巴菲特致股东的信（2001年）⑦报告收益来源

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments (primarily relating to "goodwill") are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In recent years, our "expense" for goodwill amortization has been large. Going forward, generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") will no longer require amortization of goodwill. This change will increase our reported earnings (though not our true economic earnings) and simplify this section of the report.

报告收益来源

下表显示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的收益状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，近年来我们在商誉摊销的费用相当庞大。从今以后，一般公认会计原则将不再要求商誉必须摊销，此举将提高我们的帐面收益(虽然实质的经济收益一点变动都没有)，并大幅简化这部分的报告。

Here are some highlights (and lowlights) from 2001 relating to our non-insurance activities:

以下是 2001 年我们非保险业务相关的重点摘要：

● Our shoe operations (included in "other businesses") lost $46.2 million pre-tax, with profits at H.H. Brown and Justin swamped by losses at Dexter.

● 我们的制鞋事业营运(包含在其它业务当中)税前亏损为 4,620 万美元，其中布朗鞋业和 Justin 靴业的利润被Dexter 的亏损所淹没。

I've made three decisions relating to Dexter that have hurt you in a major way: (1) buying it in the first place; (2) paying for it with stock and (3) procrastinating when the need for changes in its operations was obvious. I would like to lay these mistakes on Charlie (or anyone else, for that matter) but they were mine. Dexter, prior to our purchase ¾ and indeed for a few years after ¾ prospered despite low-cost foreign competition that was brutal. I concluded that Dexter could continue to cope with that problem, and I was wrong.

至于 Dexter 鞋业，我当初的三项决定，让大家损失惨重：(1)决定购买；(2)决定用股票交换；(3)在明显需要做改变的时刻迟疑不决。我实在很想将这些过错推到查理身上(或者其它任何一个人都可以)，但无奈这确实是我的错，Dexter 在我们正式买下的前后几年，确曾享受过几年的好光景，尽管一直到面临海外低成本产品的激烈竞争，当时我认为 Dexter 应该有能力解决这样的问题，但我的判断却错的离谱。

We have now placed the Dexter operation ¾ which is still substantial in size ¾ under the management of Frank Rooney and Jim Issler at H.H. Brown. These men have performed outstandingly for Berkshire, skillfully contending with the extraordinary changes that have bedeviled the footwear industry. During part of 2002, Dexter will be hurt by unprofitable sales commitments it made last year. After that, we believe our shoe business will be reasonably profitable.

现在我们将 Dexter 的营运重任交付给布朗鞋业的 Frank Rooney 和 Jim Issler，这些人在伯克希尔表现优异，即便在鞋业剧烈的产业波动下，仍能运用各项技巧生存下来。在 2002 年的前半段，Dexter 仍将受到先前所签订不赚钱的合约所影响，但在那之后，我们的鞋业有望回到合理的获利水准。

● MidAmerican Energy, of which we own 76% on a fully-diluted basis, had a good year in 2001. Its reported earnings should also increase considerably in 2002 given that the company has been shouldering a large charge for the amortization of goodwill and that this "cost" will disappear under the new GAAP rules.

● 我们持股 76%的中美能源公司，在 2001 年的表现相当不俗。该公司必须承担大笔的商誉摊销费用，但预期2002 年获利仍将大幅成长，因为依照一般公认会计原则，以后这类摊销成本将不再出现。

Last year MidAmerican swapped some properties in England, adding Yorkshire Electric, with its 2.1 million customers. We are now serving 3.6 million customers in the U.K. and are its 2nd largest electric utility. We have an equally important operation in Iowa as well as major generating facilities in California and the Philippines.

去年中美能源买下位于英国的输电业务，其中包含拥有 210 万用户的约克郡电力(Yorkshire Electric)，目前我们在英国拥有 360 万的用户，在全英排名第二位，此外我们在爱荷华州、加州及菲律宾都拥有重大的发电设施。(用北方电力公司天然气资产换取输电业务，将 2 个毗邻供电区域连成一片形成规模效应)

At MidAmerican ¾ this may surprise you ¾ we also own the second-largest residential real estate brokerage business in the country. We are market-share leaders in a number of large cities, primarily in the Midwest, and have recently acquired important firms in Atlanta and Southern California. Last year, operating under various names that are locally familiar, we handled about 106,000 transactions involving properties worth nearly $20 billion. Ron Peltier has built this business for us, and it's likely he will make more acquisitions in 2002 and the years to come.

