巴菲特致股东的信（2020年）②我们弓上的两根弦

Two Strings to Our Bow

我们弓上的两根弦

Berkshire is often labeled a conglomerate, a negative term applied to holding companies that own a hodge-podge of unrelated businesses. And, yes, that describes Berkshire – but only in part. To understand how and why we differ from the prototype conglomerate, let’s review a little history.

伯克希尔经常被贴上"大型企业集团"的标签，这是一个贬义词，专门用来形容那些拥有一堆五花八门、互不相关业务的控股公司。没错，这在一定程度上描述了伯克希尔——但只是部分。为了弄清楚我们如何以及为什么与传统企业集团不同，让我们回顾一段历史。

Over time, conglomerates have generally limited themselves to buying businesses in their entirety. That strategy, however, came with two major problems. One was unsolvable: Most of the truly great businesses had no interest in having anyone take them over. Consequently, deal-hungry conglomerateurs had to focus on so-so companies that lacked important and durable competitive strengths. That was not a great pond in which to fish.

长期以来，企业集团通常只做一件事：整体收购其他企业。然而，这个策略带来了两个大问题。第一个无法解决：大多数真正伟大的企业根本不愿意被任何人收购。因此，饥渴的收购者们不得不将目标瞄准那些缺乏重要且持久竞争优势的平庸公司。那可不是一个钓鱼的好池塘。

Beyond that, as conglomerateurs dipped into this universe of mediocre businesses, they often found themselves required to pay staggering “control” premiums to snare their quarry. Aspiring conglomerateurs knew the answer to this “overpayment” problem: They simply needed to manufacture a vastly overvalued stock of their own that could be used as a “currency” for pricey acquisitions. (“I’ll pay you $10,000 for your dog by giving you two of my $5,000 cats.”)

除此之外，当企业集团涉足这些平庸企业时，它们常常发现自己必须支付惊人的"控股权"溢价才能捕获猎物。有抱负的企业集团掌门人知道如何解决这个"出价过高"的难题：他们只需要把自己公司的股票炒到严重高估的水平，然后把它当作"货币"去搞昂贵的收购就行了。（"我用两只价值5,000美元的猫换你的狗，作价一万美元买下它。"）

Often, the tools for fostering the overvaluation of a conglomerate’s stock involved promotional techniques and “imaginative” accounting maneuvers that were, at best, deceptive and that sometimes crossed the line into fraud. When these tricks were “successful,” the conglomerate pushed its own stock to, say, 3x its business value in order to offer the target 2x its value.

通常，用来推高企业集团股价的手段包括各种推销术和"富有想象力"的会计操纵，这些手段往好了说是误导，有时候干脆就越界成了欺诈。当这些花招"奏效"时，企业集团就能把自己的股价推到商业价值的三倍，然后给收购目标出价两倍于其实际价值。

Investing illusions can continue for a surprisingly long time. Wall Street loves the fees that deal-making generates, and the press loves the stories that colorful promoters provide. At a point, also, the soaring price of a promoted stock can itself become the “proof” that an illusion is reality.

投资幻觉可以持续出人意料地长时间。华尔街喜欢交易产生的佣金，媒体喜欢那些花里胡哨的推销者提供的故事。到了一定程度，一只被炒作的股票飙升的价格本身就成了幻觉即是现实的"证据"。

Eventually, of course, the party ends, and many business “emperors” are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards.

当然，派对终有散场的一天，许多商业"皇帝"被发现根本没穿衣服。金融史上写满了曾经被记者、分析师和投资银行家奉为商业天才的企业集团巨头们的名字，但他们一手打造的帝国最终沦为了商业垃圾场。

Conglomerates earned their terrible reputation.

企业集团糟糕的名声，是它们自己挣来的。

Charlie and I want our conglomerate to own all or part of a diverse group of businesses with good economic characteristics and good managers. Whether Berkshire controls these businesses, however, is unimportant to us.

查理和我希望我们的企业集团能拥有一系列具有良好经济特质和优秀管理者的多元化企业的全部或部分股权。至于伯克希尔是否控制这些企业，对我们来说并不重要。

It took me a while to wise up. But Charlie – and also my 20-year struggle with the textile operation I inherited at Berkshire – finally convinced me that owning a non-controlling portion of a wonderful business is more profitable, more enjoyable and far less work than struggling with 100% of a marginal enterprise.

我花了不少时间才想明白这个道理。但查理——加上我在伯克希尔接手纺织业务后长达20年的苦苦挣扎——最终让我确信，拥有一家出色企业的非控股权，比百分之百控股一家勉强赚钱的企业更赚钱、更愉快，而且工作量少得多。

For those reasons, our conglomerate will remain a collection of controlled and non-controlled businesses. Charlie and I will simply deploy your capital into whatever we believe makes the most sense, based on a company’s durable competitive strengths, the capabilities and character of its management, and price.

因此，我们的企业集团将继续由控股类和非控股类企业组成。查理和我只是根据一家公司的持久竞争优势、管理层的能力和品格、以及价格，把你们的资金配置到我们认为最合理的地方。

If that strategy requires little or no effort on our part, so much the better. In contrast to the scoring system utilized in diving competitions, you are awarded no points in business endeavors for “degree of difficulty.” Furthermore, as Ronald Reagan cautioned: “It’s said that hard work never killed anyone, but I say why take the chance?”

如果这个策略只需要我们付出极少甚至不需要付出努力，那就更好了。与跳水比赛的计分规则不同，在商业世界里你不会因为"难度系数"高而加分。此外，正如罗纳德·里根 (Ronald Reagan) 提醒我们的："人们说努力工作不会要命，但我要说，何必冒这个险呢？"