巴菲特致股东的信（2016年）②我们希望达成的目标

What We Hope to Accomplish

我们希望达成的目标

Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power per share to increase every year. Actual earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of periodic weakness in the U.S. economy. In addition, insurance mega-catastrophes or other industry-specific events may occasionally reduce earnings at Berkshire, even when most American businesses are doing well.

伯克希尔副董事长兼我的搭档查理·芒格，跟我预计伯克希尔的经常性(normalized)每股盈利能力每年都会增加。当然，实际收益有时会因为美国经济的周期性疲软而下降，此外，即使大多数美国企业表现良好，保险业务的特大灾难或其他行业的特定事件，也可能降低伯克希尔的收益。

It’s our job, though, to over time deliver significant growth, bumpy or not. After all, as stewards of your capital, Berkshire directors have opted to retain all earnings. Indeed, in both 2015 and 2016 Berkshire ranked first among American businesses in the dollar volume of earnings retained, in each year reinvesting many billions of dollars more than did the runner-up. Those reinvested dollars must earn their keep.

我们的工作就是随着时间的推移，实现公司收益的大幅增长，尽管过程会起伏不定。毕竟，作为你们资本的管理人，伯克希尔董事们选择了保留全部收益。事实上，2015 年和2016 年，伯克希尔的留存收益在美国企业中排名第一，每年的再投资金额比第二名多出数十亿美元。这些再投资的资金必须获得适当的回报。

Some years, the gains in underlying earning power we achieve will be minor; very occasionally, the cash register will ring loud. Charlie and I have no magic plan to add earnings except to dream big and to be prepared mentally and financially to act fast when opportunities present themselves. Every decade or so, dark clouds will fill the economic skies, and they will briefly rain gold. When downpours of that sort occur, it’s imperative that we rush outdoors carrying washtubs, not teaspoons. And that we will do.

在一些年份，公司潜在的盈利能力实现的收益会很小，而其他一些年份，又特别巨大。查理和我并没有大幅增加盈利能力的神奇计划，仅仅有一个远大的梦想，以及在精神上和财务上做好准备，以便在机会出现时迅速采取行动。每隔十年左右，经济环境就会周期性地出现恶化，但随后投资机会就会短暂闪现。当倾盆金雨降临时，我们必须带着澡盆而不是汤匙冲出门去。这就是我们要做的事。

I earlier described our gradual shift from a company obtaining most of its gains from investment activities to one that grows in value by owning businesses. Launching that transition, we took baby steps – making small acquisitions whose impact on Berkshire’s profits was dwarfed by our gains from marketable securities. Despite that cautious approach, I made one particularly egregious error, acquiring Dexter Shoe for $434 million in 1993. Dexter’s value promptly went to zero. The story gets worse: I used stock for the purchase, giving the sellers 25,203 shares of Berkshire that at yearend 2016 were worth more than $6 billion.

前些年我已经解释过，我们正从一家通过投资获得大部分收益的公司逐渐转变为一家通过拥有公司实现价值增长的公司。在启动这一转型时，我们通过一些小规模的收购迈出了一小步，这些收购对伯克希尔收益的影响与我们有价证券投资获得的收益相比，还微不足道。尽管收购采取了非常谨慎的做法，但我还是犯了一个特别严重的错误。1993 年时我以4.34 亿美元收购Dexter 鞋业，随后这家公司的价值迅速归零。但是让情况得更加糟糕的是，我在收购时使用25203 股伯克希尔的股票进行了支付，截止2016 年底这些股票的价值已超过60 亿美元。

That wreck was followed by three key happenings – two positive, one negative – that set us firmly on our present course. At the beginning of 1996, we acquired the half of GEICO we didn’t already own, a cash transaction that changed our holding from a portfolio investment into a wholly-owned operating business. GEICO, with its almost unlimited potential, quickly became the centerpiece around which we built what I believe is now the world’s premier property/casualty business.

