巴菲特致股东的信（2001年）
⑤2001年保险业务的运营

Insurance Operations in 2001

     Over the years, our insurance business has provided ever-growing, low-cost funds that have fueled much of Berkshire's growth. Charlie and I believe this will continue to be the case. But we stumbled in a big way in 2001, largely because of underwriting losses at General Re.

2001年保险业务的运营

多年以来，我们旗下的保险业务提供了大量低成本且不断增长的资金，为伯克希尔的增长提供了大部分动力。查理跟我都认为这样的态势仍将继续维持下去，谁知道我们竟在 2001 年跌了一大跤，主要的原因就在于通用再保险的承保亏损。

     In the past I have assured you that General Re was underwriting with discipline ¾ and I have been proven wrong. Though its managers' intentions were good, the company broke each of the three underwriting rules I set forth in the last section and has paid a huge price for doing so. One obvious cause for its failure is that it did not reserve correctly ¾ more about this in the next section ¾ and therefore severely miscalculated the cost of the product it was selling. Not knowing your costs will cause problems in any business. In long-tail reinsurance, where years of unawareness will promote and prolong severe underpricing, ignorance of true costs is dynamite.

过去我一再保证，通用再保险的承保一向是有纪律的，事实证明我看错了，虽然管理层的意图是好的，但公司还是违反了前面我提到的三项原则，更为此付出极大的代价，其中一个失败的主要原因就在于损失准备金提列不当，在后段我还会再详细说明，从而因此严重低估了某些尚在销售的保单成本，对许多企业来说，搞不清楚自己的成本会在任何业务中造成相当严重的问题，在长尾再保险中，多年的无知将会加剧和延长定价的严重不足，不了解成本结构就像是一颗不定时的炸弹。

     Additionally, General Re was overly-competitive in going after, and retaining, business. While all concerned may intend to underwrite with care, it is nonetheless difficult for able, hard-driving professionals to curb their urge to prevail over competitors. If "winning," however, is equated with market share rather than profits, trouble awaits. "No" must be an important part of any underwriter's vocabulary.

此外，通用再保险过于热衷追求或留住业务，即便所有人都知道要小心谨慎地承接业务，但还是很难让有才干又肯努力的经理人克制战胜竞争对手的欲望，但如果胜利的定义是争取市场份额而非利润的话，那么麻烦就随时准备上门，勇敢地说 NO，是任何保险从业人员字典里应该必备的一个字。 

     At the risk of sounding Pollyannaish, I now assure you that underwriting discipline is being restored at General Re (and its Cologne Re subsidiary) with appropriate urgency. Joe Brandon was appointed General Re's CEO in September and, along with Tad Montross, its new president, is committed to producing underwriting profits. Last fall, Charlie and I read Jack Welch's terrific book, Jack, Straight from the Gut (get a copy!). In discussing it, we agreed that Joe has many of Jack's characteristics: He is smart, energetic, hands-on, and expects much of both himself and his organization.

虽然听起来有点过度乐观，不过我还是向各位保证通用再保险(以及其子公司科隆再保险)的承保纪律目前正在以适当的紧迫性恢复当中(更换管理层)， 乔·布兰登(Joe Brandon)已在九月被任命为通用再保险的新任 CEO，再加上新任总裁 Tad Montross 皆致力于转亏为盈，去年秋天，查理跟我在读了杰克韦尔奇的新书《杰克韦尔奇自传》(快买一本)，在经过讨论后，我们都认为 Joe 拥有许多杰克谈到的特点，他相当聪明、有活力、经验也够，同时对本身及组织都有深切的自我期许。

     When it was an independent company, General Re often shone, and now it also has the considerable strengths Berkshire brings to the table. With that added advantage and with underwriting discipline restored, General Re should be a huge asset for Berkshire. I predict that Joe and Tad will make it so.

当它还是一家独立的公司时，通用再保险就相当出色，如今它又有伯克希尔带来的巨大优势，有了这一额外优势加上承保纪律逐渐恢复的情况下，我们认为通用再保险应该可以成为伯克希尔最重要的资产之一，我预期Joe 跟 Tad 一定办得到。

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     At the National Indemnity reinsurance operation, Ajit Jain continues to add enormous value to Berkshire. Working with only 18 associates, Ajit manages one of the world's largest reinsurance operations measured by assets, and the largest, based upon the size of individual risks assumed.

