巴菲特致股东的信（2016年）⑥制造、服务和零售业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our manufacturing, service and retailing operations sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

我们的制造、服务和零售业务生产销售从从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机各种各样的产品。不过让我们先来看一看整个业务板块的资产负债表和利润表。

Included in this financial summary are 44 businesses that report directly to headquarters. But some of these companies, in turn, have many individual operations under their umbrella. For example, Marmon has 175 separate business units, serving widely disparate markets, and Berkshire Hathaway Automotive owns 83 dealerships, operating in nine states.

上表中包括44 家向总部直接汇报业务的企业。但其中部分企业旗下又包含许多独立业务。例如Marmon 公司旗下拥有175 家独立运行的业务子公司，向很多不同的市场提供服务，而伯克希尔汽车销售公司(BHA)在美国拥有83 家经销商，业务覆盖美国9 个州。

This collection of businesses is truly a motley crew. Some operations, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific returns that, in a couple of instances, exceed 100%. Most are solid businesses generating good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.

这个企业集群真是五花八门。以未杠杆化的净有形资产回报率衡量，部分业务的回报率极高，少数情况下超过了100%，大多数是稳健的企业，回报率介于12-20%之间。

A few, however – these are serious blunders I made in my job of capital allocation – produce very poor returns. In most cases, I was wrong when I originally sized up the economic characteristics of these companies or the industries in which they operate, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. In a couple of instances, I stumbled in assessing either the fidelity or ability of incumbent managers or ones I later put in place. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. Fortunately, Charlie – never bashful – is around to say “no” to my worst ideas.

不过，有少数几家公司的回报率非常低，这是我在资本配置时犯的严重错误。在多数情况下，当时我对公司或其所在行业的经济动态的评估是错误的。我们正在为我的误判付出代价。有时候，我在评估现任或继任经理人的忠诚度和能力方面犯了错误。可以肯定的是，我将来还会犯更多错误。幸运的是，查理从不会碍于面子，他会对我最糟糕的想法直接说"NO"。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in the manufacturing, service and retailing group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2016 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and carrying very little debt, earned 24% after-tax on that capital.

作为一个整体来，这些制造、服务和零售业务企业是一家非常优秀的企业。2016 年，它们占用的净有形资产平均为240 亿美元，尽管持有大量超额现金且几乎没有债务，但其投入资本税后回报率为24%。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show on our balance sheet for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Absent a recession, earnings from the group will likely grow in 2017, in part because Duracell and Precision Castparts (both bought in 2016) will for the first time contribute a full year’s earnings to this group. Additionally, Duracell incurred significant transitional costs in 2016 that will not recur.

当然，如果是以过高的价格买入经济效益极佳的企业，它也可能是笔糟糕投资。我们已经为大多数业务所拥有的净有形资产支付了大量的溢价，其成本反映在我们报告的庞大的商誉和其它无形资产数字上。但总的来说，我们在该行业部署的资本为我们带来了可观的回报。如果在2017 年没有经济衰退，该业务集团的收益可能会实现增长，部分原因是2016 年完成收购的金霸王(Duracell)和精密机件(PrecisionCastparts)公司将首次为该集团贡献全年收益。此外，2016 年Duracell 曾经发生高额转型成本，本年度将不会再次发生。

We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses, we might be disadvantaged if outsiders knew our numbers. Therefore, in certain of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 90 - 94. Be aware, though, that it’s the growth of the Berkshire forest that counts. It would be foolish to focus over-intently on any single tree.

该业务集团有太多的公司，我们无法一一单独评论，而且它们(现有和潜在)的竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。在我们一些业务上，如果其他人知道某些数字，我们可能处于不利地位。因此那些对伯克希尔的价值没有实质性影响的业务，我们只披露需要披露的内容。你可以在完整报告中找到我们业务运营的大量细节。但要知道，真正重要的是整个伯克希尔森林的增长，把注意力过度集中于任何一棵树上都是非常愚蠢的。

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For several years I have told you that the income and expense data shown in this section does not conform to GAAP. I have explained that this divergence occurs primarily because of GAAP-ordered rules regarding purchase-accounting adjustments that require the full amortization of certain intangibles over periods averaging about 19 years. In our opinion, most of those amortization “expenses” are not truly an economic cost. Our goal in diverging from GAAP in this section is to present the figures to you in a manner reflecting the way in which Charlie and I view and analyze them.

