巴菲特致股东的信（2022年）②我们做什么

What We Do

我们做什么

Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.

查理和我把你们在伯克希尔的积蓄分配到两种相关的所有权形式中。第一种，我们投资于自己控制的企业，通常是100%买下。伯克希尔负责这些子公司的资本配置，并选定负责日常运营决策的CEO。管理大型企业时，信任和规章缺一不可。伯克希尔对前者的强调达到了一种非同寻常的程度——有人会说是极端的程度。失望在所难免。我们对商业上的失误可以谅解；但对个人品行问题的容忍度为零。

In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.

我们的第二种所有权形式，是购买公开交易的股票，由此被动地持有企业的一部分。持有这些投资时，我们在经营管理上没有发言权。

Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

我们在两种所有权形式中追求的目标是一致的：对那些既有长期优良经济特质、又有值得信赖的管理层的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有上市公司股票是基于对其长期经营表现的预期，而不是把它们当作灵活买卖的工具。这一点至关重要：查理和我不是选股者，我们是选企业的人。

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”

这些年来，我犯了很多错误。因此，我们目前广泛的企业群中包括：少数经济效益真正卓越的公司，许多经济特质很不错的公司，还有一大批表现平平的公司。一路走来，我投资过的其他企业有些已经倒闭了，它们的产品被公众抛弃。资本主义有两面性：这个体系在不断堆积越来越多的失败者的同时，也源源不断地提供更好的商品和服务。熊彼特 (Schumpeter) 把这种现象称为"创造性破坏"。

One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.

我们上市公司股票组合的一个优势在于——虽然不是一直有——偶尔你可以用极好的价格买到一小块极好的企业。关键要明白一点：股票的交易价格经常荒唐可笑，无论是过高还是过低。"有效"市场只存在于教科书里。事实上，有价证券的行为令人困惑，往往要事后回头看才能理解。

Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.

控股企业则是另一回事。它们有时候被标上高得离谱的价格，但几乎从来不会以便宜的估值出售。除非迫不得已，控股企业的主人根本不会考虑以恐慌性估值卖出。

At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)

说到这里，我该给自己亮亮成绩单了：在管理伯克希尔的58年里，我的大部分资本配置决策都只能算马马虎虎。有时候，我的臭棋还是靠大把运气才被救回来的。（还记得我们在全美航空 (USAir) 和所罗门兄弟 (Salomon) 的险些灾难中死里逃生吗？我可记得清清楚楚。）

Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.

我们之所以能取得令人满意的业绩，靠的是大约十几个真正正确的决定——大约每五年一个——再加上一个有时被人遗忘的优势，而这个优势偏偏眷顾像伯克希尔这样的长期投资者。让我们掀开幕布瞧一瞧。