巴菲特致股东的信（2011年）⑧投资业务

Investments

投资业务

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

以下表格列示了我们在 2011 年底持有的市值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资：

We made few changes in our investment holdings during 2011. But three moves were important: our purchases of IBM and Bank of America and the $1 billion addition we made to our Wells Fargo position.

2011 年我们的投资持股几乎没有变化。但有三个投资举动非常重大：我们大幅购买 IBM 和美国银行，还增持了 10 亿美元的富国银行。

The banking industry is back on its feet, and Wells Fargo is prospering. Its earnings are strong, its assets solid and its capital at record levels. At Bank of America, some huge mistakes were made by prior management. Brian Moynihan has made excellent progress in cleaning these up, though the completion of that process will take a number of years. Concurrently, he is nurturing a huge and attractive underlying business that will endure long after today’s problems are forgotten. Our warrants to buy 700 million Bank of America shares will likely be of great value before they expire.

银行业正在恢复，富国银行现在正蓬勃发展，其盈利强劲增长，资产稳健，资本金也达到创纪录的水平。至于美国银行，之前管理层犯下了一些重大错误。其现任首席执行官 Brian Moynihan 在清理这些错误方面取得了极其出色的进展，不过还需要数年时间才能完成清理过程。与此同时他正在培育一个规模巨大且有吸引力的基础业务，在今天的问题被人们遗忘之后，该业务能够持续经营下去。我们购买的 7 亿美国银行认购权证将在到期之前可能将会具有很高的价值。

As was the case with Coca-Cola in 1988 and the railroads in 2006, I was late to the IBM party. I have been reading the company’s annual report for more than 50 years, but it wasn’t until a Saturday in March last year that my thinking crystallized. As Thoreau said, “It’s not what you look at that matters, it’s what you see.”

如同我在 1988 年才投资可口可乐以及在 2006 年才投资 BNSF 铁路一样，我再一次因下手太晚而错过 IBM的投资机会。我已经持续阅读这家公司的年报 50 多年了，直到去年 3 月的一个周六，我的想法才变的清晰起来。正如梭罗所说："重要的不是你在看什么，而是你看到了什么"。

Todd Combs built a $1.75 billion portfolio (at cost) last year, and Ted Weschler will soon create one of similar size. Each of them receives 80% of his performance compensation from his own results and 20% from his partner’s. When our quarterly filings report relatively small holdings, these are not likely to be buys I made (though the media often overlook that point) but rather holdings denoting purchases by Todd or Ted.

Todd Combs 去年建立了一个 17.5 亿美元的投资组合(按成本计)，Ted Weschler 也将很快建立一个类似规模的投资组合。他们每个人的业绩报酬，80%来自于自己，20%来自于合伙人。当我们的季度申报文件披露了占投资组合比例相对较小的持股时，这些股票不太可能是我买入的(尽管媒体经常会忽略这一点)，而是表示这是 Todd或者 Ted 买入的。

One additional point about these two new arrivals. Both Ted and Todd will be helpful to the next CEO of Berkshire in making acquisitions. They have excellent “business minds” that grasp the economic forces likely to determine the future of a wide variety of businesses. They are aided in their thinking by an understanding of what is predictable and what is unknowable.

对这两位新来的投资经理人，我还有一点要补充说明。Ted 和 Todd 都会对伯克希尔的下一任CEO 在收购企业决策中提供帮助。他们拥有非常出色的"商业头脑"，能够抓到那些可能决定各种企业未来的关键经济力量。他们两人通过理解什么是可预知的，什么是不可知的，来帮助他们进行思考。

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There is little new to report on our derivatives positions, which we have described in detail in past reports. (Annual reports since 1977 are available at www.berkshirehathaway.com.) One important industry change, however, must be noted: Though our existing contracts have very minor collateral requirements, the rules have changed for new positions. Consequently, we will not be initiating any major derivatives positions. We shun contracts of any type that could require the instant posting of collateral. The possibility of some sudden and huge posting requirement – arising from an out-of-the-blue event such as a worldwide financial panic or massive terrorist attack – is inconsistent with our primary objectives of redundant liquidity and unquestioned financial strength.

关于我们的金融衍生品仓位，并没有什么新东西需要报告，在过去的年报中已经解释得非常详细。(从 1977年以来我们的所有年报都可以在 berkshirehathaway.com 官网上查阅。)然而，我必须谈谈一个重要的行业性变化：虽然我们现有的合约对抵押品的要求很小，但是对于新建立的仓位的规定已经发生改变。因此，我们将不会新建任何大规模的衍生品仓位。我们回避任何要求立即提供抵押品的衍生合约。由于突发事件根本无法预测(比如全球金融危机或者大规模恐袭)，可能会导致某些突然且要求提供巨额担保物的要求，这完全不符合我们的首要目标——保持过剩的流动性和毋庸置疑的财务实力。

Our insurance-like derivatives contracts, whereby we pay if various issues included in high-yield bond indices default, are coming to a close. The contracts that most exposed us to losses have already expired, and the remainder will terminate soon. In 2011, we paid out $86 million on two losses, bringing our total payments to $2.6 billion. We are almost certain to realize a final “underwriting profit” on this portfolio because the premiums we received were $3.4 billion, and our future losses are apt to be minor. In addition, we will have averaged about $2 billion of float over the five-year life of these contracts. This successful result during a time of great credit stress underscores the importance of obtaining a premium that is commensurate with the risk.

我们持有的类似于保险的衍生品合约，如果高收益率债券指数中包含的各种发行公司出现违约，我们将根据合约进行赔付。我们持有的损失风险最大的那些合约已经到期，其余的合约也将很快终止。2011 年，我们为两笔赔付支付了 8600 万美元，这也让我们的赔付总额达到了 26 亿美元。我们几乎可以确定，这个投资组合最终将会实现"承保盈利"，因为我们收到的类似保费收入是 34 亿美元，而我们未来的赔付会很小。此外，在这类合约的 5年期间，我们持有的浮存金规模平均为 20 亿美元。在面临巨大信贷压力的时期取得这一成功业绩凸显出，保费定价与所承担的风险相匹配是多么重要。

Charlie and I continue to believe that our equity-put positions will produce a significant profit, considering both the $4.2 billion of float we will have held for more than fifteen years and the $222 million profit we’ve already realized on contracts that we repurchased. At yearend, Berkshire’s book value reflected a liability of $8.5 billion for the remaining contracts; if they had all come due at that time our payment would have been $6.2 billion.

考虑到我们未来能够持有 42 亿美元的浮存金超过 15 年以上，而且我们已经在那些回购合约上赚到了 2.22亿美元，查理和我相信，我们的股票指数卖出期权合约将会实现相当可观的利润。2011 年底，伯克希尔的账面价值反映其余衍生品合约的 85 亿美元负债。如果这些合约全部持有到期，我们将会支付 62 亿美元。