巴菲特致股东的信（1997年）②非常规性投资

Unconventional Commitments

When we can't find our favorite commitment -- a well-run and sensibly-priced business with fine economics -- we usually opt to put new money into very short-term instruments of the highest quality. Sometimes, however, we venture elsewhere. Obviously we believe that the alternative commitments we make are more likely to result in profit than loss. But we also realize that they do not offer the certainty of profit that exists in a wonderful business secured at an attractive price. Finding that kind of opportunity, we know that we are going to make money -- the only question being when. With alternative investments, we think that we are going to make money. But we also recognize that we will sometimes realize losses, occasionally of substantial size.

非常规性投资

有时我们的资金不一定能够找到最理想的去处，也就是那些经营良好、价格合理的企业，这时我们就会将资金投入到一些期间较短但品质不错的投资工具上，虽然我们很明白这样的做法可能无法像我们买进好公司那样稳健的盈利，甚至在少数的状况下有可能赔大钱，不过总的来说我们相信赚钱的机率还是远高于赔钱，唯一的关键在于其盈利何时能够实现。

We had three non-traditional positions at yearend. The first was derivative contracts for 14.0 million barrels of oil, that being what was then left of a 45.7 million barrel position we established in 1994-95. Contracts for 31.7 million barrels were settled in 1995-97, and these supplied us with a pre-tax gain of about $61.9 million. Our remaining contracts expire during 1998 and 1999. In these, we had an unrealized gain of $11.6 million at yearend. Accounting rules require that commodity positions be carried at market value. Therefore, both our annual and quarterly financial statements reflect any unrealized gain or loss in these contracts. When we established our contracts, oil for future delivery seemed modestly underpriced. Today, though, we have no opinion as to its attractiveness.

截至年底，我们总共有三项异于往常的投资，首先是 1400 万桶的原油期货合约，这是我们在 1994-1995 年间所建立 4570 万桶原油的剩余部位，预计在 1998-1999 年陆续到期，目前未实现盈利约有 1160 万美元，而已经结仓的 3170 万桶原油合约总共贡献我们 6190 万美元的盈利，会计原则规定期货合约必须依市场价格评价，因此这些合约所有未实现的损益皆已反应在我们年度或每季的财务报表上，当初我们之所以会建立这些部位，主要考量当时的石油期货价位有些低估，至于现在的市场状况我们则没有任何意见。

Our second non-traditional commitment is in silver. Last year, we purchased 111.2 million ounces. Marked to market, that position produced a pre-tax gain of $97.4 million for us in 1997. In a way, this is a return to the past for me: Thirty years ago, I bought silver because I anticipated its demonetization by the U.S. Government. Ever since, I have followed the metal's fundamentals but not owned it. In recent years, bullion inventories have fallen materially, and last summer Charlie and I concluded that a higher price would be needed to establish equilibrium between supply and demand. Inflation expectations, it should be noted, play no part in our calculation of silver's value.

至于第二项非常规投资是白银，去年我们一口气买进总共 1.112 亿盎司的白银(约 10 亿美元)，以目前的市价计算，1997 年总共贡献 9740 万美元的税前利益，某个角度来说，这仿佛又让我回到过去，记得在 30 年前，我因为预期美国政府货币将自由化(美元黄金脱钩)而买进白银，自此之后，我便一直追踪贵金属的基本面，只是并没有其它的买进动作，直到最近这几年，银锭的库存突然大幅下滑，查理跟我得到一个结论，那就是白银的价格应该要稍微向上调整以维持供需平衡，需要指出的是，通货膨胀的预期不在我们计算白银价值的考虑范围之内。(每年白银市场供应缺口 1.5 亿盎司，市场需求约 8 亿盎司，但只有 5 亿盎司是矿山生产的，而且还是冶炼的副产品，另有 1.5 亿回收，主要是来自照相工业，几年前 10-20 亿盎司白银库存以及消耗殆尽，白银作为副产品，供应没有弹性，而需求刚性，白银供需缺口已经足够大，价格必定上涨弥补供应不足)

Finally, our largest non-traditional position at yearend was $4.6 billion, at amortized cost, of long-term zero-coupon obligations of the U.S. Treasury. These securities pay no interest. Instead, they provide their holders a return by way of the discount at which they are purchased, a characteristic that makes their market prices move rapidly when interest rates change. If rates rise, you lose heavily with zeros, and if rates fall, you make outsized gains. Since rates fell in 1997, we ended the year with an unrealized pre-tax gain of $598.8 million in our zeros. Because we carry the securities at market value, that gain is reflected in yearend book value.

第三项也是最大的非常规投资是 46 亿美元以帐面摊销的长期美国零息债券，这些债券不支付利息，相反的是以通过折价发行的方式向债券持有人提供回报，因此这类债券的价格会因市场利率变动而大幅波动，如果利率上升，持有零息债券的人可能损失惨重，反之若利率下跌，投资人就可能因此大赚一笔，而因为 1997 年的利率大幅下滑，所以 1997 年我们的未实现利益就高达 5.98 亿美元，由于我们以市场价格认列这些证券，因此这些利益已全数反应在公司年底的帐上。

In purchasing zeros, rather than staying with cash-equivalents, we risk looking very foolish: A macro-based commitment such as this never has anything close to a 100% probability of being successful. However, you pay Charlie and me to use our best judgment -- not to avoid embarrassment -- and we will occasionally make an unconventional move when we believe the odds favor it. Try to think kindly of us when we blow one. Along with President Clinton, we will be feeling your pain: The Munger family has more than 90% of its net worth in Berkshire and the Buffetts more than 99%.

当然不好好持有现金类投资而去投资零息债券不是没有风险的，这种基于宏观经济分析的投资绝对不敢保证100%成功，不过查理跟我绝对会运用我们最佳的判断能力，大家可不是请我们来混日子，当我们认为胜算颇大时，我们就会大胆地去做一些非常规的投资，当然万一不小心失败时，还请大家多多包含，就如同克林顿总统一样，我们绝对与各位感同身受，因为芒格家族有 90%的资产放在伯克希尔，而巴菲特家族更高达 99%。