几年以来我一直告诉你，本节列示的收入和支出数据并不符合GAAP 会计准则。我已经解释过，出现这种差异的主要原因是因为GAAP 准则关于购买法会计调整的规定，要求在平均19 年内全额摊销某些无形资产。但在我们看来，大多数摊销"费用"并不是真正的经济成本。我们在本节中以非GAAP 准则的方式向你展示这些数据，这也是查理和我看待和分析这些数据的方式。

On page 54 we itemize $15.4 billion of intangibles that are yet to be amortized by annual charges to earnings. (More intangibles to be amortized will be created as we make new acquisitions.) On that page, we show that the 2016 amortization charge to GAAP earnings was $1.5 billion, up $384 million from 2015. My judgment is that about 20% of the 2016 charge is a “real” cost.

在年报中我们详细列出了总额为154 美元尚未摊销的无形资产。随着新的收购的进行，将产生更多待摊销无形资产。2016 年扣除摊销费用后按GAAP 准则计算的税前收益为15 亿美元，比2015 年增加3.84 亿美元。我个人的判断是，2016 年的摊销费用有20%是"真实"的成本。

Eventually amortization charges fully write off the related asset. When that happens – most often at the 15-year mark – the GAAP earnings we report will increase without any true improvement in the underlying economics of Berkshire’s business. (My gift to my successor.)

最终，摊销费用将完全冲销相关资产。当这种情况发生时(通常需要15 年左右)，我们报告的按GAAP 准则计算的税前收益将会增加，但伯克希尔业务的基本经济状况并不会出现任何实质性的改善，这是我留给继任者的礼物。

Now that I’ve described a GAAP expense that I believe to be overstated, let me move on to a less pleasant distortion produced by accounting rules. The subject this time is GAAP-prescribed depreciation charges, which are necessarily based on historical cost. Yet in certain cases, those charges materially understate true economic costs. Countless words were written about this phenomenon in the 1970s and early 1980s, when inflation was rampant. As inflation subsided – thanks to heroic actions by Paul Volcker – the inadequacy of depreciation charges became less of an issue. But the problem still prevails, big time, in the railroad industry, where current costs for many depreciable items far outstrip historical costs. The inevitable result is that reported earnings throughout the railroad industry are considerably higher than true economic earnings.

现在我已经描述了一个我认为被夸大的在GAAP 准则下的费用支出，那么让我继续讨论会计准则产生的另一个非常令人不快的失真。这个主题是GAAP 准则下的折旧费用必须要基于历史成本。然而，在某些情况下，基于历史成本的折旧费用，严重低估了真实的经济成本。在1970-80 年代通货膨胀肆虐期间，有关这一现象的文章数不胜数。由于Paul Volcker 的铁腕政策，通货膨胀开始消退，折旧费用不足的问题才变得不那么重要了。但这个问题在铁路行业依然严重。因为许多折旧项目的当前成本远远超过其历史成本，一个不可避免的结果是，整个铁路行业的报告的盈利远远高于其真实的经济收益。

At BNSF, to get down to particulars, our GAAP depreciation charge last year was $2.1 billion. But were we to spend that sum and no more annually, our railroad would soon deteriorate and become less competitive. The reality is that – simply to hold our own – we need to spend far more than the cost we show for depreciation. Moreover, a wide disparity will prevail for decades.

具体到BNSF 铁路来说，我们去年GAAP 准则下的折旧费用为21 亿美元。但如果我们每年维护性资本支出只投入这么多资金的话，我们铁路设施的运行状况将很快出现恶化。公司的竞争力也将随之下降。因此，现实的情况是，为了保持竞争力，我们需要在BNSF 铁路投入的资本支出远远超过我们列示的折旧费用。此外，在未来几十年中，这个巨大的差额将持续存在。

All that said, Charlie and I love our railroad, which was one of our better purchases.

