巴菲特致股东的信（2002年）⑧公司治理

Corporate Governance

Both the ability and fidelity of managers have long needed monitoring. Indeed, nearly 2,000 years ago, Jesus Christ addressed this subject, speaking (Luke 16:2) approvingly of “a certain rich man” who told his manager, “Give an account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest no longer be steward.”

公司治理

长久以来，管理层的能力与诚信本就必须受到严密的检视，事实上，在 2000 多年以前，耶稣基督就曾对这个议题发表过看法，他在路加福音 16：2 提到：「一位财主叫管家来，请你把所管的事情交代一下，因为你不再是我的管家了」。

Accountability and stewardship withered in the last decade, becoming qualities deemed of little importance by those caught up in the Great Bubble. As stock prices went up, the behavioral norms of managers went down. By the late ’90s, as a result, CEOs who traveled the high road did not encounter heavy traffic.

过去 10 多年来，企业管理层的责任感和管理能力日渐萎缩，在网络泡沫巅峰时期，这些特质不再受到人们的重视，当公司股价上涨的同时，经理人的行为规范却向下沉沦，这使得 90 年代末期，那些高格调的CEO 几乎遇不到同路人。

Most CEOs, it should be noted, are men and women you would be happy to have as trustees for your children’s assets or as next-door neighbors. Too many of these people, however, have in recent years behaved badly at the office, fudging numbers and drawing obscene pay for mediocre business achievements. These otherwise decent people simply followed the career path of Mae West: “I was Snow White but I drifted.”

不过必须注意的是，大部分的 CEO 就像你很乐意让他们成为你孩子资产的受托人或像是邻居般亲切的好好先生女士。然而近几年来，这里面有太多人在职场上的表现却每下愈况，不但表现平庸，还假造数字藉以榨取高额不当的利益。这些原本体面的人士，遵循的不过是 MaeWest 生涯规划："曾经我是位白雪公主，但如今我已不再清白。"

In theory, corporate boards should have prevented this deterioration of conduct. I last wrote about the responsibilities of directors in the 1993 annual report. (We will send you a copy of this discussion on request, or you may read it on the Internet in the Corporate Governance section of the 1993 letter.) There, I said that directors “should behave as if there was a single absentee owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all proper ways.” This means that directors must get rid of a manager who is mediocre or worse, no matter how likable he may be. Directors must react as did the chorus-girl bride of an 85-yearold multimillionaire when he asked whether she would love him if he lost his money. “Of course,” the young beauty replied, “I would miss you, but I would still love you.”

理论上，公司董事会本应预防这类恶劣行为的发生，最近一次我在 1993 年的年报上曾提到过董事们应尽的责任，(若有需要，可向我们索取这份年报，或者通过网络下载)，当时我曾表示「我认为董事会应该表现得像一个因事缺席的大股东一样，他们应该以一切适当的方式确保这位虚拟大股东的长期利益不会受到损害」，这句话的意思是，董事会绝对不能容许公司存在一个平庸或甚至是差劲的经理人，不管他是如何讨人喜欢。董事们应该要像是一位年轻的辣妹在下嫁给 85 岁的亿万富翁时，被问到：「如果我身无分文的话，你是否还会爱我？」时的反应一样，这位年轻女郎回答说：「虽然我爱你，但我会更想念你」。

In the 1993 annual report, I also said directors had another job: “If able but greedy managers overreach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders’ pockets, directors must slap their hands.” Since I wrote that, over-reaching has become common but few hands have been slapped.

在 1993 年的年报中，我也曾说过董事的另外一项责任：「要是能干的管理层过于贪心，不时地想要从股东的口袋里捞钱，那么董事会就必须适时地出手制止并给予警告」，只可惜自从那以后，尽管经理人过度伸手的行为已司空见惯，但却不见有人出面制止。

Why have intelligent and decent directors failed so miserably? The answer lies not in inadequate laws – it’s always been clear that directors are obligated to represent the interests of shareholders – but rather in what I’d call “boardroom atmosphere.”

