巴菲特致股东的信（2015年）②伯克希尔这一年

The Year at Berkshire

伯克希尔这一年

Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights:

伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人查理·芒格，跟我预计伯克希尔的经常性(normalized)盈利能力每年都会增加。当然，实际的年收益有时会因为美国经济的疲软而下降，或者可能因为保险业遭遇大灾。在一些年份经营性盈利会较少，而另一些年份会较多。但去年是收获颇丰的一年，以下为其中的亮点：

● The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about $5.8 billion during the year in capital expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual depreciation charge. It was money well spent.

1，在2015 年伯克希尔最重要的进展不是金融业务，虽然它带来了更好的收益。在2014 年表现欠佳后，我们的BNSF 铁路去年大幅改善了对客户的服务。而为了实现这一目的，我们在资本支出中投入了58 亿美元，远超美国铁路历史的纪录，并且几乎是我们年度折旧费用的三倍，但它花的真值！

BNSF moves about 17% of America’s intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our shippers’ welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy.

无论是通过铁路，公路，航空，水路还是管道运输，以吨英里的收入来计算，BNSF 铁路承担了美国17%的城际货运量。在这方面，我们是美国七大铁路公司(其中两家在加拿大)中毋庸置疑最大的，吨英里的货运量超出最接近的竞争对手45%。因此，我们保持一流的服务不仅对我们的托运人的至关重要，而且对美国经济的平稳运行至关重要。

For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record $6.8 billion* (a gain of $606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and deserve yours.

对于大多数美国铁路公司来说，2015 年是令人失望的一年，货运总吨英里数下滑，利润也在降低。但BNFS销售规模保持不变，税前收益达到了创纪录的68 亿美元，比2014 年增长6.06 亿美元。BNSF 铁路的经理人Matt Rose 和Carl Ice，他们理应得到你们的感谢。

* Throughout this letter, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated.

在本信中，除非另有说明，所有盈利数据均按税前口径列示。

● BNSF is the largest of our “Powerhouse Five,” a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies – our five most profitable non-insurance businesses – earned $13.1 billion in 2015, an increase of $650 million over 2014.

2，BNSF 铁路是"五驾马车"中最大的一个，该集团还包括伯克希尔能源(BHE)、IMC(以色列金属切削工具供应商)、路博润(Lubrizol)以及Marmon 集团，他们是伯克希尔5 个最大的非保险业务，在2015 的税前收益达到

Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us in 2003. Subsequently, we purchased three of the other four on an all-cash basis. In acquiring BNSF, however, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.

131 亿美元，较2014 年增加了6.5 亿美元。在这五个巨头中，2003 年我们只拥有伯克希尔能源，当时税前收益为3.93 亿美元，后来我们相继以全现金相继购买了其余4 家中的3 家，在收购BNSF 铁路时，我们用全现金支付了70%，30%发行伯克希尔股票，使伯克希尔股本规模增加了6.1%。换句话说，这五驾马车在12 年的时间里，为伯克希尔带来了每年127 亿美元的税前收益，但只带来了轻微的股权稀释。我们的目标不仅仅是增加收益，还要确保我们能提高每股收益。

● Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.

3，明年，我将要着手"第六驾马车"的建设。新加入的公司将是Precision Castparts Corp(PCC)，我们在一个月前以320 亿美元现金收购了它。

Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world’s premier supplier of aerospace components (most of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark’s accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft.

PCC 完全符合伯克希尔模式，并将大幅提高我们的经营性每股盈利能力。在CEO-Mark Donegan 带领下，PCC 已经成为世界顶级的航空零部件供应商(其中大多数都是原件供应业务，尽管备件供应业务也很重要)。Mark 的成就让我想起了Jacob Harpaz 在IMC 中展示的法宝，两人将普通的材料加工成非凡的切削产品，供全球主要制造厂商使用，每一个产品都是他们工艺中的杰作。

PCC’s products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft. Other industries are served as well by the company’s 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13 countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look forward to having him deploy Berkshire’s capital.

