巴菲特致股东的信（2016年）④保险业务

Insurance

保险业务

Let’s now look at Berkshire’s various businesses, starting with our most important sector, insurance. The property/casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.

现在让我们看看伯克希尔各种业务，从我们最重要的部门保险业务开始。自1967 年我们以860 万美元收购国民保险及其姊妹公司国家火灾和海事保险公司以来，保险业的财产意外险业务一直是推动我们扩张的引擎。现在按账面价值计算，国民保险公司是全世界最大的财产意外险公司。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

我们被财产意外险业务吸引的一个原因是其财务特征：财产意外险公司提前收到保费，之后再支付理赔金。在极端情况下，例如大量因接触石棉而提出的索赔，款项支付可能长达数十年。这种先收后付的模式使得保险公司持有大量流动资金，我们称之为浮存金，这些资金最终会流向投保人。与此同时，保险公司能够用浮存金为自己的利益进行投资。虽然单个保单和索赔进进出出，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模相对于保费通常维持一个相对稳定的关系。因此，随着我们业务的扩张，浮存金规模也相应增长。至于它们是如何增长的，如下图所示：

We recently wrote a huge policy that increased float to more than $100 billion. Beyond that one-time boost, float at GEICO and several of our specialized operations is almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of large run-off contracts whose float is certain to drift downward.

我们最近签了一份大额保单，能够将浮存金增加到1000 亿美元。除了这类一次性增加外，GEICO 保险和我们的一些专业业务的浮存金几乎必定会以很快的速度增长。然而，国民保险的再保险部门是许多大额流动性合同的缔约方，这些合同的浮存金必定会下滑。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. It will never be compromised.

随着时间的推移，我们可能会经历浮存金规模的下滑。如果是这样的话，那么下滑将是缓慢的，任何一年的下滑都不会超过3%。我们保险合同的性质要求，我们永远不会受到对我们的现金资源具有重要意义的即时或短期需求的影响。这种结构是经过精心设计的，是我们保险业务无与伦比的财务实力的关键组成部分。这个现金要求将永远不会妥协。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费收入超过了我们运营费用和最终损失赔付的总和，那么我们的保险业务将实现承保盈利，该利润将增加浮存金创造的投资收益。当我们赚到这样的利润时，我们将享受免费资金的使用，更好的是，我们持有这些资金获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人满意的结果，这导致了激烈的竞争，甚至异常激烈，有时会导致整个财产意外险行业遭受巨大的承保亏损。实际上，这一损失就是保险行业保持其浮存金所付出的代价。但和美国其他行业的公司相比，竞争动态几乎会确保保险公司，将保持净有形资产回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。

This outcome is made more certain by the dramatically lower interest rates that now exist throughout the world. The investment portfolios of almost all P/C companies – though not those of Berkshire – are heavily concentrated in bonds. As these high-yielding legacy investments mature and are replaced by bonds yielding a pittance, earnings from float will steadily fall. For that reason, and others as well, it’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly in the case of companies that specialize in reinsurance.

这一结果因现在全世界的低利率政策而变得更加确定。几乎所有财产意外险公司的投资组合都集中于债券上(不包括伯克希尔)，随着这些高收益的历史债券到期，并被收益率更低的债券所取代，浮存金的投资收益将持续减少。出于这个以及其他原因，未来十年保险行业的业绩将低于过去十年的纪录，这是毋庸置疑的事情，尤其对于那些专门从事再保险业务的公司。

Nevertheless, I very much like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage; occasionally, they offer us major opportunities. When others are constrained, our choices expand.

尽管如此，我还是非常看好我们自己的发展前景。伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使我们在投资方面相比其他保险公司更加灵活。我们拥有更多的投资选择是我们的一大优势，偶尔会提供给我们重大的机会。当其他公司受到限制时，我们的投资选择就会增加。

Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 14 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $28 billion. That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

此外，我们的财产意外险公司拥有卓越的承保记录。伯克希尔现在已经连续14 年实现承保盈利，期间我们的税前承保收益累计达到了280 亿美元。这样的业绩记录并非偶然：严格的承保记录是我们所有的保险经理们每天都关注点，他们都知道，尽管浮存金很有价值，但其优势也可能被糟糕的承保业绩所埋没。对于承保纪律，所有的保险公司都只是嘴上说说而已。而在伯克希尔，这是一种信仰。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as a typical liability is a major mistake. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $27 billion to more than six million claimants in 2016 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.

那么浮存金将如何影响我们的内在价值？当我们计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金的总额被作为负债减掉，就好像我们明天就要将其全部支付而无法补充一样。但将浮存金严格视作典型负债是错误的。它应该被视为一个循环基金。我们每天都要支付过去的索赔和相关费用，2016 年就向600 多万索赔人支付了270 亿美元的巨额费用，这减少了我们的浮存金。但同样肯定的是，我们每天都在承保新的业务，收取的保费又增加了浮存金。

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.

