巴菲特致股东的信（1986年）⑦税负

Taxation

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects our various businesses in important and divergent ways. Although we find much to praise in the Act, the net financial effect for Berkshire is negative: our rate of increase in business value is likely to be at least moderately slower under the new law than under the old. The net effect for our shareholders is even more negative: every dollar of increase in per-share business value, assuming the increase is accompanied by an equivalent dollar gain in the market value of Berkshire stock, will produce 72 cents of after-tax gain for our shareholders rather than the 80 cents produced under the old law. This result, of course, reflects the rise in the maximum tax rate on personal capital gains from 20% to 28%.

税负

1986 年通过的《税收改革法案》对我们旗下许多业务产生了重要而不同的影响。尽管我们在该法案中发现了许多值得称赞的地方，但伯克希尔的净财务效应是负面的：在新法案下，我们的企业价值增长速度会适度放缓。对我们股东的净效应更为负面：假设每股账面价值每增加 1 美元，伯克希尔股票的市值也会增加 1 美元，那么我们的股东将获得 72 美分的税后收益，而不是原来的 80 美分，主要是因为个人资本利得的上限税率由 20%调高到28%的缘故。

Here are the main tax changes that affect Berkshire:

兹将对伯克希尔所有影响列示如下：

o The tax rate on corporate ordinary income is scheduled to decrease from 46% in 1986 to 34% in 1988. This change obviously affects us positively - and it also has a significant positive effect on two of our three major investees, Capital Cities/ABC and The Washington Post Company.

o 企业一般收入的税率由 46%减少到 34%，这个变化对我们的影响颇为正面，同时包含我们三个主要的被投资业务中的两个：大都会/ABC 与华盛顿邮报。

I say this knowing that over the years there has been a lot of fuzzy and often partisan commentary about who really pays corporate taxes - businesses or their customers. The argument, of course, has usually turned around tax increases, not decreases. Those people resisting increases in corporate rates frequently argue that corporations in reality pay none of the taxes levied on them but, instead, act as a sort of economic pipeline, passing all taxes through to consumers. According to these advocates, any corporate-tax increase will simply lead to higher prices that, for the corporation, offset the increase. Having taken this position, proponents of the "pipeline" theory must also conclude that a tax decrease for corporations will not help profits but will instead flow through, leading to correspondingly lower prices for consumers.

之所以这样说，是因为多年来在不同政党间一直存在的争论：到底是企业或是消费者在支付所得税？这种争论最后通常导致企业税负增加而不是减少，反对调涨税率的一派认为，不管税率有高，企业总是有办法将税负成本转嫁到消费者身上，导致产品价格调高，以弥补税负上的支出，反之调降税率并不会增加企业的获利，而是会使产品价格下跌。

Conversely, others argue that corporations not only pay the taxes levied upon them, but absorb them also. Consumers, this school says, will be unaffected by changes in corporate rates.

另一派则认为企业不但要支付税负，同时还要吸收调涨的税负成本，所以对消费者来说一点影响都没有。

What really happens? When the corporate rate is cut, do Berkshire, The Washington Post, Cap Cities, etc., themselves soak up the benefits, or do these companies pass the benefits along to their customers in the form of lower prices? This is an important question for investors and managers, as well as for policymakers.

事实到底是怎样呢？当企业税率减少，伯克希尔、华盛顿邮报或是大都会公司他们自己是将所有获利放到自己口袋，还是通过降价将利益转移给消费者？这对投资人、经理人或是政策制定者来说，都是一个很重要的问题。

Our conclusion is that in some cases the benefits of lower corporate taxes fall exclusively, or almost exclusively, upon the corporation and its shareholders, and that in other cases the benefits are entirely, or almost entirely, passed through to the customer. What determines the outcome is the strength of the corporation’s business franchise and whether the profitability of that franchise is regulated.

最后我们自己得到的结论是，部分企业会将减税的利益全部或是大部交到企业与其股东的手上，另一部分的企业则是将利益完全或者大部分转移到消费者身上，决定的关键在于，企业本身的竞争优势(特许经营权)以及该竞争优势的获利能力是否受到政府管制。

For example, when the franchise is strong and after-tax profits are regulated in a relatively precise manner, as is the case with electric utilities, changes in corporate tax rates are largely reflected in prices, not in profits. When taxes are cut, prices will usually be reduced in short order. When taxes are increased, prices will rise, though often not as promptly.

