巴菲特致股东的信（2022年）④过去一年简述

The Past Year in Brief

过去一年简述

Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:

伯克希尔2022年的表现不错。公司的经营收益——我们用这个词来指按通用会计准则 (GAAP) 计算、但剔除股票持仓资本利得或损失后的利润——创下了308亿美元的纪录。查理和我聚焦于这个经营数字，也敦促你们这样做。如果不做我们这种调整，GAAP利润在每个报告日都会剧烈而无常地波动。看看它在2022年那翻跟头一般的表现吧，而这其实并不罕见：

The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.

无论从季度还是年度来看，GAAP收益数字都是百分之百误导人的。毫无疑问，在过去几十年里，资本利得对伯克希尔极为重要，我们也预计在未来几十年里它们仍将是显著的正面贡献。但它们季度间的上蹿下跳被媒体例行公事又不动脑子地做成头条，完全误导了投资者。

A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.

伯克希尔去年的第二个积极进展，是我们收购了由乔·布兰登 (Joe Brandon) 掌舵的财产意外险公司阿勒格尼 (Alleghany Corporation)。我以前跟乔共事过，他既懂伯克希尔，也懂保险。阿勒格尼对我们有特殊价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使其保险子公司能够采取几乎所有竞争对手都无法效仿的、有价值且持久的投资策略。

Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.

在阿勒格尼的助力下，我们的浮存金在2022年从1,470亿美元增长到了1,640亿美元。凭借严格的承保纪律，这些资金长期来看很有可能实现零成本。自1967年收购第一家财产意外险公司以来，通过收购、运营和创新，伯克希尔的浮存金增长了8,000倍。虽然在我们的财务报表中没有得到确认，但这笔浮存金对伯克希尔来说是一笔了不起的资产。新股东可以通过阅读A-2页我们每年更新的浮存金说明来了解其价值。

A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.

2022年，通过伯克希尔自身的股票回购以及苹果 (Apple) 和美国运通的类似举措（这两家都是我们的重要投资对象），每股内在价值获得了非常小的增长。在伯克希尔这边，我们通过回购公司1.2%的流通股，直接增加了各位在我们独特企业组合中的权益。在苹果和美国运通那边，回购在我们没有花一分钱的情况下增加了伯克希尔的持股比例。

The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.

计算并不复杂：当总股数减少时，你在我们众多企业中的权益就上升了。只要回购是在增值价格上进行的，每一点都有帮助。同样确定的是，当一家公司为回购支付了过高的价格时，继续持有股票的股东就会亏损。到那时候，获益的只有卖出股票的股东，以及那些态度友好但收费昂贵、建议了这桩蠢事的投资银行家。

Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?

应该强调的是，以增值价格进行的回购在每一个方面都有利于所有股东。请想象一下，当地一家汽车经销商有三位消息完全透明的股东，其中一位负责管理经营。再想象一下，其中一位被动股东想把自己的权益以一个对两位继续持有的股东来说很有吸引力的价格卖回给公司。交易完成后，有谁受到了伤害吗？那位管理者是不是比另一位继续持股的被动股东更占便宜了？公众利益受损了吗？

When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).

当有人告诉你，所有回购都对股东或者对国家有害，或者对CEO特别有利时，你听到的要么是一个经济文盲在说话，要么是一个巧舌如簧的蛊惑者在说话（这两个身份并不互相排斥）。

Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.

伯克希尔2022年运营的详尽细节列在K-33到K-66页上。查理和我以及伯克希尔的许多股东，都喜欢细细研读那一部分的大量事实和数字。但那些页面并非必读。在伯克希尔的股东中，有许多身家数千万乃至数十亿美元的人从来没有研究过我们的财务数据。他们只是知道查理和我——连同我们的家人和至亲好友——持续在伯克希尔保有非常大的投资，他们相信我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。

And that is a promise we can make.

这是我们可以做出的承诺。

Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.

最后，一个重要的警告：即使是我们偏好的经营收益数字，也很容易被有心操纵的管理者所篡改。CEO们、董事们和他们的顾问往往认为这种手脚很高明。记者和分析师也欣然接受它的存在。超"预期"的利润被吹嘘为管理层的胜利。

That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.

这种行为令人作呕。操纵数字不需要什么才华，只需要一颗满心想要欺骗的心。一位CEO曾对我如此描述他的欺骗手法——"大胆而富有想象力的会计"——这已经成为资本主义的耻辱之一。