巴菲特致股东的信（2011年）⑨投资者的基本选择与我们的强烈偏好

The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer

投资者的基本选择与我们的强烈偏好

Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power – after taxes have been paid on nominal gains – in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.

投资经常被描述为现在投入资金，以期望在未来收回更多的资金的过程。在伯克希尔，我们采用更加严格的标准，把投资定义为：现在把购买力转让给别人，并合理的预期未来将获得更多的购买力(按税后名义收益)。更简洁的说，投资就是放弃现在的消费，以便未来拥有消费更多的能力。

From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability – the reasoned probability – of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing-power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

根据我们的定义可以得出一个重要的推论：一项投资的风险高低不能用贝塔值来衡量(beta 贝塔值是一个包含波动性的华尔街金融术语，经常用于衡量风险)，而应该用购买力损失的可能性来衡量，也就是在其持有期内，这项投资导致其持有人的购买力出现损失的合理概率。资产的价格可以大幅波动，只要这些资产在持有期间能够合理地确保增加购买力，就可以说这项投资是没有风险的。后面我们将会分析说明，一项价格没有波动的资产可能充满风险。

Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it’s important to understand the characteristics of each. So let’s survey the field.

可供选择的投资种类多种多样，但投资总体上可以分为三大类，理解每类投资的特点非常重要，因此让我们来仔细分析这三类投资资产。

•Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as “safe.” In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.

•第一类投资：基于货币的资产基于给定货币计价的投资，包括货币市场基金、债券、抵押贷款、银行存款和其他金融工具。大多数此类基于货币资产的投资都被视为"安全的"，但事实上它们是最危险的资产之一。它们的贝塔值可能是零，但它们的风险值却是巨大的。

Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.

在过去的一个世纪，这类投资工具摧毁了很多国家投资者的购买力，即使投资人能够按时收到支付的利息和本金。而且，这样的糟糕结果未来将一再重现。政府决定了货币的最终价值，而系统性力量有时会导致政府更加倾向于采取那些会导致通货膨胀的政策。而这些政策总是会一次又一次失去控制。

Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as “income.”

即使是在美国，尽管政府强烈希望维持美元币值稳定，但自 1965 年我接管伯克希尔 47 年来，美元贬值了令人震惊的 86%。今天要花至少 7 美元才能买到当初 1 美元的东西。因此，一个免税机构也必须从债券投资中取得4.3%的收益率才能保持购买力不变。假如投资经理人把任何利息收入视为"收益"，他们就是在自欺欺人。

For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor’s visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It’s noteworthy that the implicit inflation “tax” was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. “In God We Trust” may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government’s printing press has been all too human.

对于像你我这样必须缴税的投资者来说，情况就更加糟糕了。在过去这 47 年里，美国国债不断地滚动发行，年化收益率为 5.7%。听起来好像还不错。但对于一个所得税率平均为 25%的个人投资者来说，这 5.7%的国债名义收益率却不能够产生任何实际回报。投资者有形的所得税将从他 5.7%名义收益中拿走其中的 1.4%，而无形的通货膨胀税将吞噬掉剩余的 4.3%。值得注意的是，隐形的通胀税是显性的所得税的三倍多，而投资者却可能认为所得税是其主要负担。虽然每张美元上都印着"我们信仰上帝"，但实际上启动政府印钞机的却是凡人之手。

High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

当然，投资基于货币的资产时，高利率能弥补投资者必须面临的通胀风险。实际上，1980 年代早期的高利率确实很好地做到了这一点。可是，现在的利率水平并不足以抵消投资者承担的购买力减少风险。因此，现在的债券应该贴上一个风险警告标签。

Under today’s conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

因此，在目前利率水平低于通胀率的环境下，我一点也喜欢那些基于货币的投资资产。尽管如此，伯克希尔仍持有大量的这类资产，主要是短期品种。在伯克希尔保持充足流动性的需求永远被置于极其重要的中心地位，不管利率水平是多么低，它都不会被轻视。为了满足这种流动性的需要，我们主要持有美国短期国债，在最混乱的经济环境下，这是唯一可以指望获得流动性的投资资产。我们正常运营的流动性水平要求是 200 亿美元，100亿美元是我们的最低限度。

Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we’ve exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: “Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk.”

