巴菲特致股东的信（2015年）⑩重要的风险

Important Risks

重要的风险

We, like all public companies, are required by the SEC to annually catalog “risk factors” in our 10-K. I can’t remember, however, an instance when reading a 10-K’s “risk” section has helped me in evaluating a business. That’s not because the identified risks aren’t real. The truly important risks, however, are usually well known. Beyond that, a 10-K’s catalog of risks is seldom of aid in assessing: (1) the probability of the threatening event actually occurring; (2) the range of costs if it does occur; and (3) the timing of the possible loss. A threat that will only surface 50 years from now may be a problem for society, but it is not a financial problem for today’s investor.

和所有的上市公司一样，美国SEC 要求我们每年都要在10-K 中列出"风险因素"。然而，我并不记得哪一个例子是我在阅读10-K 文件中的"风险"部分时帮我评估了一项业务。这并不是因为这些已确认的风险是不真实的，而是真正重要的风险通常是众所周知的。除此之外，10-K 文件中的风险因素也很少有助于评估：(1)威胁事件真正发生的概率；(2)如果发生，将付出的成本区间；(3)可能发生损失的时间。50 年后才可能浮现出来的问题可能会成为社会问题，但对于今天的投资者来说，这并不是一个在财务上需要考虑的问题。

Berkshire operates in more industries than any company I know of. Each of our pursuits has its own array of possible problems and opportunities. Those are easy to list but hard to evaluate: Charlie, I and our various CEOs often differ in a very major way in our calculation of the likelihood, the timing and the cost (or benefit) that may result from these possibilities.

伯克希尔涉足的行业比我知道的其他任何公司都要多。我们的每一个兴趣都有自己的一系列可能的问题和机会。列举出来容易但是评估很难：查理、我以及我们的CEO 计算这些可能的投资机会可能发生的概率、发生的时机和带来的损益时，往往有很大的区别。

Let me mention just a few examples. To begin with an obvious threat, BNSF, along with other railroads, is certain to lose significant coal volume over the next decade. At some point in the future – though not, in my view, for a long time – GEICO’s premium volume may shrink because of driverless cars. This development could hurt our auto dealerships as well. Circulation of our print newspapers will continue to fall, a certainty we allowed for when purchasing them. To date, renewables have helped our utility operation but that could change, particularly if storage capabilities for electricity materially improve. Online retailing threatens the business model of our retailers and certain of our consumer brands. These potentialities are just a few of the negative possibilities facing us – but even the most casual follower of business news has long been aware of them.

我可以举几个例子。我们从一个最显而易见的威胁开始吧：BNSF 和其他铁路公司，未来十年很可能将失去大量的煤炭运输业务。而未来的某个时刻(虽然在我看来在很长一段时间内都不会)，无人驾驶可能会让GEICO 保险的保单数量大规模萎缩。这种趋势也会影响到我们的汽车经销商业务。我们纸质报纸的发行量还将继续下降，这是我们在收购时就非常清楚的。目前，可再生能源对我们的公用事业业务起到了助力，但如果电力存储技术得到实质提升，那么情况将有可能改变。在线零售已经威胁到了我们的零售商和某些消费品牌的商业模式。这些都还只是我们面临的负面可能性的一小部分，但即便是对商业新闻再漫不经心的人，也早已意识到了这些负面因素。

None of these problems, however, is crucial to Berkshire’s long-term well-being. When we took over the company in 1965, its risks could have been encapsulated in a single sentence: “The northern textile business in which all of our capital resides is destined for recurring losses and will eventually disappear.” That development, however, was no death knell. We simply adapted. And we will continue to do so.

然而，这些问题都对伯克希尔的长远发展都起不到什么关键性的影响。1965 年我们刚接手这家公司时，一句话就能概括当时的风险："我们所有的资本所在的北方纺织业务注定将持续亏损，直至消亡。"然而，这种发展趋势，并没有敲响丧钟。我们只是适应了它，未来也将如此。

Every day Berkshire managers are thinking about how they can better compete in an always-changing world. Just as vigorously, Charlie and I focus on where a steady stream of funds should be deployed. In that respect, we possess a major advantage over one-industry companies, whose options are far more limited. I firmly believe that Berkshire has the money, talent and culture to plow through the sort of adversities I’ve itemized above – and many more – and to emerge with ever-greater earning power.

