巴菲特致股东的信（1986年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1986 was $492.5 million, or 26.1%. Over the last 22 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,073.06, or 23.3% compounded annually. Both the numerator and denominator are important in the per-share book value calculation: during the 22-year period our corporate net worth has increased 10,600% while shares outstanding have increased less than 1%.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

本公司 1986 年的账面价值增加了 4.925 亿美元，或增长了 26.1%(标普 18.6%)，自现任管理层接手的 22 年以来，每股账面价值由 19.46 美元增长到现在的 2,073.06 美元，年复合增长率为 23.3%。在计算每股帐面价值时，分子与分母都很重要，过去 22 年公司帐面价值虽然增加 106 倍，但流通股却增加不到 1%。

In past reports I have noted that book value at most companies differs widely from intrinsic business value - the number that really counts for owners. In our own case, however, book value has served for more than a decade as a reasonable if somewhat conservative proxy for business value. That is, our business value has moderately exceeded our book value, with the ratio between the two remaining fairly steady.

在过去的年报中我多次提醒，大多数公司的帐面价值与其实际的内在价值存在极大的差异，内在价值对股东来说非常重要，在我们自身案例中，过去十多年来帐面价值可以作为内在价值一个合理偏保守的指标。也就是说伯克希尔的内在价值略微超越其帐面价值，两者之间的比率非常稳定。

The good news is that in 1986 our percentage gain in business value probably exceeded the book value gain. I say "probably" because business value is a soft number: in our own case, two equally well-informed observers might make judgments more than 10% apart.

好消息是，在 1986 年我们内在价值的增长可能超过帐面价值增长，我说“可能”是因为内在价值的判断较为模糊，就我们自己来说，两个同样完全了解本公司的人给出的估值可能会相差 10%以上。

A large measure of our improvement in business value relative to book value reflects the outstanding performance of key managers at our major operating businesses. These managers - the Blumkins, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - have over the years improved the earnings of their businesses dramatically while, except in the case of insurance, utilizing little additional capital. This accomplishment builds economic value, or "Goodwill," that does not show up in the net worth figure on our balance sheet, nor in our per-share book value. In 1986 this unrecorded gain was substantial.

我们内在价值的增长要归功于旗下经理人的出色表现，他们是：家具业务的 Blumkins 家族，保险业务的Mike Goldberg，制服业务的 Heldmans 家族，糖果业务的 Chuck Huggins，报纸业务的 Stan Lipsey 与制造业务的 Ralph Schey 等人，除了保险业外，这些企业在几乎没有新增资本投入的情况下，稳定地提高了公司的现金产出能力，这就是典型的经济价值商誉，虽然在我们资产负债表或每股账面价值里找不出来，但在 1986 年这一未被记录的收益却极为显著。

So much for the good news. The bad news is that my performance did not match that of our managers. While they were doing a superb job in running our businesses, I was unable to skillfully deploy much of the capital they generated. Charlie Munger, our Vice Chairman, and I really have only two jobs. One is to attract and keep outstanding managers to run our various operations. This hasn’t been all that difficult. Usually the managers came with the companies we bought, having demonstrated their talents throughout careers that spanned a wide variety of business circumstances. They were managerial stars long before they knew us, and our main contribution has been to not get in their way. This approach seems elementary: if my job were to manage a golf team - and if Jack Nicklaus or Arnold Palmer were willing to play for me - neither would get a lot of directives from me about how to swing.

讲完了好消息，接下来的坏消息是本人的表现与这些优秀的经理人不相匹配，当他们在各自的岗位上奋力生产现金，可是我却没能好好有效地利用。查理·芒格跟我平时主要只有两项工作，一个是吸引并留住优秀的经理人来管理我们的各项业务，这项工作并不太难，通常在我们买下一家企业时，其经理人便随同而来，早在我们认识他们之前便已在各自领域展现出他们的经营才华，我们主要贡献就是不妨碍到他们即可，这点非常重要，如果我的工作是管理一支职业高尔夫球队，若 Jack Nicklaus 或 Arnold Palmer 愿意替我效力，他们根本不会问我如何挥杆。

Some of our key managers are independently wealthy (we hope they all become so), but that poses no threat to their continued interest: they work because they love what they do and relish the thrill of outstanding performance. They unfailingly think like owners (the highest compliment we can pay a manager) and find all aspects of their business absorbing.

