巴菲特致股东的信（2000年）⑥报告收益来源

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on page 65, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

报告收益来源

下表显示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的收益状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计师查核的数字一致。

Most of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses did at least reasonably well last year.

去年，我们旗下的制造、零售与服务业的表现都相当不错。

The exception was shoes, particularly at Dexter. In our shoe businesses generally, our attempt to keep the bulk of our production in domestic factories has cost us dearly. We face another very tough year in 2001 also, as we make significant changes in how we do business.

唯一的例外是制鞋业，尤其是 Dexter，为了让所有的制造工厂尽量留在美国境内，我们付出了极大的代价，即便我们之后经营方式做了一番调整，但 2001 年仍将是辛苦的一年。

I clearly made a mistake in paying what I did for Dexter in 1993. Furthermore, I compounded that mistake in a huge way by using Berkshire shares in payment. Last year, to recognize my error, we charged off all the remaining accounting goodwill that was attributable to the Dexter transaction. We may regain some economic goodwill at Dexter in the future, but we clearly have none at present.

事后看来，我在 1993 年斥资买下 Dexter 根本是个错误，更惨的是当时我还是用伯克希尔股份换来的，为此我们在去年将当初买入 Dexter 产生的所有商誉一次性注销了，虽然部分商誉在未来可能有机会转回，但就目前而言，该公司的商誉可说是一毛不值。

The managers of our shoe businesses are first-class from both a business and human perspective. They are working very hard at a tough ¾ and often terribly painful ¾ job, even though their personal financial circumstances don’t require them to do so. They have my admiration and thanks.

不管从经营上还是人品上，我们制鞋事业的经理人都称得上是一流的，他们在非常艰苦的环境下努力工作，即便他们个人的经济状况并不需要这么努力，为此我衷心地佩服并感谢他们。

On a more pleasant note, we continue to be the undisputed leader in two branches of Aircraft Services ¾ pilot training at FlightSafety (FSI) and fractional ownership of business jets at Executive Jet (EJA). Both companies are run by their remarkable founders.

另外一方面，我们很高兴能继续在两项航空服务业中处于领导地位，一个是训练飞行员的飞安国际公司(FSI)，另一个是共享飞机所有权的公务机航空公司(EJA)，两家公司目前依然由其杰出的创始人在经营着。

Al Ueltschi at FSI is now 83 and continues to operate at full throttle. Though I am not a fan of stock splits, I am planning to split Al’s age 2-for-1 when he hits 100. (If it works, guess who’s next.)

FSI的Al Ueltschi现在已经83岁了，并继续全速运转。虽然我不喜欢股票分割，但我计划在Al 100岁时，把他的年龄分成2比1。(如果成功了，猜猜下一个是谁。)

We spent $272 million on flight simulators in 2000, and we’ll spend a similar amount this year. Anyone who thinks that the annual charges for depreciation don’t reflect a real cost ¾ every bit as real as payroll or raw materials ¾ should get an internship at a simulator company. Every year we spend amounts equal to our depreciation charge simply to stay in the same economic place ¾ and then spend additional sums to grow. And growth is in prospect for FSI as far as the eye can see.

2000 年我们投资 2.72 亿美元在购买飞行模拟器上头，今年的投资金额也约当此数，有谁胆敢说每年的折旧费用不算是真正的成本的，应该请他到飞行模拟器公司打工，让他知道每一分折旧都跟薪资或原料成本一样真实，每一年我们都必须投入约当于折旧金额的资金在更新设备上，以维持既有的竞争优势，而如果我们想要成长的话，就必须再投入额外的资金，对于 FSI 而言，其目前成长的前景依然可期。

Even faster growth awaits EJA (whose fractional-ownership program is called NetJets®). Rich Santulli is the dynamo behind this business.

另一方面，成长更快速的是 EJA(其飞机的部分所有权业务称之为 NetJet)，Rich Santulli 是背后主要的推手。

Last year I told you that EJA’s recurring revenue from monthly management fees and hourly usage grew by 46% in 1999. In 2000 the growth was 49%. I also told you that this was a low-margin business, in which survivors will be few. Margins were indeed slim at EJA last year, in part because of the major costs we are incurring in developing our business in Europe.

去年，我告诉大家 EJA 在 1999 年每月固定的管理费加上飞行时数收入成长了 46%，到了 2000 年成长幅度增加为 49%，我也曾向各位报告说这个行业的毛利不高，所以能够存活的家数不多，去年 EJA 的利润率确实相当微薄，部分的原因是因为我们正在努力扩展欧洲的业务当中。

Regardless of the cost, you can be sure that EJA’s spending on safety will be whatever is needed. Obviously, we would follow this policy under any circumstances, but there’s some self-interest here as well: I, my wife, my children, my sisters, my 94-year-old aunt, all but one of our directors, and at least nine Berkshire managers regularly fly in the NetJets program. Given that cargo, I applaud Rich’s insistence on unusually high amounts of pilot training (an average of 23 days a year). In addition, our pilots cement their skills by flying 800 or so hours a year. Finally, each flies only one model of aircraft, which means our crews do no switching around among planes with different cockpit and flight characteristics.

不论成本有多高，只要是为了安全考量，EJA 愿意不惜血本，在任何情况下，我们都会坚持这项政策，因为这其中还掺杂有个人的因素在里头，包含我本人、夫人、小孩、姊妹、高龄 94 岁的阿姨、伯克希尔的所有董事(除了一位例外)以及其它 9 位主要经理人都是 NetJet 的常客，在这里我要特别为 Rich 维持飞行员一年平均达 23天高时数训练的坚持给予掌声，此外我们的飞行员一年平均都维持 800 小时以上的飞行时数以强化本身的飞行技巧，同时每位飞行员只固定飞一种机型，这意思是说，他们不必常常在不同种飞机之间换来换去。

EJA’s business continues to be constrained by the availability of new aircraft. Still, our customers will take delivery of more than 50 new jets in 2001, 7% of world output. We are confident we will remain the world leader in fractional ownership, in respect to number of planes flying, quality of service, and standards of safety.

虽然 EJA 的业务依然受限于有限的飞机供应数量，但是 2001 年至少有 50 架飞机会加入服务的行列，这约占全世界公务机出厂数量的 7%，我们有信心可以继续在共享飞机所有权这个行业中维持领先的地位，不管是以飞机数量、服务品质以及安全可靠性来说，皆是如此。

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Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 42-58, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 67-73, we have rearranged Berkshire’s financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.

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有关其它旗下企业的信息大家可以在后文找到，包含依照一般公认会计准则编制的各业务信息，此外你还可以找到经过重编，依照伯克希尔四大部门编排的信息(非按一般公认会计准则编制)，这是查理跟我认为最能够完整呈现伯克希尔现况的模式。