巴菲特致股东的信（2001年）⑥损失调整和保险会计

"Loss Development" and Insurance Accounting

Bad terminology is the enemy of good thinking. When companies or investment professionals use terms such as "EBITDA" and "pro forma," they want you to unthinkingly accept concepts that are dangerously flawed. (In golf, my score is frequently below par on a pro forma basis: I have firm plans to "restructure" my putting stroke and therefore only count the swings I take before reaching the green.)

损失调整和保险会计

不当的名词是正确思考的敌人，当一家公司或基金经理人使用诸如"EBITDA"(扣除利息税负及折旧摊销前的利润)及"Pro-Forma"(备考财务报表)等名词时，通常代表他们意图引导你错误地接受某些严重偏差的概念，(在高尔夫比赛中，我的成绩通常拟制性地低于标准杆：由于我确定的计划来重组我的推杆过程，因此我只将到达果岭以前的杆数列入计算)。

In insurance reporting, "loss development" is a widely used term ¾ and one that is seriously misleading. First, a definition: Loss reserves at an insurer are not funds tucked away for a rainy day, but rather a liability account. If properly calculated, the liability states the amount that an insurer will have to pay for all losses (including associated costs) that have occurred prior to the reporting date but have not yet been paid. When calculating the reserve, the insurer will have been notified of many of the losses it is destined to pay, but others will not yet have been reported to it. These losses are called IBNR, for incurred but not reported. Indeed, in some cases (involving, say, product liability or embezzlement) the insured itself will not yet be aware that a loss has occurred.

在保险业的会计制度中，"损失调整"是被广泛使用的术语，而且具有严重的误导性，首先，根据定义：保险公司提列的损失准备金，并不是提拨以备雨天不时之需的资金，实际上它应该是一个负债科目，如果能经由合理地估算，这项负债代表，保险公司在财务报表截止日，已经发生，但所有损失尚未支付的可能金额(包含所有相关费用)。在计算损失时，保险公司除了已经被正式告知必须支付的损失外(未决赔偿准备金)，还必须包含那些尚未被告知的潜在损失，后者通称为 IBNR(未报案准备金)，代表已经发生但尚未告知的损失，事实上，在某些情况下(比如涉及产品责任或员工贪污)，被保人本身甚至还不知道损失已经发生了。

It's clearly difficult for an insurer to put a figure on the ultimate cost of all such reported and unreported events. But the ability to do so with reasonable accuracy is vital. Otherwise the insurer's managers won't know what its actual loss costs are and how these compare to the premiums being charged. GEICO got into huge trouble in the early 1970s because for several years it severely underreserved, and therefore believed its product (insurance protection) was costing considerably less than was truly the case. Consequently, the company sailed blissfully along, underpricing its product and selling more and more policies at ever-larger losses.

对于保险公司来说，实在是很难事先去准确地算出这些已告知及未告知意外事件的最终成本，但以合理的准确性估算的能力却至关重要，否则保险业的经理人将无从得知本身真实的经营成本，从而制定合理的保费。GEICO 在 1970 年代发生的经营危机，就是因为它连续好几年严重低估了损失准备，因而大大低估了其产品的成本，导致公司在不知情的状况下，以不当的价格出售其保单，卖得越多，亏得就越多。

When it becomes evident that reserves at past reporting dates understated the liability that truly existed at the time, companies speak of "loss development." In the year discovered, these shortfalls penalize reported earnings because the "catch-up" costs from prior years must be added to current-year costs when results are calculated. This is what happened at General Re in 2001: a staggering $800 million of loss costs that actually occurred in earlier years, but that were not then recorded, were belatedly recognized last year and charged against current earnings. The mistake was an honest one, I can assure you of that. Nevertheless, for several years, this underreserving caused us to believe that our costs were much lower than they truly were, an error that contributed to woefully inadequate pricing. Additionally, the overstated profit figures led us to pay substantial incentive compensation that we should not have and to incur income taxes far earlier than was necessary.

当保险公司日后发现，之前报告的损失准备金明显低于真实的潜在赔偿时，公司便将"损失调整"这个科目搬出来，这些以前年度遗留下来的准备金缺口，却必须在实际发现的年度报表上认列，这正是 2001 年通用再保险身上所发生的事情：以前年度没有记录的总计 8 亿美元的损失缺口令人震惊，一次性在去年的财务报表上确认并计入当期损益。我可以向各位保证，这个数字应该是相当中肯的了。然而，多年来的准备金提列不当，让我们误以为我们的成本远低于实际数字，这又导致我们后来保单定价不当。除此之外，过度高估的利润，又让我们为此支付额外的奖金以及更早的缴纳所得税。

We recommend scrapping the term "loss development" and its equally ugly twin, "reserve strengthening." (Can you imagine an insurer, upon finding its reserves excessive, describing the reduction that follows as "reserve weakening"?) "Loss development" suggests to investors that some natural, uncontrollable event has occurred in the current year, and "reserve strengthening" implies that adequate amounts have been further buttressed. The truth, however, is that management made an error in estimation that in turn produced an error in the earnings previously reported. The losses didn't "develop" ¾ they were there all along. What developed was management's understanding of the losses (or, in the instances of chicanery, management's willingness to finally fess up).

