巴菲特致股东的信（2016年）③股票回购

Share Repurchases

股票回购

In the investment world, discussions about share repurchases often become heated. But I’d suggest that participants in this debate take a deep breath: Assessing the desirability of repurchases isn’t that complicated.

在投资界，有关股票回购的讨论往往变得很激烈。但我建议这场辩论的参与者们先深吸一口气，评估回购的必要性并没有那么复杂。从退出股东的角度来看，回购往往带来好处。

From the standpoint of exiting shareholders, repurchases are always a plus. Though the day-to-day impact of these purchases is usually minuscule, it’s always better for a seller to have an additional buyer in the market.

虽然这些回购活动每天的影响通常很小，但对于卖家而言，市场上多一个买家总是更好的。

For continuing shareholders, however, repurchases only make sense if the shares are bought at a price below intrinsic value. When that rule is followed, the remaining shares experience an immediate gain in intrinsic value. Consider a simple analogy: If there are three equal partners in a business worth $3,000 and one is bought out by the partnership for $900, each of the remaining partners realizes an immediate gain of $50. If the exiting partner is paid $1,100, however, the continuing partners each suffer a loss of $50. The same math applies with corporations and their shareholders. Ergo, the question of whether a repurchase action is value-enhancing or value-destroying for continuing shareholders is entirely purchase-price dependent.

然而，对于继续持有的股东来说，只有在股价低于内在价值的时候，回购才有意义。当遵循这一规则时，剩余的股票将立即获得内在价值的提升。考虑一个简单的类比：如果一家价值3000 美元的企业中有三个平等的合伙人，其中一个合伙人的股权被公司以900 美元的价格回购，那么剩下的两个合伙人将立即获得50 美元收益。如果退出的合伙人得到了1100 美元，那么剩下的两个合伙人将分别损失50 美元。同样的计算方法也同样适用于企业及其股东。因此，"回购行为对于继续持有的股东而言是价值增加还是价值破坏"，完全取决于回购价格。

It is puzzling, therefore, that corporate repurchase announcements almost never refer to a price above which repurchases will be eschewed. That certainly wouldn’t be the case if a management was buying an outside business. There, price would always factor into a buy-or-pass decision.

然而令人费解的是，企业回购股票的公告几乎从未提及应该避免的回购价格。如果管理层正在收购一家外部企业，那么情况肯定不会如此。在那里，价格将总是影响买或不买的关键因素。

When CEOs or boards are buying a small part of their own company, though, they all too often seem oblivious to price. Would they behave similarly if they were managing a private company with just a few owners and were evaluating the wisdom of buying out one of them? Of course not.

然而，当CEO 或董事会回购自己的公司部分股份时，他们往往无视回购的价格。如果他们管理一家只有少数股东的私企，并且评估收购其中一个股东持有的股权是否明智时，他们会有类似的行为吗？当然不会。

It is important to remember that there are two occasions in which repurchases should not take place, even if the company’s shares are underpriced. One is when a business both needs all its available money to protect or expand its own operations and is also uncomfortable adding further debt. Here, the internal need for funds should take priority. This exception assumes, of course, that the business has a decent future awaiting it after the needed expenditures are made.

重要的是要记住，在两种情况下，即使公司的股价被低估，应不应该回购。一种情况是，当一家企业需要所有可用的资金来保护或扩大其运营业务，而又不愿意进一步增加更多债务时。在这种情况下，内部的资金需求应该优先考虑。当然，这一例外情况的前提假设是，在做出必要的资本开支后，企业拥有一个光明的未来。

The second exception, less common, materializes when a business acquisition (or some other investment opportunity) offers far greater value than do the undervalued shares of the potential repurchaser. Long ago, Berkshire itself often had to choose between these alternatives. At our present size, the issue is far less likely to arise.

第二种例外情况不太常见，当收购其他业务(或其他投资机会)提供的价值，远高于回购其低估股票时。很久以前，伯克希尔经常不得不在这些方案中做出选择。以我们目前的规模，这个问题不大可能出现。

My suggestion: Before even discussing repurchases, a CEO and his or her Board should stand, join hands and in unison declare, “What is smart at one price is stupid at another.”

我的建议是，在讨论回购前，CEO 和董事会应该站起来做出一致声明：在一个价格上回购是明智的，但在另一个价格上就是愚蠢的。

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To recap Berkshire’s own repurchase policy: I am authorized to buy large amounts of Berkshire shares at 120% or less of book value because our Board has concluded that purchases at that level clearly bring an instant and material benefit to continuing shareholders. By our estimate, a 120%-of-book price is a significant discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a spread that is appropriate because calculations of intrinsic value can’t be precise.

回顾伯克希尔自己的回购政策：我被授权以账面价值的120%或更低的价格，购买大量伯克希尔的股票。因为我们的董事会已经得出结论，按照这一价格水平回购，能够给继续持有的股东带来立即的实质性收益。我们估计，120%的账面价值相对于伯克希尔的内在价值拥有一个巨大的折扣，由于内在价值的计算不可能精确，所以这一价差是恰当的。

The authorization given me does not mean that we will “prop” our stock’s price at the 120% ratio. If that level is reached, we will instead attempt to blend a desire to make meaningful purchases at a value-creating price with a related goal of not over-influencing the market.

赋予我这一权限并不意味着，我们将以120%比率去支撑我们的股价水平。如果达到这一水平，我们将尝试把"以增值的价格进行有意义回购"这一愿望和"不过度影响市场价格"这一目标融合在一起。

To date, repurchasing our shares has proved hard to do. That may well be because we have been clear in describing our repurchase policy and thereby have signaled our view that Berkshire’s intrinsic value is significantly higher than 120% of book value. If so, that’s fine. Charlie and I prefer to see Berkshire shares sell in a fairly narrow range around intrinsic value, neither wishing them to sell at an unwarranted high price – it’s no fun having owners who are disappointed with their purchases – nor one too low. Furthermore, our buying out “partners” at a discount is not a particularly gratifying way of making money. Still, market circumstances could create a situation in which repurchases would benefit both continuing and exiting shareholders. If so, we will be ready to act.

迄今为止，回购我们的股票被证明是很难的事情，这很可能是因为我们已经明确描述了我们的回购政策，也已经表明了我们的观点，即"伯克希尔的内在价值远高于120%的账面价值"。如果是这样，那也没关系。查理和我更愿意看到，伯克希尔的股价在一个围绕内在价值相当狭窄的范围内交易，既不希望它们以不合理的高价出售(拥有感到失望的股东并不有趣)，也不希望交易的价格太低。而且，折价购买合伙人的股权也不是一种令人满意的赚钱方式。尽管如此，市场环境也可能创造出一种局面：回购既有利于继续持有的股东，也有利于退出的股东。如果是这样，我们将准备采取行动。

One final observation for this section: As the subject of repurchases has come to a boil, some people have come close to calling them un-American – characterizing them as corporate misdeeds that divert funds needed for productive endeavors. That simply isn’t the case: Both American corporations and private investors are today awash in funds looking to be sensibly deployed. I’m not aware of any enticing project that in recent years has died for lack of capital. (Call us if you have a candidate.)

本节最后一个发现是：随着回购话题越来越热门，一些人们几乎称其为反美行为：他们将回购定性为转移生产所需资金的企业不当行为。事实并非如此，美国企业和私人投资者们拥有大量寻求合理部署的资金。这些年我并没有看到任何诱人的项目因资金缺乏而夭折。(如果你有此类项目，请给我们打电话)。