巴菲特致股东的信（2000年）④GEICO保险

GEICO (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)

We show below the usual table detailing GEICO’s growth. Last year I enthusiastically told you that we would step up our expenditures on advertising in 2000 and that the added dollars were the best investment that GEICO could make. I was wrong: The extra money we spent did not produce a commensurate increase in inquiries. Additionally, the percentage of inquiries that we converted into sales fell for the first time in many years. These negative developments combined to produce a sharp increase in our per-policy acquisition cost.

GEICO保险(1-800-847-7536/GEICO.com)

下表是用来显示 GEICO 保险成长幅度的一张表，去年我很兴奋地向各位报告我们 2000 年在广告营销的大笔投入，并强调每一分钱都结结实实花在刀口上，事实证明我错了，我们额外广告投入的经费并没有为我们增加咨询电话，而且平均每个咨询电话的成交率几年来也首度下滑，这些不利的进展使得我们平均每张保单的取得成本大幅增加。

Agonizing over errors is a mistake. But acknowledging and analyzing them can be useful, though that practice is rare in corporate boardrooms. There, Charlie and I have almost never witnessed a candid post-mortem of a failed decision, particularly one involving an acquisition. A notable exception to this never-look-back approach is that of The Washington Post Company, which unfailingly and objectively reviews its acquisitions three years after they are made. Elsewhere, triumphs are trumpeted, but dumb decisions either get no follow-up or are rationalized.

事后悔恨犯下的错误固然不对，但勇敢承认并虚心检讨原因却大有助益。虽然这种景象在美国企业的内部高层会议上并不常见，查理跟我本人几乎很少看到有人会诚心诚意的检讨一项错误的决策，尤其是跟并购案有关，唯一著名的例外是华盛顿邮报认真客观地检讨三年前的一项失败的并购案，除此之外，就只看到大家对成功的案子歌功颂德，至于愚蠢的决定则只字未提，置之不理。

The financial consequences of these boners are regularly dumped into massive restructuring charges or write-offs that are casually waved off as "nonrecurring." Managements just love these. Indeed, in recent years it has seemed that no earnings statement is complete without them. The origins of these charges, though, are never explored. When it comes to corporate blunders, CEOs invoke the concept of the Virgin Birth.

这类错误投资最后的下场往往是在财报上放进大规模重组费用中或一次性注销，这些费用被认为是非经常性的。专业经理人最喜欢这样搞，这使得近年来这类费用，反而成为一般公司的损益表上的常客，至于它发生的原因则没有人愿意花时间去深究，当谈及公司的失败案子时，CEO 通常将它们归类为无性生殖。

To get back to our examination of GEICO: There are at least four factors that could account for the increased costs we experienced in obtaining new business last year, and all probably contributed in some manner.

回到 GEICO 保险的检讨，去年成本大幅增加主要归咎于四个原因，而且所有因素都以某种方式作出了贡献。

First, in our advertising we have pushed "frequency" very hard, and we probably overstepped in certain media. We’ve always known that increasing the number of messages through any medium would eventually produce diminishing returns. The third ad in an hour on a given cable channel is simply not going to be as effective as the first.

首先，我们的广告频率过高，在某些媒体的曝光实在是过度频繁，大家知道大量且密集通过媒体传递讯息的效果绝对是递减的，同样在有线电视，一个小时内连续第三波的广告，其效果绝对比不上第一波。

Second, we may have already picked much of the low-hanging fruit. Clearly, the willingness to do business with a direct marketer of insurance varies widely among individuals: Indeed, some percentage of Americans ¾ particularly older ones ¾ are reluctant to make direct purchases of any kind. Over the years, however, this reluctance will ebb. A new generation with new habits will find the savings from direct purchase of their auto insurance too compelling to ignore.

其次，所有优质客户可能都已经被我们给捡光了，很明显的，虽然愿意经由电话直销投保的客户群分布甚广，但不论如何，老年人就是不愿通过电话这种渠道投保，当然时间站在我们这一边，这种排斥感终究会消退，新一代乐于接受新事物的年轻人，很快就会发现通过电话直销投保可以为他们省下大笔的保费。

Another factor that surely decreased the conversion of inquiries into sales was stricter underwriting by GEICO. Both the frequency and severity of losses increased during the year, and rates in certain areas became inadequate, in some cases substantially so. In these instances, we necessarily tightened our underwriting standards. This tightening, as well as the many rate increases we put in during the year, made our offerings less attractive to some prospects.

