巴菲特致股东的信（2020年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

Berkshire earned $42.5 billion in 2020 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The four components of that figure are $21.9 billion of operating earnings, $4.9 billion of realized capital gains, a $26.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold and, finally, an $11 billion loss from a write-down in the value of a few subsidiary and affiliate businesses that we own. All items are stated on an after-tax basis.

依据通用会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔 (Berkshire) 2020年的利润为425亿美元。这个数字由四个部分组成：219亿美元的经营收益；49亿美元的已实现资本利得；267亿美元的净未实现资本利得增加额，来自我们持有的股票；最后是110亿美元的亏损，源自对我们旗下若干子公司和关联企业的减值。以上均为税后数字。

Operating earnings are what count most, even during periods when they are not the largest item in our GAAP total. Our focus at Berkshire is both to increase this segment of our income and to acquire large and favorably-situated businesses. Last year, however, we met neither goal: Berkshire made no sizable acquisitions and operating earnings fell 9%. We did, though, increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by both retaining earnings and repurchasing about 5% of our shares.

经营收益才是最重要的，即便在某些年份它不是通用会计准则利润总额中金额最大的那一项。伯克希尔的工作重点有两个：一是增加经营收益，二是收购大型且前景良好的企业。然而去年，两个目标我们都没有达成：伯克希尔没有完成任何大规模收购，经营收益还下降了9%。不过，通过留存盈余和回购约5%的股份，我们确实提高了伯克希尔的每股内在价值。

The two GAAP components pertaining to capital gains or losses (whether realized or unrealized) fluctuate capriciously from year to year, reflecting swings in the stock market. Whatever today’s figures, Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I firmly believe that, over time, Berkshire’s capital gains from its investment holdings will be substantial.

通用会计准则中与资本利得或亏损相关的两个部分（无论已实现还是未实现），每年都会反复无常地波动，这反映的是股市的涨涨跌跌。不管眼下的数字是什么，我的长期合伙人查理·芒格 (Charlie Munger) 和我都坚信，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔从投资中获得的资本利得将是相当可观的。

As I’ve emphasized many times, Charlie and I view Berkshire’s holdings of marketable stocks – at yearend worth $281 billion – as a collection of businesses. We don’t control the operations of those companies, but we do share proportionately in their long-term prosperity. From an accounting standpoint, however, our portion of their earnings is not included in Berkshire’s income. Instead, only what these investees pay us in dividends is recorded on our books. Under GAAP, the huge sums that investees retain on our behalf become invisible.

正如我多次强调的那样，查理和我将伯克希尔持有的上市公司股票——年底市值达2,810亿美元——视为一系列企业。我们并不控制这些公司的运营，但我们按比例分享它们的长期繁荣。然而，从会计角度来看，我们在这些公司利润中所占的份额并不计入伯克希尔的收入。在我们的账簿上记录的，只有这些被投资公司支付给我们的股息。按照通用会计准则，被投资公司代我们留存的巨额收益就这样变成了"隐形资产"。

What’s out of sight, however, should not be out of mind: Those unrecorded retained earnings are usually building value – lots of value – for Berkshire. Investees use the withheld funds to expand their business, make acquisitions, pay off debt and, often, to repurchase their stock (an act that increases our share of their future earnings). As we pointed out in these pages last year, retained earnings have propelled American business throughout our country’s history. What worked for Carnegie and Rockefeller has, over the years, worked its magic for millions of shareholders as well.

然而，看不见的不该被遗忘：那些未入账的留存收益通常正在为伯克希尔创造价值——而且是大量的价值。被投资公司用留存的资金扩张业务、进行收购、偿还债务，还经常回购自家股票（这一举动增加了我们在它们未来收益中的份额）。正如我们去年在这封信中指出的，留存收益贯穿美国历史，推动着美国企业向前发展。当年对卡内基 (Carnegie) 和洛克菲勒 (Rockefeller) 管用的法则，多年来对数百万股东同样施展着它的魔力。

Of course, some of our investees will disappoint, adding little, if anything, to the value of their company by retaining earnings. But others will over-deliver, a few spectacularly. In aggregate, we expect our share of the huge pile of earnings retained by Berkshire’s non-controlled businesses (what others would label our equity portfolio) to eventually deliver us an equal or greater amount of capital gains. Over our 56-year tenure, that expectation has been met.

当然，我们投资的某些公司会让人失望，它们的留存收益对公司价值几乎没有增益。但另一些会超额回报我们，其中少数表现极为出色。总的来说，我们预期伯克希尔在这些非控股企业中（别人或许会称之为我们的股票投资组合）留存的巨额利润，最终将带给我们等量甚至更多的资本利得。在我们56年的经营历程中，这一期望得到了验证。

The final component in our GAAP figure – that ugly $11 billion write-down – is almost entirely the quantification of a mistake I made in 2016. That year, Berkshire purchased Precision Castparts (“PCC”), and I paid too much for the company.

通用会计准则中的最后一个部分——那笔令人难堪的110亿美元减值——几乎全部是我2016年犯下的一个错误的数字化体现。那一年，伯克希尔收购了精密铸件公司 (Precision Castparts, "PCC")，我付的价格太高了。

No one misled me in any way – I was simply too optimistic about PCC’s normalized profit potential. Last year, my miscalculation was laid bare by adverse developments throughout the aerospace industry, PCC’s most important source of customers.

没有任何人以任何方式误导我——是我对精密铸件公司的正常盈利能力过于乐观了。去年，整个航空航天工业的不利发展赤裸裸地暴露了我的误判，而航空航天业正是精密铸件公司最重要的客户来源。

In purchasing PCC, Berkshire bought a fine company – the best in its business. Mark Donegan, PCC’s CEO, is a passionate manager who consistently pours the same energy into the business that he did before we purchased it. We are lucky to have him running things.

收购精密铸件公司，伯克希尔买到的是一家好公司——同行中最好的那一家。精密铸件公司的CEO马克·多尼根 (Mark Donegan) 是一位充满激情的管理者，他在我们收购之后一如既往地倾注心血。有他来掌舵，是我们的幸运。

I believe I was right in concluding that PCC would, over time, earn good returns on the net tangible assets deployed in its operations. I was wrong, however, in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business.

我认为我的以下判断是正确的：随着时间的推移，精密铸件公司将在其运营中部署的净有形资产上获得良好的回报。然而，我对它未来平均收益水平的判断是错误的，因此也就错误地计算了合理的收购价格。

PCC is far from my first error of that sort. But it’s a big one.

精密铸件公司远非我犯的第一个这类错误。但这是个大错误。