巴菲特致股东的信（2002年）⑨审计委员会

The Audit Committee

Audit committees can’t audit. Only a company’s outside auditor can determine whether the earnings that a management purports to have made are suspect. Reforms that ignore this reality and that instead focus on the structure and charter of the audit committee will accomplish little.

审计委员会

审计委员会没有能力进行稽核，唯有公司外部独立的会计师才有能力判断公司管理层提交的收益报告是否可疑，没有正视这项现实而只是将焦点放在审计委员会组织架构和章程的任何改革终将徒劳无功。

As we’ve discussed, far too many managers have fudged their company’s numbers in recent years, using both accounting and operational techniques that are typically legal but that nevertheless materially mislead investors. Frequently, auditors knew about these deceptions. Too often, however, they remained silent. The key job of the audit committee is simply to get the auditors to divulge what they know.

就像是我们先前讨论过的，近年来太多的经理人在公司的营运数字上动手脚，不管是会计帐上或是营运统计皆是如此，这些手法表面上通常是合法的，但实际上却严重误导投资人，审计人员通常都相当清楚这些欺骗手法，然而他们选择保持沉默，所以审计委员会最主要的职责就是让会计师吐露他们所知道的事实。

To do this job, the committee must make sure that the auditors worry more about misleading its members than about offending management. In recent years auditors have not felt that way. They have instead generally viewed the CEO, rather than the shareholders or directors, as their client. That has been a natural result of day-to-day working relationships and also of the auditors’ understanding that, no matter what the book says, the CEO and CFO pay their fees and determine whether they are retained for both auditing and other work. The rules that have been recently instituted won’t materially change this reality. What will break this cozy relationship is audit committees unequivocally putting auditors on the spot, making them understand they will become liable for major monetary penalties if they don’t come forth with what they know or suspect.

要达成这项任务，委员会必须确定会计师勇于冒犯管理层，而不是误导委员会。但很遗憾近年来会计师的想法作为却刚好相反，他们往往把公司的 CEO，而不是股东或董事当作是客户，这是工作关系的自然结果。同时会计师也很清楚，不论公司的报表数字如何，CEO 与 CFO 保证会支付审计费用，并且有权决定是否由原会计师继续从事审计业务及其它服务，而最近修正的法规依然无法改变这一根本的现实。想要打破这种暧昧的关系，唯有靠审计委员会明白地告诉会计师，让他们清楚地了解如果不将所发现或怀疑的事实说出来，他们将承担大笔罚款。

In my opinion, audit committees can accomplish this goal by asking four questions of auditors, the answers to which should be recorded and reported to shareholders. These questions are:

我个人认为，审计委员会可以通过向会计师提出以下四个问题来达到这个目的，同时必须将他们的回复记录下来，并向股东报告，这四个问题分别是：

1.If the auditor were solely responsible for preparation of the company’s financial statements, would they have in any way been prepared differently from the manner selected by management? This question should cover both material and nonmaterial differences. If the auditor would have done something differently, both management’s argument and the auditor’s response should be disclosed. The audit committee should then evaluate the facts.

1、如果今年是由贵会计师单独负责本公司的财务报表编制，那么会计师编制的报表会不会与现在管理层准备的报表有所不同？不论是重大或不重大的差异，都必须答复，如果贵会计师的做法有任何不同，则应披露管理层的观点以及会计师的回复，然后由审计委员会来评估现实的状况。

2.If the auditor were an investor, would he have received – in plain English – the information essential to his understanding the company’s financial performance during the reporting period?

2、如果贵会计师是一名投资人，那么你是否认为已经收到了你认为了解这家公司报告期内的财务经营状况所需的所有必要信息？直接回答是或不是。

3.Is the company following the same internal audit procedure that would be followed if the auditor himself were CEO? If not, what are the differences and why?

3、如果贵会计师是本公司的 CEO，那么你认为本公司是否已经遵循了所有必要的内部审计程序？如果没有，是哪边有差异，以及其原因是什么？

4.Is the auditor aware of any actions – either accounting or operational – that have had the purpose and effect of moving revenues or expenses from one reporting period to another?

