巴菲特致股东的信（2017年）⑤十年赌约如期结束，并带来一堂意想不到的投资课

“The Bet” is Over and Has Delivered an Unforeseen Investment Lesson

十年赌约如期结束，并带来一堂意想不到的投资课

Last year, at the 90% mark, I gave you a detailed report on a ten-year bet I had made on December 19, 2007. (The full discussion from last year’s annual report is reprinted on pages 24 – 26.) Now I have the final tally – and, in several respects, it’s an eye-opener.

去年，在赌约进行了90%的时候，我给了你们一份关于我2007年12月19日立下的十年赌约的详细报告。（去年年报中的完整讨论重印于第24至26页。）现在，我有了最终的结算数据——从好几个方面来看，都让人大开眼界。

I made the bet for two reasons: (1) to leverage my outlay of $318,250 into a disproportionately larger sum that – if things turned out as I expected – would be distributed in early 2018 to Girls Inc. of Omaha; and (2) to publicize my conviction that my pick – a virtually cost-free investment in an unmanaged S&P 500 index fund – would, over time, deliver better results than those achieved by most investment professionals, however well-regarded and incentivized those “helpers” may be.

我下这个赌注有两个原因：（1）将我318,250美元的投入通过杠杆放大为一笔大得不成比例的金额——如果事情按我预期发展的话——这笔钱将在2018年初捐赠给奥马哈女孩公司 (Girls Inc. of Omaha)；（2）宣传我的一个信念：我选择的投资——一只几乎零成本的非主动管理型标普500指数基金——随着时间推移，将会比大多数投资专家取得更好的成绩，不管这些"帮手们"多么声名显赫、激励机制多么诱人。

Addressing this question is of enormous importance. American investors pay staggering sums annually to advisors, often incurring several layers of consequential costs. In the aggregate, do these investors get their money’s worth? Indeed, again in the aggregate, do investors get anything for their outlays?

解答这个问题具有重大意义。美国投资者每年向投资顾问支付的费用高得惊人，而且往往叠加了好几层间接成本。总体而言，这些投资者的花费物有所值吗？说得更直白些，投资者花出去的钱到底换回来了什么？

Protégé Partners, my counterparty to the bet, picked five “funds-of-funds” that it expected to overperform the S&P 500. That was not a small sample. Those five funds-of-funds in turn owned interests in more than 200 hedge funds.

我的对赌方门徒合伙公司 (Protégé Partners) 选了5只"基金的基金"(FOF)，认为它们的表现将超越标普500指数。这可不是一个小样本。这5只FOF基金轮番持有200多只对冲基金的权益。

Essentially, Protégé, an advisory firm that knew its way around Wall Street, selected five investment experts who, in turn, employed several hundred other investment experts, each managing his or her own hedge fund. This assemblage was an elite crew, loaded with brains, adrenaline and confidence.

实际上，门徒合伙公司——一家对华尔街了如指掌的咨询公司——挑选了5位投资专家，而这5位专家又雇佣了数以百计的其他投资专家，每人都管理着自己的对冲基金。这是一支精英团队，聪明绝顶、热血沸腾、信心满满。

The managers of the five funds-of-funds possessed a further advantage: They could – and did – rearrange their portfolios of hedge funds during the ten years, investing with new “stars” while exiting their positions in hedge funds whose managers had lost their touch.

这5只FOF基金的经理还拥有一个额外的优势：他们可以——也确实这样做了——在十年期间不断调整旗下的对冲基金组合，投资新崛起的"明星"，同时退出那些失去手感的基金经理。

Every actor on Protégé’s side was highly incentivized: Both the fund-of-funds managers and the hedge-fund managers they selected significantly shared in gains, even those achieved simply because the market generally moves upwards. (In 100% of the 43 ten-year periods since we took control of Berkshire, years with gains by the S&P 500 exceeded loss years.)