如果我们的循环浮存金没有成本且可以长期保持规模(我相信会是这样)，那么这种负债的真正价值会显著低于会计上的账面负债。因为新的业务会替代旧的索赔，因此欠下的每1 美元永远都不会从公司消失，这跟持有明天就将付出而无法收回的1 美元截然不同。然而根据GAAP 准则这两种类型的负债被认为是完全相同的。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that is included in our book-value figure. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

我们在收购保险公司时产生了155 亿美元的"商誉"资产，这增加了账面价值，并部分抵消了这一被夸大的浮存金负债。很大程度上这种商誉体现了我们为保险业务获得浮存金能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的收购成本与真实价值无关。举例来说，如果一家保险公司蒙受了长期大额的承保损失，那么无论其原始取得成本如何，账面上的任何商誉资产都应被视作是毫无价值的。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000 when float was $28 billion. Yet we have subsequently increased our float by $64 billion, a gain that in no way is reflected in our book value. This unrecorded asset is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value far exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，伯克希尔并不是这样。查理和我相信，我们保险公司商誉真正的经济价值远超其历史账面价值。如果我们收购拥有类似商誉的保险公司，我们很乐意为类似质量的浮存金支付费用。事实上，2000 年我们在保险业务中为商誉支付的155 亿美元几乎全部计入账面价值，当时的浮存金规模是280 亿美元，然而，我们之后浮存金规模增加了640 亿美元，这部分的价值丝毫没有反映到我们的账面价值上，这些未记录的资产价值，就是我们认为伯克希尔内在商业价值远高于其账面价值的一个巨大的原因。

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Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that in most cases possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

伯克希尔颇具吸引力的保险经济模式之所以存在，都是因为我们拥有一批杰出的经理人。他们经营着纪律严明的承保业务，在大多数情况下，拥有难以复制的商业模式。让我来向你们介绍几个主要业务的运营情况。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

首先，浮存金规模最高的是由阿吉特·贾因管理的伯克希尔再保险集团。阿吉特对别人不敢兴趣或没有资本承保的风险提供保险。他的运营结合了能力、速度和果断。更重要的是，他的思维方式在保险界独一无二。然而，他从来没有将伯克希尔暴露在与我们资源不相称的风险之中。

Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a large profit for the year. Our many streams of non-insurance earnings would see to that. Additionally, we would remain awash in cash and be eager to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.

事实上，伯克希尔在规避风险方面远比其他大多数大型保险公司要保守。举例来说，如果保险业因某种特大灾难而遭受2500 亿美元的损失，这一损失大约为保险行业经历过最大损失的3 倍，伯克希尔作为一个整体，由于其众多的非保险收益来源，依然将实现可观的利润。此外，我们也将保持现金充沛，并渴望在一个可能陷入动荡的保险市场中寻找大量的承保机会。而其他的主要保险或再保险公司即使不面临破产，也会出现严重亏损。

When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our small and struggling reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders. If there were ever to be another Ajit and you could swap me for him, don’t hesitate. Make the trade!

1986 年的那个周六，阿吉特走进了伯克希尔的办公室，那时的他甚至没有一点保险业方面的经验。尽管如此，时任我们的保险经理人MikeGoldberg 还是让他管理再保险业务。在这种鼓励和推动下，阿吉特在保险界崭露头角，并且很快大放异彩，为伯克希尔的股东创造了数百亿美元的价值。如果有另外一个Ajit，你可以用我本人交换他，不要犹豫，马上交易！

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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed until recently by Tad Montross. After 39 years at General Re, Tad retired in 2016. Tad was a class act in every way and we owe him a ton of thanks. Kara Raiguel, who has worked with Ajit for 16 years, is now CEO of General Re.

我们另一个再保险业务巨头是由TadMontross 管理通用再保险公司。在通用再保险公司工作了39 年后，Tad 于2016 年退休了。他在各个方面都是佼佼者，我们对他感激万分。与Ajit 一起工作了16 年的Kara Raiguel接任通用再保险的CEO。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

本质上，一个稳健的保险公司需要遵守四大承保纪律，它必须：(1)理解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险；(2)谨慎的评估风险发生的可能性及其可能造成的损失；(3)设定合理的保费。平均而言，保费在满足可能发生的损失及运营费用的总和后，将带来利润；(4)如果在无法获得合适保费的情况下愿意放手。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Tad never listened to that nonsensical excuse for sloppy underwriting, and neither will Kara.

许多保险公司都能遵守前三条规则，却忽视了第四条。他们根本无法放弃竞争对手正在积极争取的业务。老话说："别人都这么做，我们也必须这么做"，这在许多行业都会招致麻烦，但保险行业尤为突出。Tad 从来都不听那些草率荒谬的承保借口，Kara 也将如此。

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Finally, there is GEICO, the company that set my heart afire 66 years ago (and for which the flame still burns). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 55 years of service in 2016.

最后是GEICO 保险，这家公司66 年前在我的心中燃起了火焰，至今仍在燃烧。该公司由Tony Nicely 管理着，他18 岁就加入这家公司，到2016 年已有55 个年头。

Tony became CEO of GEICO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony, who brings his combination of brilliance, dedication and soundness to the job. (The latter quality is essential to sustained success. As Charlie says, it’s great to have a manager with a 160 IQ – unless he thinks it’s 180.) Like Ajit, Tony has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire.

