巴菲特致股东的信（2020年）③家族珍宝，以及我们如何增加你的珍宝份额

The Family Jewels and How We Increase Your Share of These Gems

家族珍宝，以及我们如何增加你的珍宝份额

On page A-1 we list Berkshire’s subsidiaries, a smorgasbord of businesses employing 360,000 at yearend. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don’t control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse.

在A-1页，我们列出了伯克希尔的子公司，年底这些琳琅满目的企业共雇用了36万名员工。关于这些控股企业的详细信息，可以在本报告后面的10-K文件中找到。我们在部分持股但不控制的公司中的主要头寸列在本信第7页。这个投资组合同样规模庞大、种类繁多。

Most of Berkshire’s value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels.

然而，伯克希尔的大部分价值集中在四类业务上，三类是控股企业，一类是我们仅持有5.4%股权的非控股企业。四类都是珍宝。

The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field. So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986.

价值最大的是我们的财产/意外险业务，53年来一直是伯克希尔的核心。我们的保险家族在保险行业独一无二。它的管理者同样独一无二——阿吉特·贾恩 (Ajit Jain)，他于1986年加入伯克希尔。

Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds.

总体而言，我们的保险舰队运营的资本远远超过全球任何一家竞争对手。如此强大的财务实力，加上伯克希尔每年从非保险业务获得的巨额现金流，使得我们的保险公司能够安全地执行重仓股票的投资策略，这对绝大多数保险公司来说根本不可行。出于监管和信用评级的考量，这些竞争对手必须以债券为主。

And bonds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at yearend – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.

而如今，债券不是好的投资去处。你能相信吗？10年期美国国债最近的收益率——年底为0.93%——比1981年9月15.8%的收益率下降了94%？在一些大而重要的国家，比如德国和日本，投资者在数万亿美元的主权债务上获得的是负回报。全球的固定收益投资者——无论是养老基金、保险公司还是退休人员——都面临着暗淡的未来。

Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim.

一些保险公司和其他债券投资者可能会试图通过转向购买信用不佳的借款人发行的债券来给可怜的回报率加点料。然而，高风险贷款不是解决利率低迷问题的答案。30年前，一度强大的储贷行业把自己毁掉了，部分原因就是无视了这条箴言。

Berkshire now enjoys $138 billion of insurance “float” – funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills. Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change – but, over time, I like our odds.

伯克希尔现在拥有1,380亿美元的保险"浮存金"——这些资金不属于我们，但我们可以用它们来投资，无论是债券、股票还是美国国库券之类的现金等价物。浮存金与银行存款有些相似之处：保险公司每天都有现金进进出出，但总额变化很小。伯克希尔持有的这笔巨额资金很可能会在未来许多年保持在目前的水平，而从累计来看，使用这些资金对我们来说是零成本的。当然，这个令人愉快的结果可能会改变——但从长远来看，我喜欢我们的胜算。

I have repetitiously – some might say endlessly – explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you. Therefore, I will this year ask new shareholders who wish to learn more about our insurance business and “float” to read the pertinent section of the 2019 report, reprinted on page A-2. It’s important that you understand the risks, as well as the opportunities, existing in our insurance activities.

在我每年给大家写的信中，我已经反反复复——有人可能会说没完没了——地解释了我们的保险业务。因此，今年我请那些希望进一步了解我们保险业务和"浮存金"的新股东阅读2019年报告的相关章节，该内容重印在A-2页。了解我们保险业务中存在的风险和机遇，这一点很重要。

Our second and third most valuable assets – it’s pretty much a toss-up at this point – are Berkshire’s 100% ownership of BNSF, America’s largest railroad measured by freight volume, and our 5.4% ownership of Apple. And in the fourth spot is our 91% ownership of Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”). What we have here is a very unusual utility business, whose annual earnings have grown from $122 million to $3.4 billion during our 21 years of ownership.

我们第二大和第三大最有价值的资产——目前谁排第二谁排第三基本上是五五开——分别是伯克希尔百分百持有的BNSF铁路 (BNSF)，按货运量计算是美国最大的铁路公司，以及我们持有5.4%股权的苹果公司 (Apple)。排名第四的是我们持有91%股权的伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司 (Berkshire Hathaway Energy, "BHE")。这是一家非常独特的公用事业公司，在我们21年的持有期间，其年利润从1.22亿美元增长到了34亿美元。

I’ll have more to say about BNSF and BHE later in this letter. For now, however, I would like to focus on a practice Berkshire will periodically use to enhance your interest in both its “Big Four” as well as the many other assets Berkshire owns.

