巴菲特致股东的信（2000年）③财产意外险的经营哲学

The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance

Our main business ¾ though we have others of great importance ¾ is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

财产意外险的经营哲学

保险是我们最主要的本业，当然其它事业也相当重要，想要了解伯克希尔，你就必须知道如何去评估一家保险公司，其中主要的关键因素有：(1)这个行业所能产生的浮存金数量；(2)以及获得浮存金的成本；(3)最重要的是这些因素的长期展望。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以覆盖最后支付出去的相关损失与费用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它渠道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价值，否则一旦保险业务取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗极酸的柠檬。

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. Both the income statements and balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.

有一点必须特别注意的是，因为损失成本必须依赖估算，所以保险业者对于承保结算的成绩有相当大伸缩的空间，连带使得投资人很难正确地衡量一家保险公司真正的浮存金成本，估计错误，通常是无心，但有时却是故意，与真实的结果往往会有很大的差距，而这种结果直接反映在公司的损益表上，有经验的行家通常可以通过检查公司的准备提列情形发现重大的错误，但对于一般投资大众来说，除了被迫接受财务报表的数字之外，别无他法，而我个人常常被这些经过各大会计师事务所背书的财务报告所吓到，许多保险公司的损益表与资产负债表上布满了许多地雷。

At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative in our reserving. But we will make mistakes. And we warn you that there is nothing symmetrical about surprises in the insurance business: They almost always are unpleasant.

在伯克希尔，我们在提列准备金时，都尽量采取最保守的做法，不过我还是要警告大家，保险业所发生的意外，通常都不会是什么好消息。

The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 34 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment "Other Primary"). For the table we have calculated our float ¾ which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume ¾ by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Don’t panic, there won’t be a quiz.)

下表中所显示的数字是，伯克希尔自取得国民保险公司经营权，进入保险业务 34 年以来所贡献的浮存金，(其中传统业务包含在其它主险项下)，在这张计算浮存金的表中(相对于收到的保费收入，我们持有的浮存金部位算是相当大的)，我们将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备、再保险预先收取的资金与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付并购成本、预付税负以及取得再保业务的相关递延费用，得出浮存金的数额，不要紧张，这不是什么考试！

We’re pleased by the growth in our float during 2000 but not happy with its cost. Over the years, our cost of float has been very close to zero, with the underwriting profits realized in most years offsetting the occasional terrible year such as 1984, when our cost was a staggering 19%. In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6 billion, which gave us a float cost of 6%. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect our float cost to fall in 2001 ¾ perhaps substantially ¾ in large part because of corrections in pricing at General Re that should increasingly be felt as the year progresses. On a smaller scale, GEICO may experience the same improving trend.

对于 2000 年的浮存金成长我们感到相当欣慰，但却对其成本不甚满意，一直以来，我们浮存金成本通常都维持在接近于零的低水准，好的时候，还能享有可观的承保利益，来弥补像 1984 年那样糟糕的年度，当年的资金成本高达 19%，不过 2000 年我们的承保损失却高达 16 亿美金，这使得我们的浮存金成本飙高至 6%，除非再发生什么重大的灾难，否则我们预期 2001 年的浮存金成本将会大幅下降，主要的原因是通用再保险已经逐渐开始调高价格，至于 GEICO 保险虽然规模较小，但也应该会有同样的情形。

There are two factors affecting our cost of float that are very rare at other insurers but that now loom large at Berkshire. First, a few insurers that are currently experiencing large losses have offloaded a significant portion of these on us in a manner that penalizes our current earnings but gives us float we can use for many years to come. After the loss that we incur in the first year of the policy, there are no further costs attached to this business.