1993 年Tony 成为GEICO 保险的CEO，自那以后公司蓬勃发展。没有比Tony 更好的经理人了，他将他的才华、奉献精神和稳健性融入工作。(后一种品质对于持续成功至关重要，正如查理所说，拥有一个智商是160 的经理很不错，除非他自认为智商为180)。和Ajit 一样，Tony 也为伯克希尔创造了数百亿美元的价值。

On my initial visit to GEICO in 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed over the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. The company’s annual sales were then $8 million; In 2016, GEICO did that much business every three hours of the year.

1951 年当我第一次造访GEICO 保险时，我就被这家公司相对于行业巨头所拥有的巨大成本优势所震撼。我很清楚GEICO 将会成功，因为它理应成功。那时GEICO 的年销售额是800 万美元，2016 年该公司每三个小时就能做这么多业务。

Auto insurance is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver those. In fact, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading – right now! – and go to geico.com or call 800-847-7536.

汽车保险是大多数家庭的主要开支。节约对他们来说很重要——只有低成本的运营才能实现这些目标。实际上，至少40%阅读这封信的人可以通过向GEICO 保险投保来省钱。所以停止阅读，现在就访问geico.com 或拨打800-847-7536 咨询一下吧。

GEICO’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. As a result, the company gobbles up market share year after year, ending 2016 with about 12% of industry volume. That’s up from 2.5% in 1995, the year Berkshire acquired control of GEICO. Employment, meanwhile, grew from 8,575 to 36,085.

GEICO 的成本优势创造了一条竞争对手无法逾越的护城河，所以该公司能够年复一年持续扩大市场份额。到2016 年底，我们的市场份额达到12%，高于1995 年我们取得控制权时的2.5%。与此同时，其员工数量也从8575 人增至36085 人。

GEICO’s growth accelerated dramatically during the second half of 2016. Loss costs throughout the auto-insurance industry had been increasing at an unexpected pace and some competitors lost their enthusiasm for taking on new customers. GEICO’s reaction to the profit squeeze, however, was to accelerate its new-business efforts. We like to make hay while the sun sets, knowing that it will surely rise again.

从2016 年下半年开始，GEICO 的增长显著加快。期间，整个汽车保险行业的损失成本正在以令人意想不到的速度增长，一些竞争对手因此开始失去了吸引新客户的热情。但GEICO 公司对于利润空间被压缩的应对措施是加快扩大其新业务的努力。趁热打铁，把握时机。

GEICO continues on a roll as I send you this letter. When insurance prices increase, people shop more. And when they shop, GEICO wins.

在我写这封信件的时候，GEICO 保险仍然保持着良好的发展势头，当保险价格开始上升时，人们就会买入更多保险，当他们购买时，GEICO 最终也会成为赢家。

Have you called yet? (800-847-7536 or go to geico.com)

你打过电话咨询了吗？(800-847-7536 或访问geico.com)

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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a collection of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually one much superior to that reported by their competitors. Over the past 14 years, this group has earned $4.7 billion from underwriting – about 13% of its premium volume – while increasing its float from $943 million to $11.6 billion.

我们除了拥有的三大保险公司，我们还有其他一些规模较小的公司，它们主要承保商业保险。整体而言，这些公司是一个规模庞大、不断增长且价值不菲的业务。它们始终保持承保盈利，并且通常比同行报告的利润好得多。在过去14 年中，该集团从承保业务赚得了47 亿美元收益(约占其保费收入的13%)，同时浮存金从9.43 亿美元增长到116 亿美元。

Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which is included in this grouping. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge, a move that proved to be a home run: We expected significant losses in the early years while Peter built the personnel and infrastructure needed for a world-wide operation. Instead, he and his crew delivered significant underwriting profits throughout the start-up period. BHSI’s volume increased 40% in 2016, reaching $1.3 billion. It’s clear to me that the company is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.

不到三年前，我们成立了伯克希尔特种保险公司(BHSI)，我们也将其纳入该集团。我们第一个决定就是让Peter Eastwood 去管理这个公司。事后证明，这绝对是一个英明的决定：最初我们预计公司成立前几年将在会出现重大承保亏损，因为Peter 正在组建全球运营所需的人员和基础设施。相反，Peter 和他的团队在整个初创期都获得了可观的承保利润。BHSI 在2016 年的业务量已经达到13 亿美元，增长了40%。显而易见，该公司注定将成为全球一流的财产意外险公司。

Here’s a recap of pre-tax underwriting earnings and float by division:

以下按业务部门划分的税前承保业绩和浮存金规模摘要：

Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a range of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that time will only make more valuable.

伯克希尔优秀的经理人、出色的财务实力和各种受护城河保护的商业模式，在保险业中是独一无二的。这些优势组合是伯克希尔股东的巨大财富，时间只会让其更有价值。