几十年来，州立农业保险一直是汽车保险和房屋保险领域承保规模的领头羊。同样采用直销模式运营的好事达保险公司(Allstate)长期位居亚军。州立农业保险和好事达保险的承保费用都在25%左右。

In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association (“USAA”), a mutual-like company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing innovation rose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the steady renewals that came from permanent residents.

在1930 年代早期，另一个类似的竞争者联合服务汽车协会(USAA)开始直接面向客户为军官提供汽车保险。这种营销创新源于军事人员在从一个基地转移到另一个基地时必须购买保险。这是本地保险机构不感兴趣的业务，因为它们希望常居民能够稳定的续保。

The direct distribution method of USAA, as it happened, incurred lower costs than those enjoyed by State Farm and Allstate and therefore delivered an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with $100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).

事实上，USAA 的直销方式比State Farm 和Allstate 的承保成本更低，因此可以为客户提供更大的折扣。这使得USAA 的雇员Leo 和Lillian Goodwin，梦想扩大将其直销模式的目标市场扩大到军官之外。1936 年他们以10 万美元的资本成立了政府雇员保险公司(Government EmployesInsurance Co.，后来简化成GEICO)。

Their fledgling did $238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did $22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)

1937 年，他们刚刚起步的公司完成了23.8 万美元汽车保险收入，这是第一个完整的年份。去年GEICO 完成了226 亿美元，是 USAA 的两倍多。(尽管早起的鸟儿有虫吃，但第二只老鼠有奶酪吃)。2015 年GEICO 和USAA 的承保费用占保费都为14.7%，USAA 是唯一一家承保费用比率较低的大公司。(GEICO 与USAA 效率完全一样，但GEICO 在促进增长的广告上花费更多) 。

With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s not surprising that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 – my 100th birthday – I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.

GEICO 凭借低成本优势，几年前成功取代Allstate 成为汽车保险第二名也就不足为奇了。尽管State Farm 在保费数量上仍远远领先于GEICO，但差距已经大大缩小。在我的100 岁生日也就是2030 年8 月30 日，我计划宣布GEICO 已经占据了榜首位置。记得在你的日历上做记号。

GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.

GEICO 雇佣了大约3.4 万名员工为其1400 万名投保人提供服务。我猜测，在代理制度下，为相似数量的保单持有人提供服务所需要的劳动力数量，我相信这个数字至少会达到6 万人，这是保险公司在直接雇佣所需要人员和支持机构所需要的人员的总和。

● In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) operates within a changing economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In fact, a “sloppy” operation could do just fine financially.

3，在电力公用事业领域，伯克希尔能源公司(BHE)的运营模式不断改变。从历史来看，地方电力企业的生存并不取决于其效率。事实上，一个"松散"的运营方式也能在财务上做的不错。

That’s because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office. And some CEOs ran things accordingly.

这是因为公用事业公司往往是某种刚需产品的唯一供应商，并被允许在一定水平上定价，以使其投入的资本获得规定的回报。业内有这样一个笑话：公用事业是唯一一个通过装修老板办公室就自动赚更多钱的行业。许多公用事业公司的CEO 确实是按着这个套路操作的。

That’s all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in our country’s long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost operator. BHE’s long-established emphasis on efficiency – even when the company didn’t need it to attain authorized earnings – leaves us particularly competitive in today’s market (and, more important, in tomorrow’s as well).

但现在这一切都变了。今天，社会已经达成共识，联邦政府补贴的风力发电和太阳能发电符合我们的长远利益。联邦政府通过税款抵免来落实这一政策，以使可再生能源的价格在特定地区具有竞争力。这些可再生能源的税收抵免(或其他政策支持)，最终可能会侵蚀现有的公用事业的经济效益，尤其是那些运行成本较高的公司。尽管公司并不需要通过提高效益来获得允许的收益，但BHE 一直以来都非常注重提升效率，这也使得BHE 在当今市场(特别重要的是明天的市场)变得特别有竞争力。

BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced 19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatt- hours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period during which industry rates increased 44%.

1999 年，BHE 收购了爱荷华公用事业公司。而前一年该公司雇佣了3700 人，发电量为1900 万兆瓦时。现在我们雇佣了3500 名员工，发电量达到了2900 兆瓦时。效率的大幅提高让我们能够在16 年不提价，而同期行业平均提价了44%。

The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had .79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015 compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.