尽管如此，查理和我都非常看好我们的铁路业务，这也是我们最好的收购项目之一。

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Too many managements – and the number seems to grow every year – are looking for any means to report, and indeed feature, “adjusted earnings” that are higher than their company’s GAAP earnings. There are many ways for practitioners to perform this legerdemain. Two of their favorites are the omission of “restructuring costs” and “stock-based compensation” as expenses.

太多公司的管理层(而且这个数字越来越多)正在寻找一切办法来报告"调整后收益"，甚至报告的数字高于GAAP 准则的收益。对于会计人员来说有很多办法来施展他们的财技。他们最喜欢忽略的两项成本是"重组费用"和"股权补偿"。

Charlie and I want managements, in their commentary, to describe unusual items – good or bad – that affect the GAAP numbers. After all, the reason we look at these numbers of the past is to make estimates of the future. But a management that regularly attempts to wave away very real costs by highlighting “adjusted per-share earnings” makes us nervous. That’s because bad behavior is contagious: CEOs who overtly look for ways to report high numbers tend to foster a culture in which subordinates strive to be “helpful” as well. Goals like that can lead, for example, to insurers underestimating their loss reserves, a practice that has destroyed many industry participants.

查理和我希望公司管理层在财报附注部分详细描述，影响GAAP 业绩数字的非正常项目，不管是好的还是坏的。毕竟，我们研究这些历史业绩数字是为了更好地对未来做出估计。但管理层经常试图通过强调"调整后的每股收益"来掩盖非常真实的成本，这让我们感到非常紧张，因为不良行为极具传染性：那些刻意寻找粉饰报表方法的管理层，往往会培养一种鼓励下属也努力粉饰报表的企业文化。比如，保险公司管理层这样的目标会导致公司低估其损失赔款准备金，过去这种行为已经摧毁了许多保险公司。

Charlie and I cringe when we hear analysts talk admiringly about managements who always “make the numbers.” In truth, business is too unpredictable for the numbers always to be met. Inevitably, surprises occur. When they do, a CEO whose focus is centered on Wall Street will be tempted to make up the numbers.

在听到一些分析师大举赞扬那些总能"制造数字"达成目标的公司管理层时，查理和我都会感到害怕。事实上，商业前景是很难预测的，因此公司也很难总是达成业绩预期。意外总是不可避免的的出现，预期的业绩就会无法实现。当问题出现时，一个以华尔街为中心的CEO 为了股价就会忍不住诱惑去粉饰财务数字。

Let’s get back to the two favorites of “don’t-count-this” managers, starting with “restructuring.” Berkshire, I would say, has been restructuring from the first day we took over in 1965. Owning only a northern textile business then gave us no other choice. And today a fair amount of restructuring occurs every year at Berkshire. That’s because there are always things that need to change in our hundreds of businesses. Last year, as I mentioned earlier, we spent significant sums getting Duracell in shape for the decades ahead.

让我们回顾两个喜欢"不要计入该项"的管理层，先从"重组费用"开始。我认为，从1965 年我们接手开始，伯克希尔就一直在不停地在重组。当时公司仅拥有一个北方纺织业务，在重组方面并没有什么选择余地。如今，每年伯克希尔都会进行大量重组，这是因为公司数百家子公司中，总有一些业务需要改变。正如我之前提到的，去年我们在Duracell 公司重组上投入了大量资金，以确保公司在未来几十年中能维持市场竞争力。

We have never, however, singled out restructuring charges and told you to ignore them in estimating our normal earning power. If there were to be some truly major expenses in a single year, I would, of course, mention it in my commentary. Indeed, when there is a total rebasing of a business, such as occurred when Kraft and Heinz merged, it is imperative that for several years the huge one-time costs of rationalizing the combined operations be explained clearly to owners. That’s precisely what the CEO of Kraft Heinz has done, in a manner approved by the company’s directors (who include me). But, to tell owners year after year, “Don’t count this,” when management is simply making business adjustments that are necessary, is misleading. And too many analysts and journalists fall for this baloney.