相较于其它保险同业，伯克希尔现在有两项相当罕见但却越来越重要的因素影响到其浮存金的成本，首先，目前正遭受巨大承保损失的部分保险公司，通过再保险将很大部分业务转嫁我们，这会影响我们当期的收益表现，但另一方面也让我们在未来几年有更多的浮存金可以运用，而在保单第一年的记录损失后，以后年度将不会再有这方面的成本。

When these policies are properly priced, we welcome the pain-today, gain-tomorrow effects they have. In 1999, $400 million of our underwriting loss (about 27.8% of the total) came from business of this kind and in 2000 the figure was $482 million (34.4% of our loss). We have no way of predicting how much similar business we will write in the future, but what we do get will typically be in large chunks. Because these transactions can materially distort our figures, we will tell you about them as they occur.

只要保单的价格合理，我们乐于接受这类先苦后甜的结果，在 1999 年所有的承保损失当中，有 4 亿美元(约占总损失 14.4 亿的 27.8%)是来自于这类的业务，至于 2000 年则有 4.82 亿美元(约占总损失 14 亿的 34.4%)，我们无法预测以后每年能够接到多少这类的业务，不过只要有业务，金额通常都不小，而也由于这类的交易往往会严重影响到我们的损益数字，所以只要发生我一定会向各位报告。

Other reinsurers have little taste for this insurance. They simply can’t stomach what huge underwriting losses do to their reported results, even though these losses are produced by policies whose overall economics are certain to be favorable. You should be careful, therefore, in comparing our underwriting results with those of other insurers.

其它再保业者对这类业务往往没有多大兴趣，因为他们根本就无法接受其财务报表突然出现重大损失，即便可以确定此类业务长期的结果相当不错，所以在拿我们的承保结果跟其它同业做比较时，要特别注意这一点。

An even more significant item in our numbers ¾ which, again, you won’t find much of elsewhere ¾ arises from transactions in which we assume past losses of a company that wants to put its troubles behind it. To illustrate, the XYZ insurance company might have last year bought a policy obligating us to pay the first $1 billion of losses and loss adjustment expenses from events that happened in, say, 1995 and earlier years. These contracts can be very large, though we always require a cap on our exposure. We entered into a number of such transactions in 2000 and expect to close several more in 2001.

在我们的承保结果中还有一个影响更大的科目，也是你在别的地方找不到的，那就是我们假设一家公司想要把过去已经发生的损失，但损失金额还不能确定的业务处理掉，比如说，有家 XYZ 保险公司在去年向我们买了一张保单，约定我们必须支付前 10 亿美元的损失和损失调整费用，这些费用来自 1995 年及更早年份发生的事件。这些合约的金额有可能相当大，当然不论如何，我们肯定会设定一个赔付上限。我们在 2000 年签了几件这类的合约，预计 2001 年会签下更多。

Under GAAP accounting, this "retroactive" insurance neither benefits nor penalizes our current earnings. Instead, we set up an asset called "deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance," in an amount reflecting the difference between the premium we receive and the (higher) losses we expect to pay (for which reserves are immediately established). We then amortize this asset by making annual charges to earnings that create equivalent underwriting losses. You will find the amount of the loss that we incur from these transactions in both our quarterly and annual management discussion. By their nature, these losses will continue for many years, often stretching into decades. As an offset, though, we have the use of float ¾ lots of it.

依据一般公认会计原则，这类追溯型的保险对于当年度的损益不会有任何的影响，但是，我们的报表因此增加了一项叫做“假设再保险递延费用”的资产科目，将收到的保费收入与估计将支付的理赔损失(当然在此之前已预先提列准备金)的差额计入，之后我们再将这项递延费用资产按年摊销，并作为相应的承保损失计入损益表，大家可以在季报与年报的管理层讨论中看到从这些交易中承担的相关损失数字，依其特性，这类的损失会持续发生很多年，甚至达几十年，当然作为补偿，我们获得了大笔浮存金的使用权。

Clearly, float carrying an annual cost of this kind is not as desirable as float we generate from policies that are expected to produce an underwriting profit (of which we have plenty). Nevertheless, this retroactive insurance should be decent business for us.