4、贵会计师是否知悉管理层存在财务操纵，比如将公司的收入或费用从一个报告期，挪移到另一个报告期的目的或举动，不管是会计帐面或者是营运统计上？

If the audit committee asks these questions, its composition – the focus of most reforms – is of minor importance. In addition, the procedure will save time and expense. When auditors are put on the spot, they will do their duty. If they are not put on the spot . . . well, we have seen the results of that.

我相信如果审计委员会能确实询问会计师以上四个问题，那么其组织架构(这是大多数改革的重点)就一点也不重要了，此外，这样的做法可以大大节省时间和成本。当会计师被推上火线，保证他们会乖乖负起职责，但如果让他们静静地躲在角落，嗯！届时你就知道结果如何。

The questions we have enumerated should be asked at least a week before an earnings report is released to the public. That timing will allow differences between the auditors and management to be aired with the committee and resolved. If the timing is tighter – if an earnings release is imminent when the auditors and committee interact – the committee will feel pressure to rubberstamp the prepared figures. Haste is the enemy of accuracy. My thinking, in fact, is that the SEC’s recent shortening of reporting deadlines will hurt the quality of information that shareholders receive. Charlie and I believe that rule is a mistake and should be rescinded.

我们列举的这些问题必须要财务报表正式对外公布的前一周提出，这段时间应该足够让委员会了解会计师与管理层之间的差异在哪里，并把问题解决。因为如果时间太紧，将会面临财报发布在即，但会计师与委员会却还在沟通的窘境，这将使委员会迫于压力沦为橡皮图章的老路。时间越赶，准确度就越差。事实上我个人认为，SEC最近缩短财报公布的时程的做法，将严重影响到股东们收到的财务信息品质，查理跟我认为这样的规定根本就是个错误，应该立即加以改正。

The primary advantage of our four questions is that they will act as a prophylactic. Once the auditors know that the audit committee will require them to affirmatively endorse, rather than merely acquiesce to, management’s actions, they will resist misdoings early in the process, well before specious figures become embedded in the company’s books. Fear of the plaintiff’s bar will see to that.

我们这四个问题最主要的优点在于，它们将能够发挥防范于未然的效果，一旦会计师了解到审计委员会将会要求他们肯定地为管理层的行为背书，而不是默许管理层的行为，会计师就能够在事情刚发生的初期就出面制止，让有问题的数字不在会计帐上出现，可能的牢狱威胁保证会发生效用。

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The Chicago Tribune ran a four-part series on Arthur Andersen last September that did a great job of illuminating how accounting standards and audit quality have eroded in recent years. A few decades ago, an Arthur Andersen audit opinion was the gold standard of the profession. Within the firm, an elite Professional Standards Group (PSG) insisted on honest reporting, no matter what pressures were applied by the client. Sticking to these principles, the PSG took a stand in 1992 that the cost of stock options should be recorded as the expense it clearly was. The PSG’s position was reversed, however, by the “rainmaking” partners of Andersen who knew what their clients wanted – higher reported earnings no matter what the reality. Many CEOs also fought expensing because they knew that the obscene megagrants of options they craved would be slashed if the true costs of these had to be recorded.

去年 9 月，《芝加哥论坛报》就安达信会计师事务所刊登了四天连载，详细报导近年来安达信是如何让会计准则与审计质量腐化到如此地步。十几年前，安达信事务所出具的意见可以说是业界的金字招牌。在事务所内部，由一群菁英组成的专业准则小组(PSG)，不管面对来自客户多少的压力，仍坚持财务报表必须诚实编制，为了坚持这项原则，PSG 在 1992 年坚持期权本就应该列为费用的立场。然而曾几何时，PSG 在另一群"呼风唤雨"的合伙人推动下，对于此立场做了 180 度的转变，他们相当清楚客户心里最渴望的东西：那就是亮丽的收益数字，不论实际的状况如何。而许多 CEO 也极力反对将期权成本列为费用，因为他们相当清楚，如果这些高额期权成本如实反应在公司帐上的话，他们渴望已久的大笔期权将会大幅缩水。

Soon after the Andersen reversal, the independent accounting standards board (FASB) voted 7-0 for expensing options. Predictably, the major auditing firms and an army of CEOs stormed Washington to pressure the Senate – what better institution to decide accounting questions? – into castrating the FASB. The voices of the protesters were amplified by their large political contributions, usually made with corporate money belonging to the very owners about to be bamboozled. It was not a sight for a civics class.

