巴菲特致合伙人的信（1963年）⑦登普斯特农具机械制造公司

DEMPSTER MILL MFG.

This situation started as a general in 1956. At that time the stock was selling at $18 with about $72 in book value of which $50 per share was in current assets (Cash, receivables and inventory) less all liabilities. Dempster had earned good money in the past but was only breaking even currently.

登普斯特农具机械制造公司

这笔投资是1956年作为低估类开始的。当时，它的股价是18美元，净资产72美元，流动资产（现金、应收账款和存货）减去所有负债是50美元。登普斯特曾经是一家很赚钱的公司，但是在我们买入时，它只能维持盈亏平衡。

The qualitative situation was on the negative side (a fairly tough industry and unimpressive management), but the figures were extremely attractive. Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps 70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years. Just why any particular one should do so is hard to say at the time of purchase, but the group expectancy is favorable, whether the impetus is from an improved industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.

定性分析是负面的（行业竞争激烈，管理层平庸），但是从数字上看太有吸引力了。经验表明，买入100只这样的股票，在一到三年之内，其中七八十只能实现不错的收益。买入的时候，很难说哪只就能涨，只知道整个组合的前景良好。促使组合中个股上涨的因素很多，可能是行业状况好转、收到收购要约、投资者心理变化等等。

We continued to buy the stock in small quantities for five years. During most or this period I was a director and was becoming consistently less impressed with the earnings prospects under existing management. However, I also became more familiar with the assets and operations and my evaluation of the quantitative factors remained very favorable.

此后五年里，我们每次只能买到很少，但一直在买这只股票。这五年里，我担任了公司的董事，越来越不看好现有管理层领导下的盈利前景。在此期间，我也对公司的资产和经营状况有了更深的了解，通过定量分析，我仍然认为这家公司很便宜。

By mid-1961 we owned about 30% or Dempster (we had made several tender offers with poor results), but in August and September 1961 made, several large purchases at $30.25 per share, which coupled with a subsequent tender offer at the same price, brought our holding to over 70%. Our purchases over the previous five years had been in the $16-$25 range.

1961年中期，我们持有登普斯特30%的股份（我们几次提出收购要约，都无功而返）。1961年8月和9月，我们以每股30.25美元的价格完成了几笔大宗交易，随后以相同的价格提出了收购要约，我们的持股达到了70%以上。在之前五年里，我们的买入价格在16美元到25美元之间。

On assuming control, we elevated the executive vice president to president to see what he would do unfettered by the previous policies. The results were unsatisfactory and on April 23, 1962 we hired Harry Bottle as president.

取得控股权后，我们将副总裁提升为总裁，为他解除公司先前策略的束缚，看他能否带来转变。结果还是没起色。1962年4月23日，我们聘请哈里·博特尔(HarryBottle)出任总裁。

Harry was the perfect man for the job. I have recited his triumphs before and the accompanying comparative balance sheets speak louder than any words in demonstrating the re-employment of capital.

哈里是这份工作的最佳人选。我之前盛赞过哈里取得的成绩，不必多说，请看下面资产负债表的前后对比，资本重新配置的成果一目了然。

Harry:

(1)took the inventory from over $4 million (much of it slow moving) to under $1 million reducing carrying costs and obsolescence risks tremendously;

(2)correspondingly freed up capital for marketable security purchases from which we gained over $400,000

(3)cut administration and selling expense from $150,000 to $75,000 per month;

(4)cut factory overhead burden from $6 to $4.50 per direct labor hour;

(5)closed the five branches operating unprofitably (leaving us with three good ones) and replaced them with more productive distributors;

(6)cleaned up a headache at an auxiliary factory operation at Columbus, Nebraska;

(7)eliminated jobbed lines tying up considerable money (which could be used profitably in securities) while producing no profits;

(8)adjusted prices of repair parts, thereby producing an estimated $200,000 additional profit with virtually no loss of volume; and most important;

(9)through these and many other steps, restored the earning capacity to a level commensurate with the capital employed.

