巴菲特致股东的信（1992年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

本公司 1992 年的账面价值增长了 20.3%(标普 7.6%)，自现任管理层接手的 28 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 7745 美元，年复合成长率约为 23.6%。

During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.52 billion. More than 98% of this gain came from earnings and appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming from the issuance of new stock. These shares were issued as a result of our calling our convertible debentures for redemption on January 4, 1993, and of some holders electing to receive common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative. Most holders of the debentures who converted into common waited until January to do it, but a few made the move in December and therefore received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding: $25 million were converted into shares before yearend; $46 million were converted in January; and $405 million were redeemed for cash. The conversions were made at $11,719 per share, so altogether we issued 6,106 shares.

过去一年，伯克希尔的账面价值增加了 15.2 亿美元，其中 98%系来自于业务收益与投资组合的增值，剩下的2%则是因为发行新股的缘故，这些股份是因为我们在 1993 年 1 月 4 日将所发行的可转换优先股赎回，其中有部分持有人不要现金而选择转换本公司的普通股，大部分的持有人选择在 1 月进行转股，另一小部分则选择在去年12 月，总计 1989 年我们发行总值 4.76 亿美元的债券中，4,600 万美元在 1 月转股，另外 4.05 亿美元则以现金赎回，转换价定为 11,719 美元一股，换算下来一共发行了 6,106 股。

Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired control of the company.

伯克希尔目前流通在外股数为 1,152,547 股，相较于 1964 年 10 月 1 日当初，巴菲特合伙取得伯克希尔控制权时的 1,137,778 股来说，增加的股数实属有限。

We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire, doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal value, however, has not been easy to obtain, since we have always valued our shares highly. So be it: We wish to increase Berkshire's size only when doing that also increases the wealth of its owners.

对于发行新股我们有相当严格的规定，那就是除非我们确信所收到的价值与我们付出的一致时，我们才会考虑这样做，当然同等的价值不是那么容易达到，因为我们一向自视甚高，不过那又如何，除非确定公司股东的财富也会增加，否则我们不会随便扩大规模。

Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand-in-hand as an amusing but value-destroying experience in our past illustrates. On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank whose management was hell-bent on expansion. (Aren't they all?) When our bank wooed a smaller bank, its owner demanded a stock swap on a basis that valued the acquiree's net worth and earning power at over twice that of the acquirer's. Our management - visibly in heat - quickly capitulated. The owner of the acquiree then insisted on one other condition: "You must promise me," he said in effect, "that once our merger is done and I have become a major shareholder, you'll never again make a deal this dumb."

大家要知道这两个目标不一定齐头并进，事实上在我们过去所举过的例子中，有些就是看起来好笑但却是让价值损毁的经历。当时，我们在一家银行有相当大的投资，而银行经理人对于扩张却有极度偏好(他们不都是如此吗？)，当我们投资的银行在追求另外一家较小的投资银行时，对方开出的价码是以其账面价值与盈利能力作为基础后的两倍，当时我们的经理人因为正在热头上，所以很快就答应了，这时对方又得寸进尺开出另外一项条件，他是这么说的：“你必须答应我，在整个并购案完成后，我成为公司最大的股东，以后你也不能再做类似这次交易那样愚蠢的并购案了”。

You will remember that our goal is to increase our per-share intrinsic value - for which our book value is a conservative, but useful, proxy - at a 15% annual rate. This objective, however, cannot be attained in a smooth manner. Smoothness is particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply to the common stocks owned by our insurance companies, whose portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshire's net worth. Since 1979, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have required that these securities be valued at their market prices (less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation) rather than at the lower of cost or market. Run-of-the-mill fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results to gyrate, especially in comparison to those of the typical industrial company.

大家一定要记得，我们的终极目标是希望能让公司每年以 15%稳定的速度来增加每股的内在价值，当然公司的帐面价值虽然保守但却是相当有用的替代性指标，不过这样的目标很难以平稳的态势达成，这在伯克希尔尤其困难，因为会计原则规定，我们旗下保险业务所持有，占伯克希尔相当大部分的股票投资必须以市价列示。自从1979 年以来，GAAP 就要求它们以市价方式而非原先的成本与市价孰低法列在公司帐上(当然要扣除未实现资本利得估计应支付的税负)，股票价格如同水车滚轮般上上下下，也使得我们年度业绩变化很大，尤其是在与一般公司产业比较时更为明显。

To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been - and to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term results - we show on the facing page our annual change in per-share net worth and compare it with the annual results (including dividends) of the S&P 500.