为何一向英明且睿智的董事们会如此惨败呢？其实问题并不在法律层面，董事会本来就应该以捍卫股东利益为最高职责，我认为真正的症结在于我所谓的「董事会氛围」。

It’s almost impossible, for example, in a boardroom populated by well-mannered people, to raise the question of whether the CEO should be replaced. It’s equally awkward to question a proposed acquisition that has been endorsed by the CEO, particularly when his inside staff and outside advisors are present and unanimously support his decision. (They wouldn’t be in the room if they didn’t.) Finally, when the compensation committee – armed, as always, with support from a high-paid consultant – reports on a megagrant of options to the CEO, it would be like belching at the dinner table for a director to suggest that the committee reconsider.

举例来说，通常在充满和谐气氛的董事会议上，几乎不可能讨论到是否应该撤换 CEO 这类严肃的话题，同样令人尴尬的是，董事也不可能笨到会去质疑已经由 CEO 大力背书的并购案，尤其是当列席的内部幕僚与外部顾问皆一致地支持他英明的决策时，(他们若不支持的话，可能早就被赶出去了)，最后，通常由高薪的顾问组成的薪酬委员会，在报告将给予 CEO 大量的认股期权时，任何提出保留意见的董事，通常会被视为像是在宴会上打嗝一样地失礼。

These “social” difficulties argue for outside directors regularly meeting without the CEO – a reform that is being instituted and that I enthusiastically endorse. I doubt, however, that most of the other new governance rules and recommendations will provide benefits commensurate with the monetary and other costs they impose.

这些沟通困难促使外部董事在 CEO 不在场的情况下定期开会，这是一项正在实施的改革，我非常赞同。不过我也怀疑，增加任何的治理规定以及建议，其所必须付出的金钱与其它成本，能否与因此所得到的利益相当。

The current cry is for “independent” directors. It is certainly true that it is desirable to have directors who think and speak independently – but they must also be business-savvy, interested and shareholder-oriented. In my 1993 commentary, those are the three qualities I described as essential.

目前外界大声疾呼的"独立董事"制度，理论上，公司绝对必须要有思想与言论上独立的董事存在，但他们同时也必须具有丰富的商业经历、关心公司的态度，并以股东利益为导向，我在 1993 年就曾提到，这是我个人认为绝对必要的三项特质。

Over a span of 40 years, I have been on 19 public-company boards (excluding Berkshire’s) and have interacted with perhaps 250 directors. Most of them were “independent” as defined by today’s rules. But the great majority of these directors lacked at least one of the three qualities I value. As a result, their contribution to shareholder well-being was minimal at best and, too often, negative. These people, decent and intelligent though they were, simply did not know enough about business and/or care enough about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions or egregious compensation. My own behavior, I must ruefully add, frequently fell short as well: Too often I was silent when management made proposals that I judged to be counter to the interests of shareholders. In those cases, collegiality trumped independence.

过去 40 多年来，我曾经担任过 19 家公开上市公司的董事(伯克希尔不算在内)，同时至少跟 250 位以上的董事进行过互动，他们其中多数都符合目前"独立董事"的标准，但这些董事大多至少缺乏我所提到的三项特质之一，因此，他们对于股东利益的贡献微乎其微，甚至常常有害股东的利益，这些人虽然正派且学识渊博，但对于产业的了解却极其有限，同时也不会站在股东的立场去质疑愚蠢的并购决策或不合理的薪资回报。我必须遗憾地补充说，我自己的行为也经常达不到要求：当管理层在做出有违股东利益的提案时，我常常选择沉默以对，在这种状况下，和谐感战胜了独立性。

So that we may further see the failings of “independence,” let’s look at a 62-year case study covering thousands of companies. Since 1940, federal law has mandated that a large proportion of the directors of investment companies (most of these mutual funds) be independent. The requirement was originally 40% and now it is 50%. In any case, the typical fund has long operated with a majority of directors who qualify as independent.

现在我们进一步来探讨丧失独立性的现象，来看一个涵盖数千家公司的 62 年的案例研究，自从 1940 年以来，联邦法令规定投资公司(其中绝大部分为共同基金)大部分董事必须独立，原本的要求是 40%，目前则提高为50%，但不论如何，共同基金的董事会组织运作一般都符合独立性的条件。

These directors and the entire board have many perfunctory duties, but in actuality have only two important responsibilities: obtaining the best possible investment manager and negotiating with that manager for the lowest possible fee. When you are seeking investment help yourself, those two goals are the only ones that count, and directors acting for other investors should have exactly the same priorities. Yet when it comes to independent directors pursuing either goal, their record has been absolutely pathetic.