PCC 的产品大都是大型飞机中的关键部件，通常根据多年的合同交付，公司在13 个国家的162 个工厂里拥有30466 名员工为各行各业提供服务。Mark 在构建自己的商业帝国时，做了很多收购，而且将来还会有更多，我们期待着他来部署伯克希尔的资本。

A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers – they each handle about $9 billion for us – both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves.

个人致谢：收购PCC 如果没有ToddCombs 的投入和帮助是无法成功的，几年前他让我开始注意这家公司，并且一直教我这个行业的知识以及Mark 的事情。尽管Todd Combs 和Ted Weschler 的主要职责都是投资经理，他们每人为我们管理约90 亿美元，但他们两人都通过各种方式愉快且干练地为伯克希尔增加了重大价值。雇佣这二人是我所做过的最好的决定之一。

● With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 101⁄4 companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the 1⁄4.) That leaves just under 98% of America’s business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by.

4，经过收购PCC，如果它们是独立企业，伯克希尔将拥有世界财富500 强中的10.25 家(我们拥有的27%卡夫亨氏股份就是那1/4)。还剩下不到98%的美国企业巨头没有给我们打电话。接线员已经就位。

● Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.7 billion last year, up from $5.1 billion in 2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than $700 million, two that earned between $400 million and $700 million, seven that earned between $250 million and $400 million, six that earned between $100 million and $250 million, and eleven that earned between $50 million and $100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as the years go by.

5，我们数十家规模较小的非保险业务去年的税前收益为57 亿美元，高于2014 年的51 亿美元。在这个集团中，有一家公司去年税前收益超过7 亿美元，两家收益在4-7 亿美元之间，7 家收益在2.5-4 亿美元之间，11 家收益在0.5-1 亿美元之间。我们喜欢所有业务：长期来看，这些企业的数量和收益都将不断增加。

● When you hear talk about America’s crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they’re not talking about Berkshire. We invested $16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in the United States.

6，当你听到有人谈论美国摇摇欲坠的基础设施时，请放心，他们谈论的并不是伯克希尔。我们在去年投资了

I told you earlier about BNSF’s record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad’s physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier.

160 亿美元的土地、厂房和设备，86%都部署在美国。我在前面告诉过你们BNSF 铁路在2015 年创记录的资本支出。每年年底，我们铁路的设施建设将比前1 年有所改善。

Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a similar story. That company has invested $16 billion in renewables and now owns 7% of the country’s wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the 4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the generation of the runner-up utility.

BHE 能源也有类似的故事。该公司在可再生能源业务投资了160 亿美元，并拥有美国7%的风能发电和6%的太阳能发电。事实上，我们的公用事业所拥有并且运作的4423 兆瓦的风力发电是第二名的6 倍。

We’re not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both for the environment and for Berkshire’s economics.

还没结束，去年在巴黎气候大会上，BHE 对可再生能源的未来发展做出了重大承诺。我们履行这些承诺有着重大的意义，不仅仅是为了环境也是为了伯克希尔的经济利益。

● Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 – that makes 13 years in a row – and increased its float. During those years, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – grew from $41 billion to $88 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.

7，伯克希尔庞大且不断增长的保险业务在2015 年实现了连续13 年的承保盈利。这些年里，那些不属于我们、但我们可以将其用于为伯克希尔利益的投资浮存金，从410 亿美元增长到了880 亿美元。

Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $26 billion during the 13-year period, including $1.8 billion earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire’s largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business. We’ve spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can’t be replicated.

虽然，我们的浮存金的规模和价值并没有反映在伯克希尔的收益上，但浮存金产生了庞大的投资收益，因为它允许我们投资资产。同时，我们的承保盈利在13 年里累计达到了260 亿美元，包含2015 年的18 亿美元。毋庸置疑，伯克希尔最大的未记录的财富存在于保险业之中。我们用了48 年时间建立了这个无法被复制的多元化的业务。

● While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $634 million in aggregate. The cost of these purchases ranged from $300,000 to $143 million.

8，在查理和我寻找收购新的业务的时候，我们的很多子公司不定期进行补强收购。去年我们进行了29 项补强收购，预计总耗资为6.34 亿美元，收购价格从30 万到1.43 亿美元不等。如果他们定价合理，查理和我都鼓励补强收购。

Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren’t.) These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years.

