巴菲特致股东的信（2001年）④保险承保原则

Principles of Insurance Underwriting

When property/casualty companies are judged by their cost of float, very few stack up as satisfactory businesses. And interestingly ¾ unlike the situation prevailing in many other industries ¾ neither size nor brand name determines an insurer's profitability. Indeed, many of the biggest and best-known companies regularly deliver mediocre results. What counts in this business is underwriting discipline. The winners are those that unfailingly stick to three key principles:

保险承保原则

当财产意外险公司以浮存金成本来判定公司的好坏时，很少有公司的成绩可以令人感到满意，而有趣的是，与许多其他行业不同，规模或品牌并非保险公司获利的关键，事实上许多最大最有名的保险公司其业绩表现大多平平，这个行业最要紧的是承保的纪律原则，真正成功的公司必须坚守以下三项重要原则：

1. They accept only those risks that they are able to properly evaluate (staying within their circle of competence) and that, after they have evaluated all relevant factors including remote loss scenarios, carry the expectancy of profit. These insurers ignore market-share considerations and are sanguine about losing business to competitors that are offering foolish prices or policy conditions.

1，他们只接受能够正确评估的风险(坚守在自己的能力范围内)，在谨慎评估所有相关因素，包含最微小的损失可能在内，然后得出这些风险的预期利润。这些公司从来不以市场占有率为意，当竞争对手为抢夺客户而接受愚蠢的报价或不合理的理赔条件时，乐观以对而不会跃跃欲试。(能够评估风险才能正确定价)

2. They limit the business they accept in a manner that guarantees they will suffer no aggregation of losses from a single event or from related events that will threaten their solvency. They ceaselessly search for possible correlation among seemingly-unrelated risks.

2，要严格限制承保的业务，以避免公司因为单一事件或其连带事件而遭受损失聚合，从而影响公司的偿付能力，同时不遗余力地寻找任何看似不相关的风险之间，彼此可能的潜在关联。(能够评估业务才能规避风险)

3. They avoid business involving moral risk: No matter what the rate, trying to write good contracts with bad people doesn't work. While most policyholders and clients are honorable and ethical, doing business with the few exceptions is usually expensive, sometimes extraordinarily so.

3，他们避免涉入可能引发道德风险的业务，不管其费率多么诱人，不要妄想在坏人身上占到任何便宜。虽然大部分的客户都是诚信和道德的，所以不要同少数有道德瑕疵的人做生意，通常事后证明代价高昂，其成本远比想象高的多。(避开特定人群躲开诈骗风险)

The events of September 11th made it clear that our implementation of rules 1 and 2 at General Re had been dangerously weak. In setting prices and also in evaluating aggregation risk, we had either overlooked or dismissed the possibility of large-scale terrorism losses. That was a relevant underwriting factor, and we ignored it.

911 事件清楚表明，通用再保险对于第一条与第二条规则的执行极其不力，在设定费率及评估总体聚集风险时，我们不是忽略就是低估了大规模恐怖事件发生的可能性，那是一项相当要紧的承保因素，偏偏我们竟把它给忽略了。

In pricing property coverages, for example, we had looked to the past and taken into account only costs we might expect to incur from windstorm, fire, explosion and earthquake. But what will be the largest insured property loss in history (after adding related business-interruption claims) originated from none of these forces. In short, all of us in the industry made a fundamental underwriting mistake by focusing on experience, rather than exposure, thereby assuming a huge terrorism risk for which we received no premium.

举例来说，财产险在制定价格时，我们通常都会参酌过去的经验，只预期可能会遇到过去发生诸如飓风、火灾、爆炸及地震等灾害，不过谁也没有想到产险史上最大的理赔损失(在加上其它相关的业务中断理赔)与上述原因都没有任何关系，简言之，财产险所有从业人员都犯下了最基本的承保错误，那就是只专注于过去的经验，而未顾及真正暴露的风险，其结果导致我们在承担巨大的恐怖主义风险的同时，却没有为此收取任何一分的保费。

Experience, of course, is a highly useful starting point in underwriting most coverages. For example, it's important for insurers writing California earthquake policies to know how many quakes in the state during the past century have registered 6.0 or greater on the Richter scale. This information will not tell you the exact probability of a big quake next year, or where in the state it might happen. But the statistic has utility, particularly if you are writing a huge statewide policy, as National Indemnity has done in recent years.

