巴菲特致股东的信（1989年）⑧过去25年所犯的错误(浓缩版)

Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years (A Condensed Version)

To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.

过去 25 年所犯的错误(浓缩版)

套用 Robert Benchley 的名言：“养狗能教会男孩忠诚、忍耐，并在躺下前先转三圈。”这就是经验传承的难处。尽管如此，在犯下一个错误之前，最好能够先反省一下以前的那些错误，所以让我们花点时间回顾一下过去 25 年的经验。

o My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing - to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.

o 首先我所犯的第一个错误，就是买下伯克希尔纺织的控制权，虽然我很清楚纺织这个产业没什么前景，却因为它的价格实在很便宜而受其所引诱，虽然在早期投资这样的股票确实让我获利颇丰，但在 1965 年投资伯克希尔后，我就开始发现这终究不是个理想的投资模式。

If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.

如果你以很低的价格买进一家公司的股票，应该很容易有机会以不错的获利出脱了结，虽然长期而言这家公司的经营结果可能很糟糕，我将这种投资方法称之为“烟蒂”投资法，在路边随地可见的香烟头捡起来可以让你吸一口，解一解烟瘾，但“廉价购买”将使这最后一口也利润不菲。

Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.

不过除非你是清算专家，否则买下这类公司实在是属于傻瓜行径。第一，长期而言，原来看起来划算的价格到最后可能一点都不便宜。在经营艰困的企业中，通常一个问题才刚解决，另外一个问题就又冒出来，厨房里绝不会只有一只蟑螂。第二，先前的价差优势很快地就会被企业赚取的低回报绩效所侵蚀。例如你用 800 万美元买下一家清算价值达 1,000 万美元的公司，若你能马上把这家公司给处理掉，不管是出售或是清算都好，换算下来你的报酬可能会很可观。但是若这家公司要花上你十年的时间才有办法把它给处理掉，而在这之前你只能拿回一点点可怜的股利的话，那么这项投资将会令人失望。时间是好公司的朋友，但却是烂公司最大的敌人。

You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."

或许你会认为这道理再简单不过了，不过我却必须经历惨痛的教训才真正的学习到。在买下伯克希尔不久之后，我又买了巴尔的摩一家百货公司：科恩百货(Hochschild Kohn)，通过多元零售公司收购的(后来与伯克希尔合并，1987 年将联合零售商店售出 Joseph Noban)，我以账面价值相当高的折扣买下这家公司，经营的人也属一流，整个交易甚至还包括一些额外的东西：未实现的房地产增值收益与后进先出法的存货会计原则。这我怎会错过？还好三年之后，算我走运，能够以成本左右的价格脱身，在跟科恩百货结束商业关系后，我只有一个感想，就像一首乡村歌曲的歌词所述的，“我的老婆跟我最要好的朋友跑了，然而我还是十分怀念我的朋友。”

I could give you other personal examples of "bargain-purchase" folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements.

我可以给各位其他廉价购买的愚蠢例子，但我相信你已经明白：以合理的价格买下一家好公司，要比用便宜的价格买下一家普通的公司要好的多。查理老早就明白这个道理，我的反应则比较慢，不过现在当我们投资公司或股票时，我们不但选择最好的公司，同时这些公司还要有好的经理人。

o That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand.

o 从这里我们又学到了一课：好骑师也要骑好马才能有好成绩，骑劣马也不行。像伯克希尔纺织与科恩百货也都有才能兼具的人在管理，很不幸的他们所面临的是流沙般的困境，若受雇于体质更好的公司，相信他们应该会有更好的成绩。

I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."

我曾说过好几次：当一个绩效卓著的经理人遇到一家恶名昭彰的企业，通常会是后者占上风，但愿我再也没有那么多精力来创造新的例子，我以前的行为就像是 Mae West 曾说的︰“曾经我是个白雪公主，不过如今我已不再清白。”

o A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.

o 另外还学到一个教训：选容易的事做。25 年来，查理和我一直在购买和管理各种各样的业务，但我们还是没能学会如何去解决难题，不过我们倒学会了如何去避免问题。从某种程度上说，我们之所以能够成功，是因为我们专注于识别一英尺的跨栏，而不是因为我们获得了跨越七英尺的能力。

The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.