举例来说，当特性经营权很强的企业如电力事业，其获利程度受到法规管制，税率调降将直接立即反应在电力价格而非电力公司获利数字之上，反之亦然，当税收增加时，价格会上涨，尽管上涨往往没有那么迅速。

A similar result occurs in a second arena - in the price-competitive industry, whose companies typically operate with very weak business franchises. In such industries, the free market "regulates" after-tax profits in a delayed and irregular, but generally effective, manner. The marketplace, in effect, performs much the same function in dealing with the price-competitive industry as the Public Utilities Commission does in dealing with electric utilities. In these industries, therefore, tax changes eventually affect prices more than profits.

在价格竞争激烈的产业中，会出现类似的结果。这类型的企业通常竞争优势薄弱，不得不通过自由竞争市场慢慢地将税后变化反应到产品价格之上，这种市场价格反应机制与前面所提的公用电力事业相类似，税负减少对价格的影响，远大于对获利的影响。

In the case of unregulated businesses blessed with strong franchises, however, it’s a different story: the corporation and its shareholders are then the major beneficiaries of tax cuts. These companies benefit from a tax cut much as the electric company would if it lacked a regulator to force down prices.

然而，拥有强大特许经营权且较不受政府管制的企业，情况就完全不同了。企业与其背后的股东将会是最大的受益者，这些公司从减税中受益，就像电力公司缺乏监管机构来强制压低价格一样。

Many of our businesses, both those we own in whole and in part, possess such franchises. Consequently, reductions in their taxes largely end up in our pockets rather than the pockets of our customers. While this may be impolitic to state, it is impossible to deny. If you are tempted to believe otherwise, think for a moment of the most able brain surgeon or lawyer in your area. Do you really expect the fees of this expert (the local "franchise-holder" in his or her specialty) to be reduced now that the top personal tax rate is being cut from 50% to 28%?

许多我们全资拥有或部分拥有的业务都拥有这样的特许经营权。所有降税的好处最后都落到我们而非消费者的口袋里，虽然这样讲有点冒昧，却很难加以否认。若你一时无法接受这项事实，看看你所在地区最有能力的脑外科医生或律师，难道你会认为这些专业人士(也算是个人专业中的当地“特许经营持有人”)会因为个人所得税率从 50%减少到 28%，而调降其收费标准吗？

Your joy at our conclusion that lower rates benefit a number of our operating businesses and investees should be severely tempered, however, by another of our convictions: scheduled 1988 tax rates, both individual and corporate, seem totally unrealistic to us. These rates will very likely bestow a fiscal problem on Washington that will prove incompatible with price stability. We believe, therefore, that ultimately - within, say, five years - either higher tax rates or higher inflation rates are almost certain to materialize. And it would not surprise us to see both.

不过对于上述结论大家不要高兴的太早，因为预计在 1988 年实施的减税方案对我们一点来说有点不太切实际，因为可以预期的是这些减税方案将会造成未来华府的财政困难，进而对物价稳定有严重影响，所以可预期的在未来五年之内，高税率或是高通膨将会再现，且很有可能两者都会同时发生。

o Corporate capital gains tax rates have been increased from 28% to 34%, effective in 1987. This change will have an important adverse effect on Berkshire because we expect much of our gain in business value in the future, as in the past, to arise from capital gains. For example, our three major investment holdings - Cap Cities, GEICO, and Washington Post - at yearend had a market value of over $1.7 billion, close to 75% of the total net worth of Berkshire, and yet they deliver us only about $9 million in annual income. Instead, all three retain a very high percentage of their earnings, which we expect to eventually deliver us capital gains.

o 企业资本利得税率从 1987 年起将从原来的 28%调高到 34%，这种改变对于伯克希尔来说将有重大影响，因为我们预计，未来我们的业务价值增长中，很大一部分将来自于资本收益，就像过去一样。例如我们主要的三大投资：大都会/ABC、GEICO 保险与华盛顿邮报，年末总市值已高达 17 亿美元，约占伯克希尔账面价值的 75%，但每年反应在公司帐上的收益却只有 900 万美元，相反，这三家公司都保留了很高比例的收益，我们预计这最终将为我们带来资本收益。

The new law increases the rate for all gains realized in the future, including the unrealized gains that existed before the law was enacted. At yearend, we had $1.2 billion of such unrealized gains in our equity investments. The effect of the new law on our balance sheet will be delayed because a GAAP rule stipulates that the deferred tax liability applicable to unrealized gains should be stated at last year’s 28% tax rate rather than the current 34% rate. This rule is expected to change soon. The moment it does, about $73 million will disappear from our GAAP net worth and be added to the deferred tax account.

