巴菲特致股东的信（2018年）③回购与报告

Repurchases and Reporting

回购与报告

Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.

之前我提到，伯克希尔将不时回购自己的股票。假设我们以低于伯克希尔内在价值的价格买入——这当然是我们的目标——回购将同时有利于离开的股东和留下来的股东。

True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That’s because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire’s stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.

诚然，对于离开的股东来说，回购带来的好处微乎其微。因为我们谨慎的买入方式会尽量减少对伯克希尔股价的影响。尽管如此，市场上多一个买家，对卖家总还是有些好处的。

For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner’s interest at, say, 90¢ on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is value- destructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.

对于留下来的股东，好处就很明显了：如果市场给一位离开的合伙人的权益定价为，比方说，1美元只值90美分，那么公司每回购一次，留下来的股东每股内在价值就增加一些。显然，回购必须对价格敏感：盲目买入被高估的股票是在毁灭价值。这个道理，许多爱搞宣传或永远乐观的CEO们却没搞明白。

When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.

当一家公司表示正在考虑回购时，至关重要的一点是，所有股东合伙人都必须获得做出明智价值判断所需的信息。提供这些信息，正是查理和我在这份报告中力图做到的。我们不希望任何合伙人因为被误导或信息不充分而把股份卖回给公司。

Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.

当然，有些卖家可能不认同我们的价值判断，另一些可能找到了他们认为比伯克希尔更有吸引力的投资。第二类人中有些肯定是对的：毫无疑问，有很多股票的回报将远超我们。

In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it’s time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.

此外，有些股东会决定，是时候让自己或家人做一个净消费者，而不是继续积累财富。查理和我暂时没兴趣加入这个行列。也许到了老年，我们会变成大手大脚的人。

For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.

54年来，我们在伯克希尔的管理决策一直是从留下来的股东的角度出发，而不是从离开的股东出发。因此，查理和我从未关注过当季的业绩。

Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire’s overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.

事实上，伯克希尔可能是财富500强 (Fortune 500) 里唯一一家不编制月度损益报告或资产负债表的公司。当然，我会定期查看大多数子公司的月度财务报告。但查理和我只按季度了解伯克希尔的整体收益和财务状况。

Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly “number” to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.

此外，伯克希尔没有全公司范围的预算（尽管许多子公司觉得预算很有用）。我们没有这种工具，意味着母公司从来没有一个要达到的季度"数字"。摒弃这种目标向我们众多经理人传递了一个重要信号，强化了我们所珍视的企业文化。

Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.

多年来，查理和我见过各种各样糟糕的企业行为——无论是会计还是运营方面——都是被管理层迎合华尔街预期的欲望所驱使。为了不让"华尔街"失望，一开始只是"无伤大雅"的数字修饰——比如在季末突击出货、对不断上升的保险损失视而不见、或者从"小金库"准备金中取用——但这可能成为走向全面欺诈的第一步。"就这一次玩玩数字"也许是CEO的初衷，但很少是最终结果。而一旦老板可以稍微作点弊，下属也就很容易为类似行为找到借口了。

At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.

在伯克希尔，我们的听众既不是分析师也不是评论员：查理和我是在为我们的股东合伙人工作。汇报到我们手上的数字，就是我们原封不动发送给你们的数字。