巴菲特致股东的信（1977年）③保险事业的投资④银行业⑤蓝筹印花公司

Insurance Investments

During the past two years insurance investments at cost(excluding the investment in our affiliate, Blue Chip Stamps) have grown from $134.6 million to $252.8 million. Growth in insurance reserves, produced by our large gain in premium volume, plus retained earnings, have accounted for this increase in marketable securities. In turn, net investment income of the Insurance Group has improved from $8.4 million pre-tax in 1975 to $12.3 million pre-tax in 1977.

保险事业的投资

过去两年我们保险事业投入的资金成本(扣除对关系企业蓝筹印花的投资)已从原先的1.346亿美元成长到2.528亿美元，保险资金的成长，主要是由于保费收入的大幅增加，加上保留的盈余，是我们投资部位之所以大幅增加的原因，也因此，我们整体保险事业因为投资而增加的净收益也由1975年税前840万美元的利益成长到1977年的1,230万美元。

In addition to this income from dividends and interest, we realized capital gains of $6.9 million before tax, about one- quarter from bonds and the balance from stocks. Our unrealized gain in stocks at yearend 1977 was approximately $74 million but this figure, like any other figure of a single date (we had an unrealized loss of $17 million at the end of 1974), should not be taken too seriously. Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company; i.e., marketable common stocks.

除了股利与利息收入之外，我们还实现了税前690万美元的资本利得，四分之一来自债券，剩下的则来自股票，至于1977年年底未实现的资本利得大约在7,400万美元之谱，对于这个数字，就像任何单一日期的数字，(1974年底帐上有1,700万美元的未实现损失)大家不必看得太认真，因为我们持股部位比较大的投资，往往要持有很长一段时间，所以我们的投资绩效依据的是这些被投资公司在这段期间的经营表现，而不是特定时期的股票价格，就像我们认为买下一家公司却只关心他的短期状况是件很傻的事，同样地持有公司部份所有权-也就是股票，我们认为只关心短期盈余或者是盈余短暂的变动也不应该。

A little digression illustrating this point may be interesting. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing were merged in 1955 to form Berkshire Hathaway Inc. In 1948, on a pro forma combined basis, they had earnings after tax of almost $18 million and employed 10,000 people at a dozen large mills throughout New England. In the business world of that period they were an economic powerhouse. For example, in that same year earnings of IBM were $28 million (now $2.7 billion), Safeway Stores, $10 million, Minnesota Mining, $13 million, and Time, Inc., $9 million. But, in the decade following the 1955 merger aggregate sales of $595 million produced an aggregate loss for Berkshire Hathaway of $10 million. By 1964 the operation had been reduced to two mills and net worth had shrunk to $22 million, from $53 million at the time of the merger. So much for single year snapshots as adequate portrayals of a business.

离题一下，有一点很有趣足以说明上述情况，伯克希尔纺纱与Hathaway工业是在1955年合并成为伯克希尔Hathaway公司的，再将时间往回推到1948年，在拟制合并的基础下，当年他们合计税前盈余达到1,800万美元，旗下拥有十个遍布新英格兰地区的工厂，员工人数一万人，在当时的环境，他们算是经济成长的重要动力之一，因为IBM在同一年度的盈余也不过2,800万美元(现在的年获利达到27亿美元)，另外Safeway商店1,000万、3M只有1,300万而时代杂志则为900万，然而在双方合并后的十年内，累计营收虽然有5.95亿，但结算亏损却达到1,000万美元，时至1964年，公司的营运仅剩两家工厂，净值更从合并时的5,300万美元大幅缩减至2,200万美元，所以我们可以这样说，单一年度所透露出公司营运的景况实在是极其有限。

Equity holdings of our insurance companies with a market value of over $5 million on December 31, 1977 were as follows:

下表显示的是在1977年底我们旗下保险事业持有的市值超过5百万美元的投资部位：

We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price. We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term. In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.

我们投资股票的选择方式与买进整家企业的模式很相近，我们想要的企业必须是(1)我们可以了解的行业；(2)具有长期竞争力；(3)由德才兼具的人士所经营；(4)吸引人的价格。我们从来不试着去买进一些短期股价预期有所表现的股票。事实上，如果其企业的表现符合我们的预期，我们反而希望他们的股价不要太高，如此我们才有机会以更理想的价格买进更多的股权。

Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies. Consequently, bargains in business ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquisition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership. When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results by corporations will translate over the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority.

我们过去的经验显示，一家好公司部份所有权的价格，常常要比协议谈判买下整家要来得便宜许多，也因此想要拥有价廉物美的企业所有权，直接购并的方式往往不可得，还不如透过间接拥有股权的方式来达到目的，当价格合理，我们很愿意在某些特定的公司身上持有大量的股权，这样做不是为了要取得控制权，也不是为了将来再转卖出或是进行购并，而是期望企业本身能有好的表现，进而转化成企业长期的价值以及丰厚的股利收入，不论是少数股权或是多数股权皆是如此。

Such investments initially may have negligible impact on our operating earnings. For example, we invested $10.9 million in Capital Cities Communications during 1977. Earnings attributable to the shares we purchased totaled about $1.3 million last year. But only the cash dividend, which currently provides $40,000 annually, is reflected in our operating earnings figure.

