巴菲特致股东的信（1992年）
⑧固定收益证券

Fixed-Income Securities

Below we list our largest holdings of fixed-income securities:

固定收益证券

下表是我们持有的主要固定收益证券仓位：

     (1) Carrying value in our financial statements
     (2) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me

(1)在我们财务报表中的账面价值
(2)由查理和我确定的公允价值

     During 1992 we added to our holdings of ACF debentures, had some of our WPPSS bonds called, and sold our RJR Nabisco position.

1992 年我们增加了美国汽车铸造公司(ACF)债券的部位，另外华盛顿公用电力系统债券(WPPSS)有部分被赎回，另外 RJR Nabisco 的仓位已出清。

     Over the years, we've done well with fixed-income investments, having realized from them both large capital gains (including $80 million in 1992) and exceptional current income. Chrysler Financial, Texaco, Time-Warner, WPPSS and RJR Nabisco were particularly good investments for us. Meanwhile, our fixed-income losses have been negligible: We've had thrills but so far no spills.

过去几年来，我们在固定收益证券的表现还不错，靠着他们不但实现了可观的资本利得(包含 1992 年的 8000万美元)与利息收益，克莱斯勒财务公司、宾州中央铁路、Texaco 石油、时代华纳、WPPSS 与 RJR Nabisco 都是相当好的投资，与此同时，发生损失的部分也相当少，虽然过程一度紧张但幸好最后并没有搞砸。

     Despite the success we experienced with our Gillette preferred, which converted to common stock in 1991, and despite our reasonable results with other negotiated purchases of preferreds, our overall performance with such purchases has been inferior to that we have achieved with purchases made in the secondary market. This is actually the result we expected. It corresponds with our belief that an intelligent investor in common stocks will do better in the secondary market than he will do buying new issues.

虽然我们在吉列优先股的投资还算是成功(在 1991 年转换为普通股)，但整体而言，这类协议谈判所取得的优先股投资的总体绩效还是略逊于从二级市场投资所取得的业绩，不过这种结果我们早已预期到，这也与我们的信念相一致，即一个聪明的投资人在二级流通市场的投资表现，会比他一级市场协议收购表现的更好。

     The reason has to do with the way prices are set in each instance. The secondary market, which is periodically ruled by mass folly, is constantly setting a "clearing" price. No matter how foolish that price may be, it's what counts for the holder of a stock or bond who needs or wishes to sell, of whom there are always going to be a few at any moment. In many instances, shares worth xin business value have sold in the market for 1/2x or less.

原因与两个市场设定价格的方式有关，二级市场周期性地被大众愚蠢的心理情绪所影响，经常出现「清算价」，不管价格是多么的离谱，对于那些希望或需要出售的股票或债券的持有人来说，这个价格才是最重要的，不论何时总会有一小部分人会有这种念头。在很多的情况下，一家价值为 X 的股票往往以不到 1/2X 或更少的价格求售。

     The new-issue market, on the other hand, is ruled by controlling stockholders and corporations, who can usually select the timing of offerings or, if the market looks unfavorable, can avoid an offering altogether. Understandably, these sellers are not going to offer any bargains, either by way of a public offering or in a negotiated transaction: It's rare you'll find x for1/2x here. Indeed, in the case of common-stock offerings, selling shareholders are often motivated to unload only when they feel the market is overpaying. (These sellers, of course, would state that proposition somewhat differently, averring instead that they simply resist selling when the market is underpaying for their goods.)

另一方面，新股发行市场则受到发行公司与大股东所掌控，通常会选择对他们最有利的时点发行，当市场状况不理想的时候，甚至会避开发行，可以理解的是，卖方不太可能让你有任何便宜可占，不管是通过公开发行或私下协议的方式都一样，你不可能以一半的价格买到你想要的东西。事实上，在发行普通股时，原股东只有在他们认为市场价格明显过高时，才会主动出手，(当然，这些卖方会以不同方式强调，如果市场过于低估其股份时，他们是不可能贱价出售的)。

     To date, our negotiated purchases, as a group, have fulfilled but not exceeded the expectation we set forth in our 1989 Annual Report: "Our preferred stock investments should produce returns modestly above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios." In truth, we would have done better if we could have put the money that went into our negotiated transactions into open-market purchases of the type we like. But both our size and the general strength of the markets made that difficult to do.