(大部分提供给我们的交易报价显然不合理。)这些收购将资本配置在适合我们现有的运营业务中，并将由我们的专业的经理人团队管理。这意味着，我们不需要增加额外的工作，但伯克希尔的收益却增加了，我们认为这种结合非常具有吸引力。我们在未来几年将会做更多的补强性收购。

● Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of $4.25 billion. Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%) that cost us $9.8 billion. The new company has annual sales of $27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting – bring your kids.)

9，在去年我们与Jorge Paulo Lemann，Alex Behring 和Bernardo Hees 的亨氏伙伴关心通过与卡夫的合并，规模增加了1 倍多。在这笔交易之前，我们花费了42.5 亿美元购买亨氏的53%股份。现在，我们拥有3.254亿股卡夫亨氏股份(约27%)，成本为98 亿美元。新公司每年有着270 亿美元的销售额，可以为你提供亨氏番茄酱或者芥末酱，搭配卡夫的Oscar Mayer 热狗，加一杯可口可乐，你就将享受到我最喜欢的一顿饭了(我们将在每年的年会上设置Oscar Mayer 热狗车，带上你的孩子一起来。)

Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, “GAAP” (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us to record a $6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love.

尽管我们并没有出售卡夫亨氏的股票，但GAAP 会计原则要求我们在合并完成后，记录68 亿美元的投资减记。这就使得我们资产负债表上的卡夫亨氏的控股权益，高出我们的成本数十亿，却比市值要低出数百亿，这样的结果只有会计师才会喜欢。

Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us $720 million annually and are carried at $7.7 billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for $8.32 billion in June (the earliest date allowed under the preferred’s terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for Berkshire.

伯克希尔还拥有着卡夫亨氏的优先股，每年支付我们7.2 亿美元利息，在我们资产负债表上的价值为77 亿美元。几乎肯定卡夫亨氏将会在今年6 月(优先股条款允许的最早赎回日期)以83.2 亿美元赎回，这对于卡夫亨氏来说将会是一个好消息，但对于伯克希尔来说就是个坏消息了。

Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal.

JorgePaulo 和他的团队是再好不过的合伙人了。我们与他们分享并购，重构并持有这些满足人们基本需求和欲望的大型企业的激情。但是在追求同一个目标的过程中，我们走的是不同的道路。

Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then – very promptly – to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working hour – that’s the measure of productivity gains – an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his associates.

他们的方法一直以来都非常的成功，通过收购那些能够减少不必要成本的公司，然后迅速地采取行动完成工作。他们的行动极大的提升了生产力，而生产力是过去240 年里美国经济增长的最重要的因素。如果每小时没有产出更多的有需求的商品和服务(这是衡量生产力提升的标准)，经济不可避免地会停滞不前。在美国大部分公司里，真正重大提升生产力是可能的，这一事实给JorgePaulo 和他的团队提供了机会。

At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs – and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded – can maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.”)

在伯克希尔，我们也渴望效率并且厌恶官僚主义。为了实现我们的目标，我们采取收购像PCC 这样的公司，来强调避免机构臃肿，因为这些公司长期以来一直由注重成本和高效运营的经理人管理。在收购之后，我们的角色就仅仅是创造一个环境，让那些CEO 以及他们志同道合的最终继任者，能够最大限度地提高他们的管理效率和从工作的获得的乐趣。(这种不干涉风格遵循了著名的芒格主义：如果你不想让自己生活在痛苦之中，就不要带着改变别人行为方式的目的去结婚。)

We will continue to operate with extreme – indeed, almost unheard of – decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the case when his group purchased Tim Horton’s, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz. We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia.

我们将继续以极端(实际上几乎闻所未闻)权力下放的方式来运营伯克希尔。但我们也会寻找与像JorgePaulo这样的伙伴合作的机会，要么像他的集团收购了TimHorton 时那样仅作为融资方，要么像亨氏一样作为股权和融资合作伙伴。我们也会偶尔和他人合作，就像我们在Berkadia 成功做过的那样。

Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these “opportunities” for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome.