这类的投资初期对于我们的经营利益的助益或许不大，举例来说，1977年我们投资了1,090万美元在资本城通讯公司之上，去年依照持股比例应可分得的盈余约为130万美元，但实在反应在我们财务报表上的却只有区区4万美元的现金股利。

Capital Cities possesses both extraordinary properties and extraordinary management. And these management skills extend equally to operations and employment of corporate capital. To purchase, directly, properties such as Capital Cities owns would cost in the area of twice our cost of purchase via the stock market, and direct ownership would offer no important advantages to us. While control would give us the opportunity - and the responsibility - to manage operations and corporate resources, we would not be able to provide management in either of those respects equal to that now in place. In effect, we can obtain a better management result through non-control than control. This is an unorthodox view, but one we believe to be sound.

资本城拥有优良的资产与优异的管理阶层，而这些管理技能同样也延伸至营运面及资金管理面，想要直接买下资本城所要花费的成本可能是两倍于间接透过股票市场投资，更何况直接拥有权对我们并没有多大的好处，控制权虽然让我们拥有机会，但同样也带来责任去管理企业的营运及资源，我们根本就没有能力提供现有管理阶层关于这些方面额外任何的助益，事实上，与其管还不如不管，更能得到好的结果，这样的观念或许很反常，但却是我们认为比较合适的。

Banking

In 1977 the Illinois National Bank continued to achieve a rate of earnings on assets about three times that of most large banks. As usual, this record was achieved while the bank paid maximum rates to savers and maintained an asset position combining low risk and exceptional liquidity. Gene Abegg formed the bank in 1931 with $250,000. In its first full year of operation, earnings amounted to $8,782. Since that time, no new capital has been contributed to the bank; on the contrary, since our purchase in 1969, dividends of $20 million have been paid. Earnings in 1977 amounted to $3.6 million, more than achieved by many banks two or three times its size.

银行业

1977年伊利诺国家银行的资产报酬率约为其它规模较大同业的三倍，一如往常，这样的成绩，还搭配给予存户最优惠的利率，同时维持风险最低流动性最高的资产组合，Gene Abegg在1931年以25万美元成立这家银行，在第一个完整的营业年度，盈余就达到8,782美元，从那时候开始，银行就没有再办理任何一次增资，相反地，当我们在1969年买下该公司时，马上就领到了2,000万美元的现金股利，1977年的盈余更达到360万美元，甚至比规模大他两三倍的银行同业还多。

Late last year Gene, now 80 and still running a banking operation without peer, asked that a successor be brought in. Accordingly, Peter Jeffrey, formerly President and Chief Executive Officer of American National Bank of Omaha, has joined the Illinois National Bank effective March 1st as President and Chief Executive Officer.

去年现年80岁依然一马当先专注于银行营运的Gene，要求新的接任者接手，因此前奥玛哈美国国家银行的总裁Peter Jeffrey于3/1正式加入伊利诺国家银行担任新总裁。

Gene continues in good health as Chairman. We expect a continued successful operation at Rockford’s leading bank.

老当益壮的Gene依然担任董事长，我们预期该银行仍将成为Rockford地区首区一指的银行(伊利诺州城市)。

Blue Chip Stamps

We again increased our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and owned approximately 36 1/2% at the end of 1977. Blue Chip had a fine year, earning approximately $12.9 million from operations and, in addition, had realized securities gains of $4.1 million.

蓝筹印花

我们再度增加对蓝筹印花的持股权益，截至1977年底，持有的股权比例大约是36.5%，蓝筹印花去年的表现相当不错，营业利益达到1,290万美元，此外还有410万的已实现资本利得。

Both Wesco Financial Corp., an 80% owned subsidiary of Blue Chip Stamps, managed by Louis Vincenti, and See’s Candies, a 99% owned subsidiary, managed by Chuck Huggins, made good progress in 1977. Since See’s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $4.2 million to $12.6 million with little additional capital investment. See’s achieved this record while operating in an industry experiencing practically no unit growth. Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. may obtain the annual report of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting it from Mr. Robert H. Bird, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.

蓝筹印花持有80%股权的Wesco金融公司(由Louis Vincenti所管理)及持有99%股权的子公司喜诗糖果(由Chuck Huggins所管理)在1977年都有重大进展，自从喜诗糖果在1972年被蓝筹印花所买下后，就没有投入任何额外的资本，其税前盈余从420万美元成长到1,260万美元，尤其难得的是喜诗所处的产业环境，几乎没有成长，若有需要伯克希尔的股东可向Mr.Robert(地址加州洛杉矶5801 South Eastern Avenue)索取蓝筹印花的年报。

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
March 14,1978

沃伦.巴菲特，董事会主席
1978年3月14日

Equity holdings of our insurance companies with a market value of over $5 million on December 31, 1977 were as follows:

Gene continues in good health as Chairman. We expect a continued successful operation at Rockford’s leading bank.

Blue Chip Stamps We again increased our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and owned approximately 36 1/2% at the end of 1977. Blue Chip had a fine year, earning approximately $12.9 million from operations and, in addition, had realized securities gains of $4.1 million.

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman March 14,1978

Blue Chip Stamps

We again increased our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and owned approximately 36 1/2% at the end of 1977. Blue Chip had a fine year, earning approximately $12.9 million from operations and, in addition, had realized securities gains of $4.1 million.

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
March 14,1978