新法案提高了所有未实现收益的资本利得税负，包含过去新法修正之前已存在的未实现收益，到年底为止，我们帐上有高达 12 亿未实现股票投资利得，新法律对我们资产负债表的影响将被推迟，因为 GAAP 规定，适用于未实现收益的递延税务责任应按去年的 28%税率而不是目前的 34%税率列报。预计这条 GAAP 规则很快就会改变。一旦这样改变，将会使得公司账面价值减少 7300 万美元，并被添加到递延税款账户上了。

o Dividend and interest income received by our insurance companies will be taxed far more heavily under the new law. First, all corporations will be taxed on 20% of the dividends they receive from other domestic corporations, up from 15% under the old law. Second, there is a change concerning the residual 80% that applies only to property/casualty companies: 15% of that residual will be taxed if the stocks paying the dividends were purchased after August 7, 1986. A third change, again applying only to property/casualty companies, concerns tax-exempt bonds: interest on bonds purchased by insurers after August 7, 1986 will only be 85% tax-exempt.

o 保险业务收到的股利与利息收入的税负将比过去更重，首先企业从国内公司收到的股利税率将从 15%增加到20%，第二是有关财产意外险业者剩下的 80%的股利，若股票是在 1986 年 8 月 7 日以后取得的，还要再加课15%的所得税，第三也是与财产意外险业者相关，也就是在 1986 年 8 月 7 日以后取得的免税债券，将只有 85%的比例可以免税。

The last two changes are very important. They mean that our income from the investments we make in future years will be significantly lower than would have been the case under the old law. My best guess is that these changes alone will eventually reduce the earning power of our insurance operation by at least 10% from what we could previously have expected.

后面两项的变动非常重要，代表我们在以后年度，投资所得将会比旧法律来的少，我个人估计，这些变化最终将使我们的保险业务的盈利能力降低约 10%。

o The new tax law also materially changes the timing of tax payments by property/casualty insurance companies. One new rule requires us to discount our loss reserves in our tax returns, a change that will decrease deductions and increase taxable income. Another rule, to be phased in over six years, requires us to include 20% of our unearned premium reserve in taxable income.

o 新税法也会大幅影响财产意外险公司支付税负的时点，新规定要求我们在报税时将所提列的损失准备折现，这一变化将减少扣除额并增加应税收入。另一项规则，将在六年内分阶段实施，要求我们将未赚取的保费准备金的 20%纳入应税收入。

Neither rule changes the amount of the annual tax accrual in our reports to you, but each materially accelerates the schedule of payments. That is, taxes formerly deferred will now be front-ended, a change that will significantly cut the profitability of our business. An analogy will suggest the toll: if, upon turning 21, you were required to immediately pay tax on all income you were due to receive throughout your life, both your lifetime wealth and your estate would be a small fraction of what they would be if all taxes on your income were payable only when you died.

虽然两者并不影响报表中应付所得税的数字，但却都会大幅加速我们支付税金的时点，意味着以前递延的税收现在将会提前缴纳，这对我们的获利能力将有相当大的影响。这好比当你 21 岁成年时，便被要求要对你一生所能赚得的收入预先课税，则你的终生财富将会比原来你死时再课税要来的少的多。

Attentive readers may spot an inconsistency in what we say. Earlier, discussing companies in price-competitive industries, we suggested that tax increases or reductions affect these companies relatively little, but instead are largely passed along to their customers. But now we are saying that tax increases will affect profits of Berkshire’s property/casualty companies even though they operate in an intensely price-competitive industry.

细心的读者可能会发现一项与我们先前所说不一致的地方，刚刚提到在价格竞争激烈的产业，我们认为税负的增减，只会将变化移转到客户的身上，对公司的获利影响有限，不过以目前正处在激烈竞争的财产意外险业来说，税负的增加直接影响的却是公司的获利能力。

The reason this industry is likely to be an exception to our general rule is that not all major insurers will be working with identical tax equations. Important differences will exist for several reasons: a new alternative minimum tax will materially affect some companies but not others; certain major insurers have huge loss carry-forwards that will largely shield their income from significant taxes for at least a few years; and the results of some large insurers will be folded into the consolidated returns of companies with non-insurance businesses. These disparate conditions will produce widely varying marginal tax rates in the property/casualty industry. That will not be the case, however, in most other price-competitive industries, such as aluminum, autos and department stores, in which the major players will generally contend with similar tax equations.