哈里：

(1)把存货从400多万美元（大多数是周转率极低的）降低到100万美元以下，极大地降低了存货持有成本和淘汰过时的风险。

(2)释放出资本，我们将其用于投资有价证券，获得了40多万美元的收益。

(3)将销售和管理费用从每月150,000美元降低到75,000美元；

(4)将工厂营运成本从每直接工时6美元降低到4.5美元；

(5)关闭了五家不赚钱的分公司（保留了三家赚钱的），用效率更高的分销商取而代之；

(6)整顿了内布拉斯加州哥伦布市经营混乱的一家配件工厂；

(7)砍掉了消耗大量资金，却不能贡献利润的承包工程业务（释放出的资金可以投资证券获利）；

(8)调整了维修配件的价格，在不影响销量的情况下，增加了超过200,000美元的利润；

(9)最重要的是，通过包括上述措施在内的努力，让登普斯特恢复到与投入资本相称的盈利能力。

In 1963, the heavy corporate taxes we were facing (Harry surprised me by the speed with which he had earned up our tax loss carry-forward) coupled with excess liquid funds within the corporation compelled us to either in some way de-incorporate or to sell the business.

1963年，一方面，哈里恢复登普斯特盈利能力的速度比我预想的快得多，我们很快就用完了税损结转，需要缴纳巨额税款，另一方面，登普斯特公司有大量流动资金用不完，我们别无选择，只能想办法把公司注销或卖出去。

We set out to do either one or the other before the end of 1963. De-incorporating had many problems but would have, in effect, doubled earnings for our partners and also eliminated the problem of corporate capital gain tax on Dempster securities.

我们着手在1963年末之前解决这个问题。注销公司很麻烦，但是我们的合伙人可以多获得一倍的收益，而且不用为登普斯特持有的证券缴纳资本利得税。

At virtually the last minute, after several earlier deals had fallen through at reasonably advanced stages, a sale of assets was made. Although there were a good many wrinkles to the sale, the net effect was to bring approximately book value. This, coupled with the gain we have in our portfolio of marketable securities, gives us a realization of about $80 per share. Dempster (now named First Beatrice Corp. - we sold the name to the new Co.) is down to almost entirely cash and marketable securities now. On BPL's yearend audit, our First Beatrice holdings were valued at asset value (with securities at market) less a $200,000 reserve for various contingencies.

我们最初谈了几笔交易，都是快谈到最后时没谈妥。几乎到了最后一刻，我们达成了一笔出售资产的交易。虽说我们对这笔交易里的很多细节并不满意，但是整体来说，我们大概获得了净资产的价值。加上我们通过有价证券投资组合获得的收益，我们实现的价值是每股80美元。登普斯特（已更名为FirstBeatriceCorp.，我们将登普斯特商标出售给了新公司）现在几乎只剩下现金和有价证券了。在巴菲特合伙基金的年末审计中，我们持有的FirstBeatrice的估值方法是用资产价值（以市价计算证券价值）减去200,000美元储备金。

I might mention that we think the buyers will do very well with Dempster. They impress us as people of ability and they have sound plans to expand the business and its profitability. We would have been quite happy to operate Dempster on an unincorporated basis, but we are also quite happy to sell it for a reasonable price. Our business is making excellent purchases -- not making extraordinary sales.

顺便说一句，我认为买方会把登普斯特经营得很好。他们是很有能力的人，对于将来如何拓展业务和提升盈利能力，制定了完善的计划。无论是以非法人的形式经营登普斯特，还是以合理的价格卖出去，我们都很乐意。我们在投资中追求的是买得好，不是卖得好。

Harry works the same way I do -- he likes big carrots. He is presently a limited partner of BPL, and the next belt-tightening operation we have, he's our man.

哈里和我一样，我们都喜欢丰厚的奖赏。他目前已经是巴菲特合伙基金的有限合伙人，下次我们再有需要瘦身的公司，就会派哈里上阵。

The Dempster saga points up several morals:

(1)Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy. It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, why we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.

(2)We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improve our results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.”

从登普斯特的故事里，我可以得到以下两点启示：

(1)我们所做的投资需要耐心。有的投资组合里都是股价高飞、人见人爱的股票，我们根本不买这些股票。在热门股风头正劲时，我们的投资可能看起来乏善可陈。对于我们看好的股票，在我们买入时，它们的股价几个月甚至几年呆滞不动，对我们来说是好事。所以说，要给我们足够的时间，才能看出来我们的业绩如何。我们认为这个时间至少是三年。

(2)我们不能透露我们正在做的投资。把我们的投资说出去，提高不了我们的收益，还可能给我们带来严重损失。包括合伙人在内，无论是谁问我们是否看好某只股票，我们都会援引“宪法第五修正案”保持沉默。