另外一个肯定会降低成交率的因素是 GEICO 保险的投保资格审核趋严，去年不管是事故发生的频率与严重性都提高，使得某些地区的费率变得不合理，在这种情况下，我们必须提高承保的标准，同时提高费率，这两项变动使得我们产品相对于其它对手的竞争力略微下降。

A high percentage of callers, it should be emphasized, can still save money by insuring with us. Understandably, however, some prospects will switch to save $200 per year but will not switch to save $50. Therefore, rate increases that bring our prices closer to those of our competitors will hurt our acceptance rate, even when we continue to offer the best deal.

当然我必须强调，对于大部分打电话上门投保的顾客来说，还他们是可以省下一大笔钱，不过比起过去可以省下 200 美元，现在只能省 50 美元，其吸引力确实大不如前，所以费率提升使得我们的价格与其它同业相近，也会影响我们在客户间的接受率。

Finally, the competitive picture changed in at least one important respect: State Farm ¾ by far the largest personal auto insurer, with about 19% of the market ¾ has been very slow to raise prices. Its costs, however, are clearly increasing right along with those of the rest of the industry. Consequently, State Farm had an underwriting loss last year from auto insurance (including rebates to policyholders) of 18% of premiums, compared to 4% at GEICO. Our loss produced a float cost for us of 6.1%, an unsatisfactory result. (Indeed, at GEICO we expect float, over time, to be free.) But we estimate that State Farm’s float cost in 2000 was about 23%. The willingness of the largest player in the industry to tolerate such a cost makes the economics difficult for other participants.

最后，财产险的竞争格局产生了一项重大变化，那就是目前排名第一市占率约 19%的州立农业保险公司，提价速度相当缓慢，虽然他的成本的增加幅度肯定与其它同业不相上下，州立农业保险公司去年的承保损失率(包含回馈保户的退佣)高达 18%，相较之下 GEICO 保险则只有 4%，即便如此我们浮存金的成本也高达 6.1%，这种结果当然不令人满意，事实上我们预计长期浮存金成本扔会低于零，我们估算州立农业保险公司 2000 年的浮存金成本将高达 23%，而当市场上最大的玩家愿意忍受如此高的经营成本，其它业者的处境就可想而知了。

That does not take away from the fact that State Farm is one of America’s greatest business stories. I’ve urged that the company be studied at business schools because it has achieved fabulous success while following a path that in many ways defies the dogma of those institutions. Studying counter-evidence is a highly useful activity, though not one always greeted with enthusiasm at citadels of learning.

不过这仍然无损于州立农业保险公司身为美国企业最伟大的传奇故事之一，我不断建议商学院应该把这家成功的企业列为课堂的教材，因为他的成功过程有许多方面与学术教条相悖，研究反例是相当有用的学习方法，虽然并不是所有人都喜欢在学术殿堂中热烈地把它拿来讨论。

State Farm was launched in 1922, by a 45-year-old, semi-retired Illinois farmer, to compete with long-established insurers ¾ haughty institutions in New York, Philadelphia and Hartford ¾ that possessed overwhelming advantages in capital, reputation, and distribution. Because State Farm is a mutual company, its board members and managers could not be owners, and it had no access to capital markets during its years of fast growth. Similarly, the business never had the stock options or lavish salaries that many people think vital if an American enterprise is to attract able managers and thrive.

州立农业保险公司成立于 1922 年，由伊利诺伊州一位 45 岁半退休的农夫所创立，当初他是为了与纽约、费城与 Hartfold 长期垄断的傲慢保险业者对抗才成立州立农业保险公司的，相对于前者拥有资本、信誉与渠道等强大优势，由于州立农业保险公司是互助模式，所以他的董事与经理人不得拥有股份，因此在早期高成长时期，无法通过上市获得资本，同时他们也没有一般公司认为吸引优秀经理人必需的认股期权或高额薪水。

In the end, however, State Farm eclipsed all its competitors. In fact, by 1999 the company had amassed a tangible net worth exceeding that of all but four American businesses. If you want to read how this happened, get a copy of The Farmer from Merna.

