巴菲特致股东的信（2016年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2016 was $27.5 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.7%. Over the last 52 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $172,108, a rate of 19% compounded annually.*

2016 年伯克希尔的账面价值增长了275 亿美元，A/B 股每股账面价值增长10.7%(标普12%)。自现任管理层接手的52 年来，每股账面价值已从19 美元增至172108 美元，年均复合增长率约为19%。

* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.

本报告使用的所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔的A股。B股数据为A股所示数据的1/1500。

During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”

在这52 年里的前半段时间里，伯克希尔的账面价值大致等于企业真正重要的内在价值，之所以相近是因为我们大多数资源都部署在定期以市价重估的有价证券中(需扣除出售时将产生的税款)。按华尔街的话说，伯克希尔的资产负债表很大程度上是按市场计价的。

By the early 1990s, however, our focus was changing to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that materially diminished the relevance of balance sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules (commonly referred to as “GAAP”) that apply to companies we control differ in important ways from those used to value marketable securities. Specifically, the accounting for businesses we own requires that the carrying value of “losers” be written down when their failures become apparent. “Winners,” conversely, are never revalued upwards.

然而到了1990 年代初，我们资本配置的重点转向对其他企业的完全所有权，这一重大转变大大降低了公司内在价值和资产负债数据的相关性。之所以出现这种脱节，是因为适用于我们控股公司的GAAP 会计准则，在许多重要方面不同于评估有价证券。具体来说，通常会计准则要求我们所拥有的企业，衰败时账面价值需要被减记，而胜出时账面价值却永远不会被重估。

We’ve experienced both outcomes: As is the case in marriage, business acquisitions often deliver surprises after the “I do’s.” I’ve made some dumb purchases, paying far too much for the economic goodwill of companies we acquired. That later led to goodwill write-offs and to consequent reductions in Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners among the businesses we’ve purchased – a few of the winners very big – but have not written those up by a penny.

我们已经经历过两种结果：就像在婚姻中出现的情况一样，在企业合并案中，往往会在"我愿意"之后出现意料之外的结果。我做了一些十分愚蠢的收购决定，为我们所收购公司的经济商誉付出了太多。这导致了后来的商誉减值，伯克希尔的账面价值因此而减少。在我们收购的企业中，也有一些赢家，其中一些规模非常大，但这些成功企业商誉的增值，一分钱都没有反映出来。

We have no quarrel with the asymmetrical accounting that applies here. But, over time, it necessarily widens the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our winners produce an intrinsic value for Berkshire’s shares that far exceeds their book value. The overage is truly huge in our property/casualty insurance business and significant also in many other operations.

我们对这种不对称的会计准则并无反对。但随着时间的推移，这必然会扩大伯克希尔的内在价值和账面价值之间的差距。现在我们的赢家获得的巨额且不断增长的未记录增值，为伯克希尔创造的内在价值远远超过其账面价值。这种增值在我们的财产意外险公司中特别巨大，在许多其他业务中也是如此。

Over time, stock prices gravitate toward intrinsic value. That’s what has happened at Berkshire, a fact explaining why the company’s 52-year market-price gain – shown on the facing page – materially exceeds its book-value gain.

随着时间的推移，股价会趋向于内在价值，这就是在伯克希尔所发生的事情。这一事实也解释了，在过去52年的业绩记录，我们的股价的涨幅为什么会大幅超过账面价值的涨幅。