然而，伯克希尔只会在合作伙伴进行友好收购的情况下才会加入。可以肯定的是，某些恶意收购是合理的：一些CEO 忘记了他们在为哪些股东工作，同时一些经理人也严重的不称职。不论哪种情况，董事可能会对问题视而不见，或者只是简单地不愿做出改变。这时就需要引进新的股东了。我们会把这些"机会"留给其他人。在伯克希尔，我们只去欢迎我们的地方。

● Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8% to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren’t important, consider this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by about $500 million.

10，伯克希尔公司去年增持了其"四大巨头"的投资：美国运通、可口可乐、IBM 和富国银行。我们买入了更多IBM(从7.8%增至8.4%)和富国银行(从9.4%增至9.8%)的股份。其他两家公司可口可乐和美国运通，其股票回购也提高了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐公司的股权从9.2%增至9.3%，在美国运通的股权从14.8%增至15.6%。倘若你觉得这些看似微小的增加并不重要，我们可以做一个算术：伯克希尔在这四家公司的权益总和每增加一个百分点，我们在其年收益中应占份额就会增加约5 亿美元。

These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

这四个投资对象拥有优秀的业务，由既有才华又以股东利益为导向的经理人管理。它们带来的净有形资产回报优秀甚至惊人。在伯克希尔，我们宁愿拥有优秀公司的一大部分非控股权益，也不愿拥有平庸公司的100%。

If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2015 earnings amounted to $4.7 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends they pay us – about $1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly $3 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.

正如与其拥有整颗水钻都不如拥有希望之钻的一部分。如果以伯克希尔公司的年终持股计算，我们在"四大巨头"2015 年收益中应占份额达到47 亿美元。然而，我们向你报告的收益中，我们只包含了他们支付的股息，去年约18 亿美元。但毫无疑问：我们没有报告的这些公司近30 亿美元的收益对我们来说，跟报告的部分一样有价值。

The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that increases Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital gains.

我们的投资对象保留的收益通常用于回购股票，此举增加了伯克希尔在其未来收益中所占份额，而不需要我们再投入一分钱。这些公司的留存收益也为其他商业机会提供资金，这些机会通常被证明是有利可图的。所有这些让我们预计，这四大投资对象的每股收益将随着时间的推移而大幅增长。如果这些收益确实实现了，伯克希尔的股息就会增加，我们未实现的资本收益也会增加。

Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chance of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner – well, not exactly like manner – our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us.

相比那些将收购局限于自己能运作的公司，我们在资本配置上的灵活性给了我们很大的优势，也就是说，我们愿意被动地将大笔资金投资于非控制企业上。伍迪·艾伦(Woody Allen)曾说，双性恋的优势在于它让你周六晚上找到约会对象的机会增加一倍。以相似的方式(当然并不完全一样)，我们对收购经营性业务和被动投资股票的胃口，为伯克希尔源源不断的现金找到明智的投资的几率增加一倍。除此之外，拥有金额庞大的有价证券组合，当出现重大规模收购时，为我们提供了可以利用的资金储备。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

It’s an election year, and candidates can’t stop speaking about our country’s problems (which, of course, only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not live as well as they themselves do.

今年是个选举年，候选人不停地谈论我们国家的各种问题(当然这些问题只有他们能解决)。这种消极宣传的结果是，很多美国人现在认为他们的孩子不能像他们生活的那么好。

That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.

这种观点大错特错：今天在美国出生的婴儿是历史上最幸运的孩子。

American GDP per capita is now about $56,000. As I mentioned last year that – in real terms – is a staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is certain to continue: America’s economic magic remains alive and well.

现在美国的人均GDP 为56000 美元。就像我去年提到的那样，按实际价值计算，这个数字是我所出生的1930 年人均GDP 惊人的六倍，这远远超出了我的父母和同时代人们最疯狂的梦想。今天的美国公民本质上并不比1930 年的美国人更聪明，也不是比1930 更努力工作。相反，他们的工作效率要高出很多，从而生产出更多的产品。这种强大的趋势肯定会延续下去：美国的经济魔力依然存在，并且运转良好。

Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP – and, yes, we would all like to see a higher rate. But let’s do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers astounding gains.