在这次灾难收购之后，又发生了三次关键性的收购，其中两次是有利的，一次是不利的。1996 年初我们收购了GEICO 另一半的所有权，这是一笔全现金交易，使我们的持股从证券投资转变为全资控股经营业务。GEICO凭借其几乎无限的增长潜力，很快成为我们的核心业务，我相信现在它是世界上首屈一指的财产意外险公司。

Unfortunately, I followed the GEICO purchase by foolishly using Berkshire stock – a boatload of stock – to buy General Reinsurance in late 1998. After some early problems, General Re has become a fine insurance operation that we prize. It was, nevertheless, a terrible mistake on my part to issue 272,200 shares of Berkshire in buying General Re, an act that increased our outstanding shares by a whopping 21.8%. My error caused Berkshire shareholders to give far more than they received (a practice that – despite the Biblical endorsement – is far from blessed when you are buying businesses).

不幸的是，在收购GEICO 之后，在1998 年末，我愚蠢地使用伯克希尔的股票(一揽子优质企业组合)收购了通用再保险公司。在经历了早期一些问题之后，通用再保险已经成为我们所珍视的一家优秀的保险公司。尽管如此，我在收购通用再保险时发行了272,200 股伯克希尔股票，这使得伯克希尔流通股大幅增加了21.8%，这是一个严重的错误。我的错误导致伯克希尔股东付出的远远超过他们所获得的。尽管这笔收购得到了圣经的庇护，但当你收购企业时，发行股票的方式远远谈不上幸福。

Early in 2000, I atoned for that folly by buying 76% (since grown to 90%) of MidAmerican Energy, a brilliantly-managed utility business that has delivered us many large opportunities to make profitable and socially-useful investments. The MidAmerican cash purchase – I was learning – firmly launched us on our present course of (1) continuing to build our insurance operation; (2) energetically acquiring large and diversified non-insurance businesses and (3) largely making our deals from internally-generated cash. (Today, I would rather prep for a colonoscopy than issue Berkshire shares.)

2000 年初为了弥补自己愚蠢的收购行为，我收购了中美能源76%的股份(后增持到90%)。这是一家管理出色的公用事业公司，为我们带来了许多对社会有意义的盈利的投资机会。通过对中美能源的现金收购的学习，坚定地让我们走上了目前的道路：1、继续补强收购我们保险业务；2、积极收购大型且多元化的非保险业务业务；3、在很大程度上使用内部产生的现金来进行收购。(今天我宁愿准备做结肠镜检查，也不愿意发行伯克希尔股票)

Our portfolio of bonds and stocks, de-emphasized though it is, has continued in the post-1998 period to grow and to deliver us hefty capital gains, interest, and dividends. Those portfolio earnings have provided us major help in financing the purchase of businesses. Though unconventional, Berkshire’s two-pronged approach to capital allocation gives us a real edge.

在1998 年之后的时期，尽管伯克希尔债券和股票的投资组合被淡化了，但其规模继续增长，并为我们带来巨额的资本利得，以及利息和股息回报。这些投资收益为我们在收购其他企业时提供了重要的资金。尽管伯克希尔双管齐下的资本配置方式非同寻常，但却给我们带来了实实在在的优势。

Here’s our financial record since 1999, when the redirection of our business began in earnest. During the 18-year period covered, Berkshire’s outstanding shares grew by only 8.3%, with most of the increase occurring when we purchased BNSF. That, I’m happy to say, was one issuance of stock that made good sense.

这是我们自1999 年开始认真业务调整以来财务记录。在这18 年里，伯克希尔流通股仅增长了8.3%，其中大部分增长发生在我们收购BNSF 铁路时。我很高兴地说，这次发行股票非常有意义。

Our expectation is that investment gains will continue to be substantial – though totally random as to timing – and that these will supply significant funds for business purchases. Concurrently, Berkshire’s superb corps of operating CEOs will focus on increasing earnings at the individual businesses they manage, sometimes helping them to grow by making bolt-on acquisitions. By our avoiding the issuance of Berkshire stock, any improvement in earnings will translate into equivalent per-share gains.

