巴菲特致股东的信（2012年）⑦分红

Dividends

分红

A number of Berkshire shareholders – including some of my good friends – would like Berkshire to pay a cash dividend. It puzzles them that we relish the dividends we receive from most of the stocks that Berkshire owns, but pay out nothing ourselves. So let’s examine when dividends do and don’t make sense for shareholders.

伯克希尔的一些股东(包括我一些最好的朋友)，可能都希望伯克希尔进行现金分红。让他们疑惑的是，我们从伯克希尔拥有的大多数子公司那里收到很多分红，却从来不向大家分红。我们有必要来了解一下，什么时候分红对股东有意义，什么时候没有意义。

A profitable company can allocate its earnings in various ways (which are not mutually exclusive). A company’s management should first examine reinvestment possibilities offered by its current business – projects to become more efficient, expand territorially, extend and improve product lines or to otherwise widen the economic moat separating the company from its competitors.

一家盈利的公司，可以通过各种方式分配收益(这些方法不是互相排斥的)。公司的管理层应该首先检查，当前业务再投资的可能性：提高效率，扩张地域，扩大或改进生产线，或者其他方式能加深拓宽公司与竞争对手之间的经济护城河。

I ask the managers of our subsidiaries to unendingly focus on moat-widening opportunities, and they find many that make economic sense. But sometimes our managers misfire. The usual cause of failure is that they start with the answer they want and then work backwards to find a supporting rationale. Of course, the process is subconscious; that’s what makes it so dangerous.

我要求子公司的经理人永无止境地专注于加深护城河的机会，他们也的确发现很多行之有效的办法。但有时候我们的经理人也犯错。通常错误的原因是，他们先找到了他们想要的答案，然后再反过来寻找支持它们的理由。当然这个过程是潜意识的；这也是让错误无比危险的原因。

Your chairman has not been free of this sin. In Berkshire’s 1986 annual report, I described how twenty years of management effort and capital improvements in our original textile business were an exercise in futility. I wanted the business to succeed and wished my way into a series of bad decisions. (I even bought another New England textile company.) But wishing makes dreams come true only in Disney movies; it’s poison in business.

你们的董事长也犯过同样的错误。在伯克希尔 1986 年的年报里，我详述了 20 年来我们在原有的纺织业务上的管理努力和投资，最终如何竹篮打水一场空。我希望公司最后能成功，导致了一系列糟糕的决定。(我甚至买下了另一家新英格兰的纺织厂)。但是梦想成真只在迪士尼的童话故事里存在。愿望是商业决策上的毒药。

Despite such past miscues, our first priority with available funds will always be to examine whether they can be intelligently deployed in our various businesses. Our record $12.1 billion of fixed-asset investments and bolt- on acquisitions in 2012 demonstrate that this is a fertile field for capital allocation at Berkshire. And here we have an advantage: Because we operate in so many areas of the economy, we enjoy a range of choices far wider than that open to most corporations. In deciding what to do, we can water the flowers and skip over the weeds.

虽然过去犯过如此错误，但我们可用资金的首要配置选择始终是，研究它是否能够明智的配置到我们现有的业务中。2012 年我们创纪录的 121 亿美元固定资产投资和补强型收购证明，伯克希尔内部有一大片沃土可以投资。而且我们具备显著优势：我们再经济的许多领域运营着众多的业务，我们享有比大多数公司更广泛的投资选择。在决定投资什么的时候，我们可以直接跳过杂草去浇灌鲜花。

Even after we deploy hefty amounts of capital in our current operations, Berkshire will regularly generate a lot of additional cash. Our next step, therefore, is to search for acquisitions unrelated to our current businesses. Here our test is simple: Do Charlie and I think we can effect a transaction that is likely to leave our shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis than they were prior to the acquisition?