这些董事及整个董事会有许多敷衍了事的职责，但实际上只有两项重要职责：一是找到最优秀的基金经理人，一是协调争取最低的管理费。我想当一个人在为自己寻求投资的协助时，这两项目标应该是最要紧的，代表其他投资者的董事们应该有完全相同的考量。然而实证显示，这些独立董事在这方面的表现却是令人感到叹息。

Many thousands of investment-company boards meet annually to carry out the vital job of selecting who will manage the savings of the millions of owners they represent. Year after year the directors of Fund A select manager A, Fund B directors select manager B, etc. … in a zombie-like process that makes a mockery of stewardship. Very occasionally, a board will revolt. But for the most part, a monkey will type out a Shakespeare play before an “independent” mutual-fund director will suggest that his fund look at other managers, even if the incumbent manager has persistently delivered substandard performance. When they are handling their own money, of course, directors will look to alternative advisors – but it never enters their minds to do so when they are acting as fiduciaries for others.

成千上万的投资公司董事会每年都会聚会行使投资人赋予他们的重大责任，即为其背后所代表的数百万投资人选择适当的基金管理人来管理其身家财产。年复一年，基金 A 的董事们选择经理 A，基金 B 的董事们选择经理B 等等……这是一个僵尸般的过程，完全是对管理的嘲弄。当然偶尔也会有董事会造反，但大部分的时候，就算现任的基金经理人的表现再差劲也一样视而不见，我想，等待这些独立董事提议寻找其它合适的基金经理，恐怕连猴子都能写出莎士比亚歌剧了。当然，这些人在处理自己的资产时，只要发现苗头不对，他们会立刻另觅贤能，但他们作为受托人帮他人管理资产时，他们却从来没有想过要这样做。

The hypocrisy permeating the system is vividly exposed when a fund management company – call it “A” – is sold for a huge sum to Manager “B”. Now the “independent” directors experience a “counter-revelation” and decide that Manager B is the best that can be found – even though B was available (and ignored) in previous years. Not so incidentally, B also could formerly have been hired at a far lower rate than is possible now that it has bought Manager A. That’s because B has laid out a fortune to acquire A, and B must now recoup that cost through fees paid by the A shareholders who were “delivered” as part of the deal. (For a terrific discussion of the mutual fund business, read John Bogle’s Common Sense on Mutual Funds.)

当一家基金公司，我们姑且称之为 A 公司，被一位经理人 B 以极高价位买断时，弥漫在这个系统内的伪善气氛就会被特别凸显，这时我们立刻可以发现这些独立董事们终于开始"自我反省"，认为 B 先生才是最佳的基金经理人，尽管 B 先生不是今天才存在这个业界(其实是被刻意忽略)，而且通常很不凑巧的，B 先生在自 A 先生手中买下 A 公司后，其薪资价码肯定比原本的薪资水准高得许多，我想主要原因在于，为了取得 A 公司，B 先生已经投入巨资，而 B 现在必须通过 A 股东支付的费用来补偿这一成本，A 股东事实上成为交易的一部分。如果想要多了解基金公司的内幕，建议各位读一读 JohnBogle 的著作《共同基金的常识》。

A few years ago, my daughter was asked to become a director of a family of funds managed by a major institution. The fees she would have received as a director were very substantial, enough to have increased her annual income by about 50% (a boost, she will tell you, she could use!). Legally, she would have been an independent director. But did the fund manager who approached her think there was any chance that she would think independently as to what advisor the fund should employ? Of course not. I am proud to say that she showed real independence by turning down the offer. The fund, however, had no trouble filling the slot (and – surprise – the fund has not changed managers).

几年前，我的女儿受一家大型的基金机构的邀请担任该公司的董事，担任董事的回报非常可观，大概可以让她的年收入一下子增加 50%以上，关于增加的部分，这是一个激励，该基金会告诉你，她完全能胜任。在法律形式上，她将会是一位独立的董事，但接洽她的基金经理骨子里真的会认为她能够独立地提供任何有用的建议吗？当然不。然而我也很自傲的跟各位报告，她果然很独立地拒绝了这项优越的提案，当然该基金也绝对不愁找不到有人来替代(倒是令人惊讶的该基金并未更换基金经理人)。

Investment company directors have failed as well in negotiating management fees (just as compensation committees of many American companies have failed to hold the compensation of their CEOs to sensible levels). If you or I were empowered, I can assure you that we could easily negotiate materially lower management fees with the incumbent managers of most mutual funds. And, believe me, if directors were promised a portion of any fee savings they realized, the skies would be filled with falling fees. Under the current system, though, reductions mean nothing to “independent” directors while meaning everything to managers. So guess who wins?