在安达信立场转变后不久，独立会计准则委员会(FASB)以 7 比 0 的票数通过将期权成本列为费用。不出所料，各大会计师事务所和一大群 CEO 蜂拥华盛顿向参议院施压企图废掉 FASB，到底是哪一个单位最适合来处理会计问题啊！抗议者的声音通过大笔的政治献金放大了，讽刺的是这些捐款正是来自被欺瞒股东所拥有的公司资金，这实在不是文明社会应该有的现象。

To its shame, the Senate voted 88-9 against expensing. Several prominent Senators even called for the demise of the FASB if it didn’t abandon its position. (So much for independence.) Arthur Levitt, Jr., then Chairman of the SEC – and generally a vigilant champion of shareholders – has since described his reluctant bowing to Congressional and corporate pressures as the act of his chairmanship that he most regrets. (The details of this sordid affair are related in Levitt’s excellent book, Take on the Street.)

可耻的是，参议院竟以 88 对 9 票通过反对期权列为费用，几位著名的参议员甚至扬言解散 FASB，如果它依然坚持原来的立场(真是好有独立性啊!)，当时的 SEC 主席小阿瑟·莱维特(ArthurLevitt,Jr.)，他一向也是股东权益的捍卫先锋，后来表示当时迫于压力向国会及企业低头，是他在担任 SEC 主席任内最感到遗憾的一件事，(有关这件遗憾的往事，相关的细节可参考 Levitt 所写的好书《挑战华尔街》TakeonTheStreet)。

With the Senate in its pocket and the SEC outgunned, corporate America knew that it was now boss when it came to accounting. With that, a new era of anything-goes earnings reports – blessed and, in some cases, encouraged by big-name auditors – was launched. The licentious behavior that followed quickly became an air pump for The Great Bubble.

在参议院成为其囊中物，而 SEC 又处于劣势的情况下，美国企业了解到他们在会计方面已经是天下无敌，就这样「我高兴什么都可以」收益报告的新时代于是到来，更理想的是，还有知名的大会计师在后面推波助澜。随之而来的放荡行为很快就成了大气泡的空气泵。

After being threatened by the Senate, FASB backed off its original position and adopted an “honor system” approach, declaring expensing to be preferable but also allowing companies to ignore the cost if they wished. The disheartening result: Of the 500 companies in the S&P, 498 adopted the method deemed less desirable, which of course let them report higher “earnings.” Compensation-hungry CEOs loved this outcome: Let FASB have the honor; they had the system.

面临来自参议院的威胁，FASB 也从原来的立场退缩，转而采取「自我要求」的荣誉制度做法，声明费用化为优先但也容许公司根据需要忽略此成本不计。令人沮丧的是，在 S&P500 大公司当中，共有 498 家选择采取比较不理想的方法，好让他们的报告收益好看一点，想钱想疯了的 CEO 们当然很高兴最后的结果，FASB 赢得了面子，而他们却赢得了里子。

In our 1992 annual report, discussing the unseemly and self-serving behavior of so many CEOs, I said “the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to society – about which it may have much of value to say – when it advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself.”

在我们 1992 年的年报当中，我们提到了许多 CEO 不体面的自肥行为，我说：企业精英冒着失去他们在社会重大议题公信力的风险，这是他们本来拥有相当发言份量的领域，当他们在大力鼓吹让自己夺取不合理利益的做法令人难以置信。

That loss of credibility has occurred. The job of CEOs is now to regain America’s trust – and for the country’s sake it’s important that they do so. They will not succeed in this endeavor, however, by way of fatuous ads, meaningless policy statements, or structural changes of boards and committees. Instead, CEOs must embrace stewardship as a way of life and treat their owners as partners, not patsies. It’s time for CEOs to walk the walk.