在满足了流动性需求和监管强加给我们的要求之外，只有在基于货币的资产提供了非同寻常的收益时，我们才有可能购买——要么是因为特定的借款被错误定价，就像垃圾债券周期性暴跌期间发生的那样，要么是因为利率已经上升至较高的水平(债券下跌)，从而当利率下降期间，高评级债券有可能实现可观的资本收益。尽管我们过去曾经都利用过这两种机会，未来也有可能再次利用，但是现在我们距这类投资机会相距甚远。今天，华尔街人士戴维斯(Shelby Cullom Davis)多年前说的一句辛辣的评论视乎非常贴切："被宣传为提供无风险的回报的债券，现在的价格提供的却是无回报的风险"。

•The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer’s hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.

•第二类投资：非生产性资产第二类投资是那些永远不会有任何产出的资产。投资者之所以买入，是寄希望其他投资者将来会为它们支付更高的价格，尽管这些人同样也知道这类资产永远不会有任何产出。17 世纪，郁金香一度短暂的成为此类买家的最喜爱的投资品种。

This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.

这种类型的投资需要不断扩大的买家群体，而这些买家反过来又会被吸引，因为他们相信买家群体会进一步扩大。资产所有者并不是被资产本身所能生产的东西所吸引(它将永远没有产出)，而是相信其他人在未来会更加渴望得到它。

The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.

这一类别最主要的资产是黄金。目前黄金是投资者的最爱，因为(危机之后)他们对黄金以外所有资产都非常恐惧，尤其是纸币(正如前面所说，担心纸币购买力下降是正确的)。不过，黄金有两个明显的缺点，一是没有太多用途，二是没有生产能力。的确，黄金有一些工业和装饰用途，但这些用途的需求量是有限的，而且没有能力消化新增产量。同时，如果投资者一直持有一盎司黄金，那么最终你仍将只有一盎司黄金。

What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As “bandwagon” investors join any party, they create their own truth – for a while.

大多数黄金购买者的动机是他们相信对货币贬值恐惧的队伍会进一步升级。过去十这个信念被证明是正确的。除此之外，黄金价格的持续上涨本身也刺激投资者产生了额外的购买热情，吸引了那些把金价上涨看作验证了这种投资理论的投资者。随着"跟风"投资者的涌入黄金投资的狂潮，他们创造出他们自己信奉的真理，不过只是暂时的。

Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the “proof” delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: “What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.”

过去 15 年里，我们看到的网络股泡沫和房地产泡沫都证明了：将一个最初合理的投资观念，与广为宣传的价格上涨现象结合在一起，就能创造出非同寻常的过度行为。在这些市场泡沫中，很多原本持怀疑态度的投资者，后来也屈服于市场给出的价格上涨"证据"，在一段时间内，买方群体的规模迅速扩大，不断增加的买入资金足以让泡沫继续膨胀。但吹的足够大的泡沫不可避免地会破裂。那时就会再次验证那句谚语：智者先行，愚者跟风。

Today the world’s gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce – gold’s price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

今天，全球的黄金库存量约有 17 万公吨。如果把全球所有黄金熔在一起，就会铸成一个边长约 21 米的立方体，想象一下，其大小差不多正好可以放在一个棒球场的内场里。以我现在写作时的金价 1750 美元/盎司计算，全球所有黄金的市值约为 9.6 万亿美元。我们将这个黄金立方体称为 A 资产。

Let’s now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world’s most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?

现在，让我们用同样的资金创建一个 B 资产。9.6 万亿美元的资金可以买下美国所有的土地(4 亿英亩，年产值约 2 千亿美元)，再加上 16 家埃克森美孚石油公司(全球最赚钱的公司，每年盈利超过 400 亿美元)。除此之外，还剩下约 1 万亿美元可用作流动资金。因此，即使是如此大手笔投资之后，也丝毫不会感到资金紧张。你能想像一个拥有 9.6 万亿美元资金的投资者会选择购买 A 资产而不是 B 资产吗？

Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today’s annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.