投资公司的董事同样也没有能够好好地为投资人协调争取合理的管理费，就像是很多美国大企业的薪资委员会未能将该公司总裁的薪资限制在合理的范围内一样。我想如果是你我受命委托，我可以跟各位保证，我们绝对可以轻易地跟绝大多数共同基金的现任的基金经理谈判，大幅降低其所收取的管理费。而且相信我，如果董事被告知可以分到节省下来的部分所得，我保证管理费用一定降翻天，然而在现有制度下，降低管理费对于独立的董事们来说一点好处都没有，但却又是基金经理人最最在乎的地方，所以很明显的胜负立判。

Having the right money manager, of course, is far more important to a fund than reducing the manager’s fee. Both tasks are nonetheless the job of directors. And in stepping up to these all-important responsibilities, tens of thousands of “independent” directors, over more than six decades, have failed miserably. (They’ve succeeded, however, in taking care of themselves; their fees from serving on multiple boards of a single “family” of funds often run well into six figures.)

当然对于一只基金来说，找到一位好的基金经理要远比降低管理费重要的多，但不论如何，两者都是董事最主要的职责，只是在谈到这些最最重要的责任时，数万名独立董事，六十多年来的经验显示，他们的成绩实在是惨不忍睹。不过他们对于自己的权益倒是保护的不错，即便是担任同一基金公司旗下不同基金的董事，其酬劳也高达六位数。

When the manager cares deeply and the directors don’t, what’s needed is a powerful countervailing force – and that’s the missing element in today’s corporate governance. Getting rid of mediocre CEOs and eliminating overreaching by the able ones requires action by owners – big owners. The logistics aren’t that tough: The ownership of stock has grown increasingly concentrated in recent decades, and today it would be easy for institutional managers to exert their will on problem situations. Twenty, or even fewer, of the largest institutions, acting together, could effectively reform corporate governance at a given company, simply by withholding their votes for directors who were tolerating odious behavior. In my view, this kind of concerted action is the only way that corporate stewardship can be meaningfully improved.

当基金经理非常在乎，而董事们却漠不关心，这时就需要有一股强而有力的反制力量存在，但偏偏这却是今日公司治理最缺乏的元素，想要能够摆脱平庸 CEO 的纠缠，寻找真正的能人取而代之，股东们，尤其是大股东必须要站起来有所行动。公司治理并没有那么困难，近年来股权的集中程度有增无减，机构投资法人在面对问题发生时，可以很容易依照其意志提出解决方案。只要 20 家甚至更少的大型的投资机构联合采取行动，就可以有效地改革任何一家公司的企业治理程度，只要不把票投给那些容忍恶劣行为发生的董事就成了。就我个人的看法，唯有采取这种的团结一致的行动才可能让企业治理获得明显的改善。

Unfortunately, certain major investing institutions have “glass house” problems in arguing for better governance elsewhere; they would shudder, for example, at the thought of their own performance and fees being closely inspected by their own boards. But Jack Bogle of Vanguard fame, Chris Davis of Davis Advisors, and Bill Miller of Legg Mason are now offering leadership in getting CEOs to treat their owners properly. Pension funds, as well as other fiduciaries, will reap better investment returns in the future if they support these men.

不幸的是，某些大型的投资机构根本上存在着"玻璃屋"的问题，声称可以从其它地方着手加强企业治理。比如说，它们一想到董事会要来严密检视其绩效及管理费时，就感到惊惧不已，但先锋基金的 JackBogle、Davis投顾的 ChrisDavis 及 LeggMason 的 BillMiller 现在都站出来引导 CEO 朝向公平对待股东的路上迈进，而如果退休基金以及其它信托基金也能够站出来支持这些人，个人相信这些机构在未来一定可以得到更佳的投资回报。

The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation. Managers will cheerfully agree to board “diversity,” attest to SEC filings and adopt meaningless proposals relating to process. What many will fight, however, is a hard look at their own pay and perks.