到目前为止，我们通过协议所作的投资，算是勉强达到我们在 1989 年年报所作的预期，这些优先股投资应该可以产生比一般固定收益债券还好一点的回报。事实上，若是我们当初不是通过协议而是直接在公开市场上买进类似的投资的话，我们的表现可能会更好，只是考量到我们的规模太大与市场的状况，这样的做法在执行上有其困难度。

     There was one other memorable line in the 1989 Annual Report: "We have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business, the airline industry, or the paper industry." At the time some of you may have doubted this confession of ignorance. Now, however, even my mother acknowledges its truth.

1989 年报还有一段值得铭记的话：我们没有能力去预测投资银行业、航空业以及造纸业的前景。在当时或许有很多人怀疑我们这样公开的承认有点无知，不过到如今，连我的母亲都不得不承认这项事实。

     In the case of our commitment to USAir, industry economics had soured before the ink dried on our check. As I've previously mentioned, it was I who happily jumped into the pool; no one pushed me. Yes, I knew the industry would be ruggedly competitive, but I did not expect its leaders to engage in prolonged kamikaze behavior. In the last two years, airline companies have acted as if they are members of a competitive tontine, which they wish to bring to its conclusion as rapidly as possible.

就像我们在全美航空的投资，在我们签发支票的墨水还没干之前，产业情况就已经开始恶化，如同先前所提到的，没有人强迫我，是我自己心干情愿跳下水的。没错，我的确预期到这个产业竞争会变得相当激烈，但我没想到这个行业的龙头企业竟会从事自杀性的竞争行为，过去两年以来，航空业者的行为就好象觉得自己是公务人员抢着办退休好领退休金一样，为求尽快达到目的而不择手段。

     Amidst this turmoil, Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has done a truly extraordinary job in repositioning the airline. He was particularly courageous in accepting a strike last fall that, had it been lengthy, might well have bankrupted the company. Capitulating to the striking union, however, would have been equally disastrous: The company was burdened with wage costs and work rules that were considerably more onerous than those encumbering its major competitors, and it was clear that over time any high-cost producer faced extinction. Happily for everyone, the strike was settled in a few days.

在一片混乱之中，全美航空的 CEO 塞斯·斯科菲尔德(Seth Schofield)在重新调整该公司体质之上，花了不少的工夫，尤其是去年秋天他勇于承受了一次罢工事件，若是处置不当，再拖延下去很可能让公司面临倒闭的命运，而若是屈服于工会抗争的压力，则其下场一样悲惨：该公司所面对的沉重薪资成本与工会要求，比起其它竞争同业来说要繁杂得多，而事实很明显，任何成本过高的业者到最后终将面临淘汰的命运，还好罢工事件在发生几天后圆满地落幕。

     A competitively-beset business such as USAir requires far more managerial skill than does a business with fine economics. Unfortunately, though, the near-term reward for skill in the airline business is simply survival, not prosperity.

对那些为竞争所苦的行业，如全美航空来说，比起良好经济效益的产业需要更好的管理技巧，然而，不幸的是，这种管理能力的短期好处，只不过是让公司得以继续存活下去，并不能让公司繁荣起来。

     In early 1993, USAir took a major step toward assuring survival - and eventual prosperity - by accepting British Airways' offer to make a substantial, but minority, investment in the company. In connection with this transaction, Charlie and I were asked to join the USAir board. We agreed, though this makes five outside board memberships for me, which is more than I believe advisable for an active CEO. Even so, if an investee's management and directors believe it particularly important that Charlie and I join its board, we are glad to do so. We expect the managers of our investees to work hard to increase the value of the businesses they run, and there are times when large owners should do their bit as well.

在 1993 年初，全美航空为确保存活以及长远发展，做了一项重大的决定：接受英国航空所提出的巨额但仍为少数股东的投资。通过这次的交易，查理跟我本人被邀请担任该公司的董事。我们同意了，虽然此举将使得我要同时担任五家公司的外部董事，远超过我个人认为对公司能做的贡献。不过即便如此，只要我们的被投资公司以及其董事认为查理跟我加入其董事会，会对其公司有所帮助，我们还是会欣然接受。在我们期望被投资公司的经理人努力工作以增加公司价值之时，身为公司大股东的我们，有时也应该多尽一点自己的本分。

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〔译文源于芒格书院整理的巴菲特致股东的信〕

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