一些评论家哀叹我们现在每年2%的实际GDP 增长。是的，我们都希望看到更高的增长率。但是让我们用过分悲观的2%这个数字做一些简单的数学计算。我们将看到，这一增长率带来了惊人的收益。

America’s population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive. But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita. (Compounding’s effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 x 1.2%.) In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering $19,000 increase in real GDP per capita for the next generation. Were that to be distributed equally, the gain would be $76,000 annually for a family of four. Today’s politicians need not shed tears for tomorrow’s children.

美国人口每年增长0.8%(出生率-死亡率为0.5%，净移民率为0.3%)。因此2%的整体增长产生大约1.2%的人均增长。这可能听起来并不令人印象深刻。但对一代人来说，比如25 年，这种增长速度会带来人均实际GDP增长34.4%。(复利效应产生的超额增长率，会超过简单的通过25x1.2%计算)。反过来，那34.4%的收益将为下一代带来惊人的实际人均GDP 增加19000 美元。如果平均分配，一个四口之家每年可获得76000 美元。今天的政客们不需要为明天的孩子们流泪。

Indeed, most of today’s children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His unparalleled fortune couldn’t buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is – to name just a few – transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do.

事实上，今天的孩子大部分都过得很好。我所居住的中产阶级社区的所有家庭，都比我出生时老约翰·D·洛克菲勒的生活水平要好的多。他无与伦比的财富买不到我们现在拥有的理所当然的东西，无论是交通、娱乐、通信或医疗服务领域(仅举几例)。洛克菲勒当然有权力和名声，然而他不能活得像我的邻居现在一样好。

Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us – and will forever continue. Congress will be the battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry.

尽管下一代分享的蛋糕将比今天的大得多，它将被如何分配仍被激烈争议。就像是现在的情况一样，在工作人员和退休人员之间，健康人和病患之间，在继承人和Horatio Algers 之间，在股东与员工之间，特别是那些被市场高度重视的人才和同样努力但缺乏市场所重视技能的美国人之间，会为了更多的产品和服务而斗争。这种冲突永远伴随着我们，并将永远持续下去。国会将成为战场，金钱和选票将成为武器。游说将是保持增长的产业。

The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy – as they should – far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want – nor, even more so, in delivering what people don’t yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, “search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.)

然而，好消息是，即使是"落败"那一方的成员，在未来也几乎肯定可以享受到(他们应该享受到)，比过去多得多的商品和服务。他们增加的奖金的质量也会显著提高。在生产人们想要的商品上，没有什么能与市场体系相媲美，在提供人们还不知道自己需要的商品上更是如此。我的父母年轻的时候，无法想象会有电视机，我在我50 多岁的时候，也不曾认为我需要一台个人电脑。这两种产品，当人们看见他们能做什么之后，迅速彻底改变了他们的生活。我现在每周花十个小时在网上打桥牌。而且，在我写这封信时，"搜索"功能对于我来说是十分宝贵的。不过我还没准备好使用Tinder(一款交友软件)。

For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America’s golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America’s social security promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America’s kids will live far better than their parents did.

240 年来，和美国打赌一直是一个可怕的错误，而且现在仍然不是开始的时候。美国的商业和创新的金鹅将继续下更多和更大的蛋。美国对社会保障的承诺将兑现，也许会更慷慨。而且，是的，美国的孩子们的生活将远比他们的父辈要好。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

考虑到这种有利的趋势，伯克希尔(当然许多其他企业也一样)几乎肯定会蓬勃发展。接替查理和我的经理们将按照我们简单的蓝图，构建伯克希尔的每股内在价值：(1)不断提高我们众多子公司的基本盈利能力；(2)通过补强型收购进一步增加他们的收益；(3)受益于我们投资对象的增长；(4)当伯克希尔股价大幅低于内在价值时回购股票；(5)偶尔进行大规模收购。我们还将努力通过发行很少(如果有可能的话)的伯克希尔股份让你的成果最大化。