说来各位可能会相当惊讶，中美能源旗下还拥有全美第二大的房产经纪商美国家庭服务公司，我们在许多大城市都处于领导地位，尤其是中西部的城市，最近还买下了亚特兰大及南加州几家相当大的中介公司，去年以当地知名的品牌经营，我们总共处理了 10. 6 万多件的房屋交易，成交总值高达 200 亿美元。Ron Peltier 为我们建立了这项业务，而且计划在 2002 年及以后的几年，继续收购更多的中介公司。(www.homeservices.com)

● Considering the recessionary environment plaguing them, our retailing operations did well in 2001. In jewelry, same-store sales fell 7.6% and pre-tax margins were 8.9% versus 10.7% in 2000. Return on invested capital remains high.

● 即便在景气衰退的大环境底下，我们的零售业在 2001 年的表现仍可圈可点，其中珠宝业的单店平均营业额虽然下滑了 7.6%，税前收益率由 2000 年的 10.7%下降为 8.9%，不过投入资本回报率仍然相当的高。

Same-store sales at our home-furnishings retailers were unchanged and so was the margin ¾ 9.1% pre-tax ¾ these operations earned. Here, too, return on invested capital is excellent.

至于家具业务的单店营业额则维持不变，税前利润率依然保持在 9.1%的高位，整体的投入资本回报率依旧相当出色。

We continue to expand in both jewelry and home-furnishings. Of particular note, Nebraska Furniture Mart is constructing a mammoth 450,000 square foot store that will serve the greater Kansas City area beginning in the fall of 2003. Despite Bill Child's counter-successes, we will keep this store open on Sundays.

不论是在珠宝或是家具业务，我们仍然持续扩张，其中要特别提到的是内布拉斯加家具目前正在兴建一座 45 万平方公尺超大的旗舰店，预计在 2003 年秋天落成，届时将可服务堪萨斯的广大地区，虽然有 Bill Childs 成功的反证在前，我们还是决定在周日开张营业。

● The large acquisitions we initiated in late 2000 ¾ Shaw, Johns Manville and Benjamin Moore ¾ all came through their first year with us in great fashion. Charlie and I knew at the time of our purchases that we were in good hands with Bob Shaw, Jerry Henry and Yvan Dupuy, respectively ¾ and we admire their work even more now. Together these businesses earned about $659 million pre-tax.

● 至于我们在 2000 年底进行的几项并购案，Shaw 地毯公司、JohnsManville 隔热材料公司及 Benjanmin 油漆公司，都顺利圆满地渡过了与我们在一起的第一个年头，查理跟我在买下它们的当时，就知道 BobShaw、JerryHenry 及 YvanDupuy 都是其所在产业的能手，但现在我们更感谢他们为我们所做的一切，这些建筑业务公司去年总计为我们实现了 6.59 亿美元的税前收益。

Shortly after yearend we exchanged 4,740 Berkshire A shares (or their equivalent in B shares) for the 12.7% minority interest in Shaw, which means we now own 100% of the company. Shaw is our largest non-insurance operation and will play a big part in Berkshire's future.

在年度结束的不久之后，我们又以 4740 股的伯克希尔 A 股(或等值的 B 股)买下 Shaw 工业剩余的 12.7%少数股权(约 3.5 亿估值 28 亿)，就是说我们已持有该公司 100%的股权。Shaw 工业目前是我们非保险的最大事业，在未来也将在伯克希尔扮演重要角色。

● All of the income shown for Flight Services in 2001 ¾ and a bit more ¾ came from FlightSafety, our pilot-training subsidiary. Its earnings increased 2.5%, though return on invested capital fell slightly because of the $258 million investment we made last year in simulators and other fixed assets. My 84-year-old friend, Al Ueltschi, continues to run FlightSafety with the same enthusiasm and competitive spirit that he has exhibited since 1951, when he invested $10,000 to start the company. If I line Al up with a bunch of 60-year-olds at the annual meeting, you will not be able to pick him out.

● 2001 年的航空服务多数收益都来自我们的飞行员训练子公司飞安公司，虽然去年投资 2.58 亿美元购置飞行模拟器和其他固定资产，股东投资回报率因而略有下降，但其收益仍成长了 2.5%。我 84 岁的老友 Al Ueltschi 继续以当初在 1951 年用 1 万美元创立公司时，同样的热情与毅力来经营公司。如果我在股东会上让 Al 跟一群 60几岁的老先生坐在一起，你可能分辨不出他来。

After September 11th, training for commercial airlines fell, and today it remains depressed. However, training for business and general aviation, our main activity, is at near-normal levels and should continue to grow. In 2002, we expect to spend $162 million for 27 simulators, a sum far in excess of our annual depreciation charge of $95 million. Those who believe that EBITDA is in any way equivalent to true earnings are welcome to pick up the tab.