为了解释我们账面价值变化的程度以及股票市场波动对于公司帐面收益短期的影响，从今年起我们决定在年报的首页放置每年公司账面价值变化以及与标普 500 指数(含股息)之间的比较。

You should keep at least three points in mind as you evaluate this data. The first point concerns the many businesses we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in stock market valuations. The impact of these businesses on both our absolute and relative performance has changed over the years. Early on, returns from our textile operation, which then represented a significant portion of our net worth, were a major drag on performance, averaging far less than would have been the case if the money invested in that business had instead been invested in the S&P 500. In more recent years, as we assembled our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally exceptional managers, the returns from our operating businesses have been high - usually well in excess of the returns achieved by the S&P.

大家在评估这份资料时至少必须要注意三个重点，第一、我们旗下许多业务每年年度的盈利并不受股市波动的影响，而这些企业对于我们绝对或相对的影响每年也都不一样，就早期而言，由于我们在纺织业务的收入占我们账面价值相当大的部分，所以要是在这方面投资不当，我们的绩效可能会远远落后于将钱放在标普 500 指数相关个股之上，不过到了最近，当我们逐渐利用投资组成一支由优秀经理人经营的优秀企业团队时，这些企业所带来的回报通常远高于投资标普 500 指数。

A second important factor to consider - and one that significantly hurts our relative performance - is that both the income and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are pre-tax. To comprehend the damage, imagine that Berkshire had owned nothing other than the S&P index during the 28-year period covered. In that case, the tax bite would have caused our corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in the table for the S&P. Under present tax laws, a gain for the S&P of 18% delivers a corporate holder of that index a return well short of 13%. And this problem would be intensified if corporate tax rates were to rise. This is a structural disadvantage we simply have to live with; there is no antidote for it.

第二项应该要特别注意的因素，也是影响我们相对表现的因素，那就是我们投资证券所产生的收益与资本利得必须要负担相当重的企业税负，而在此同时标普 500 指数却是以免税基础计算的，为了让大家了解这期间的差异性，假设伯克希尔在过去 28 年间就只投资 S&P500 指数，则最后所得到的投资回报将远低于标普 500 指数本身的表现，依照目前的税率，若是标普 500 上涨 18%，则投资人真正得到的税后回报只有 13%不到(税率28%)，而这个问题若是考量目前税率即将调高的情况，将会变得更严重，这是一个我们必须要忍受的结构性问题，基本上没有办法可解。

The third point incorporates two predictions: Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the past decade, and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by Berkshire's expanding capital base will substantially reduce our historical advantage relative to the index.

第三点包含两个预测，伯克希尔的副主席兼主要合伙人查理·芒格，跟我都认为，未来十年内标普 500 指数的表现将无法像过去十年那样的好。而且我们也非常确定，以伯克希尔目前资本规模越来越大的趋势，将会大大降低过去我们大幅超越指数的历史表现。

Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain: We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children. However, it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their underlying businesses, as they have so dramatically done for some time, and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be significantly smaller than they were in the last. Our second conclusion - that an increased capital base will act as an anchor on our relative performance - seems incontestable. The only open question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some tolerable, though slowed, pace.

做出第一项预测有违我们的本性，一直以来我们认为股市预言家唯一的价值就是让算命先生看起来像那么一回事，即便是现在，查理跟我还是相信短期股市的预测是毒药，应该要把他们锁在最安全的地方，远离儿童以及那些在股市中的行为表现像小孩般幼稚的成年人，虽然有时股市的表现会有相当大的起伏，然而很明显的是，股市的表现不可能永远都能超越其背后所代表的企业，这也是为何我们胆敢预测未来十年投资人在股市所获得的回报将很难再像过去十年那样的优异的原因。我们第二点结论，规模越来越大的资金将会拖累我们的绩效，对于这点倒是不容置疑，唯一的问题在于，我们背着这样的重担，如何还能以缓慢但是可以接受的速度前进。

We will continue to experience considerable volatility in our annual results. That's assured by the general volatility of the stock market, by the concentration of our equity holdings in just a few companies, and by certain business decisions we have made, most especially our move to commit large resources to super-catastrophe insurance. We not only accept this volatility but welcome it: A tolerance for short-term swings improves our long-term prospects. In baseball lingo, our performance yardstick is slugging percentage, not batting average.

往后我们将会继续经历年度绩效的上下变动，面对多变的股市，这点绝对可以确定，尤其是我们将资金集中在几家主要的被投资公司之上，同时也因为我们将大量资源投入巨灾再保险的商业决策，我们不但接受这种波动，而且相当欢迎，只要忍受短期变动的同时可以为我们带来不错的长期前景，套句棒球常用的术语，衡量我们的表现，主要是看长打率而不是击球率。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.

Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired control of the company.

To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been - and to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term results - we show on the facing page our annual change in per-share net worth and compare it with the annual results (including dividends) of the S&P 500.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.