然后到最后，州立农业保险公司竟击败所有竞争对手，事实上截至 1999 年，该公司的有形账面价值仅次于其它四家美国大企业，如果你想知道他们是如何办到的，想办法买本《The Farmer from Merna》看看。

Despite State Farm’s strengths, however, GEICO has much the better business model, one that embodies significantly lower operating costs. And, when a company is selling a product with commodity-like economic characteristics, being the low-cost producer is all-important. This enduring competitive advantage of GEICO ¾ one it possessed in 1951 when, as a 20-year-old student, I first became enamored with its stock ¾ is the reason that over time it will inevitably increase its market share significantly while simultaneously achieving excellent profits. Our growth will be slow, however, if State Farm elects to continue bearing the underwriting losses that it is now suffering.

尽管州立农业保险公司有其优势，GEICO 保险的商业模式更佳，其营运成本相当低，这个特点在一个销售一般商品化的产业中尤其重要，GEICO 保险这项竞争优势早上 1951 年，我还是一个 21 岁的学生时便是如此，当时我便因此为这家公司着迷，并认为随着时间的推移，他的市场占有率以及盈利绝对能够稳定提升，当然如果州立农业保险公司决定继续忍受现在这样的承保损失的话，GEICO 保险的成长势必将受到影响而减缓。

Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, remains an owner’s dream. Everything he does makes sense. He never engages in wishful thinking or otherwise distorts reality, as so many managers do when the unexpected happens. As 2000 unfolded, Tony cut back on advertising that was not cost-effective, and he will continue to do that in 2001 if cutbacks are called for (though we will always maintain a massive media presence). Tony has also aggressively filed for price increases where we need them. He looks at the loss reports every day and is never behind the curve. To steal a line from a competitor, we are in good hands with Tony.

GEICO 保险公司的 CEO 托尼·莱斯利 (Tony Nicely) ，依然还是老板们梦寐以求的经营长才，他所作的一切都切中要点，当意外发生时，他从来不会像其它经理人一样将时间浪费在妄想逃避或扭曲事实上，2000 年开始，他大举砍掉不具成本效益的广告，展望 2001 年若有必要他仍将继续维持相同的做法，(虽然我们依然会维持大量的媒体曝光率)，若有需要，Tony 绝对会大幅的调涨保费价格，他每天都盯着报表，永远不甘落于人后，想要从竞争对手那边扳回一城，我们绝对是 Tony 的好帮手。

I’ve told you about our profit-sharing arrangement at GEICO that targets only two variables ¾ growth in policies and the underwriting results of seasoned business. Despite the headwinds of 2000, we still had a performance that produced an 8.8% profit-sharing payment, amounting to $40.7 million.

过去我曾经向各位说明，GEICO 保险的利润分享计划主要依据两项因素：保费收入增长率和续约保户的承保盈利表现。尽管面对 2000 年的产业逆境，我们仍然发出了约 8.8%年薪的奖金，金额约为 4070 万美元。

GEICO will be a huge part of Berkshire’s future. Because of its rock-bottom operating costs, it offers a great many Americans the cheapest way to purchase a high-ticket product that they must buy. The company then couples this bargain with service that consistently ranks high in independent surveys. That’s a combination inevitably producing growth and profitability.

GEICO 保险在伯克希尔的未来仍将扮演相当重要的角色，由于其最低的营运成本，它能够以最便宜的方式提供美国大众购买最高品质的保险产品，这家公司所提供的服务在各项消费者调查报告中一直名列前茅，这样的组合将可确保公司继续维持成长与盈利的态势。

In just the last few years, far more drivers have learned to associate the GEICO brand with saving money on their insurance. We will pound that theme relentlessly until all Americans are aware of the value that we offer.

近几年来，越来越多的驾驶人知道在 GEICO 保险投保可以省下大笔的保费，我们仍将继续大力宣传直到所有美国人都知道我们的价值所在为止。