巴菲特致股东的信（2019年）⑧董事会

Boards of Directors

董事会

In recent years, both the composition of corporate boards and their purpose have become hot topics. Once, debate about the responsibilities of boards was largely limited to lawyers; today, institutional investors and politicians have weighed in as well.

近年来，公司董事会的构成及其宗旨都成了热门话题。曾几何时，关于董事会职责的讨论主要局限在律师圈子里；而今，机构投资者和政客们也纷纷加入了进来。

My credentials for discussing corporate governance include the fact that, over the last 62 years, I have served as a director of 21 publicly-owned companies (listed below). In all but two of them, I have represented a substantial holding of stock. In a few cases, I have tried to implement important change.

就谈论公司治理的资格而言，过去62年间我曾担任过21家上市公司的董事（名单如下）。除两家以外，我在其他所有公司都持有大量股权。在少数情况下，我曾试图推动重要变革。

Berkshire, Blue Chip Stamps, Cap Cities-ABC, Coca-Cola, Data Documents, Dempster, General Growth, Gillette, Kraft Heinz, Maracaibo Oil, Munsingwear, Omaha National Bank, Pinkerton’s, Portland Gas Light, Salomon, Sanborn Map, Tribune Oil, U.S. Air, Vornado, Washington Post, Wesco Financial

公司名单：伯克希尔、蓝筹印花 (Blue Chip Stamps)、大都会/ABC (Cap Cities-ABC)、可口可乐 (Coca-Cola)、数据文件 (Data Documents)、登普斯特 (Dempster)、通用发展地产 (General Growth)、吉列 (Gillette)、卡夫亨氏 (Kraft Heinz)、马拉开波石油 (Maracaibo Oil)、万星威 (Munsingwear)、奥马哈国民银行 (Omaha National Bank)、平克顿 (Pinkerton's)、波特兰煤气 (Portland Gas Light)、所罗门 (Salomon)、桑伯恩地图 (Sanborn Map)、论坛石油 (Tribune Oil)、全美航空 (U.S. Air)、沃拿多 (Vornado)、华盛顿邮报 (Washington Post)、韦斯科金融 (Wesco Financial)

During the first 30 or so years of my services, it was rare to find a woman in the room unless she represented a family controlling the enterprise. This year, it should be noted, marks the 100th anniversary of the 19th Amendment, which guaranteed American women the right to have their voices heard in a voting booth. Their attaining similar status in a board room remains a work in progress.

在我服务的头30来年里，董事会议室中很少能看到女性，除非她代表着控股家族。值得一提的是，今年是《第十九修正案》通过100周年，该修正案保障了美国女性在投票站发声的权利。而她们要在董事会议室获得同等地位，这项工作仍在进行中。

Over the years, many new rules and guidelines pertaining to board composition and duties have come into being. The bedrock challenge for directors, nevertheless, remains constant: Find and retain a talented CEO – possessing integrity, for sure – who will be devoted to the company for his/her business lifetime. Often, that task is hard. When directors get it right, though, they need to do little else. But when they mess it up, . . . . . .

多年来，关于董事会构成和职责的新规则和新指引层出不穷。然而，董事们面临的根本挑战一如既往：找到并留住一位才华横溢的CEO——当然，必须正直诚信——让他/她毕生效忠于公司。这项任务往往相当艰巨。但如果董事们做对了这件事，其他就没什么需要操心的了。可如果搞砸了……

Audit committees now work much harder than they once did and almost always view the job with appropriate seriousness. Nevertheless, these committees remain no match for managers who wish to game numbers, an offense that has been encouraged by the scourge of earnings “guidance” and the desire of CEOs to “hit the number.” My direct experience (limited, thankfully) with CEOs who have played with a company’s numbers indicates that they were more often prompted by ego than by a desire for financial gain.

审计委员会如今比过去勤奋多了，几乎都以认真的态度对待这项工作。尽管如此，面对那些想要在数字上动手脚的管理层，这些委员会仍然不是对手。而收益"指引"的歪风和CEO们想要"达到目标数字"的执念，更是助长了这种行为。我与那些操纵过公司数字的CEO打交道的直接经验（谢天谢地，经验有限）表明，驱动他们的往往是虚荣，而不是对经济利益的追求。

Compensation committees now rely much more heavily on consultants than they used to. Consequently, compensation arrangements have become more complicated – what committee member wants to explain paying large fees year after year for a simple plan? – and the reading of proxy material has become a mind-numbing experience.