伯克希尔的经理人每天都在思考，他们该如何在一个不断变化的世界中更好的竞争。查理和我每天也同样都在积极关注着，哪些领域值得我们投入资本以获得源源不断地现金流。在这一方面，我们比那些只涉足一个行业的公司更有优势，毕竟他们的选择更为有限。我一直坚信，伯克希尔拥有足够的资本、人才和文化，能够克服上面我列举的种种逆境(甚至更多)，并以越来越强大的盈利能力脱颖而出。

There is, however, one clear, present and enduring danger to Berkshire against which Charlie and I are powerless. That threat to Berkshire is also the major threat our citizenry faces: a “successful” (as defined by the aggressor) cyber, biological, nuclear or chemical attack on the United States. That is a risk Berkshire shares with all of American business.

然而，伯克希尔面临着一个明确存在且非常持久的危险，查理和我也感到束手无策。对伯克希尔的威胁也是我们的国民所面临的主要威胁：针对美国"成功"的网络、生物、核和化学袭击。这是伯克希尔与全美所有企业共同面临的风险。

The probability of such mass destruction in any given year is likely very small. It’s been more than 70 years since I delivered a Washington Post newspaper headlining the fact that the United States had dropped the first atomic bomb. Subsequently, we’ve had a few close calls but avoided catastrophic destruction. We can thank our government – and luck! – for this result.

在任何给定的年份，这种大规模毁灭的概率都非常小。70 多年前我在《华盛顿邮报》发表了一篇文章，标题是在美国投下第一颗原子弹。随后，我们与一些灾难性的破坏擦肩而过。对于这个结果，我们得感谢于我们的政府，当然还有运气。

Nevertheless, what’s a small probability in a short period approaches certainty in the longer run. (If there is only one chance in thirty of an event occurring in a given year, the likelihood of it occurring at least once in a century is 96.6%.) The added bad news is that there will forever be people and organizations and perhaps even nations that would like to inflict maximum damage on our country. Their means of doing so have increased exponentially during my lifetime. “Innovation” has its dark side.

尽管如此，短期内的小概率事件长期来看就接近必然。(如果某一事件在某一年发生的概率为1/30，那么它在一个世纪内至少发生一次的概率是96.6%)。此外，更坏的消息是，总有个人或组织、甚至可能是国家，希望对我们的国家制造最大的伤害。在我有生之年，他们达成这一目的的能力呈指数级增长。"创新"也有其阴暗面。

There is no way for American corporations or their investors to shed this risk. If an event occurs in the U.S. that leads to mass devastation, the value of all equity investments will almost certainly be decimated.

美国公司和投资者无法摆脱这种风险。如果美国发生大规模破坏事件，所有股权投资几乎肯定会大幅缩水。

No one knows what “the day after” will look like. I think, however, that Einstein’s 1949 appraisal remains apt: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”

没有人知道"后天"会是什么样子。然而，我认为，1949 年爱因斯坦的这句评价依然恰当："我不知道第三次世界大战将使用什么武器，但第四次世界大战，人们的武器将是木棒和石块！"

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I am writing this section because we have a proxy proposal regarding climate change to consider at this year’s annual meeting. The sponsor would like us to provide a report on the dangers that this change might present to our insurance operation and explain how we are responding to these threats.

我写这一章节是因为，今年的年会上，我们有一个关于气候变化的代理提案需要考虑。发起人希望我们能提交一份报告，说明气候变化可能会对我们的保险业务带来怎样的威胁，以及我们将如何应对这些挑战。

It seems highly likely to me that climate change poses a major problem for the planet. I say “highly likely” rather than “certain” because I have no scientific aptitude and remember well the dire predictions of most “experts” about Y2K. It would be foolish, however, for me or anyone to demand 100% proof of huge forthcoming damage to the world if that outcome seemed at all possible and if prompt action had even a small chance of thwarting the danger.

在我看来，气候变化很可能给地球带来一个严峻的问题。我之所以说"极有可能"，而不说"肯定"，是因为我没有相应的科学能力做出这个判断，并且我清楚地记得大多数"专家"对千年虫问题的可怕预言。不过，如果这一结果极有可能，如果迅速采取行动消除威胁的可能性又非常小的话，那么我或者任何人要求100%确凿的证据来证明伤害即将到来，那也是非常愚蠢的。

This issue bears a similarity to Pascal’s Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy. Call this Noah’s Law: If an ark may be essential for survival, begin building it today, no matter how cloudless the skies appear.