我们爱荷华公用事业公司的安全记录也非常出色。2015 年，员工的事故率只有0.79%，而我们接手前公司的事故率为7%。

In 2006 BHE purchased PacifiCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our purchase PacifiCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically, with the accident-rate-per-100-employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to .85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now ranks in the industry’s top decile.

2006 年，BHE 收购了在俄勒冈州和犹他州运营的电力公司PacifiCorp。我们收购的前一年，该公司员工数为6750 人，发电量为5260 万兆瓦时。而去年，员工数为5700 人，发电量为5630 万兆瓦时。公司的安全性也得到显著提升，事故率从2005 年的3.4%下降到2015 年的0.85%。安全方面BHE 可以排在行业前十。

Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership. No investor-owned utility in America comes close to matching BHE’s enthusiasm for reinvestment.)

这些杰出的表现解释了为什么BHE 在提议收购某个地区的公用事业公司时，当地的监管机构会表现出如此大的欢迎。监管机构知道，我们的公司会带来高效、安全可靠的运营，同时为任何有意义的项目提供无限的资本。(自我们获得所有权以来，BHE 从未向伯克希尔支付过股息。在美国，没有一家投资者拥有的公用事业公司能与BHE 的再投资热情相媲美。)

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The productivity gains that I’ve just spelled out – and countless others that have been achieved in America – have delivered awesome benefits to society. That’s the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed – and will continue to enjoy – major gains in the goods and services they receive.

我刚刚详细解释的生产力的提升(以及无数其他方面的进步)为社会带来了惊人的效益。这就是为什么我们的全体公民已经享受并将继续享受他们所获得的商品和服务所带来的巨大好处。

To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.

对于这一点，有一些抵消成份。首先近年来生产效率的提升，在很大程度上使富人更受益。其次，生产效率的提升也常常引发动荡：当创新或更高的效率颠覆了原有世界，不管是资本家还是劳动者都可能付出巨大的代价。

We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public shareholders). It’s their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average – an index fund of sorts – soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while paying ever-increasing dividends.)

我们不需要同情资本(不论是私人企业还是上市公司)，他们的本职工作就是照顾好自己。当正确的决策为投资者带来巨额的回报，那错误的决策带来巨大的损失也就无可避免。此外，那些广泛进行多元化投资并简单呆坐不动的投资者们一定会获得成功：在美国，成功投资带来的回报远远超过失败带来的损失。(20 世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数从66 点飙升至11497 点，其成分股企业一直在支付越来越多的股息。)

A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.

但长期工作的工人却面临着一个截然不同的等式。当创新与市场体系相互作用以提升生产效率时，许多工人会因此失去价值，他们的能力会被淘汰。或许有些人能在别的地方找到体面的工作，但多数人却别无选择。

When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.

当低成本竞争将鞋业生产的中心转向亚洲，我们曾经繁荣的德克斯特(Dexter)鞋业倒闭了，导致缅因州一个小镇1600 名员工失业。许多人已经过了可以再学习另一门手艺的年纪。我们失去了我们能够负担的所有投资，但许多员工失去的却是他们赖以生存的工作。同样的场景也出现在我们原来的新英格兰纺织厂"慢性死亡"的过程中。这家纺织厂垂死挣扎了整整20 年，作为一个令人心酸的例子，许多New Bedford 工厂的老员工只会说葡萄牙语，几乎不会说英语但他们没有第二个工作选择。

The answer in such disruptions is not the restraining or outlawing of actions that increase productivity. Americans would not be living nearly as well as we do if we had mandated that 11 million people should forever be employed in farming.

上述这些糟糕案例的解决方案并不是限制或禁止提高生产力。如果我们强制要求1100 万人从事农业工作，那么美国人的生活将永远不会像我们现在这样好。

The solution, rather, is a variety of safety nets aimed at providing a decent life for those who are willing to work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. (I personally favor a reformed and expanded Earned Income Tax Credit that would try to make sure America works for those willing to work.) The price of achieving ever-increasing prosperity for the great majority of Americans should not be penury for the unfortunate.

问题的解决方案在于建立各种保护措施，为那些愿意继续工作、但其才能却因为市场力量而贬值的人提供体面的生活。(我个人非常赞成改革和扩大劳动所得税减免，为那些愿意工作的人们提供最大的保障。)对大多数美国人来说，实现不断增长的繁荣的代价不应该是不幸者的贫穷。