其实我们一些经理人自己本身已经相当富有(当然我们希望所有的经理人都如此)，但这一点都不影响他们继续为公司效力，他们之所以工作是因为乐在其中，享受工作带来的成就感。他们皆站在老板的角度看事情，这是我们对这些经理人最高的恭维，而且你会为他们经营业务各方面成就所着迷。

(Our prototype for occupational fervor is the Catholic tailor who used his small savings of many years to finance a pilgrimage to the Vatican. When he returned, his parish held a special meeting to get his first-hand account of the Pope. "Tell us," said the eager faithful, "just what sort of fellow is he?" Our hero wasted no words: "He’s a forty-four, medium.")

这种职业病有一个原型：一位天主教的裁缝省吃俭用了好几年，好不容易凑够盘缠去梵蒂冈朝圣，当他回来后，教友们特地集会争相想要了解他对教宗的第一手描述，赶快告诉我们，教宗到底是个怎么样的人，只见这位裁逢师，淡淡地说︰四十四腰，中等身材。

Charlie and I know that the right players will make almost any team manager look good. We subscribe to the philosophy of Ogilvy & Mather’s founding genius, David Ogilvy: "If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants."

查理跟我都知道，好球员让任何球队经理人看起来都做的不错，就像是奥美广告创办人 David Ogilvy 曾说︰如果我们都雇用比自己矮小的人，那么我们会变成一群株孺，相反地，我们能找到一群比我们更高大的人，我们将成为巨头。

A by-product of our managerial style is the ability it gives us to easily expand Berkshire’s activities. We’ve read management treatises that specify exactly how many people should report to any one executive, but they make little sense to us. When you have able managers of high character running businesses about which they are passionate, you can have a dozen or more reporting to you and still have time for an afternoon nap. Conversely, if you have even one person reporting to you who is deceitful, inept or uninterested, you will find yourself with more than you can handle. Charlie and I could work with double the number of managers we now have, so long as they had the rare qualities of the present ones.

我们的这种企业文化使得我们可以很容易地去扩展伯克希尔的业务版图，我们看过许多管理著作，讲述一个主管只能管辖一定人数的人员，对我们来说这些管理学一点意义都没有。当你手下有一群正直又能干的人才，在帮你经营一项他们深具感情的事业时，你大可以同时管理一打以上这样的人，而且还行有余力打个盹，相反地，若他们存心要欺骗你或是能力不够或是没有热情时，只要一个就够你操心的了。只要找对人，查理与我同时管理比现在多一倍的经理人都没有问题。

We intend to continue our practice of working only with people whom we like and admire. This policy not only maximizes our chances for good results, it also ensures us an extraordinarily good time. On the other hand, working with people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marrying for money - probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but absolute madness if you are already rich.

我们将会继续维持这种与我们喜爱与敬佩的经理人合作的原则，这种原则不但可以确保经营的绩效极大化，也可以让我们能享受愉快的时光。仅仅为了赚点钱天天要与一些会令你反胃的人为共事，这感觉就像你本来就已经很有钱了，还为了钱跟不喜欢的人结婚一样，那绝对是疯了。

The second job Charlie and I must handle is the allocation of capital, which at Berkshire is a considerably more important challenge than at most companies. Three factors make that so: we earn more money than average; we retain all that we earn; and, we are fortunate to have operations that, for the most part, require little incremental capital to remain competitive and to grow. Obviously, the future results of a business earning 23% annually and retaining it all are far more affected by today’s capital allocations than are the results of a business earning 10% and distributing half of that to shareholders. If our retained earnings - and those of our major investees, GEICO and Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. - are employed in an unproductive manner, the economics of Berkshire will deteriorate very quickly. In a company adding only, say, 5% to net worth annually, capital-allocation decisions, though still important, will change the company’s economics far more slowly.