门徒合伙方的每一个参与者都受到高度激励：FOF基金经理和他们挑选的对冲基金经理都能大幅分享投资收益，哪怕那些收益不过是市场整体上涨的结果。（自我们接管伯克希尔以来的43个十年滚动期中，标普500指数上涨的年份100%都多于下跌的年份。）

Those performance incentives, it should be emphasized, were frosting on a huge and tasty cake: Even if the funds lost money for their investors during the decade, their managers could grow very rich. That would occur because fixed fees averaging a staggering 21⁄2% of assets or so were paid every year by the fund-of-funds’ investors, with part of these fees going to the managers at the five funds-of-funds and the balance going to the 200-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds.

需要强调的是，这种业绩提成不过是一块巨大美味蛋糕上的糖霜：即使这些基金在十年里让投资者亏了钱，基金经理们照样可以赚得盆满钵满。因为FOF基金的投资者每年都要支付平均高达惊人的2.5%左右的固定管理费，其中一部分流向5只FOF基金的经理，其余部分流向200多只底层对冲基金的经理。

Here’s the final scorecard for the bet:

以下是赌约的最终记分卡：

The five funds-of-funds got off to a fast start, each beating the index fund in 2008. Then the roof fell in. In every one of the nine years that followed, the funds-of-funds as a whole trailed the index fund.

注：根据我与门徒合伙公司的协议，这些FOF基金的名称从未公开披露。但我已收到门徒合伙提供的年度审计报告。基金A、B、C的2016年数据较去年最初报告略有修正。基金D已于2017年清盘；其年平均收益率按实际运营的九年计算。

Let me emphasize that there was nothing aberrational about stock-market behavior over the ten-year stretch. If a poll of investment “experts” had been asked late in 2007 for a forecast of long-term common-stock returns, their guesses would have likely averaged close to the 8.5% actually delivered by the S&P 500. Making money in that environment should have been easy. Indeed, Wall Street “helpers” earned staggering sums. While this group prospered, however, many of their investors experienced a lost decade.

5只FOF基金起步很快，2008年全都跑赢了指数基金。然后就塌了。在此后的每一年里，FOF基金整体都落后于指数基金。让我强调一下，过去十年股市的表现没有任何异常之处。如果2007年底对投资"专家"做一次关于长期股票回报率的调查，他们的预测平均值很可能接近标普500指数实际交出的8.5%。

Performance comes, performance goes. Fees never falter.

在那样的环境下，赚钱本该是件容易的事。事实上，华尔街的"帮手们"赚得盆满钵满。然而，在这个群体大发其财的同时，他们的许多投资者却经历了"失落的十年"。

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The bet illuminated another important investment lesson: Though markets are generally rational, they occasionally do crazy things. Seizing the opportunities then offered does not require great intelligence, a degree in economics or a familiarity with Wall Street jargon such as alpha and beta. What investors then need instead is an ability to both disregard mob fears or enthusiasms and to focus on a few simple fundamentals. A willingness to look unimaginative for a sustained period – or even to look foolish – is also essential.

绩效有起有落，费用从不打折。

Originally, Protégé and I each funded our portion of the ultimate $1 million prize by purchasing $500,000 face amount of zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds (sometimes called “strips”). These bonds cost each of us $318,250 – a bit less than 64¢ on the dollar – with the $500,000 payable in ten years.

这场赌约还揭示了另一个重要的投资教训：虽然市场总体上是理性的，但偶尔也会做出疯狂的事情。抓住市场在那些时刻提供的机会，不需要很高的智商、经济学学位，也不需要懂什么Alpha和Beta之类的华尔街术语。投资者真正需要的是一种能力——既能无视乌合之众的恐惧或狂热，又能专注于几个简单的基本面要素。另外，愿意在相当长的时间里表现得毫无新意——甚至看起来像个傻子——也是不可或缺的。最初，门徒合伙和我各自购买了面值50万美元的零息美国国债（有时称为"剥离债券 (strips)"），为最终100万美元的赌金提供资金。这些债券让我们每人花了318,250美元——略低于面值的六四折——50万美元将在十年后支付。

As the name implies, the bonds we acquired paid no interest, but (because of the discount at which they were purchased) delivered a 4.56% annual return if held to maturity. Protégé and I originally intended to do no more than tally the annual returns and distribute $1 million to the winning charity when the bonds matured late in 2017.