因此我们强烈建议废除"损失调整"这个会计科目，以及另外一个类似的丑陋科目"损失准备强化"(你能想象一家保险公司因为发现其先前提列的准备金过高，在回冲损失准备金时，使用"损失准备削减"的字眼呢？)。表面上，"损失调整"告诉投资人，某些自然，不可控制的事件在最近年度发生，至于"损失准备强化"则暗示损失准备金已被适当地补提增强。然而事实却是，管理层在先前的损失估计中犯了错误，导致以前年度的收益不实，损失本身并没有任何改变，它一直都在哪里，改变的是管理层对于损失的认知(或是在管理层明知故犯的情况下，最后终于承认其所犯的错误)。

A more forthright label for the phenomenon at issue would be "loss costs we failed to recognize when they occurred" (or maybe just "oops"). Underreserving, it should be noted, is a common ¾ and serious ¾ problem throughout the property/casualty insurance industry. At Berkshire we told you of our own problems with underestimation in 1984 and 1986. Generally, however, our reserving has been conservative.

我认为关于这种现象更贴切的名词应该是"未能及时发现的损失成本"或者可以简称为"哦哦"。必须说明的是，损失提列不足是财产意外险行业普遍存在的严重问题。在伯克希尔，我们就曾在 1984 年及 1986 年告诉大家，我们发生过的估计不足问题。不过总的来说，我们的损失准备金算是相当的稳健保守。

Major underreserving is common in cases of companies struggling for survival. In effect, insurance accounting is a self-graded exam, in that the insurer gives some figures to its auditing firm and generally doesn't get an argument. (What the auditor gets, however, is a letter from management that is designed to take his firm off the hook if the numbers later look silly.) A company experiencing financial difficulties ¾ of a kind that, if truly faced, could put it out of business ¾ seldom proves to be a tough grader. Who, after all, wants to prepare his own execution papers?

损失严重提列不足的现象在经营状况不佳的保险公司尤其常见。事实上，保险业的会计可以说是一项自我评分的考试，对于保险公司向审计会计师提交的报表，通常都不会得到什么异议，(会计师要的通常是一个保证书，万一数字发生重大偏差，可以用来撇清关系)，一家面临财务困难的公司，通常对于自我评分的要求都不会太高，以免真得经营不下去，毕竟没有人会想要替自己签下处以死刑的判决书。

Even when companies have the best of intentions, it's not easy to reserve properly. I've told the story in the past about the fellow traveling abroad whose sister called to tell him that their dad had died. The brother replied that it was impossible for him to get home for the funeral; he volunteered, however, to shoulder its cost. Upon returning, the brother received a bill from the mortuary for $4,500, which he promptly paid. A month later, and a month after that also, he paid $10 pursuant to an add-on invoice. When a third $10 invoice came, he called his sister for an explanation. "Oh," she replied, "I forgot to tell you. We buried dad in a rented suit."

而且就算公司有足够的诚意，还是很难保证能够适当地提列损失，我曾经说过一个关于一位旅居海外人士的故事，话说有天他的姐姐告知父亲过世的消息，他回复表示可能无法回到家乡参加父亲的葬礼，不过倒是愿意负担所有的丧葬费用，后来他果然收到一张 4500 元美元的帐单，二话不说他立即付清，可是谁知随后两个月，他又各收到一张 10 美元的账单，当第三个月收到时，他不解的询问姐姐到底是怎么一回事，他姐姐回复道："哦！我忘了告诉你，爸爸的西装是租来的。"

There are a lot of "rented suits" buried in the past operations of insurance companies. Sometimes the problems they signify lie dormant for decades, as was the case with asbestos liability, before virulently manifesting themselves. Difficult as the job may be, it's management's responsibility to adequately account for all possibilities. Conservatism is essential. When a claims manager walks into the CEO's office and says "Guess what just happened," his boss, if a veteran, does not expect to hear it's good news. Surprises in the insurance world have been far from symmetrical in their effect on earnings.

在保险业经营中，有许多这类"租来的西装"，有时候这类的问题甚至会隐藏数十年不被发现，就像是石棉责任赔偿问题，忽然病毒般的暴露出来。虽然这项估计工作有点棘手，但管理层有责任适当的将所有可能性列入考量，保守稳健绝对有其必要，当损失理赔部门的经理走进总经理的办公室说到"猜猜刚刚发生了什么事？"他的老板，如果是老兵，应该知道肯定不会是什么好消息，保险世界的意外，对于收益的影响通常不会非常一致。

Because of this one-sided experience, it is folly to suggest, as some are doing, that all property/casualty insurance reserves be discounted, an approach reflecting the fact that they will be paid in the future and that therefore their present value is less than the stated liability for them. Discounting might be acceptable if reserves could be precisely established. They can't, however, because a myriad of forces ¾ judicial broadening of policy language and medical inflation, to name just two chronic problems ¾ are constantly working to make reserves inadequate. Discounting would exacerbate this already-serious situation and, additionally, would provide a new tool for the companies that are inclined to fudge.

也由于存在着这种估算经验的偏差，所以当有人盲目地建议，财产意外险的损失准备由于反应的是未来必须支付的款项，所以在经过现值贴现后，应该会小于实际的负债。我个人认为这种想法有点可笑。当然如果能准确的提列损失准备金，按贴现或许是可以接受的。但由于各种不可抗力的因素，比如两个存在已久的问题，保单条款的任意延伸以及医疗通膨，使得损失准备金长期以来处于提列不足的状况，贴现只会让原来存在的问题变得更加严重。此外，还将为那些倾向于造假的公司提供一种新的工具。

I'd say that the effects from telling a profit-challenged insurance CEO to lower reserves through discounting would be comparable to those that would ensue if a father told his 16-year-old son to have a normal sex life. Neither party needs that kind of push.

我必须说，告诉一家在获利边缘挣扎的保险公司总经理可以通过折现将损失准备不足的影响降低，其结果就好象是一位父亲告诉自己 16 岁的儿子可以自由地享受正常的性生活一般，我想两者都不需要这种拔苗助长。