这个问题与关于"上帝是否存在"的Pascal 赌注有相似之处。人们可能还记得，Pascal 认为，如果上帝真的存在的可能性很小，那么按"上帝确实存在"行事就是有意义的，因为这么做的回报可能是无限的，但不这么做却可能带来永恒的痛苦。同样，哪怕只有1%的可能这个星球真的面临一场巨大灾难，而拖延就意味放弃任何回旋余地，那现在不作为就是愚蠢的。这就是诺亚定律：如果方舟对于生存至关重要，那么不论现在的天空有多么晴朗，都应当立即开始建造方舟。(如果上帝存在：我信上帝，那么会受到奖赏；我不信上帝，那么会受到惩罚；如果上帝不存在，不管信不信上帝什么事情都不会发生。)

It’s understandable that the sponsor of the proxy proposal believes Berkshire is especially threatened by climate change because we are a huge insurer, covering all sorts of risks. The sponsor may worry that property losses will skyrocket because of weather changes. And such worries might, in fact, be warranted if we wrote ten- or twenty-year policies at fixed prices. But insurance policies are customarily written for one year and repriced annually to reflect changing exposures. Increased possibilities of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.

代理提案的发起人认为气候变化将对伯克希尔带来巨大威胁是可以理解的，因为我们是一家庞大的保险公司，覆盖了各种类型的风险。他们或许会担心，气候变化会使财产损失概率大幅上升。事实上，如果我们以固定价格制定未来10-20 年的保单，那么这种担忧是非常有必要的。但是，产险保单通常以一年为期，每年都会重新定价以反映不断变化的风险敞口。损失概率的增加，能够迅速转化为保费的增加。

Think back to 1951 when I first became enthused about GEICO. The company’s average loss-per-policy was then about $30 annually. Imagine your reaction if I had predicted then that in 2015 the loss costs would increase to about $1,000 per policy. Wouldn’t such skyrocketing losses prove disastrous, you might ask? Well, no.

回想1951 年，我第一次对GEICO 保险产生热情。当时该公司每份保单年均损失约为30 美元。想象一下，如果我当时预测2015 年每份保单的损失成本将达到1000 美元左右，你会作何反应？你可能会问，如此飙升的损失难道不是灾难性的吗？好吧，答案是否定的。

Over the years, inflation has caused a huge increase in the cost of repairing both the cars and the humans involved in accidents. But these increased costs have been promptly matched by increased premiums. So, paradoxically, the upward march in loss costs has made insurance companies far more valuable. If costs had remained unchanged, Berkshire would now own an auto insurer doing $600 million of business annually rather than one doing $23 billion.

多年来，通货膨胀导致了汽车维修和人身事故赔偿费用激增。但这些增加的成本都及时反映到了增加的保费中。因此，矛盾的是，损失成本的上升，保险公司的价值反而增加了。如果损失成本一直维持不变，伯克希尔将拥有一家每年6 亿保费规模的汽车保险公司，而不是一家230 亿美元庞大保费规模的保险公司。

Up to now, climate change has not produced more frequent nor more costly hurricanes nor other weather- related events covered by insurance. As a consequence, U.S. super-cat rates have fallen steadily in recent years, which is why we have backed away from that business. If super-cats become costlier and more frequent, the likely – though far from certain – effect on Berkshire’s insurance business would be to make it larger and more profitable.

到目前为止，气候变化并没有带来更加频繁或损失更大的飓风，或其他保险覆盖范围的其他恶劣气候事件。因此，近年来美国的巨灾保险费率在持续下降，这也是我们放弃这一块业务的原因。如果巨灾变得更加频繁或损失更加惨重(尽管还远不能确定)，对伯克希尔保险业务的影响将是，规模更大，利润更高。

As a citizen, you may understandably find climate change keeping you up nights. As a homeowner in a low-lying area, you may wish to consider moving. But when you are thinking only as a shareholder of a major insurer, climate change should not be on your list of worries.

作为公民，气候变化让你彻夜难眠也在情理之中，如果你的房子地势较低，想要搬家也是人之常情。但单单作为一个大型保险公司的股东，气候变化不应该是你担心的事情。