薪酬委员会如今比过去更加依赖顾问。结果，薪酬安排变得越来越复杂——哪个委员会成员愿意解释为什么年年花大价钱请人设计一个简单的方案呢？——而阅读委托代理材料则已经变成了一种令人头皮发麻的体验。

One very important improvement in corporate governance has been mandated: a regularly-scheduled “executive session” of directors at which the CEO is barred. Prior to that change, truly frank discussions of a CEO’s skills, acquisition decisions and compensation were rare.

公司治理方面有一项非常重要的改进已经制度化：定期召开禁止CEO参加的董事"闭门会议"。在此之前，真正坦率地讨论CEO的能力、收购决策和薪酬，是极为罕见的。

Acquisition proposals remain a particularly vexing problem for board members. The legal orchestration for making deals has been refined and expanded (a word aptly describing attendant costs as well). But I have yet to see a CEO who craves an acquisition bring in an informed and articulate critic to argue against it. And yes, include me among the guilty.

收购提案对于董事会成员来说，依然是一个特别棘手的问题。做交易的法律流程已经被打磨和扩展（"扩展"这个词也恰如其分地形容了随之而来的费用）。但我还从未见过一位渴望收购的CEO会请来一位见多识广、能言善辩的批评者来反对这笔交易。是的，我自己也犯过同样的毛病。

Overall, the deck is stacked in favor of the deal that’s coveted by the CEO and his/her obliging staff. It would be an interesting exercise for a company to hire two “expert” acquisition advisors, one pro and one con, to deliver his or her views on a proposed deal to the board – with the winning advisor to receive, say, ten times a token sum paid to the loser. Don’t hold your breath awaiting this reform: The current system, whatever its shortcomings for shareholders, works magnificently for CEOs and the many advisors and other professionals who feast on deals. A venerable caution will forever be true when advice from Wall Street is contemplated: Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.

总的来说，一切都有利于那桩CEO及其殷勤的下属们垂涎已久的交易。一个有趣的尝试是：让公司聘请两位"专家级"收购顾问——一位赞成，一位反对——分别向董事会陈述对拟议交易的看法，胜出方的酬劳是失败方象征性费用的十倍。不过别屏息等待这项改革了：当前这套制度，无论对股东有什么缺陷，对CEO们、众多顾问和其他那些靠交易大快朵颐的专业人士来说，简直是妙不可言。当你听取华尔街的建议时，一条古老的忠告永远适用：别问理发师你是不是该理发了。

Over the years, board “independence” has become a new area of emphasis. One key point relating to this topic, though, is almost invariably overlooked: Director compensation has now soared to a level that inevitably makes pay a subconscious factor affecting the behavior of many non-wealthy members. Think, for a moment, of the director earning $250,000-300,000 for board meetings consuming a pleasant couple of days six or so times a year. Frequently, the possession of one such directorship bestows on its holder three to four times the annual median income of U.S. households. (I missed much of this gravy train: As a director of Portland Gas Light in the early 1960s, I received $100 annually for my service. To earn this princely sum, I commuted to Maine four times a year.)

多年来，董事会"独立性"成了一个新的热门领域。然而，有一个与此相关的关键问题几乎从不被提及：如今董事薪酬已经飙升到了这样的水平，不可避免地让薪酬成为影响许多并不富裕的董事成员行为的潜意识因素。试想一下：一位董事一年大约参加六次董事会，每次花上愉快的几天时间，就能赚到25万到30万美元。通常，一个这样的董事席位就能让其持有者的年收入达到美国家庭年收入中位数的三到四倍。（我倒是错过了这趟赚钱的好车：1960年代初我担任波特兰煤气 (Portland Gas Light) 的董事，每年服务费100美元。为了赚到这笔"可观"的收入，我每年得往返缅因州四趟。）

And job security now? It’s fabulous. Board members may get politely ignored, but they seldom get fired. Instead, generous age limits – usually 70 or higher – act as the standard method for the genteel ejection of directors.

现在的工作保障呢？好极了。董事会成员可能会被彬彬有礼地忽视，但很少被炒鱿鱼。取而代之的是，宽裕的年龄限制——通常是70岁或更高——充当了客客气气送走董事的标准方式。

Is it any wonder that a non-wealthy director (“NWD”) now hopes – or even yearns – to be asked to join a second board, thereby vaulting into the $500,000-600,000 class? To achieve this goal, the NWD will need help. The CEO of a company searching for board members will almost certainly check with the NWD’s current CEO as to whether NWD is a “good” director. “Good,” of course, is a code word. If the NWD has seriously challenged his/her present CEO’s compensation or acquisition dreams, his or her candidacy will silently die. When seeking directors, CEOs don’t look for pit bulls. It’s the cocker spaniel that gets taken home.