很明显，此类附带年度成本的浮存金，并不像许多预期能够产生承保收益的业务保单所产生的浮存金更令人满意，尽管如此，追溯再保险对我们来说，仍然算是不错的买卖。

The net of all this is that a) I expect our cost of float to be very attractive in the future but b) rarely to return to a "no-cost" mode because of the annual charge that retroactive reinsurance will lay on us. Also ¾ obviously ¾ the ultimate benefits that we derive from float will depend not only on its cost but, fully as important, how effectively we deploy it.

综合以上因素最后得到的结果是：a)我预期未来浮存金的成本依然会非常有吸引力；b)但由于追溯再保险每年必须提列的费用，因此浮存金可能没有办法像以前一样完全没有成本。当然很明显的，这些浮存金对我们到底是好是坏，除了当初取得的成本外，我们如何高效的运用浮存金也同样重要。

Our retroactive business is almost single-handedly the work of Ajit Jain, whose praises I sing annually. It is impossible to overstate how valuable Ajit is to Berkshire. Don’t worry about my health; worry about his.

而我们追溯再保险业务几乎完全由阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)一手包办，每年照例我都会给他褒奖一番，实在是很难去估计阿吉特在伯克希尔所代表的价值，大家除了关心我的健康之外，更应该关心他的健康。

Last year, Ajit brought home a $2.4 billion reinsurance premium, perhaps the largest in history, from a policy that retroactively covers a major U.K. company. Subsequently, he wrote a large policy protecting the Texas Rangers from the possibility that Alex Rodriguez will become permanently disabled. As sports fans know, "A-Rod" was signed for $252 million, a record, and we think that our policy probably also set a record for disability insurance. We cover many other sports figures as well.

去年，阿吉特光靠着一家英国的主要保险公司的追溯再保险，就替我们收到 24 亿美元的再保险费，这有可能历史最大一笔保费。之后，他又接了美国大联盟德州游骑兵队一张巨额保单，投保强打者亚历克斯·罗德里格斯(Alex Rodrriguez)可能终身残疾的风险，喜爱棒球的人士都知道，A-Rod 曾以 2.52 亿美元的天价签约费创下纪录，我想我们的这张保单应该又创下了失能险的保额记录，此外我们也受理了许多运动明星的保险。

In another example of his versatility, Ajit last fall negotiated a very interesting deal with Grab.com, an Internet company whose goal was to attract millions of people to its site and there to extract information from them that would be useful to marketers. To lure these people, Grab.com held out the possibility of a $1 billion prize (having a $170 million present value) and we insured its payment. A message on the site explained that the chance of anyone winning the prize was low, and indeed no one won. But the possibility of a win was far from nil.

此外阿吉特也展现他多才多艺的天份，去年秋天他与一家网络公司 Grab.com 协商定出一张相当有趣的保单，该公司成立的目标是希望吸引数百万的网友到其网站，并从其中挖掘出有用的数据资料给营销公司，而为了要吸引网友上门，Grab.com 推出了一个 10 亿美元的彩票抽奖(约等于 1.7 亿美元的现值)，万一真的有人中奖时，由我们保证支付这笔款项，当然网站上也强调得到这笔奖金的机会微乎其微，事后证明没有人得到，但在当时中奖的机率并非全无可能。

Writing such a policy, we receive a modest premium, face the possibility of a huge loss, and get good odds. Very few insurers like that equation. And they’re unable to cure their unhappiness by reinsurance. Because each policy has unusual ¾ and sometimes unique ¾ characteristics, insurers can’t lay off the occasional shock loss through their standard reinsurance arrangements. Therefore, any insurance CEO doing a piece of business like this must run the small, but real, risk of a horrible quarterly earnings number, one that he would not enjoy explaining to his board or shareholders. Charlie and I, however, like any proposition that makes compelling mathematical sense, regardless of its effect on reported earnings.