辨别改革真伪的最好方法就是看看 CEO 的待遇回报，经理人一般都会欣然同意董事会的多元化，证明向 SEC提交的文件，并依规范遵循一些没有太大意义的作业程序，然而多数经理人真正会反对的，还是如何争取对自己最有利的待遇及福利。

In recent years compensation committees too often have been tail-wagging puppy dogs meekly following recommendations by consultants, a breed not known for allegiance to the faceless shareholders who pay their fees. (If you can’t tell whose side someone is on, they are not on yours.) True, each committee is required by the SEC to state its reasoning about pay in the proxy. But the words are usually boilerplate written by the company’s lawyers or its human-relations department.

近年来，薪酬委员会经常在顾问的建议下温顺地摇尾巴，就是那群由股东们付高薪却不懂得效忠其主之流，如果你不清楚这群人到底是站在那一边，那么它们肯定不是跟你一边的。确实每一个委员会在委托书中都会被 SEC 要求说明其回报的缘由，但其用词遣字往往是由公司律师或者是公关部门事先安排好的例行法律用语。

This costly charade should cease. Directors should not serve on compensation committees unless they are themselves capable of negotiating on behalf of owners. They should explain both how they think about pay and how they measure performance. Dealing with shareholders’ money, moreover, they should behave as they would were it their own.

这类代价高昂的游戏实在没有存在的必要，董事们不应担任薪资委员会成员，除非他们能够代表股东们争取权益，同时他们必须说明对于经理人回报的看法以及如何来评估其绩效。此外，在代投资人管理资金时，他们必须像是在处理自己的金钱一样用心。

In the 1890s, Samuel Gompers described the goal of organized labor as “More!” In the 1990s, America’s CEOs adopted his battle cry. The upshot is that CEOs have often amassed riches while their shareholders have experienced financial disasters.

1890 年代，美国劳工联盟创盟主席 SamuelGompers 形容劳工组织的主要目标就是"我要更多"，1990 年代美国企业的 CEO 们采用了相同的口号，而最终的结果往往是 CEO 们累积了大量的财富的同时，股东们却遭受重大的财务损失。

Directors should stop such piracy. There’s nothing wrong with paying well for truly exceptional business performance. But, for anything short of that, it’s time for directors to shout “Less!” It would be a travesty if the bloated pay of recent years became a baseline for future compensation. Compensation committees should go back to the drawing boards.

董事会必须阻止这样的盗窃行为，虽然支付高薪给表现真正优秀的经理人本是天经地义的事，但如果不是那么一回事的话，董事们就有必要大胆说"够了"，否则，如果近年来这类夸张的薪资待遇成为日后薪资底限，那岂不是荒唐之极，因此，薪资委员会实有必要再好好重长计议一番。

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Rules that have been proposed and that are almost certain to go into effect will require changes in Berkshire’s board, obliging us to add directors who meet the codified requirements for “independence.” Doing so, we will add a test that we believe is important, but far from determinative, in fostering independence: We will select directors who have huge and true ownership interests (that is, stock that they or their family have purchased, not been given by Berkshire or received via options), expecting those interests to influence their actions to a degree that dwarfs other considerations such as prestige and board fees.

目前正在修正并几乎肯定会通过的法令，要求伯克希尔的董事会进行改组，在原董事基础上增列符合"独立性"法规的独立董事，为此我们认为还必须增加另外一项相当重要但也不是那么绝对的测试，以认定其独立性。我们将选拔拥有重大真正所有权益的董事，也就是说其本人或家族投资购买的，而不是由伯克希尔认股权给予的股份，以确保其真正会为了自身的权益而不是名望或董事酬劳来决定其行为。

That gets to an often-overlooked point about directors’ compensation, which at public companies averages perhaps $50,000 annually. It baffles me how the many directors who look to these dollars for perhaps 20% or more of their annual income can be considered independent when Ron Olson, for example, who is on our board, may be deemed not independent because he receives a tiny percentage of his very large income from Berkshire legal fees. As the investment company saga suggests, a director whose moderate income is heavily dependent on directors’ fees – and who hopes mightily to be invited to join other boards in order to earn more fees – is highly unlikely to offend a CEO or fellow directors, who in a major way will determine his reputation in corporate circles. If regulators believe that “significant” money taints independence (and it certainly can), they have overlooked a massive class of possible offenders.