关于BNSF和BHE，我在这封信的后面还有更多话要说。不过现在，我想重点谈谈伯克希尔会定期采用的一种做法，它能增加你在"四大珍宝"以及伯克希尔所有其他资产中的份额。

Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm for Berkshire’s spread of properties by repurchasing the equivalent of 80,998 “A” shares, spending $24.7 billion in the process. That action increased your ownership in all of Berkshire’s businesses by 5.2% without requiring you to so much as touch your wallet.

去年，我们斥资247亿美元回购了相当于80,998股A类股票，以此展示了我们对伯克希尔旗下各项资产价值的信心。这一举措让你在伯克希尔所有业务中的持股比例增加了5.2%，而不需要你掏一分钱。

Following criteria Charlie and I have long recommended, we made those purchases because we believed they would both enhance the intrinsic value per share for continuing shareholders and would leave Berkshire with more than ample funds for any opportunities or problems it might encounter.

按照查理和我长期以来推荐的标准，我们之所以回购，是因为我们相信这既能提高继续持股的股东的每股内在价值，又能让伯克希尔保有充裕的资金以应对未来可能遇到的任何机遇或挑战。

In no way do we think that Berkshire shares should be repurchased at simply any price. I emphasize that point because American CEOs have an embarrassing record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices have risen than when they have tanked. Our approach is exactly the reverse.

我们绝不认为伯克希尔的股票应该以任何价格回购。我之所以强调这一点，是因为美国的CEO们有一个让人尴尬的记录：股价上涨时他们大把花钱回购，股价下跌时反而不买了。我们的做法恰恰相反。

Berkshire’s investment in Apple vividly illustrates the power of repurchases. We began buying Apple stock late in 2016 and by early July 2018, owned slightly more than one billion Apple shares (split-adjusted). Saying that, I’m referencing the investment held in Berkshire’s general account and am excluding a very small and separately-managed holding of Apple shares that was subsequently sold. When we finished our purchases in mid-2018, Berkshire’s general account owned 5.2% of Apple.

伯克希尔对苹果的投资生动地展示了回购的威力。我们从2016年末开始买入苹果股票，到2018年7月初完成购买时，经拆股调整后，我们持有的苹果股票略多于10亿股。这里我指的是伯克希尔一般账户中的持股，不包括后来被出售的一小笔单独管理的苹果股票。当我们在2018年年中完成买入时，伯克希尔的一般账户持有苹果5.2%的股份。

Our cost for that stake was $36 billion. Since then, we have both enjoyed regular dividends, averaging about $775 million annually, and have also – in 2020 – pocketed an additional $11 billion by selling a small portion of our position.

这笔投资的成本是360亿美元。此后，我们享受着平均每年约7.75亿美元的固定分红，并且在2020年通过出售一小部分持股额外入账了110亿美元。

Despite that sale – voila! – Berkshire now owns 5.4% of Apple. That increase was costless to us, coming about because Apple has continuously repurchased its shares, thereby substantially shrinking the number it now has outstanding.

尽管卖了一部分——瞧！——伯克希尔目前持有苹果5.4%的股份。这个比例的增加对我们来说是零成本的，原因是苹果一直在持续回购自家股票，大幅减少了流通股数量。

But that’s far from all of the good news. Because we also repurchased Berkshire shares during the 21⁄2 years, you now indirectly own a full 10% more of Apple’s assets and future earnings than you did in July 2018.

但好消息远不止于此。因为我们在这两年半里也回购了伯克希尔的股票，你现在间接拥有的苹果资产和未来收益比2018年7月时整整多了10%。

This agreeable dynamic continues. Berkshire has repurchased more shares since yearend and is likely to further reduce its share count in the future. Apple has publicly stated an intention to repurchase its shares as well. As these reductions occur, Berkshire shareholders will not only own a greater interest in our insurance group and in BNSF and BHE, but will also find their indirect ownership of Apple increasing as well.

这种令人愉快的良性循环仍在继续。伯克希尔自年底以来回购了更多股票，未来很可能会进一步减少股份总数。苹果也公开表示了继续回购股票的意愿。随着这些回购的推进，伯克希尔的股东不仅会在我们的保险集团、BNSF和BHE中拥有更大的份额，还会发现自己间接持有的苹果权益也在增加。

The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.

回购的数学威力运转缓慢，但假以时日会变得十分强大。这个过程为投资者提供了一种简单的方式，让他们拥有的杰出企业的股权比例持续增长。

And as a sultry Mae West assured us: “Too much of a good thing can be . . . wonderful.”

正如性感的梅·韦斯特 (Mae West) 向我们保证的："好事太多可能会……太棒了。"