这种公信力沦丧的现象已经发生，目前 CEO 们最大的任务是如何重拾美国大众对他们的信任，而站在国家利益的立场，他们绝对有必要这样做，但如果我们看到的是，一再自以为是的言论、无意义的政策声明、董事会与委员会形式上的改组，那么一切的努力终将徒劳无功。相反的，我认为 CEO 们必须将管理作为一种生活方式，并将其股东视为合作伙伴，而不是待宰羔羊。现在是 CEO 们起而行之的时候了。

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Three suggestions for investors: First, beware of companies displaying weak accounting. If a company still does not expense options, or if its pension assumptions are fanciful, watch out. When managements take the low road in aspects that are visible, it is likely they are following a similar path behind the scenes. There is seldom just one cockroach in the kitchen.

给投资人三个衷心的建议，第一，特别提防会计帐务有问题的公司。如果一家公司迟迟不肯将期权成本列为费用，或者其养老金投资预期假设过于乐观，千万要小心。当管理层在人们可见的方面降低标准，那么在幕后很有可能也是如此，厨房里绝对不可能只有一只蟑螂。

Trumpeting EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is a particularly pernicious practice. Doing so implies that depreciation is not truly an expense, given that it is a “non-cash” charge. That’s nonsense. In truth, depreciation is a particularly unattractive expense because the cash outlay it represents is paid up front, before the asset acquired has delivered any benefits to the business. Imagine, if you will, that at the beginning of this year a company paid all of its employees for the next ten years of their service (in the way they would lay out cash for a fixed asset to be useful for ten years). In the following nine years, compensation would be a “non-cash” expense – a reduction of a prepaid compensation asset established this year. Would anyone care to argue that the recording of the expense in years two through ten would be simply a bookkeeping formality?

大力鼓吹 EBITDA，亦即扣除利息税负及折旧摊销前收益的观念更是一项危险的举动。这意思好象说折旧根本就不是费用的一种，因为它是非现金费用，并不影响到现金的流出，这根本就是一派胡言。事实上折旧是一项特别不引人注意的费用支出，因为它的现金支出是在取得的资产还未发挥效益之前就预先支付的。想象一下，在年初你就预先支付公司所有员工未来十年的薪资回报，就好象是支付现金购买一项耐用年限达十年之久的固定资产一般，那么在接下来的九年之间，所有的薪资回报都将变成一项没有现金支出的费用，会计上系做为预付费用的减项。在这种状况下，不知道还有没有人敢说后九年所记录的费用只不过是会计上的形式而已呢？

Second, unintelligible footnotes usually indicate untrustworthy management. If you can’t understand a footnote or other managerial explanation, it’s usually because the CEO doesn’t want you to. Enron’s descriptions of certain transactions still baffle me.

第二，复杂难懂的财务报表附注通常暗示管理层不值得信赖。如果你根本就看不懂附注或管理层的说明解释，这通常代表管理层压根就不想让你搞懂，安然公司在某些交易的过程说明，到现在还让我相当困惑。

Finally, be suspicious of companies that trumpet earnings projections and growth expectations. Businesses seldom operate in a tranquil, no-surprise environment, and earnings simply don’t advance smoothly (except, of course, in the offering books of investment bankers).

第三，要特别小心那些习惯夸大盈利预测及增长预期的公司。企业很少能够在一帆风顺、毫无意外的环境下经营，所以收益也很难按照当初预计般稳定成长，当然除了投资银行家的招股说明书。

Charlie and I not only don’t know today what our businesses will earn next year – we don’t even know what they will earn next quarter. We are suspicious of those CEOs who regularly claim they do know the future – and we become downright incredulous if they consistently reach their declared targets. Managers that always promise to “make the numbers” will at some point be tempted to make up the numbers.

目前查理跟我不仅不清楚明年我们旗下事业到底能够赚多少钱，我们甚至不知道下一季的数字，所以我们相当怀疑那些常常声称知道未来会如何如何的 CEO，而如果他们真的每次都能达到收益目标，我们反而更怀疑这其中有鬼，那些保证能够达到目标的管理层，总有一天会被迫去造假。