我们的预期是，投资收益将继续大幅增长，尽管就时间而言是完全随机的，并且这些投资收益将为我们后续的企业收购提供大量的资金。与此同时，伯克希尔优秀的运营CEO 团队将致力于增加他们所管理的各项业务的经营收益，有时候他们会进行补强型收购来助力增长，通过避免发行伯克希尔股票，收益的任何增长都将转化为相当比例的每股收益增长。

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Our efforts to materially increase the normalized earnings of Berkshire will be aided – as they have been throughout our managerial tenure – by America’s economic dynamism. One word sums up our country’s achievements: miraculous. From a standing start 240 years ago – a span of time less than triple my days on earth – Americans have combined human ingenuity, a market system, a tide of talented and ambitious immigrants, and the rule of law to deliver abundance beyond any dreams of our forefathers.

我们大幅提高经营性每股收益所采取的努力将得到美国经济活力的助力，正如我们在过去整个管理期间过发生过的一样。如果要用一个词来描述我们国家取得的成就，那就是奇迹。从240 年前的起点开始，美国人已经将人类的智慧、市场体系、才会横溢雄心勃勃的移民以及法治融合在一起，创造出我们先辈梦寐以求的财富。

You need not be an economist to understand how well our system has worked. Just look around you. See the 75 million owner-occupied homes, the bountiful farmland, the 260 million vehicles, the hyper-productive factories, the great medical centers, the talent-filled universities, you name it – they all represent a net gain for Americans from the barren lands, primitive structures and meager output of 1776. Starting from scratch, America has amassed wealth totaling $90 trillion.

你们不需要成为一名经济学家，就能了解我们的体系运作得多好。看看你们周围，看看这7500 万套自有住房、肥沃的农田、2.6 亿辆汽车、高产工厂、健全的医疗中心、人才济济的大学，它们都代表着美国人从1776 年贫瘠的土地、原始社会结构和贫弱的产出中，获得的净收益。美国白手起家，已经累积了90 万亿美元的财富。

It’s true, of course, that American owners of homes, autos and other assets have often borrowed heavily to finance their purchases. If an owner defaults, however, his or her asset does not disappear or lose its usefulness. Rather, ownership customarily passes to an American lending institution that then disposes of it to an American buyer. Our nation’s wealth remains intact. As Gertrude Stein put it, “Money is always there, but the pockets change.”

当然，那些有车有房以及拥有其他资产的美国人们往往为了买这些资产负债累累，然而，如果资产所有者违约，这些资产并不会消失或者丧失其用途。所有权通常会转移给借贷机构，然后该机构将其转卖给其他买家。我们国家的财富仍然完好无损。正如Gertrude Stein 所说：钱总在那里，只是装钱的口袋不断改变。

Above all, it’s our market system – an economic traffic cop ably directing capital, brains and labor – that has created America’s abundance. This system has also been the primary factor in allocating rewards. Governmental redirection, through federal, state and local taxation, has in addition determined the distribution of a significant portion of the bounty.

总之，正是我们的市场经济体系创造了美国今天的富足，它就像一个交警，巧妙引导资本、智慧、人才和劳动力的流动。这个体系还是利益分配奖励过程中的主要因素。此外，政府通过联邦、州和地方税收的重定向，决定了一大部分财富的再分配。

America has, for example, decided that those citizens in their productive years should help both the old and the young. Such forms of aid – sometimes enshrined as “entitlements” – are generally thought of as applying to the aged. But don’t forget that four million American babies are born each year with an entitlement to a public education. That societal commitment, largely financed at the local level, costs about $150,000 per baby. The annual cost totals more than $600 billion, which is about 31⁄2% of GDP.

例如，美国已经决定，那些处于盛年的公民应该帮助年老者和年幼者。这类形式的帮助有时被称为"权利"，通常被认为适用于年老者。但是不要忘了每年出生的400 万婴儿，他们有权利接受公共教育。这一社会投入大多由地方政府提供资金支持，每个婴儿大约花费15 万美元。每年的总开支超过了6000 亿美元，大约相当于GDP的3.5%。

However our wealth may be divided, the mind-boggling amounts you see around you belong almost exclusively to Americans. Foreigners, of course, own or have claims on a modest portion of our wealth. Those holdings, however, are of little importance to our national balance sheet: Our citizens own assets abroad that are roughly comparable in value.