当然经验是承保大部分风险最有用的出发点，举例来说，保险公司在承保加州地震险时，绝对必须了解过去一百年来，当地地震规模在里氏六级以上发生的次数，虽然这些信息无法告诉你明年发生大地震的确切概率，或者是可能发生的地点，但统计数字是有用的，特别是当你正在承接一个全州的地震险保单时更是如此，就像国民保险最近几年所得那样。

At certain times, however, using experience as a guide to pricing is not only useless, but actually dangerous. Late in a bull market, for example, large losses from directors and officers liability insurance ("D&O") are likely to be relatively rare. When stocks are rising, there are a scarcity of targets to sue, and both questionable accounting and management chicanery often go undetected. At that juncture, experience on high-limit D&O may look great.

不过在某些时候，运用过去的经验当作依据来制定保费价格，不但毫无用处，有时反而相当的危险。举例来说，牛市中后期，董事及高管的责任险(D&O)实际上发生重大损失的机率少之又少，当股票价格上涨，很难找到适合的目标起诉，而此时会计欺诈及管理舞弊通常不会引起太多的注意，在此种情势下，业者在高限额的 D&O保险经验肯定相当不错。

But that's just when exposure is likely to be exploding, by way of ridiculous public offerings, earnings manipulation, chain-letter-like stock promotions and a potpourri of other unsavory activities. When stocks fall, these sins surface, hammering investors with losses that can run into the hundreds of billions. Juries deciding whether those losses should be borne by small investors or big insurance companies can be expected to hit insurers with verdicts that bear little relation to those delivered in bull-market days. Even one jumbo judgment, moreover, can cause settlement costs in later cases to mushroom. Consequently, the correct rate for D&O "excess" (meaning the insurer or reinsurer will pay losses above a high threshold) might well, if based on exposure, be five or more times the premium dictated by experience.

不过此时，正是风险暴露可能爆炸的时候，通过离谱的公开募股、收益操控、连锁信式的股票操纵以及一些令人生厌的举动等行为大举出笼，然而等到股价暴跌时，所有的罪恶都将浮现，给投资人带来数千亿美元的损失，而决定这些损失，到底该由小额投资人，还是大型保险公司来承担的陪审团，将对保险公司造成打击，其裁决与牛市时的裁决毫无关系，此外，只要出现一个大案子，就有可能导致以后案件的和解费用大幅增加，因此若真要考量暴露的风险，D&O 超额保险(是指保险业者及再保业者将支付超过上限的所有损失)的正确费率极有可能是现行依照经验所订保费的五倍以上。

Insurers have always found it costly to ignore new exposures. Doing that in the case of terrorism, however, could literally bankrupt the industry. No one knows the probability of a nuclear detonation in a major metropolis this year (or even multiple detonations, given that a terrorist organization able to construct one bomb might not stop there). Nor can anyone, with assurance, assess the probability in this year, or another, of deadly biological or chemical agents being introduced simultaneously (say, through ventilation systems) into multiple office buildings and manufacturing plants. An attack like that would produce astronomical workers' compensation claims.

保险业者往往会发现所忽视的新风险暴露的代价相当的高昂，而若是遇到恐怖活动这种情况，更可能造成保险公司实质上的破产，没有人知道今年在主要大都会发生核爆炸的可能性有多大(甚至是连环爆炸，假若恐怖份子一旦有能力制造一颗的话就铁定不会就此止步)，也没有人能评估，今年或某一年，致命的生化武器被大量运用(比如说通过空调系统)进入办公大楼及工厂的机率有多高，诸如此类的恐怖袭击有可能造成天文数字的员工理赔。

Here's what we do know:

a. The probability of such mind-boggling disasters, though likely very low at present, is not zero.

b. The probabilities are increasing, in an irregular and immeasurable manner, as knowledge and materials become available to those who wish us ill. Fear may recede with time, but the danger won't ¾ the war against terrorism can never be won. The best the nation can achieve is a long succession of stalemates. There can be no checkmate against hydra-headed foes.

c. Until now, insurers and reinsurers have blithely assumed the financial consequences from the incalculable risks I have described.

d. Under a "close-to-worst-case" scenario, which could conceivably involve $1 trillion of damage, the insurance industry would be destroyed unless it manages in some manner to dramatically limit its assumption of terrorism risks. Only the U.S. Government has the resources to absorb such a blow. If it is unwilling to do so on a prospective basis, the general citizenry must bear its own risks and count on the Government to come to its rescue after a disaster occurs.

