巴菲特致股东的信（2014年）⑥制造、服务和零售业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

我们在这一板块的业务包括了方方面面。不过让我先看看整个板块的合并资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 49. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.

我们符合GAAP 会计准则的收入和支出数据在完整报告中。这里的运营费用是非GAAP 准则的，不包含一些购买法会计调整项目(主要是一些无形资产摊销)。我们用此方法呈现数字是因为，查理和我都认为这些数据能更准确反映企业真实的支出和收益情况。

I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. The concept of making charges against other intangibles, such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arises through purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.

我不会解释所有的调整，其中一些调整微小且不易解释，但认真的投资者应理解无形资产的不同性质。有些无形资产的价值会随着时间推移而损耗殆尽，而有些完全不会受损。例如软件的摊销费用就是非常真实的费用。而其它无形资产是不应被"摊销"的，比如客户关系。如果通过购买法会计计算显然不能反映真实情况。GAAP 会计准则认为这两种费用没有区别，也就是说，在计算收益的时候，两者都被列为费用，尽管从投资者的角度来看，它们的差异再大不过了。

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 49, amortization charges of $1.15 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once non- existent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.

在符合GAAP 的完整报告中，有11.5 亿美元的摊销费用已作为费用扣除。我们认为其中只有20%是"真实"的，其余的则不是。由于我们进行了多次收购，伯克希尔曾经不存在的"非真实"费用变得非常重要，随着我们继续收购更多的公司，"非真实"摊销费用几乎肯定会进一步上升。

The GAAP-compliant table on page 67 gives you the current status of our intangible assets. We now have $7.4 billion left to amortize, of which $4.1 billion will be charged over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of non-real costs becomes entirely charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat. Depreciation charges, we want to emphasize, are different: Every dime of depreciation expense we report is a real cost. That’s true, moreover, at most other companies. When CEOs tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, wire them up for a polygraph test.

在完整报告中列示了无形资产的现状。我们目前还有74 亿美元无形资产有待摊销，其中41 亿美元将在未来五年摊销完毕。当然，最终每一美元非真实成本将全部被扣除。到那时，即使真实的收益持平，财报列示的收益也将增长。但我们想强调的是，折旧费用是不同的：我们报告的每一美元的折旧都是真实成本。此外，在大多数其他公司也是如此。当CEO 吹嘘息税折旧摊销前利润是估值标准时，请把他们绑起来测谎。

Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.

当然，我们公开的报告将继续符合GAAP 会计准则。然而，为了认清现实，你应该记得把我们报告的大部分摊销费用加回来。

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To get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, they sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, the result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates.

回到我们许多制造、服务和零售业务上，他们销售涵盖从棒棒糖到喷气飞机等各种产品。以未加杠杆的净有形资产计算，其中一些业务经济效益极佳，实现的税后回报率高达25%甚至超过100%。其他业务的回报率在12-20%之间。不过，有几家公司的回报率非常低，这是我在资本配置时犯了一些严重错误。我并没有被误导，只是在评估公司和产业经济动态时，我的判断是错误的。

Fortunately, my blunders normally involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, nonetheless, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.

幸运的是，我的失误通常只涉及相对较小的收购。我们的大型收购总体表现不错，个别则是极好。但我在购买公司或股票时依然会犯错，并非所有事情都按计划进行。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2014 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using little leverage, earned 18.7% after-tax on that capital.

若作为整个实体来看，这一集团是一家优秀企业。尽管它们持有大量超额现金，几乎没有使用债务杠杆，它们2014 年平均使用了240 亿美元净有形资产，但其税后回报率高达18.7%。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought for too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin, and that premium is likely to widen. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in both the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.

当然，如果是以过高的价格买入经济效益极佳的企业，它也可能是笔糟糕投资。我们为大多数业务的净有形资产支付了大量溢价，这一成本反映再我们报告的巨大商誉数字中。不过总体来说，我们在该业务板块投入的资本获得了可观回报。而且，这些业务的内在价值远超账面价值，这种溢价可能还会扩大。即便如此，保险业和受监管行业的内在价值和账面价值的差距更大。真正的大赢家在哪里。

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We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 97-100.

这个业务集团有太多的公司，我们无法一一评论，而且它们(现有和潜在)的竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。在我们一些业务上，如果其他人知道某些数字，我们可能处于不利地位。因此那些对伯克希尔的价值没有实质性影响的业务，我们只披露需要披露的内容。你可以在完整报告中找到我们业务运营的大量细节。