即使在我们在伯克希尔现有业务中部署了大量资本后，伯克希尔依然源源不断产出富余的现金。因此，我们的下一步则是，寻找与当前业务无关的收购机会。我们的标准也很简单：查理和我认为，我们是否能够达成一项交易，让我们的股东在每股基础上，比收购之前更加富有？

I have made plenty of mistakes in acquisitions and will make more. Overall, however, our record is satisfactory, which means that our shareholders are far wealthier today than they would be if the funds we used for acquisitions had instead been devoted to share repurchases or dividends.

我在收购中犯了很多错误，而且还会接着犯错。不过总体来说，我们的记录还算是令人满意的，也就是说，比起把资金用来回购或者分红，把资金用于收购让我们的股东变得更加富有了。

But, to use the standard disclaimer, past performance is no guarantee of future results. That’s particularly true at Berkshire: Because of our present size, making acquisitions that are both meaningful and sensible is now more difficult than it has been during most of our years.

不过借用标准的免责申明，过去的表现并不能保证未来的收益。对伯克希尔来说尤其如此：相比多年以前规模较小的时候，我们当前的规模进行有意义且明智的收购越来越难。

Nevertheless, a large deal still offers us possibilities to add materially to per-share intrinsic value. BNSF is a case in point: It is now worth considerably more than our carrying value. Had we instead allocated the funds required for this purchase to dividends or repurchases, you and I would have been worse off. Though large transactions of the BNSF kind will be rare, there are still some whales in the ocean.

尽管如此，一笔大额的收购还是可以大幅提高我们的每股内在价值。BNSF 铁路就是一个不错的例子：它现在的价值远高于账面价值。如果我们这次收购的钱用来分红或者回购，我们的情况要比现在更糟糕。虽然像 BNSF这样的大家伙不多，但是海里还是有鲸鱼的。

The third use of funds – repurchases – is sensible for a company when its shares sell at a meaningful discount to conservatively calculated intrinsic value. Indeed, disciplined repurchases are the surest way to use funds intelligently: It’s hard to go wrong when you’re buying dollar bills for 80¢ or less. We explained our criteria for repurchases in last year’s report and, if the opportunity presents itself, we will buy large quantities of our stock. We originally said we would not pay more than 110% of book value, but that proved unrealistic. Therefore, we increased the limit to 120% in December when a large block became available at about 116% of book value.

资金的第三种利用方式是回购。当公司股票以明显低于保守估计的内在价值的折扣出售时，回购就有意义。实际上，有纪律的股票回购是合理利用资金的最可靠方式：以 80 美分或者更低的价格购买 1 美元很难出错。在去年年报里，我们解释了回购的标准，如果机会来了，我们会大笔回购股票。我们之前说我们回购不会支付超过110%的账面价值，但是事实证明那不切实际。因此，我们在 12 月将上限提高到 120%，当时一大笔股票以账面价值的 116%在出售。

But never forget: In repurchase decisions, price is all-important. Value is destroyed when purchases are made above intrinsic value. The directors and I believe that continuing shareholders are benefitted in a meaningful way by purchases up to our 120% limit.

但永远不要忘记：在回购决策中，价格是最重要的。如果回购价格高于内在价值那就是在毁灭价值。董事们和我都认为，继续以低于账面价值 120%的价格回购股票对股东是有利的。

And that brings us to dividends. Here we have to make a few assumptions and use some math. The numbers will require careful reading, but they are essential to understanding the case for and against dividends. So bear with me.

最后我们来谈谈分红。这里我们需要一些假设并且要做些计算。这些数字需要仔细阅读才能理解，但是这对于理解应该和不应该分红的理由至关重要。所以请耐心听我讲。

We’ll start by assuming that you and I are the equal owners of a business with $2 million of net worth. The business earns 12% on tangible net worth – $240,000 – and can reasonably expect to earn the same 12% on reinvested earnings. Furthermore, there are outsiders who always wish to buy into our business at 125% of net worth. Therefore, the value of what we each own is now $1.25 million.