这其中又牵涉到常常被忽视的董事回报问题，上市公司董事的年平均收入达到 5 万美元以上。让我感到困惑的是，我们的董事会成员罗恩·奥尔森(RonOlson)可能被认为不独立，理由是他的董事回报只占他从伯克希尔获得的巨额律师费收入中的很小一部分。而其他多数董事在面对这笔超过其年收入 20%以上的金钱时，是如何维持其独立性的？就如一位投资公司 saga 所说的，一位收入严重依赖董事费的董事，而且非常希望被邀请加入其他董事会以赚取更多费用，他很有可能不敢得罪 CEO 或其它董事成员，因为后者对于前者在公司业界的名声有相当大的影响力，而如果监管机构认为高额金钱会影响到独立性(事实也确是如此)，那么他们也忽略了一大群可能的罪犯。

At Berkshire, wanting our fees to be meaningless to our directors, we pay them only a pittance. Additionally, not wanting to insulate our directors from any corporate disaster we might have, we don’t provide them with officers’ and directors’ liability insurance (an unorthodoxy that, not so incidentally, has saved our shareholders many millions of dollars over the years). Basically, we want the behavior of our directors to be driven by the effect their decisions will have on their family’s net worth, not by their compensation. That’s the equation for Charlie and me as managers, and we think it’s the right one for Berkshire directors as well.

在伯克希尔，为了避免董事回报占其个人收入的比例太高，我们仅象征性地支付一点回报。此外为了不让董事们规避公司发生重大经营意外的风险，我们不向他们提供高管和董事责任保险，这是一种非正统的做法，多年来为我们的股东节省了数百万美元，基本上，我们希望董事们的行为想法跟在处理自家财产一般小心谨慎，而不只是着眼于董事回报，这是查理与我本人在身为伯克希尔经营者的心态一致，我们这样的做法同样也适用于伯克希尔的董事们。

To find new directors, we will look through our shareholders list for people who directly, or in their family, have had large Berkshire holdings – in the millions of dollars – for a long time. Individuals making that cut should automatically meet two of our tests, namely that they be interested in Berkshire and shareholder-oriented. In our third test, we will look for business savvy, a competence that is far from commonplace.

为了寻找新任董事，我们会先从现有股东名单中着手，挑选个人或其家族长期拥有数百万美元伯克希尔股份的股东，因为达到标准的这些人很自然的已经符合前两项测试，也就是他们关心伯克希尔，同时也以股东权益为导向，至于第三项测试，我们将挑选具有丰富商业经验的人士，这点的困难度相对就较高。

Finally, we will continue to have members of the Buffett family on the board. They are not there to run the business after I die, nor will they then receive compensation of any kind. Their purpose is to ensure, for both our shareholders and managers, that Berkshire’s special culture will be nurtured when I’m succeeded by other CEOs.

最后，巴菲特家族成员也将继续留在伯克希尔的董事会中，但这并不代表他们在我死后会接手经营伯克希尔，也不会另外领取其它额外的回报，他们主要的目标是替所有公司经理人与股东，确保未来在其它 CEO 接替我之后，伯克希尔能够继续保有其特有的企业文化。

Any change we make in the composition of our board will not alter the way Charlie and I run Berkshire. We will continue to emphasize substance over form in our work and waste as little time as possible during board meetings in show-and-tell and perfunctory activities. The most important job of our board is likely to be the selection of successors to Charlie and me, and that is a matter upon which it will focus.

当然任何董事会的变动都不会影响到查理跟我经营伯克希尔的方式，我们还是会像过去一样，重实质而不重形式，并且尽量避免董事会把时间浪费在形式上的问答上，伯克希尔董事会最主要的任务就是决定查理跟我日后的继承人，这才是他们将来真正应该要做的。

The board we have had up to now has overseen a shareholder-oriented business, consistently run in accord with the economic principles set forth on pages 68-74 (which I urge all new shareholders to read). Our goal is to obtain new directors who are equally devoted to those principles.

截至目前为止，我们的董事会监督的是一家以股东权益为主要导向的企业，始终按照伯克希尔经营原则运行，这也是我一向督促新进股东必读的原则，而我们的目标也是找到同样关心这类原则的新任董事。