911 事件发生之后，商业飞机训练业务受到严重影响，而且截至目前为止依旧没有改善的迹象，不过我们的主要业务商务及一般飞行的训练则维持在近乎正常的水准，并有可能继续维持成长。展望 2002 年，我们预计斥资 1.62 亿美元新购 27 台飞行模拟器，远超过我们一年的 9500 万美元的折旧金额，我们欢迎那些爱用 EBITDA作为真实收益的的人士来为我们买单。

Our NetJets® fractional ownership program sold a record number of planes last year and also showed a gain of 21.9% in service income from management fees and hourly charges. Nevertheless, it operated at a small loss, versus a small profit in 2000. We made a little money in the U.S., but these earnings were more than offset by European losses. Measured by the value of our customers' planes, NetJets accounts for about half of the industry. We believe the other participants, in aggregate, lost significant money.

去年我们的 NetJets 飞机部分所有权业务卖出了创纪录的飞机架数，同时管理费收入及小时服务费也大幅成长了 21.9%，但即便如此，相较于 2000 年的小赚，其营运还是呈现小幅亏损，虽然我们在美国的业务有获利，但这些收益却不足以弥补我们在欧洲发生的亏损。若以我们客户拥有的飞机价值来看，NetJets 的占有率大概超过整个行业的半数，因此我们推断其他竞争对手亏损会更大。

Maintaining a premier level of safety, security and service was always expensive, and the cost of sticking to those standards was exacerbated by September 11th. No matter how much the cost, we will continue to be the industry leader in all three respects. An uncompromising insistence on delivering only the best to his customers is embedded in the DNA of Rich Santulli, CEO of the company and the inventor of fractional ownership. I'm delighted with his fanaticism on these matters for both the company's sake and my family's: I believe the Buffetts fly more fractional-ownership hours ¾ we log in excess of 800 annually ¾ than does any other family. In case you're wondering, we use exactly the same planes and crews that serve NetJet's other customers.

要维持高等级的飞行安全和服务水准，其代价肯定相当高昂，这种情况在 911 事件发生之后更是加剧，不过不论成本有多高，我们还是努力在这些方面成为产业趋势的领导者，对于服务丝毫不打折扣的坚持早已深植在该公司总裁兼飞机部分所有权创始人 RichSantulli 的基因里，于公于私，我个人对于 Santulli 的执着皆感到相当欣慰，我相信巴菲特家族是全世界使用飞机部分所有权时数最频繁的家庭，去年整个家族的飞行总时数超过 800 个小时。大家不必怀疑，我们所使用的飞机与机组员与其它所有客户并无二致。

NetJets experienced a spurt in new orders shortly after September 11th, but its sales pace has since returned to normal. Per-customer usage declined somewhat during the year, probably because of the recession.

在 911 事件发生之后，NetJets 的订单曾经出现短暂爆增的情况，但不久之后其销售速度就回到正常的水准，每位客户平均使用的时数甚至略微下滑，我想这多少跟经济景气不佳有些关联。

Both we and our customers derive significant operational benefits from our being the runaway leader in the fractional ownership business. We have more than 300 planes constantly on the go in the U.S. and can therefore be wherever a customer needs us on very short notice. The ubiquity of our fleet also reduces our "positioning" costs below those incurred by operators with smaller fleets.

由于 NetJets 在行业的领导地位，使得我们及客户皆受益良多，目前我们拥有遍布全美 300 架飞机，让客户在很短的时间内就能得到想要的服务，这种特性让我们可以大幅减少飞机停在地面上的成本。

These advantages of scale, and others we have, give NetJets a significant economic edge over competition. Under the competitive conditions likely to prevail for a few years, however, our advantage will at best produce modest profits.

我们拥有的规模经济等优势让 NetJets 在面临竞争时拥有强大的优势，只是在过去几年略占上风的竞争环境下，这些优势也顶多只能让我们获得少许利润。

● Our finance and financial products line of business now includes XTRA, General Re Securities (which is in a run-off mode that will continue for an extended period) and a few other relatively small operations. The bulk of the assets and liabilities in this segment, however, arise from a few fixed-income strategies, involving highly-liquid AAA securities, that I manage. This activity, which only makes sense when certain market relationships exist, has produced good returns in the past and has reasonable prospects for continuing to do so over the next year or two.

● 在金融及金融衍生品业务方面，我们目前包含 XTRA、通用再保险证券(衍生品部门目前正处于退出模式)以及其它一些规模比较小的业务，这一业务的大部分资产与负债，来自我个人亲自管理的一些固定收益策略，包括高流动性的 AAA 高级有价证券。这部分的业务只有在市场符合某些特定状况存在时才有用，过去以来一直为我们贡献不错的回报，展望未来几年内，仍将维持这样的态势。