巴菲特致股东的信（2017年）④投资业务

Investments

投资业务

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $17.6 billion. The shares had a yearend market value of $25.3 billion, and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.

下表列出了截至2017年底市值最大的15只普通股投资。我们没有将卡夫亨氏的持股列入其中——325,442,152股——因为伯克希尔是控股集团的一员，因此必须按"权益法"对这笔投资入账。在资产负债表上，伯克希尔对卡夫亨氏的持股按GAAP计价为176亿美元。这些股份的年末市值为253亿美元，成本基础为98亿美元。

Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently of me, manages more than $12 billion; I usually learn about decisions they have made by looking at monthly portfolio summaries. Included in the $25 billion that the two manage is more than $8 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.

2017年12月31日表中部分股票由托德·库姆斯 (Todd Combs) 或泰德·韦施勒 (Ted Weschler) 负责，他们与我一起管理伯克希尔的投资。他们每人都独立于我管理着超过120亿美元的资金；我通常是通过查阅月度投资组合摘要来了解他们的决策。两人管理的250亿美元资金中包含伯克希尔某些子公司超过80亿美元的养老金信托资产。如前所述，养老金投资并未计入前面的伯克希尔持仓表格。

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Charlie and I view the marketable common stocks that Berkshire owns as interests in businesses, not as ticker symbols to be bought or sold based on their “chart” patterns, the “target” prices of analysts or the opinions of media pundits. Instead, we simply believe that if the businesses of the investees are successful (as we believe most will be) our investments will be successful as well. Sometimes the payoffs to us will be modest; occasionally the cash register will ring loudly. And sometimes I will make expensive mistakes. Overall – and over time – we should get decent results. In America, equity investors have the wind at their back.

查理和我把伯克希尔持有的有价证券视为对企业的所有权，而不是根据"技术图形"、分析师"目标价"或媒体专家的意见来买卖的股票代码。相反，我们只是相信，如果被投资企业的经营是成功的（我们相信大多数都会如此），那我们的投资也将是成功的。有时我们的回报会比较温和；偶尔收银机会响个不停。有时我也会犯下代价高昂的错误。总体而言——随着时间的推移——我们应该能取得不错的成绩。在美国，股票投资者是顺风而行的。

From our stock portfolio – call our holdings “minority interests” in a diversified group of publicly-owned businesses – Berkshire received $3.7 billion of dividends in 2017. That’s the number included in our GAAP figures, as well as in the “operating earnings” we reference in our quarterly and annual reports.

从我们的股票投资组合中——你们可以把我们的持仓称为对一个多元化上市企业集团的"少数股东权益"——伯克希尔在2017年收到了37亿美元的股息。这个数字已包含在我们的GAAP收益中，也包含在我们在季报和年报中提及的"经营收益"中。

That dividend figure, however, far understates the “true” earnings emanating from our stock holdings. For decades, we have stated in Principle 6 of our “Owner-Related Business Principles” (page 19) that we expect undistributed earnings of our investees to deliver us at least equivalent earnings by way of subsequent capital gains.

但是，这个股息数字远远低估了我们所持股票的"真实"收益。几十年来，我们一直在"股东商业原则"第六条中声明（见第19页），我们预期被投资公司的未分配收益将通过后续的资本增值为我们带来至少等量的回报。我们确认的资本损益将是不均匀的，尤其是我们将遵循新GAAP准则，要求我们持续记录未实现损益。但我有信心，随着时间推移，被投资公司的留存收益——将所有被投资公司视为一个整体——终将转化为伯克希尔相应的资本增值。

Our recognition of capital gains (and losses) will be lumpy, particularly as we conform with the new GAAP rule requiring us to constantly record unrealized gains or losses in our earnings. I feel confident, however, that the earnings retained by our investees will over time, and with our investees viewed as a group, translate into commensurate capital gains for Berkshire.

我刚才描述的价值积累与留存收益之间的联系，在短期内是不可能看出来的。股价暴涨暴跌，似乎与逐年积累的内在价值毫无关系。然而随着时间推移，本杰明·格雷厄姆 (Ben Graham) 那句广为引用的格言终会被证明是对的："短期来看，市场是一台投票机；但从长远来看，它是一台称重机。"

The connection of value-building to retained earnings that I’ve just described will be impossible to detect in the short term. Stocks surge and swoon, seemingly untethered to any year-to-year buildup in their underlying value. Over time, however, Ben Graham’s oft-quoted maxim proves true: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine; in the long run, however, it becomes a weighing machine.”

伯克希尔自身就提供了一些生动的例子，说明短期股价的随机波动如何掩盖价值的长期增长。在过去53年里，公司通过将收益进行再投资、让复利施展魔力来创造价值。我们年复一年向前迈进。然而伯克希尔的股价确实遭受过四次真正的重大下跌。以下就是血淋淋的细节：这张表格是我能找到的反对借钱炒股的最有力论据。因为你根本无法知道股票在短期内能跌多深。即使你的借款金额很小，仓位也没有立刻受到暴跌市场的威胁，但那些令人毛骨悚然的新闻标题和让人喘不过气来的评论也足以让你心神大乱。而一个心绪不宁的人是做不出好决策的。

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Berkshire, itself, provides some vivid examples of how price randomness in the short term can obscure long- term growth in value. For the last 53 years, the company has built value by reinvesting its earnings and letting compound interest work its magic. Year by year, we have moved forward. Yet Berkshire shares have suffered four truly major dips. Here are the gory details:

在接下来的53年里，伯克希尔的股票（以及其他股票）必将经历与表格中相似的暴跌。没有人能告诉你这些事情什么时候会发生。绿灯可以在任何时候不经黄灯直接变成红灯。

This table offers the strongest argument I can muster against ever using borrowed money to own stocks. There is simply no telling how far stocks can fall in a short period. Even if your borrowings are small and your positions aren’t immediately threatened by the plunging market, your mind may well become rattled by scary headlines and breathless commentary. And an unsettled mind will not make good decisions.

但是，当大跌来临时，它为那些没有债务拖累的人提供了非凡的机会。这时候该想想吉卜林 (Kipling) 那首《如果》(If) 里的诗句了："如果所有人都失去理智，你却能保持冷静……

In the next 53 years our shares (and others) will experience declines resembling those in the table. No one can tell you when these will happen. The light can at any time go from green to red without pausing at yellow.

如果你能耐心等待，而不急不躁……

When major declines occur, however, they offer extraordinary opportunities to those who are not handicapped by debt. That’s the time to heed these lines from Kipling’s If:

如果你能审慎思考，而不以思考为目的……

“If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs . . . If you can wait and not be tired by waiting . . . If you can think – and not make thoughts your aim . . . If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you . . . Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it.”

如果众人对你心存猜疑，你仍能自信如常……那么，你拥有的将是整个世界和世间万物。"