顾名思义，我们买的这种债券不支付利息，但（因为购买时有折价）如果持有至到期，年化回报率为4.56%。门徒合伙和我最初的计划只是每年统计回报率，并在2017年底债券到期时把100万美元捐给获胜方选定的慈善机构。

After our purchase, however, some very strange things took place in the bond market. By November 2012, our bonds – now with about five years to go before they matured – were selling for 95.7% of their face value. At that price, their annual yield to maturity was less than 1%. Or, to be precise, .88%.

然而，购买之后债券市场发生了一些非常奇怪的事情。到2012年11月，我们的债券——距到期还有大约五年——已经涨到了面值的95.7%。按这个价格，其到期年化收益率不到1%。确切地说，是0.88%。

Given that pathetic return, our bonds had become a dumb – a really dumb – investment compared to American equities. Over time, the S&P 500 – which mirrors a huge cross-section of American business, appropriately weighted by market value – has earned far more than 10% annually on shareholders’ equity (net worth).

考虑到这个可怜的回报率，与美国股票相比，我们的债券已经变成了一项愚蠢的——真正愚蠢的——投资。长期来看，标普500指数——代表了美国企业的一个巨大横截面，按市值适当加权——股东权益（净资产）的年化回报率远超10%。

In November 2012, as we were considering all this, the cash return from dividends on the S&P 500 was 21⁄2% annually, about triple the yield on our U.S. Treasury bond. These dividend payments were almost certain to grow. Beyond that, huge sums were being retained by the companies comprising the 500. These businesses would use their retained earnings to expand their operations and, frequently, to repurchase their shares as well. Either course would, over time, substantially increase earnings-per-share. And – as has been the case since 1776 – whatever its problems of the minute, the American economy was going to move forward.

2012年11月，当我们权衡这一切时，标普500指数的股息现金收益率约为年化2.5%，大约是我们那只国债收益率的三倍。而且这些股息几乎肯定还会增长。除此之外，构成标普500的企业还留存了巨额收益。这些企业会用留存收益来扩大业务，而且经常还会回购自家股票。这两种做法随着时间推移都会大幅提高每股收益。而且——正如1776年以来一直如此的那样——不管眼下遇到什么问题，美国经济都会继续向前发展。

Presented late in 2012 with the extraordinary valuation mismatch between bonds and equities, Protégé and I agreed to sell the bonds we had bought five years earlier and use the proceeds to buy 11,200 Berkshire “B” shares. The result: Girls Inc. of Omaha found itself receiving $2,222,279 last month rather than the $1 million it had originally hoped for.

面对2012年底债券与股票之间如此异常的估值错配，门徒合伙和我决定卖掉五年前买的债券，用所得资金买入11,200股伯克希尔B股。结果是：奥马哈女孩公司上个月收到了2,222,279美元，而不是最初期望的100万美元。

Berkshire, it should be emphasized, has not performed brilliantly since the 2012 substitution. But brilliance wasn’t needed: After all, Berkshire’s gain only had to beat that annual .88% bond bogey – hardly a Herculean achievement.

需要强调的是，自2012年进行这一转换以来，伯克希尔的股票表现并不算出色。但出色并非必要：毕竟，伯克希尔的收益只需要超过债券年化0.88%的那个可怜的标杆就行——这远算不上什么赫拉克勒斯式的壮举。

The only risk in the bonds-to-Berkshire switch was that yearend 2017 would coincide with an exceptionally weak stock market. Protégé and I felt this possibility (which always exists) was very low. Two factors dictated this conclusion: The reasonable price of Berkshire in late 2012, and the large asset build-up that was almost certain to occur at Berkshire during the five years that remained before the bet would be settled. Even so, to eliminate all risk to the charities from the switch, I agreed to make up any shortfall if sales of the 11,200 Berkshire shares at yearend 2017 didn’t produce at least $1 million.

从债券转为伯克希尔股票的唯一风险在于，2017年底恰好赶上一个异常疲弱的股市。门徒合伙和我都认为这种可能性（虽然始终存在）非常小。两个因素支撑了这一判断：2012年底伯克希尔的估值合理，以及在赌约到期前的五年里伯克希尔几乎必然会实现大量的资产积累。尽管如此，为了完全消除这次转换给慈善机构带来的风险，我同意如果2017年底出售这11,200股伯克希尔B股不能产生至少100万美元的收益，我将补足差额。

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Investing is an activity in which consumption today is foregone in an attempt to allow greater consumption at a later date. “Risk” is the possibility that this objective won’t be attained.