难怪一位不太富裕的董事（简称"NWD"）现在会希望——甚至渴望——被邀请加入第二家公司的董事会，从而一跃进入年薪50万到60万美元的行列？为了实现这个目标，NWD需要一些"帮助"。一家在物色董事的公司CEO，几乎肯定会向NWD的现任CEO核实NWD是否是个"好"董事。"好"这个字当然是个暗号。如果NWD曾认真质疑过现任CEO的薪酬或收购梦想，那么他或她的候选资格就会被悄无声息地抹掉。CEO们找董事的时候，要的不是斗牛犬。被带回家的是温顺的可卡犬。

Despite the illogic of it all, the director for whom fees are important – indeed, craved – is almost universally classified as “independent” while many directors possessing fortunes very substantially linked to the welfare of the corporation are deemed lacking in independence. Not long ago, I looked at the proxy material of a large American company and found that eight directors had never purchased a share of the company’s stock using their own money. (They, of course, had received grants of stock as a supplement to their generous cash compensation.) This particular company had long been a laggard, but the directors were doing wonderfully.

尽管这一切都不合逻辑，但那些对薪酬极其看重——甚至渴望——的董事，几乎一律被归类为"独立"董事；而许多拥有与公司休戚相关的巨额财富的董事，反倒被认为缺乏独立性。不久前我翻阅了一家美国大公司的委托代理材料，发现有八位董事从未用自己的钱买过一股公司股票。（当然，他们获得了股票授予，作为其丰厚现金薪酬的补充。）这家公司长期以来表现平平，但董事们的日子过得挺滋润。

Paid-with-my-own-money ownership, of course, does not create wisdom or ensure business smarts. Nevertheless, I feel better when directors of our portfolio companies have had the experience of purchasing shares with their savings, rather than simply having been the recipients of grants.

当然，用自己的钱买股票并不能创造智慧或保证商业嗅觉。尽管如此，当我们投资组合中公司的董事有用自己的积蓄买入股票的经历——而不只是被动接受赠予的股票——我心里总会踏实些。

Here, a pause is due: I’d like you to know that almost all of the directors I have met over the years have been decent, likable and intelligent. They dressed well, made good neighbors and were fine citizens. I’ve enjoyed their company. Among the group are some men and women that I would not have met except for our mutual board service and who have become close friends.

在这里我应该暂停一下：我想让你们知道，这些年来我遇到的几乎所有董事都是正派、可亲且聪明的人。他们衣着得体，是好邻居，也是好公民。和他们在一起我很愉快。这些人中有些男男女女，如果不是因为我们共同的董事会服务，我根本不会认识他们，而如今他们已成了我的亲密朋友。

Nevertheless, many of these good souls are people whom I would never have chosen to handle money or business matters. It simply was not their game.

尽管如此，这些善良的灵魂中有许多人，我永远不会选择他们来管理金钱或处理商业事务。这根本不是他们的强项。

They, in turn, would never have asked me for help in removing a tooth, decorating their home or improving their golf swing. Moreover, if I were ever scheduled to appear on Dancing With the Stars, I would immediately seek refuge in the Witness Protection Program. We are all duds at one thing or another. For most of us, the list is long. The important point to recognize is that if you are Bobby Fischer, you must play only chess for money.

反过来，他们也永远不会找我帮忙拔牙、装修房子或改善高尔夫球技。而且，如果我被安排参加"与星共舞" (Dancing With the Stars)节目，我会立刻申请证人保护计划的庇护。我们每个人总在某些方面一窍不通。对大多数人来说，这个清单还挺长。需要认识到的关键是：如果你是鲍比·费舍尔 (Bobby Fischer)，你就只能靠下棋来赚钱。

At Berkshire, we will continue to look for business-savvy directors who are owner-oriented and arrive with a strong specific interest in our company. Thought and principles, not robot-like “process,” will guide their actions. In representing your interests, they will, of course, seek managers whose goals include delighting their customers, cherishing their associates and acting as good citizens of both their communities and our country.

在伯克希尔，我们将继续寻找精通商业的董事，他们以股东利益为导向，并对我们的公司怀有强烈的特定兴趣。指导他们行动的是思想和原则，而非机器人式的"流程"。在代表你们的利益时，他们当然会寻找那些以取悦客户为目标、珍惜同事、并努力做社区和国家好公民的管理者。

Those objectives are not new. They were the goals of able CEOs sixty years ago and remain so. Who would have it otherwise?

这些目标并不新鲜。60年前，有能力的CEO们追求的就是这些，今天依然如此。谁会要求别的呢？