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在国民保险的再保业务方面，阿吉特·贾恩继续为伯克希尔增加巨大的价值，只靠着 18 位同仁的协助，阿吉特管理全世界最大(以资产计)的再保险业务之一，而若以承担的整体风险来算，更是全世界第一。

     I have known the details of almost every policy that Ajit has written since he came with us in 1986, and never on even a single occasion have I seen him break any of our three underwriting rules. His extraordinary discipline, of course, does not eliminate losses; it does, however, prevent foolish losses. And that's the key: Just as is the case in investing, insurers produce outstanding long-term results primarily by avoiding dumb decisions, rather than by making brilliant ones.

自从他 1986 年加入以来，对于他承接的所有保单，我知之甚详，但我从来没有发现他违背前述三项原则，虽然他严格的纪律无法保证绝不会发生承保损失，但他确实可以避免愚蠢的错误，这就是关键，就像是我们在投资时一样，保险业者想要有优异的长期绩效，靠的不是少数的成功个案，而是如何持续避免做出愚蠢的决定。

     Since September 11th, Ajit has been particularly busy. Among the policies we have written and retained entirely for our own account are (1) $578 million of property coverage for a South American refinery once a loss there exceeds $1 billion; (2) $1 billion of non-cancelable third-party liability coverage for losses arising from acts of terrorism at several large international airlines; (3) £500 million of property coverage on a large North Sea oil platform, covering losses from terrorism and sabotage, above £600 million that the insured retained or reinsured elsewhere; and (4) significant coverage on the Sears Tower, including losses caused by terrorism, above a $500 million threshold. We have written many other jumbo risks as well, such as protection for the World Cup Soccer Tournament and the 2002 Winter Olympics. In all cases, however, we have attempted to avoid writing groups of policies from which losses might seriously aggregate. We will not, for example, write coverages on a large number of office and apartment towers in a single metropolis without excluding losses from both a nuclear explosion and the fires that would follow it.

自从 911 事件发生之后，阿吉特就变得异常忙碌，在我们承接且全部自留在公司帐上的保单，主要有(1)南美洲炼油厂损失超过 10 亿美元以上的 5.78 亿美元意外险；(2)数家国际航空公司 10 亿美元恐怖份子攻击事件不得撤销第三方责任险；(3)北海石油平台 5 亿英镑恐怖袭击及恶意破坏的财产意外险，以及其他保险公司超过 6 亿英镑以上自留或再保损失；(4)芝加哥 Sears 大厦包括恐怖袭击在内超过 5 亿美元以上的重大损失险；此外我们也接了许多项超大型的意外险，例如世界杯足球赛以及 2002 年冬奥会等，但不论什么情况下，我们都尽量避免会发生连锁反应大量累积损失的保单，比如说，我们不会对单一大城市大量的办公及住宅大楼承保，除非核爆及后续可能引发的火灾损失能够排除。

     No one can match the speed with which Ajit can offer huge policies. After September 11th, his quickness to respond, always important, has become a major competitive advantage. So, too, has our unsurpassed financial strength. Some reinsurers ¾ particularly those who, in turn, are accustomed to laying off much of their business on a second layer of reinsurers known as retrocessionaires ¾ are in a weakened condition and would have difficulty surviving a second mega-cat. When a daisy chain of retrocessionaires exists, a single weak link can pose trouble for all. In assessing the soundness of their reinsurance protection, insurers must therefore apply a stress test to all participants in the chain, and must contemplate a catastrophe loss occurring during a very unfavorable economic environment. After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. At Berkshire, we retain our risks and depend on no one. And whatever the world's problems, our checks will clear.

