巴菲特致股东的信（2023年）③我们做什么

What We Do

我们做什么

Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.

伯克希尔的目标很简单：我们想全部或部分拥有那些具有良好经济特征的企业，而且这种良好特征是根基深厚、经久不衰的。在资本主义制度下，有些企业能繁荣很长时间，有些则注定是个无底洞。要预测谁是赢家、谁是输家，比你想象的要难得多。而那些告诉你他们知道答案的人，要么是自欺欺人，要么是江湖骗子。

At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.

伯克希尔特别偏爱那种罕见的企业——能够在未来以高回报率投入额外资本的那种。只需拥有一家这样的公司，安安静静地坐着，就能获得几乎无法估量的财富。甚至这种持股的继承人——唉！——有时候也能一辈子悠闲度日。

We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.

我们也希望这些心仪的企业由能干且值得信赖的管理者来经营，尽管这方面的判断更难做出，而且伯克希尔也有过让人失望的经历。

In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.

1863 年，美国第一任审计长休·麦卡洛克（Hugh McCulloch）给所有国民银行写了一封信。他的指示中包含这样一条警告："永远不要抱着能防住他骗你的幻想去跟无赖打交道。"许多自以为能"管住"无赖问题的银行家已经领教了麦卡洛克先生这番忠告的智慧——我也是。人心不好看透。真诚和同情心是很容易装出来的，这一点今天和 1863 年一样。

This combination of the two necessities I’ve described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate. If I missed one – and I missed plenty – another always came along.

兼具我上面说的两个条件的企业，长期以来一直是我们的收购目标。有一段时间，可供评估的候选对象多得很。如果我错过了一家——而我确实错过了很多——总还会有下一家冒出来。

Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.

那种好日子早已过去了；规模把我们拖住了，当然收购竞争加剧也是一个因素。

Berkshire now has – by far – the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies – a who’s who of American business – was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)

伯克希尔现在拥有——遥遥领先——美国企业中按通用会计准则（GAAP）计算最大的净资产。创纪录的经营收益加上强劲的股市，使年末数字达到 5,610 亿美元。标普 500 指数中其余 499 家公司——堪称美国商界的名人录——2022 年合计净资产为 8.9 万亿美元。（2023 年标普 500 的数据尚未统计出来，但大幅超过 9.5 万亿的可能性不大。）

By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately juices net worth).

按这个标准，伯克希尔现在占据了它所在这个世界近 6% 的份额。想在五年内把这么庞大的基数再翻一倍，根本不现实——尤其是我们非常不愿意增发股票（增发会立刻注水般地推高净资产）。

There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we can’t. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.

在这个国家，能真正对伯克希尔产生实质影响的公司只剩下屈指可数的几家，而且它们早已被我们和别人反复筛选过了。有些我们能估值，有些不能。即便能估值，价格也得有足够的吸引力。在美国之外，对伯克希尔来说基本没有什么有意义的资本配置选项。总而言之，我们不可能再有令人瞠目的表现。

Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.

尽管如此，管理伯克希尔多数时候还是很有乐趣的，而且始终很有意思。从好的方面说，经过 59 年的拼凑组装，公司现在全部或部分拥有各种各样的企业，加权来看，它们的前景比大多数美国大公司要好一些。凭借运气和勇气，在几十个决策中跑出了几个超级大赢家。我们还有一小群长期任职的经理人，从来不想去别的地方，把 65 岁只当作又一个普通生日而已。

Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldn’t wish to do so? – our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.

伯克希尔受益于异乎寻常的坚定和清晰的目标。我们固然强调善待员工、社区和供应商——谁不想这样做呢？——但我们的忠诚将永远属于我们的国家和股东。我们始终不会忘记：虽然你们的钱和我们的混在一起，但它并不属于我们。

With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it is now.

有了这个信念，加上我们目前的业务组合，伯克希尔应该比美国企业的平均水平做得好一点，而且更重要的是，应该在永久性资本损失风险方面也低得多。但任何超过"稍好一点"的期望，都是痴心妄想。当年伯蒂全仓买入伯克希尔的时候，我们还不至于如此谦虚——但现在确实如此。