除了现在全球黄金库存的市值高得惊人之外，按照当前的金价计算，黄金年产量也高达约 1600 亿美元。黄金的买家，不管是珠宝制造商、工业用户、非常恐惧货币贬值的个人、还是投机者，都必须不断地消化这些每年不断增加的黄金供应量，仅仅是为了在目前的金价水平上保持供需均衡。

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.

一个世纪以后，美国 4 亿英亩的土地将产出数量惊人的玉米、小麦、棉花和其他农作物，而且不论未来货币是什么，都将继续生产这些宝贵的产品。埃克森美孚石油公司可能会向股东派发了几万亿美元的股利，而且公司还将会持有价值数万亿美元的资产(记住你拥有 16 家埃克森美孚石油公司)。而 17 万公吨黄金的体积不会有丝毫变化，而且仍然不会有任何产出。当然，你可以天天爱抚这个黄金立方体，但是它却不会对你有任何回应。

Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it’s likely many will still rush to gold. I’m confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.

不可否认，即使是 100 年之后，当人们感到恐惧时，可能还是会有很多人冲向黄金。但我相信，在本世纪末当前价值 9.6 万亿美元的 A 资产，其年化回报率将会远远低于 B 资产。

•Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard “cash is king” in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard “cash is trash” in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.

•第三类资产：生产性资产当恐惧心理达到顶点时，前两类资产最受欢迎：对经济崩溃的恐惧，驱使个人投资基于货币的资产，尤其是美国国债。而对货币崩溃的恐惧，则驱使人们投资黄金等非生产性资产。在 2008 年末，我们听到人人都在说"现金为王"，而当时应该花掉现金而不是持有现金。同样，在 1980 年代初，我们听到人人都在说"现金是垃圾"，但是那时固定收益投资正处于我们记忆中最有吸引力的高收益水平。在这两种情况下，那些盲目跟风的投资者为这种内心安慰而付出了高昂的代价。

My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See’s Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.

我自己最看好就是我们接下来要谈到的第三类：投资生产性资产。不管是企业、农场，还是房地产。最理想的标准是：在通货膨胀时期，这些资产能够生产出保持其购买力的产出，同时只需最低水平的新增资本投入。农场、房地产和许多优秀企业，比如可口可乐、IBM 以及我们拥有的喜诗糖果，都能经受住上述双重标准的检验。当然其他的公司之所以破产(比如受到政府监管的公用事业公司)，是因为通胀会给它们带来沉重的追加资本的要求。为了获得更多盈利，它们的股东必须投入更多的资本。尽管如此，这类投资仍将优于非生产性资产和基于货币的投资。

Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See’s peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

不管一个世纪后的货币形式是黄金、贝壳、鲨鱼牙，还是今天这样的一个小纸片，人们还是会愿意用几分钟的日常劳动，来换取一罐可口可乐或一些喜诗花生糖。未来，美国人肯定将运输更多的商品，消费更多的食物，要求更大的住房。人们将会永远用自己生产的东西交换别人生产的东西。

Our country’s businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial “cows” will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of “milk” to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire’s goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we’ve examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.

美国企业将会继续高效地提供美国人所需要的商品和服务。打个比方，这些商业"奶牛"将会存活上好几百年，并生产出更多的"牛奶"。它们价值高低不取决于商品交换的媒介，而是取决于它们的产奶能力。销售牛奶的收益将会为奶牛所有者带来复利增长，就像 20 世纪的股票投资一样，期间道琼斯指数从 66 点增长到了 11497 点(并支付了大量股息)。伯克希尔的目标将是不断增加一流企业的所有权。我们的第一个选择是整体收购这些一流企业成为唯一的主人，但我们也愿意通过持有大量流通股的方式拥有其部分所有权。我相信在未来任何一个较长的时期内，对于一流企业的这类投资都将证明，是我们前面分析的三类投资最终的赢家。更重要的是，它也将是迄今为止最安全的投资。