巴菲特致股东的信（2023年）⑤令人放心的非控股企业

Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable

令人放心的非控股企业

Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire’s long-duration partial-ownership positions – Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.

去年我提到过伯克希尔长期持有的两个非控股头寸——可口可乐（Coca-Cola）和美国运通（American Express）。它们的仓位不像苹果（Apple）那么大，按 GAAP 净资产计算，各自只占伯克希尔的 4-5%。但它们是有价值的资产，也很好地体现了我们的投资思路。

American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts. In the past – but definitely not now – both were even mismanaged.

美国运通始创于 1850 年，可口可乐于 1886 年在亚特兰大的一间药房里诞生。（伯克希尔对新生事物不太感冒。）多年来，两家公司都尝试过向不相关的领域扩张，结果都不怎么样。过去，两家公司甚至还被管理不善过——但绝对不是现在。

But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.

然而，两家公司都在各自的核心业务上取得了巨大的成功，并根据市场环境不断调整。而且至关重要的是，它们的产品"走向了世界"。可口可乐和运通都成了全球知名品牌，而且液体消费的需求和对可靠金融信用的需求是这个世界永恒的刚需。

During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.

整个 2023 年，我们没有买卖一股运通或可口可乐——延续了我们如瑞普·凡·温克尔（Rip Van Winkle）般的酣睡，如今已经持续了远超二十年。去年两家公司再次通过增加利润和分红来回报我们的"不作为"。事实上，2023 年我们在运通上对应的收益已经大大超过了当初购买它时花的 13 亿美元。

Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the case of AMEX – and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”

运通和可口可乐几乎肯定都会在 2024 年提高分红——运通大约提高 16%——而我们也将毫无疑问地全年持股不动。我能打造出比它们俩更好的全球业务吗？伯蒂会告诉你："没门儿。"

Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.

虽然伯克希尔在 2023 年没有买入两家公司的股票，但由于伯克希尔自身进行了股票回购，你们在可口可乐和运通上的间接持股比例去年还是略有增加。这种回购的效果是提高你们在伯克希尔所拥有的每一项资产中的份额。在这个显而易见却常被忽视的事实之上，我再补充一句老生常谈：所有股票回购都应该以价格为依据。在低于企业价值时回购是明智的，在溢价时回购就是愚蠢。

The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable.

可口可乐和运通给我们的启示是什么？当你找到一家真正优秀的企业，紧紧抓住它。耐心总有回报，一家优秀的企业足以抵消一堆不可避免的平庸决策。

This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023.

今年，我想再介绍另外两项我们打算无限期持有的投资。跟可口可乐和运通一样，相对于我们的体量，这两笔投资规模不算大。但它们是值得的，而且我们在 2023 年都增加了持仓。

At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.

截至年底，伯克希尔持有西方石油（Occidental Petroleum）27.8% 的普通股，同时持有认股权证，在超过五年的时间里给予我们以固定价格大幅增持的选择权。虽然我们非常喜欢我们的持股和这份期权，但伯克希尔无意收购或管理西方石油。我们特别看好它在美国的巨大油气储备，以及它在碳捕捉技术方面的领先地位——尽管这项技术的经济可行性尚未得到证实。这两项业务都非常符合我国的利益。

Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the country’s needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign – potentially unstable – suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.

不久之前，美国还在可悲地依赖进口石油，碳捕捉也没什么人关注。事实上，1975 年美国石油产量仅为每天 800 万桶油当量（BOEPD），远低于国家需求。美国曾凭借有利的能源地位支撑了二战中的国防动员，后来却退化到严重依赖可能不稳定的海外供应商。人们预测国内石油产量将进一步下降，而需求将持续增长。

For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate – though not come close to eliminating – this erosion of American self-sufficiency.

有很长一段时间，悲观论调似乎是对的——到 2007 年产量已经跌至每天 500 万桶。与此同时，美国政府在 1975 年建立了战略石油储备（SPR），以缓解——虽然远不能消除——美国自给自足能力的侵蚀。

And then – Hallelujah! – shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very – very – nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.

然后——哈利路亚！——2011 年页岩油气的开采变得经济可行了，我们的能源依赖问题一举解决。现在美国产量超过每天 1,300 万桶，OPEC 不再占据上风。仅西方石油一家的美国年产量就接近 SPR 的全部库存。如果国内产量还停留在每天 500 万桶，而我们又高度依赖非美国来源，这个国家今天会非常——非常——紧张。在那个产量水平上，一旦海外石油供应中断，SPR 的库存几个月内就会耗尽。

Under Vicki Hollub’s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.

在维奇·霍卢布（Vicki Hollub）的领导下，西方石油正在做对国家和股东都正确的事情。没人知道下个月、明年或下个十年油价会怎么走。但维奇知道怎么从岩石中把石油分离出来，这是一项不同寻常的才能，对她的股东和国家都很有价值。

Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.

此外，伯克希尔继续被动地、长期地持有五家非常大的日本公司的股权，它们每一家都以高度多元化的方式运营，在某种程度上类似于伯克希尔自身的模式。去年格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）和我去东京跟它们的管理层谈过之后，我们增持了这五家公司的全部股份。

Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.

伯克希尔现在分别持有这五家公司约 9% 的股份。（小细节：日本公司计算流通股的方式跟美国不同。）伯克希尔还向每家公司承诺，持股不会超过 9.9%。我们五家合计的成本为 1.6 万亿日元，年末合计市值为 2.9 万亿日元。不过，由于日元近年来走弱，按美元计算的年末未实现收益为 61%，即 80 亿美元。

Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don’t believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.

格雷格和我都不相信自己能预测主要货币的汇率，也不相信能雇到有这种本事的人。因此，伯克希尔的日本投资大部分是用发行的 1.3 万亿日元债券所得来融资的。这批债券在日本很受欢迎，我相信伯克希尔持有的日元计价债务比其他任何美国公司都多。日元的走弱为伯克希尔带来了 19 亿美元的年末收益，根据 GAAP 规则，这笔收益已在 2020-2023 年间分期确认为收入。

In certain important ways, all five companies – Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo – follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.

在某些重要方面，这五家公司——伊藤忠（Itochu）、丸红（Marubeni）、三菱（Mitsubishi）、三井（Mitsui）和住友（Sumitomo）——实行的股东友好政策远比美国企业的通常做法更为出色。自我们开始买入以来，每一家都以有吸引力的价格回购并减少了流通股数量。

Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1⁄3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.

与此同时，这五家管理层在自身薪酬方面的要求远不如美国企业那么激进。还要注意，每家公司只将大约三分之一的利润用于分红。留存的大量资金既用于壮大各项业务，也在较小程度上用于回购股票。跟伯克希尔一样，这五家公司都不愿意增发股票。

An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.

对伯克希尔来说还有一个额外的好处：我们的投资可能会带来机会，让我们与这五家管理有方、备受尊敬的大公司在全球范围内合作。它们的业务范围远比我们广泛。从它们的角度看，日本的 CEO 们也可以放心，伯克希尔将始终拥有巨额流动性资源，无论合作项目规模多大，都能即时响应。

Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.

我们在 2019 年 7 月 4 日开始买入日本股票。考虑到伯克希尔目前的体量，通过公开市场建仓需要极大的耐心和长时间的"友好"价格。这个过程就像战舰转弯。这是我们早年在伯克希尔没有遇到过的重大劣势。