这个行业可能是一个例外，原因是，不是所有的主要保险公司将工作与相同的税收方程式。存在重大差异的原因有几个：新的替代性最低税收将对一些公司产生实质性影响，但对其他公司没有影响；某些大型保险公司有巨额亏损结转，这将在很大程度上保护它们的收入在至少几年内不受重大税收的影响；一些大型保险公司的业绩将纳入非保险业务公司的综合收益。这些不同的条件将导致财产意外险的边际税率差异很大。然而，在铝、汽车和百货公司等大多数其他价格竞争性行业，情况并非如此，在这些行业，主要参与者通常会面临类似的税收方式。

The absence of a common tax calculus for property/casualty companies means that the increased taxes falling on the industry will probably not be passed along to customers to the degree that they would in a typical price-competitive industry. Insurers, in other words, will themselves bear much of the new tax burdens.

税负成本基础不一，导致差异无法像在典型的价格竞争性行业那样完全转移到客户的身上，保险公司本身必须吸收大部分的税务负担。

o A partial offset to these burdens is a "fresh start" adjustment that occurred on January 1, 1987 when our December 31, 1986 loss reserve figures were converted for tax purposes to the newly-required discounted basis. (In our reports to you, however, reserves will remain on exactly the same basis as in the past - undiscounted except in special cases such as structured settlements.) The net effect of the "fresh start" is to give us a double deduction: we will get a tax deduction in 1987 and future years for a portion of our-incurred-but-unpaid insurance losses that have already been fully deducted as costs in 1986 and earlier years.

o 另外部分负担可被 1987 年 1 月 1 日发生的“重新开始”调整所抵免，虽然当我们在 1986 年 12 月 31 日提列的损失准备，依照新税法规定，在 1987 年认列时将被打折，(当然在给各位的财务报告上的数字仍维持不变)，不过“重新开始”的净效应是给我们一个双重扣抵：我们将在 1987 年和未来几年获得部分已发生但未支付的保险损失的税收减免，这些损失已在 1986 年及更早年份已完全扣除为成本。

The increase in net worth that is produced by this change is not yet reflected in our financial statements. Rather, under present GAAP rules (which may be changed), the benefit will flow into the earnings statement and, consequently, into net worth over the next few years by way of reduced tax charges. We expect the total benefit from the fresh-start adjustment to be in the $30 - $40 million range. It should be noted, however, that this is a one-time benefit, whereas the negative impact of the other insurance-related tax changes is not only ongoing but, in important respects, will become more severe as time passes.

这一变化产生的账面价值增加尚未反应在年度的资产负债表上，依照现行的 GAAP 原则，这项影响数将会陆续反应在未来的损益表的减税利益上，我们预期这项重新的调整将会使得公司账面价值增加 3000-4000 万美元，不过须特别注意的是，这种优惠只是一次性的，而其它不利的税负增加却是永久的。

o The General Utilities Doctrine was repealed by the new tax law. This means that in 1987 and thereafter there will be a double tax on corporate liquidations, one at the corporate level and another at the shareholder level. In the past, the tax at the corporate level could be avoided, If Berkshire, for example, were to be liquidated - which it most certainly won’t be - shareholders would, under the new law, receive far less from the sales of our properties than they would have if the properties had been sold in the past, assuming identical prices in each sale. Though this outcome is theoretical in our case, the change in the law will very materially affect many companies. Therefore, it also affects our evaluations of prospective investments. Take, for example, producing oil and gas businesses, selected media companies, real estate companies, etc. that might wish to sell out. The values that their shareholders can realize are likely to be significantly reduced simply because the General Utilities Doctrine has been repealed - though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all. My impression is that this important change in the law has not yet been fully comprehended by either investors or managers.

o 公用事业原则在新税法实施后将被废除，意思是说在 1987 年以后，对于企业的清算将双重征税，一个是在企业层面，一个是在股东个人层面。在过去企业层面的税负可通过适当方法予以规避，举例来说，假设今天我们把伯克希尔清算，(当然这是不可能的事)，在新制之下，公司股东从我们物业的销售中获得的收益，将比过去旧制时代少了很多，假设出售价格相同。虽然这只是假设，但事实上却影响到许多准备清算的公司，同样也会影响我们对投资标的的评估，如石油业、媒体业、或不动产业等等。虽然公司实际经营状况并没有多大改变，但其处分价值却因税法的修订而有极大的变动。个人认为，一般投资人或基金经理人可能尚未完全了解其严重性。

This section of our report has been longer and more complicated than I would have liked. But the changes in the law are many and important, particularly for property/casualty insurers. As I have noted, the new law will hurt Berkshire’s results, but the negative impact is impossible to quantify with any precision.

我们报告的这一部分比我所希望的要长和复杂，但法律的变化是多方面的，也是重要的，特别是对财产意外保险公司而言。正如我所指出的，新法律将损害伯克希尔的业绩，但其负面影响无法以任何精确度量化。