但是，我们从未将公司重组费用单独列出，然后告诉你，在估计伯克希尔正常盈利能力时，不要考虑这些费用。如果在某一年中有一些真正重大的费用开支，我当然会在公司附注部分中说明。事实上，当一家企业发生全面重组的话，例如卡夫和亨氏合并时，我们认为必须在几年时间内向股东清楚解释，花费巨额资金去合并经营的合理化理由。而卡夫亨氏公司的CEO 也是这么做的，他们的做法得到了包括我在内的公司董事的批准。但是，当公司只是简单地进行必要的业务调整时，管理层却年复一年的告诉股东"不要把这计算在内"，这是具有误导性的。许多股票分析师和财经记者也都轻信了这种粉饰后的财务数字。

To say “stock-based compensation” is not an expense is even more cavalier. CEOs who go down that road are, in effect, saying to shareholders, “If you pay me a bundle in options or restricted stock, don’t worry about its effect on earnings. I’ll ‘adjust’ it away.”

不仅如此，如果说"股票补偿"不是一项经营开支，那管理层就太傲慢了。实际上这样做的CEO 是在告诉股东："如果公司付给我一大笔股票期权或限制性股票来作为薪酬，那就不用担心它们对公司收益的表现，因为我会把这些开支调整掉的"。

To explore this maneuver further, join me for a moment in a visit to a make-believe accounting laboratory whose sole mission is to juice Berkshire’s reported earnings. Imaginative technicians await us, eager to show their stuff.

为了更好地探索这一财技，让我们观摩一个虚构的会计实验室，这个实验室的唯一目标就是粉饰伯克希尔的财报。富于想象力的会计师正在等着我们，迫切地想要展示他们的财技。

Listen carefully while I tell these enablers that stock-based compensation usually comprises at least 20% of total compensation for the top three or four executives at most large companies. Pay attention, too, as I explain that Berkshire has several hundred such executives at its subsidiaries and pays them similar amounts, but uses only cash to do so. I further confess that, lacking imagination, I have counted all of these payments to Berkshire’s executives as an expense.

请注意，我曾告诉这些支持者，"股票补偿"通常占大多数公司前三四名高管薪酬总额的20%。更应当注意的是，伯克希尔子公司有数百名这样的高管，他们获得薪水也有这么多，但我们仅用现金来支付。不仅如此，由于缺乏想象力，我将这些向伯克希尔高管支付的费用都计入公司的经营开支中。

My accounting minions suppress a giggle and immediately point out that 20% of what is paid these Berkshire managers is tantamount to “cash paid in lieu of stock-based compensation” and is therefore not a “true” expense. So – presto! – Berkshire, too, can have “adjusted” earnings.

但是，一些会计人员可能会笑出声，立即向我指出，这些支付给伯克希尔高管的薪资报酬中，20%的报酬可以计入"代替股票补偿而支付的现金"科目中，因此这些费用可以不计入"真正"费用支出。所以，伯克希尔也可以报告"调整后收益"。

Back to reality: If CEOs want to leave out stock-based compensation in reporting earnings, they should be required to affirm to their owners one of two propositions: why items of value used to pay employees are not a cost or why a payroll cost should be excluded when calculating earnings.

让我们回归现实。如果一个公司的CEO 想要在报告收益中不计入"股票补偿"费用，他们应该被要求向股东解释以下两个问题：为什么支付给公司职员的现金替代品不应计入公司成本，或者为什么在计算公司收益时将工资成本排除在外？

During the accounting nonsense that flourished during the 1960s, the story was told of a CEO who, as his company revved up to go public, asked prospective auditors, “What is two plus two?” The answer that won the assignment, of course, was, “What number do you have in mind?”

在1960 年代粉饰财报的情况非常普遍。曾经有这样一个故事：一位CEO 在公司即将上市时问未来的审计师："2+2 等于几？"当然赢得这项工作的回答是："你心里想要的数字是多少？"。