投资是一种放弃今天的消费、以期在未来获得更多消费能力的活动。"风险"是指这一目标可能无法实现。

By that standard, purportedly “risk-free” long-term bonds in 2012 were a far riskier investment than a long- term investment in common stocks. At that time, even a 1% annual rate of inflation between 2012 and 2017 would have decreased the purchasing-power of the government bond that Protégé and I sold.

按照这个标准，2012年那些号称"无风险"的长期债券，其实际风险要远高于长期投资股票。当时，即便2012到2017年间的年通胀率仅仅只有1%，也会侵蚀门徒合伙和我出售的那只国债的购买力。

I want to quickly acknowledge that in any upcoming day, week or even year, stocks will be riskier – far riskier – than short-term U.S. bonds. As an investor’s investment horizon lengthens, however, a diversified portfolio of U.S. equities becomes progressively less risky than bonds, assuming that the stocks are purchased at a sensible multiple of earnings relative to then-prevailing interest rates.

我要坦率地承认，在任何未来的一天、一周乃至一年里，股票的风险都会比短期美国国债高——高得多。然而，随着投资者投资期限的拉长，一个多元化的美国股票组合——假设是以相对当时利率水平合理的市盈率买入——的风险会逐渐低于债券。

It is a terrible mistake for investors with long-term horizons – among them, pension funds, college endowments and savings-minded individuals – to measure their investment “risk” by their portfolio’s ratio of bonds to stocks. Often, high-grade bonds in an investment portfolio increase its risk.

对于具有长期投资视野的投资者——包括养老基金、大学捐赠基金和注重储蓄的个人——用投资组合中债券和股票的比例来衡量投资"风险"，这是一个严重的错误。通常，投资组合中的高等级债券反而会增加其风险。

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A final lesson from our bet: Stick with big, “easy” decisions and eschew activity. During the ten-year bet, the 200-plus hedge-fund managers that were involved almost certainly made tens of thousands of buy and sell decisions. Most of those managers undoubtedly thought hard about their decisions, each of which they believed would prove advantageous. In the process of investing, they studied 10-Ks, interviewed managements, read trade journals and conferred with Wall Street analysts.

来自我们赌约的最后一课：坚持做重大而"简单"的决策，避免频繁折腾。在十年赌约期间，那200多位对冲基金经理几乎肯定做出了数以万计的买卖决策。毫无疑问，大多数经理都对每一个决策深思熟虑，认为每一步都会被证明是有利的。在投资过程中，他们研究10-K报表、访谈管理层、研读行业期刊、与华尔街分析师交流意见。

Protégé and I, meanwhile, leaning neither on research, insights nor brilliance, made only one investment decision during the ten years. We simply decided to sell our bond investment at a price of more than 100 times earnings (95.7 sale price/.88 yield), those being “earnings” that could not increase during the ensuing five years.

与此同时，门徒合伙和我在十年里只做了一个投资决策，既不靠深入研究，也不靠独到洞见，更不靠什么天才。我们只是决定以超过100倍"市盈率"的价格卖掉债券投资（95.7的卖价 / 0.88的收益率），而且这些"收益"在接下来五年里不可能增长。

We made the sale in order to move our money into a single security – Berkshire – that, in turn, owned a diversified group of solid businesses. Fueled by retained earnings, Berkshire’s growth in value was unlikely to be less than 8% annually, even if we were to experience a so-so economy.

我们卖出债券是为了将资金转入单一的一只证券——伯克希尔——而这家公司又拥有一个多元化的稳健企业组合。在留存收益的推动下，伯克希尔的价值增长不太可能低于年化8%，哪怕我们要经历一个平淡无奇的经济周期。

After that kindergarten-like analysis, Protégé and I made the switch and relaxed, confident that, over time, 8% was certain to beat .88%. By a lot.

做完了这番幼儿园水平的分析，门徒合伙和我完成了转换，然后就安心地坐下来了。我们深信，随着时间推移，8%肯定能大幅击败0.88%。事实也确实如此。