我们假设你和我各自拥有一家价值 200 万美元的公司的一半。公司每年的净有形资产收益率是 12%，即 24万美元，并且可以合理预期再投资收益率也是 12%。此外，外部投资者愿意以净资产 125%的价格收购我们的公司。于是，我们各自拥有的资产价格是 125 万美元。

You would like to have the two of us shareholders receive one-third of our company’s annual earnings and have two-thirds be reinvested. That plan, you feel, will nicely balance your needs for both current income and capital growth. So you suggest that we pay out $80,000 of current earnings and retain $160,000 to increase the future earnings of the business. In the first year, your dividend would be $40,000, and as earnings grew and the one- third payout was maintained, so too would your dividend. In total, dividends and stock value would increase 8% each year (12% earned on net worth less 4% of net worth paid out).

你可能希望公司每年把利润的三分之一用来分配，剩余三分之二继续投资。你觉得这个方案即满足了当前收入的要求，又能实现资本增值。所以你建议我们分配 8 万美元现金，剩余 16 万用于增加公司未来的利润。第一年，你会收到 4 万美元的分红，随着利润的增长和三分之一的分红比例保持不变，你收到的分红也会增长。总的来说，分红和股票价值会以每年 8%的速度增长(12%收益率-4%分红)。

After ten years our company would have a net worth of $4,317,850 (the original $2 million compounded at 8%) and your dividend in the upcoming year would be $86,357. Each of us would have shares worth $2,698,656 (125% of our half of the company’s net worth). And we would live happily ever after – with dividends and the value of our stock continuing to grow at 8% annually.

十年后，我们公司的净资产会达到 4,317,850 美元(期初的 200 万按 8%的复利计算)，同时你下一年收到的分红也会增长到 86,357 美元。我们两人各自的股票价值 2,698,656(我们各自一半净资产的 125%)。我们之后会生活的非常快乐，因为分红和股价依然每年增长 8%。

There is an alternative approach, however, that would leave us even happier. Under this scenario, we would leave all earnings in the company and each sell 3.2% of our shares annually. Since the shares would be sold at 125% of book value, this approach would produce the same $40,000 of cash initially, a sum that would grow annually. Call this option the “sell-off” approach.

但还有另一种方式会让我们更加快乐。那就是我们留存所有的利润，同时每人每年卖出手中 3.2%的股票。因为股票可以以净资产 125%的价格卖出，所以这种方法第一年也能获得 4 万美元的现金，卖出获得的资金也会不断增长。我们暂且把这种方法叫做"卖出法"。

Under this “sell-off” scenario, the net worth of our company increases to $6,211,696 after ten years ($2 million compounded at 12%). Because we would be selling shares each year, our percentage ownership would have declined, and, after ten years, we would each own 36.12% of the business. Even so, your share of the net worth of the company at that time would be $2,243,540. And, remember, every dollar of net worth attributable to each of us can be sold for $1.25. Therefore, the market value of your remaining shares would be $2,804,425, about 4% greater than the value of your shares if we had followed the dividend approach.

在"卖出法"的情形下，十年后公司的净资产值会增长到 6,211,686 美元(期初的 200 万按 12%的复利计算)。但是因为我们每年都会卖出股票，持股比例会下降，十年后，我们每人拥有公司 36.12%的股票。即便如此，你所持的股票对应的净资产为 2,243,540 美元。另外别忘了，每 1 美元的净资产值可以以 1.25 美元卖出。因此，剩余的股票市值 2,804,425 美元，大约比"分红法"高出 4%。

Moreover, your annual cash receipts from the sell-off policy would now be running 4% more than you would have received under the dividend scenario. Voila! – you would have both more cash to spend annually and more capital value.