这项发现看起来似乎不太公平，但在商业和投资领域，简单地坚持简单而显而易见的做法，通常比解决困难要好得多。当然，有时也必须去解决棘手的难题，就像是我们刚开始在布法罗创办周末版一样。在其他时候，当一家好公司遇到可以一次性解决的暂时难关，也会出现绝佳的投资机会，就像是以前美国运通与 GEICO 保险都曾经一度发生状况。不过总的来说，我们尽量做到回避妖龙，而不是冒险去屠龙。

o My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.

o 我最意外的发现是：一股看不见的力量在商业中发挥着压倒性的重要性。我们称之为“制度迫力”，在学校时没有人告诉我这种迫力的存在，而我进入商业世界时也没有直观地理解它。我当时以为，任何正直、聪明有经验的经理人都会很自动的做出理性决策，但慢慢地我发现，事实并非如此。相反，当制度迫力发挥影响时，理性往往会变质。

For example: (1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.

举例来说：(1)就好象是受牛顿第一运动定律支配，任何一个组织机构都会抵抗对现有方向做任何的改变(一致性)，(2)就像我们会用工作来填满所有的时间那样，企业的项目计划或并购案永远有足够的理由将资金耗尽，(3)管理层的商业欲望，不管有多离谱，他的团队永远可以找到可以支持其理论的投资评估分析报告，(4)同业的举动，不管是做扩张、并购、设定高管薪酬还是其他什么，都会被盲目模仿。

Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.

制度迫力，而非腐败或愚蠢，推动企业走上这些道路。由于我忽略了这种习惯性的力量，我犯了一些代价高昂的错误，我试图以尽量减少其影响的方式组织和管理伯克希尔，同时查理跟我也试着将我们的投资集中在对于这种问题有相当警觉的公司之上。

o After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.

o 在犯下其它几个错误之后，我学会了只与我们所欣赏喜爱与信任的人往来。就像是我之前曾提到的，这种原则本身不会保证你一定成功，二流的纺织工厂或是百货公司，不会只因为管理人员是那种你会想把女儿嫁给他的人就会成功的，然而公司的老板或是投资人却可以因为与那些真正具有商业头脑的人打交道而获益良多，相反地我们不愿意跟那些不具令人尊敬特质的人为伍，不管他的公司有多吸引人都一样。永远不会想着与坏人做成一笔好生意。

o Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.

o 我犯下的一些更为严重的错误却没有那么明显：一些明明我很熟悉了解的股票或公司，却因故没有投资。错失一些能力圈之外的大好机会当然没有罪，但是我却白白错过一些自动送上门，应该把握却没有好好把握的好买卖，对于伯克希尔的股东，当然包括我自己在内，这种损失是难以估计的。

o Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.

o 另外，我们一贯采取保守的财务政策可能也是一种错误。不过在我看来，事实却并非如此。回想起来，很明显的，我们只要能够再多用一点财务杠杆 (虽然较之他人还是很保守)，就可以得到远比现在每年平均 23.8%还要高的投资回报率。即使是在 1965 年，我们也可以 99%地确定，高一点的财务杠杆绝对只有好处没有坏处，但同时我们可能会有 1%的机会，不管是从内部或是外部所引发令人异想不到的因素，而让我们面临极大的风险。

We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also.

我们不想要那种 99：1 的赔率，将来也不会。在我看来，挫败或侮辱的小机会永远不能被额外回报的大好机会所弥补。只要你的行为是明智的，就一定能够得到好的结果。在大部分的状况下，财务杠杆顶多只会让你发展的更快。查理跟我从来都不会着急，我们享受过程的快乐更甚于收益，虽然我们也学会与收益共存。

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We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.

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我们希望 25 年后还能向各位报告伯克希尔头 50 年所犯的错误，我想公元 2015 年的年报，大家应该可以确定这一部分将占据更多的版面。

* * * * * * * * * * * * We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.