以下是我们所知道的：

a，这类震慑人心灾难的可能性，现在虽然很低，但绝非没有可能。

b，这种可能性正在以一种不规则且难以衡量的速度逐渐增加当中，随着仇视我们的敌人渐渐掌握伤害我们的信息及资源，恐惧的心理或许会随着时间慢慢淡化，但危险却依然存在，对抗恐怖活动的战争永远不会结束，我们能够得到最好的结果是让问题控制在一定程度之下，对于铲除仇视我们的狂热份子绝无根治之道。

c，到目前为止，保险及再保险公司仍然不自知地承担以上我提到的这种无法预估风险的财务后果。

d，在最坏的状况下，有可能产生 1 万亿美元的经济损失，保险业将被崩溃，除非经营者能够将恐怖攻击风险承担的上限大幅压低在一定的水准以下，我想只有美国政府才有能力承受如此大的重击，如果政府不愿意积极地担下此重大责任，任由人民负担所有的风险，则只有等灾难真的发生之后，再由政府出面来收拾残局。

Why, you might ask, didn't I recognize the above facts before September 11th? The answer, sadly, is that I did ¾ but I didn't convert thought into action. I violated the Noah rule: Predicting rain doesn't count; building arks does. I consequently let Berkshire operate with a dangerous level of risk ¾ at General Re in particular. I'm sorry to say that much risk for which we haven't been compensated remains on our books, but it is running off by the day.

或许有人会问，为何我没有在 911 事件发生之前，就提出这项警讯？遗憾的是，我确实有想到了这一点，但可惜的是我并未将想法转化为具体的行动，关于这点我严重违反了诺亚的原则："能够准确预测下雨不重要，重要的是要去建方舟"，我等于是让伯克希尔以相当危险的风险水平运营，尤其是通用再保险，而且我必须承认，截至目前我们没有拿到对应保费的许多风险仍停留在我们账上，所幸这种风险已随着时间慢慢减少。

At Berkshire, it should be noted, we have for some years been willing to assume more risk than any other insurer has knowingly taken on. That's still the case. We are perfectly willing to lose $2 billion to $2½ billion in a single event (as we did on September 11th) if we have been paid properly for assuming the risk that caused the loss (which on that occasion we weren't).

在伯克希尔，有一点必须说明的是，多年以来我们一直有强烈的意愿承担比其他业者更多的风险，即便是现在也是如此，前提是只要保费合理，对于单一事件我们愿意承担最多 20 亿到 25 亿美元的可能损失(就像是 911那样的损失规模，只可惜那时我们没有收到一毛钱的保费)。

Indeed, we have a major competitive advantage because of our tolerance for huge losses. Berkshire has massive liquid resources, substantial non-insurance earnings, a favorable tax position and a knowledgeable shareholder constituency willing to accept volatility in earnings. This unique combination enables us to assume risks that far exceed the appetite of even our largest competitors. Over time, insuring these jumbo risks should be profitable, though periodically they will bring on a terrible year.

事实上，我们愿意承担巨额赔付损失的意愿，使得我们拥有巨大的竞争优势，伯克希尔拥有大量的流动资产、极高的非保险业务收益、有利的租税结构，以及愿意承受收益上下波动的优秀股东阵容，这种独特的组合，让我们可以承担远比其它竞争对手更高的潜在风险，长期而言，接受这类巨型风险肯定有利可图，尽管它们会周期性地带来糟糕的一年。

The bottom-line today is that we will write some coverage for terrorist-related losses, including a few non-correlated policies with very large limits. But we will not knowingly expose Berkshire to losses beyond what we can comfortably handle. We will control our total exposure, no matter what the competition does.

目前我们的底限是愿意承接一些有关恐怖袭击事件的保险，包含少数非相关的限额极高的保单，但我们绝不愿意让伯克希尔暴露于我们无法妥善处理的风险之下，我们会将整体的风险部位控制在一定程度之内，不论外在的市场竞争状况如何都一样。