无论我们的财富如何分配，你们所看到的令人难以置信的财富完全属于美国人。当然，外国人也拥有我们财富的一小部分。然而这一部分资产对于我们国家的资产负债表无足轻重：我们的公民拥有的海外资产价值大致相当。

Early Americans, we should emphasize, were neither smarter nor more hard working than those people who toiled century after century before them. But those venturesome pioneers crafted a system that unleashed human potential, and their successors built upon it.

我们应该强调一点，早期的美国人既不会比他们之前几个世纪辛苦劳作的人们更聪明，也不比他们更努力工作。但是这些富有冒险精神的前辈们创造出了一个能够释放人类潜能的系统，他们的后辈也在此基础上加强这个系统。这一经济创造在未来为我们的子孙后代带来越来越多的财富。

This economic creation will deliver increasing wealth to our progeny far into the future. Yes, the build-up of wealth will be interrupted for short periods from time to time. It will not, however, be stopped. I’ll repeat what I’ve both said in the past and expect to say in future years: Babies born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.

当然财富累积的过程总会时不时被短期打断。然而，它不会被阻止。我将重复过去我已经说过的话，并且在未来也会重复说：现在在美国出生的人是历史上最幸运的一代人。

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America’s economic achievements have led to staggering profits for stockholders. During the 20th century the Dow-Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497, a 17,320% capital gain that was materially boosted by steadily increasing dividends. The trend continues: By yearend 2016, the index had advanced a further 72%, to 19,763.

美国的经济成就已经为股东们带来了惊人的利润。在20 世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数从66 点涨至11497 点，实现了17320%的资本收益，其中主要得益于股息的稳定增加。这一趋势仍将持续下去。截至2016 年底，该指数进一步增长了72%至19763 点。

American business – and consequently a basket of stocks – is virtually certain to be worth far more in the years ahead. Innovation, productivity gains, entrepreneurial spirit and an abundance of capital will see to that. Ever-present naysayers may prosper by marketing their gloomy forecasts. But heaven help them if they act on the nonsense they peddle.

在未来几年美国企业以及一篮子股票的价值必定更高。创新、生产力提高、企业家精神和充足的资本都将确保这一点实现。无处不在的怀疑论者们可能通过宣传他们的悲观预期而发迹。但是如果他们按照他们宣传的废话行动，那么只有上帝才能帮助他们了。

Many companies, of course, will fall behind, and some will fail. Winnowing of that sort is a product of market dynamism. Moreover, the years ahead will occasionally deliver major market declines – even panics – that will affect virtually all stocks. No one can tell you when these traumas will occur – not me, not Charlie, not economists, not the media. Meg McConnell of the New York Fed aptly described the reality of panics: “We spend a lot of time looking for systemic risk; in truth, however, it tends to find us.”

当然，许多公司将被甩在后面，一些公司将会倒闭。这种淘汰是市场活力的产物。而且，未来几年偶尔会发生市场大幅下跌甚至恐慌，这将影响到几乎所有股票。没人能告诉你们这些冲击将何时发生。我做不到、查理做不到，经济学家们也做不到，媒体更无能为力。纽约联储的Meg McConnell 曾贴切地对这一恐慌现实进行了描述："我们花了大量时间去寻找系统性风险，然而事实上它往往先找到我们。

During such scary periods, you should never forget two things: First, widespread fear is your friend as an investor, because it serves up bargain purchases. Second, personal fear is your enemy. It will also be unwarranted. Investors who avoid high and unnecessary costs and simply sit for an extended period with a collection of large, conservatively-financed American businesses will almost certainly do well.

"在这种可怕时期中，你们应该牢记两点：首先，大范围的恐慌是投资者的朋友，因为你可以低位买入优质资产；其次，个人的恐慌是你的敌人，因为这是毫无必要的。那些避免高昂和不必要的成本，只是长期持有许多大型且财务保守的美国企业股票的投资者们，将必定获得不错的回报。

As for Berkshire, our size precludes a brilliant result: Prospective returns fall as assets increase. Nonetheless, Berkshire’s collection of good businesses, along with the company’s impregnable financial strength and owner-oriented culture, should deliver decent results. We won’t be satisfied with less.

尽管如此，伯克希尔良好的业务组合，以及公司坚不可摧的财务实力和以股东利益为导向的企业文化，应该能实现出不错的回报。我们不会满足于低回报。