签下这类的保单，我们将可以预先收到为数可观的保费，但同样也必须面临潜在的重大损失，所幸概率上对我们有利，并不是所有的保险业者都爱玩这种游戏，因为他们没办法利用再保险来克服这样的不愉快感，由于每一张保单都不尽相同，甚至有的独一无二，保险公司无法通过标准的再保险安排来规避偶尔发生的重大损失，也因此几乎所有的保险公司 CEO 在经营此类业务时，都必须面临这种概率不大但却又不容忽视可能深深影响单一季度收益数字的风险，没有任何一位经理人愿意向董事会或股东会解释这中间的原因，这简直是有如芒刺在背。不过对于查理跟我本人而言，只要数学概率合理，我们根本就不在乎其对报告数字有何影响。

At General Re, the news has turned considerably better: Ron Ferguson, along with Joe Brandon, Tad Montross, and a talented supporting cast took many actions during 2000 to bring that company’s profitability back to past standards. Though our pricing is not fully corrected, we have significantly repriced business that was severely unprofitable or dropped it altogether. If there’s no mega-catastrophe in 2001, General Re’s float cost should fall materially.

至于通用再保险，情况变得比以前好多了，罗恩·弗格森(RonFerguson)加上乔·布兰登(JoeBrandon)与TadMontross 以及一班能干的团队在 2000 年采取了许多纠正措施，让公司的盈利回到过去的水平，虽然我们的定价还无法完全修正过来，但对于盈利情况最差的那部分业务，我们已大幅调整价格或干脆舍弃掉，如果 2001年没有再发生什么重大的天灾人祸，通用再保险的浮存金成本可望大幅下降。

The last couple of years haven’t been any fun for Ron and his crew. But they have stepped up to tough decisions, and Charlie and I applaud them for these. General Re has several important and enduring business advantages. Better yet, it has managers who will make the most of them.

过去的几年对罗恩和他的团队来说一点都不顺畅，但是他们已经做出了艰难的决定，查理和我为他们鼓掌。通用再保险有几个重要而持久的业务优势。更好的是，它拥有能最大限度地利用这些优势的经理人。

In aggregate, our smaller insurance operations produced an excellent underwriting profit in 2000 while generating significant float ¾ just as they have done for more than a decade. If these companies were a single and separate operation, people would consider it an outstanding insurer. Because the companies instead reside in an enterprise as large as Berkshire, the world may not appreciate their accomplishments ¾ but I sure do. Last year I thanked Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Don Towle and Don Wurster, and I again do so. In addition, we now also owe thanks to Tom Nerney at U.S. Liability and Michael Stearns, the new head of Cypress.

总的来说，其它规模较小的保险业务在 2000 年产生了可观的承保收益，同时一如过去十年来持续贡献大量的浮存金，如果把这些公司视为一家独立的企业，那么他们绝对可以称得上是一家经营绩效优异的保险公司，而因为这些事业隐身在伯克希尔如此庞大的事业体中，外界无法理解他们的努力与成就，但至少我个人能够深深地体会地，去年我感谢过 Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Don Towle 和 Don Wurster，今年则还要再加上美国责任险的Tom Nerney 以及加州 Cypress 保险的新任主管 Michael Stearns。

You may notice that Brad Kinstler, who was CEO of Cypress and whose praises I’ve sung in the past, is no longer in the list above. That’s because we needed a new manager at Fechheimer Bros., our Cincinnati-based uniform company, and called on Brad. We seldom move Berkshire managers from one enterprise to another, but maybe we should try it more often: Brad is hitting home runs in his new job, just as he always did at Cypress.

大家可能会发现过去我常称赞的 Cypress 保险公司的前任主管 Brad Kinstler 已不在上述的名单当中，那是因为我们位于辛辛那堤的费区海默制服公司需要一位新的经理人(临时 CEO 帕特里克·伯恩离职去经营 Overstock)，所以我们特地拜托 Brad，在伯克希尔我们很少调动经理人，不过现在看来我们应该要再多试一试，因为 Brad 在新职务上表现相当优异，就如同他原来在 Cypress 的表现一般。