同时，你从"卖出法"获得的现金要比"分红法"获得的现金高 4%。瞧！你不但每年有更有钱花，最后还有更多的财产。

This calculation, of course, assumes that our hypothetical company can earn an average of 12% annually on net worth and that its shareholders can sell their shares for an average of 125% of book value. To that point, the S&P 500 earns considerably more than 12% on net worth and sells at a price far above 125% of that net worth.

当然，上述的计算假设平均每年 12%的净资产回报率，而且股东能以账面价值的 125%卖出股票。到目前为止，标普 500 指数的净资产回报率明显超过 12%，并且售价远超净资产的 125%。

Both assumptions also seem reasonable for Berkshire, though certainly not assured.

这两条假设对于伯克希尔来说似乎都是适当的，当然这无法保证。

Moreover, on the plus side, there also is a possibility that the assumptions will be exceeded. If they are, the argument for the sell-off policy becomes even stronger. Over Berkshire’s history – admittedly one that won’t come close to being repeated – the sell-off policy would have produced results for shareholders dramatically superior to the dividend policy.

考虑到乐观的情形，上面的假设被超过的可能性也是存在的。如果事实如此，那么"卖出法"就更具优势。根据伯克希尔的历史(当然这一历史无法重演)，"卖出法"比"分红法"给股东带来了多得多的财富。

Aside from the favorable math, there are two further – and important – arguments for a sell-off policy. First, dividends impose a specific cash-out policy upon all shareholders. If, say, 40% of earnings is the policy, those who wish 30% or 50% will be thwarted. Our 600,000 shareholders cover the waterfront in their desires for cash. It is safe to say, however, that a great many of them – perhaps even most of them – are in a net-savings mode and logically should prefer no payment at all.

除了计算上的优势以外，还有两个支持"卖出法"的原因也非常重要。第一，分红策略强制对所有股东进行同样比例的分红。比如说，分红比例是 40%，那些希望分红比例是 30%或 50%的股东就受到伤害。我们 60 万股东的分红偏好各不相同。或许可以肯定地说，他们中的许多人(或许是绝大多数)偏好净储蓄模式，他们宁愿不分红。

The sell-off alternative, on the other hand, lets each shareholder make his own choice between cash receipts and capital build-up. One shareholder can elect to cash out, say, 60% of annual earnings while other shareholders elect 20% or nothing at all. Of course, a shareholder in our dividend-paying scenario could turn around and use his dividends to purchase more shares. But he would take a beating in doing so: He would both incur taxes and also pay a 25% premium to get his dividend reinvested. (Keep remembering, open-market purchases of the stock take place at 125% of book value.) The second disadvantage of the dividend approach is of equal importance: The tax consequences for all taxpaying shareholders are inferior – usually far inferior – to those under the sell-off program. Under the dividend program, all of the cash received by shareholders each year is taxed whereas the sell-off program results in tax on only the gain portion of the cash receipts.

第二，"卖出法"让股东可以自己决定现金和资本增值之间的比例。一位股东可以选择兑现 60%的利润，另一位可以选择兑现 20%或者不兑现。当然，"分红法"股东可以用分红把股票买回来，但是他这样做会受到伤害：既要交税，又要支付 25%的溢价才能把股票买回来。(记住，公开市场以账面价值的 125%交易股票。)分红的第二个坏处同样严重："分红法"的税收负担不如(通常远不如) "卖出法"。根据股息计划，每年股东收到所有的现金分红都要交税，而"卖出法"只需为现金收入中的利得部分交税。

Let me end this math exercise – and I can hear you cheering as I put away the dentist drill – by using my own case to illustrate how a shareholder’s regular disposals of shares can be accompanied by an increased investment in his or her business. For the last seven years, I have annually given away about 4 1 ⁄ 4 % of my Berkshire shares. Through this process, my original position of 712,497,000 B-equivalent shares (split-adjusted) has decreased to 528,525,623 shares. Clearly my ownership percentage of the company has significantly decreased.