提到承接巨额保单的速度，没有人可以比得上阿吉特，在 911 事件发生之后，他的快速反应，就变成一个极其重要的竞争优势，当然还有我们引以为傲的财务实力。某些再保险同业，尤其是那些习惯将大部分的风险转嫁给其它再保险公司(转分保)保险人的情况都相当凄惨，而且很有可能无法在承受第二次巨灾的发生，当转分保产生致命的连锁关系时，一个薄弱环节就可能导致全面的崩溃。因此，当保险业者在衡量其再保险安排的合理性时，必须谨慎地对整个链条的保险公司进行压力测试，并深切地思考在非常困难的经济状况下一旦发生巨灾损失的情况下该如何自保。毕竟只有在退潮时，你才能够发现到底是谁在裸泳，在伯克希尔，我们将所有的风险自留，独立承担绝不依赖他人，而不论世上发生什么问题，我们的保单保证永远都能够兑现。

     Ajit's business will ebb and flow ¾ but his underwriting principles won't waver. It's impossible to overstate his value to Berkshire.

阿吉特的业务量会起起落落，但他的承保原则绝不改变，他在伯克希尔的价值永远不可限量。

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     GEICO, by far our largest primary insurer, made major progress in 2001, thanks to Tony Nicely, its CEO, and his associates. Quite simply, Tony is an owner's dream.

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我们目前最大的直保业务 GEICO 保险再 2001 年取得重大进展，这要归功于 CEO 托尼·莱斯利(Tony Nicely)及所有同仁的努力，毫无疑问，Tony 是我们心目中的明星经理人。

     GEICO's premium volume grew 6.6% last year, its float grew $308 million, and it achieved an underwriting profit of $221 million. This means we were actually paid that amount last year to hold the $4.25 billion in float, which of course doesn't belong to Berkshire but can be used by us for investment.

GEICO 去年的保费收入成长了 6.6%，浮存金净增加 3.08 亿美元，并贡献了 2.21 亿美元的承保收益，这代表去年我们在帮别人保管 42.5 亿资金的同时，还有一笔额外的收入，虽然这笔浮存金不属于伯克希尔所有，但却可以为我们运用，进行各项投资。

     The only disappointment at GEICO in 2001 ¾ and it's an important one ¾ was our inability to add policyholders. Our preferred customers (81% of our total) grew by 1.6% but our standard and non-standard policies fell by 10.1%. Overall, policies in force fell .8%.

2001 年 GEICO 唯一让我们失望的是保户的数量没有增加，我们的优先级保单(约占总保户的 81%)成长了1.6%，但标准型与非标准型的保单则下滑了 10.1%，总的来说，有效保单数量减少了 0.8%。

     New business has improved in recent months. Our closure rate from telephone inquiries has climbed, and our Internet business continues its steady growth. We, therefore, expect at least a modest gain in policy count during 2002. Tony and I are eager to commit much more to marketing than the $219 million we spent last year, but at the moment we cannot see how to do so effectively. In the meantime, our operating costs are low and far below those of our major competitors; our prices are attractive; and our float is cost-free and growing.

最近几个月，新保单业务有所复苏，我们的电话销售成交率正在攀升之中，网络销售稳定成长，因此我们预期 2002 年的保单数量至少将可维持些许的成长，Tony 跟我都急于想要投入比去年 2.19 亿美元还要多的营销预算，但直到目前为止，我们仍然找不到有效的方法。在此同时，我们的营运成本依旧远低于其它主要的竞争对手，我们的价格相当具吸引力，而我们的浮存金依旧不须成本且持续成长当中。

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     Our other primary insurers delivered their usual fine results last year. These operations, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Michael Stearns, Don Towle and Don Wurster had combined premium volume of $579 million, up 40% over 2000. Their float increased 14.5% to $685 million, and they recorded an underwriting profit of $30 million. In aggregate, these companies are one of the finest insurance operations in the country, and their 2002 prospects look excellent.

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去年我们其它直保保险公司依旧表现出色，由 RodEldred，JohnKizer，TomNerney，MichaelStearns，DonTowle 和 DonWurster 等人带领的各家保险事业，总计贡献了 5.79 亿美元的保费收入，较 2000 年成长了四成，浮存金则增加 14.5%为 6.85 亿美元，外加 0.3 亿美元的承保收益，总的来说，这些公司堪称全美最好的保险公司之一，展望 2002 年他们的前景依然可期。

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〔译文源于芒格书院整理的巴菲特致股东的信〕

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