查理跟我的第二项工作是处理资金的分配，相比大多数公司来说这对伯克希尔尤其重要，其主要原因有三：一是我们现金生产能力超过平均水平，二是我们赚的钱都保留下来而不分红，三是最重要的，我们旗下的业务几乎不需要额外投入资金便能保持竞争力与增长。显然，一家每年能赚 23%且全数保留收益的公司，相比一家每年赚 10%且只保留半数收益的公司，前者资金配置的任务对未来的业绩影响更大。如果将来伯克希尔以及旗下主要被投资公司 GEICO 保险、大都会/ABC 公司等公司的资本配置不佳，则伯克希尔经营情况恶化的程度将会非常地快，而每年只有 5%净值增长的公司其资金分配的工作对公司影响就要小的多。

Capital allocation at Berkshire was tough work in 1986. We did make one business acquisition - The Fechheimer Bros. Company, which we will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer is a company with excellent economics, run by exactly the kind of people with whom we enjoy being associated. But it is relatively small, utilizing only about 2% of Berkshire’s net worth.

在 1986 年伯克希尔资金分配的工作并不好干，我们确实是完成了一项并购案：收购了费区海默兄弟制服公司(Fechheimer)，后面我们还会有详细的描述。这家公司极具竞争力，而且是由那种我们喜欢交往的人在经营，不过就是规模小了点，仅运用了伯克希尔不到 2%净值的资金。

Meanwhile, we had no new ideas in the marketable equities field, an area in which once, only a few years ago, we could readily employ large sums in outstanding businesses at very reasonable prices. So our main capital allocation moves in 1986 were to pay off debt and stockpile funds. Neither is a fate worse than death, but they do not inspire us to do handsprings either. If Charlie and I were to draw blanks for a few years in our capital-allocation endeavors, Berkshire’s rate of growth would slow significantly.

在此同时，我们从市场直接买进股权这方面也没有太大的进展，相较几年前我们可以很容易地用大笔资金以合理的价格买进许多不错的股票，而现在市场上这种机会却极少。因此，1986 年我们主要的资本配置策略举措是偿还债务并囤积资金，虽然这比死掉还好一点，但却没有做到繁衍下一代的任务，如果查理跟我在往后的几年持续在资金配置交白卷，伯克希尔账面价值的增长将显著放缓。

We will continue to look for operating businesses that meet our tests and, with luck, will acquire such a business every couple of years. But an acquisition will have to be large if it is to help our performance materially. Under current stock market conditions, we have little hope of finding equities to buy for our insurance companies. Markets will change significantly - you can be sure of that and some day we will again get our turn at bat. However, we haven’t the faintest idea when that might happen.

我们会持续在市场上寻找符合我们标准的企业，幸运的是，每隔几年都能找到一家，但若想要对公司账面价值有明显助益，则收购规模必须够大，只是以目前的股票市场状况，我们实在很难为我们的保险公司找到合适的投资标的，当然市场终究会转变，总有一天会轮到我们上场，只是不清楚是什么时间。

It can’t be said too often (although I’m sure you feel I’ve tried) that, even under favorable conditions, our returns are certain to drop substantially because of our enlarged size. We have told you that we hope to average a return of 15% on equity and we maintain that hope, despite some negative tax law changes described in a later section of this report. If we are to achieve this rate of return, our net worth must increase $7.2 billion in the next ten years. A gain of that magnitude will be possible only if, before too long, we come up with a few very big (and good) ideas. Charlie and I can’t promise results, but we do promise you that we will keep our efforts focused on our goals.

即使在市场有利的条件下，我们的回报记录也肯定会因为规模扩大而下降，这一点再怎么说也不为过，我们希望平均股本回报率达到 15%，并保持这一水准，尽管本报告后面部分描述了一些负面的税法变化。要实现我们的目标，净资产必须在未来十年增加 72 亿美元，我们将来需要找到一些又大又好的机会才能实现如此巨大的收益。查理和我不能保证实现，但我们向你保证，我们将把努力集中在我们的目标上。