让我们以我自己的例子来结束这场数学练习(我可以听到你们好像牙医的钻头被拿开了一样的开心的欢呼)，并解释股东如何逐步减持股票，同时实现投资的增值。在过去的 7 年里，我每年都会捐出自己持有的 4.25%伯克希尔股票。经过这个过程，我原持有的 712,497,000 股 B 股股票(经过拆股)已经减少到了 528,525,623 股。很显然我的持股比例显著的减少了。

Yet my investment in the business has actually increased: The book value of my current interest in Berkshire considerably exceeds the book value attributable to my holdings of seven years ago. (The actual figures are $28.2 billion for 2005 and $40.2 billion for 2012.) In other words, I now have far more money working for me at Berkshire even though my ownership of the company has materially decreased. It’s also true that my share of both Berkshire’s intrinsic business value and the company’s normal earning power is far greater than it was in 2005. Over time, I expect this accretion of value to continue – albeit in a decidedly irregular fashion – even as I now annually give away more than 4 1 ⁄ 2 % of my shares (the increase having occurred because I’ve recently doubled my lifetime pledges to certain foundations).

但我在公司的投资实际上增加了：我现在持有的股票的账面价值明显高于 7 年之前。(具体数字是 2005 年的282 亿，2012 年为 402 亿)。换句话说，虽然我现在伯克希尔的持股比例降低了，但是投在伯克希尔的钱更多了。同样的，我在伯克希尔的内在价值和公司的盈利能力也比 2005 年大大增强。随着时间推移，我预计这种价值增长还会继续(尽管是以一种不规则的方式)，即使我现在每年都会捐赠超过 4.25%的股票(增加的份额是由于我增加了对某些基金会的终身承诺)。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Above all, dividend policy should always be clear, consistent and rational. A capricious policy will confuse owners and drive away would-be investors. Phil Fisher put it wonderfully 54 years ago in Chapter 7 of his Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, a book that ranks behind only The Intelligent Investor and the 1940 edition of Security Analysis in the all-time-best list for the serious investor. Phil explained that you can successfully run a restaurant that serves hamburgers or, alternatively, one that features Chinese food. But you can’t switch capriciously between the two and retain the fans of either.

最重要的是，分红政策必须始终保持清晰、一致和合理。反复无常的政策会把股东弄糊涂，也会排斥潜在的投资者。54 年前菲利普·费雪(Phil Fisher)在他的《普通股和不普通的利润》一书的第 7 章非常精彩地阐述了这一点，对认真的投资者而言，这本书在经典书目上仅次于《聪明的投资者》以及 1940 年版的《证券分析》。费雪说你可以成功地运营一家卖汉堡的餐馆或一家中餐为特色的餐馆，但是你不能不停地转换还同时留住两类顾客。

Most companies pay consistent dividends, generally trying to increase them annually and cutting them very reluctantly. Our “Big Four” portfolio companies follow this sensible and understandable approach and, in certain cases, also repurchase shares quite aggressively.

大多数公司奉行稳定的分红策略，通常试图逐年提高分红，但非常不愿意削减分红。我们的"四大"投资组合就遵循类似的、可理解的模式。有时候，还会非常积极地回购股票。

We applaud their actions and hope they continue on their present paths. We like increased dividends, and we love repurchases at appropriate prices.

我们拍手称赞它们现行的策略，并希望它们继续保持。我们喜欢增加分红，我们也喜欢以合理的价格回购股票。

At Berkshire, however, we have consistently followed a different approach that we know has been sensible and that we hope has been made understandable by the paragraphs you have just read. We will stick with this policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions.

当然在伯克希尔，我们一直遵循一种不同的分红策略，我们深知这样做的合理性，我们也希望上述的段落能帮助大家理解这一策略。只要我们相信，我们关于账面价值增长和市场价格溢价的假设依然合理，我们就会一直坚持上述策略。如果将来某项因素变化导致了实质性的改变，我们将会重新审视我们的策略。