巴菲特致合伙人的信（1962年）④投资方法

Our Method of Operation

Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow, in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.

我们的投资方法

我们做的投资可以分为三个类型：这几种类型的投资各有各的特性，我们如何在这几类投资中分配资金会对我们每年相对道指的业绩产生重要影响。每类投资的占比事先有一定的计划，但实际分配时会见机行事，主要视投资机会情况而定。

The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called “generals”) where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself .Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.

第一类是低估的股票，在此类投资中，我们对公司决策没有话语权，也掌控不了估值修复所需时间。这些年来，在我们的投资中，低估的股票是占比最大的一类，这类投资赚的钱比其他两类都多。我们一般以较大仓位（每只占我们总资产的5%到10%）持有5、6只低估的股票，以较小的仓位持有其他10或15只低估的股票。

Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any compelling reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. Combining this individual margin of safety with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.

此类投资获利的时间有时候很短，很多时候则需要几年。在买入时，很难找到任何令人信服的理由来解释这些低估的股票怎么就能涨。但是，正因为黯淡无光，正因为看不到任何短期上涨的希望，才有这么便宜的价格。付出的价格低，得到的价值高。在低估类中，我们买入的每只股票价值都远远高于价格，都存在相当大的安全边际。每只都有安全边际，分散买入多只，就形成了一个既有足够安全保障，又有上涨潜力的投资组合。对于低估类，我们本来就没打算赚到最后一分钱，能在买入价与产业资本评估的合理价值中间的位置附近卖出，我们就很满意了。

Many times generals represent a form of "coattail riding" where we feel the dominating stockholder group has plans for the conversion of unprofitable or under-utilized assets to a better use. We have done that ourselves in Sanborn and Dempster, but everything else equal we would rather let others do the work. Obviously, not only do the values have to be ample in a case like this, but we also have to be careful whose coat we are holding.

很多时候，我们买低估的股票是跟着大股东吃肉喝汤，我们觉得大股东有计划优化资源，转化没盈利能力或利用率低的资产，我们就跟着买。在桑伯恩和登普斯特这两笔投资中，我们亲自动手优化资源，但是在其他条件一样的情况下，我们更愿意让别人做这个工作。做这样的投资，不但价值要足够高，而且跟谁也要选好。

The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961. This is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market, and in 1962, not only did we not make any money out of our general category, but I am even doubtful if it did better than the Dow.

低估类的涨跌受大盘影响很大，就算便宜，也一样会下跌。当市场暴跌时，低估类的跌幅可能不亚于道指。我相信低估类能长期跑赢道指，也能在1961年那样的牛市中跑赢道指。在我们的投资组合中，低估类对收益率的贡献最大。在市场下跌时，低估类也是最脆弱的。1962年，低估类不但没给我们赚到钱，可能连道指都没跟上。

Our second category consists of "work-outs. These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., I lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.

我们的第二类投资是“套利类”。在套利类投资中，投资结果取决于公司行为，而不是股票买卖双方之间的供给和需求关系。换言之，此类股票有具体的时间表，我们可以在很小的误差范围内，事先知道在多长时间内可以获得多少回报，可能出现什么意外，打乱原有计划。并购、清算、重组、分拆等公司活动中可以找到套利机会。近些年来，套利机会主要来自大型综合石油公司收购石油生产商。

This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow, or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year.

无论道指涨跌如何，套利投资每年基本上都能带来相当稳定的收益。在某一年，如果我们把投资组合中大部分资金用于套利，这年大市下跌，我们的相对业绩会很好；这年大市上涨，我们的相对业绩会很差。

We were fortunate in that we had a good portion of our portfolio in work outs in 1962. As I have said before, this was not due to any notion on my part as to what the market would do, but rather because I could get more of what I wanted in this category than in the generals. This same concentration in work-outs hurt our performance during the market advance in the second half of the year.

1962年，我们运气很好，我们的投资组合中套利类占比很高。我以前说过，这不是绝对不是因为我预见到了市场会怎么走，而是因为我发现套利类的投资机会比低估类更好。下半年市场上涨，集中于套利类投资拖累了我们的业绩。

Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in five to ten of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio, since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. For instance, you will note when you receive our audit report, that we paid $75,000 of interest to banks and brokers during the year. Since our borrowing was at approximately 5%, this means we had an average of $1,500,000 borrowed from such sources. Since 1962 was a down year in the market, you might think that such borrowing would hurt results. However, all of our loans were to offset work-outs, and this category turned in a good profit for the year. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% per annum range. My self-imposed standard limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth, although something extraordinary could result in modifying this for a limited period of time.

多年以来，套利是我们第二大投资类别。我们总是同时进行10到15个套利操作，有的处于初期阶段，有的处于末期阶段。无论是从最终结果，还是过程中的市场表现来讲，套利类投资具有高度安全性，我相信完全可以借钱作为套利类投资组合的部分资金来源。在收到审计报告后，大家可以看到我们今年向银行和券商支付了75,000美元的利息。我的借款利率是5%左右，借款总额1,500,000美元。1962年是跌市，你可能觉得在这样的行情里借钱会降低收益率。实际上，我们的所有借款都用于补充套利资金，套利类今年的收益很高。不考虑借钱对收益的放大作用，套利类的收益率一般在10%到20%之间。我自己规定了一个限制条件，借来的钱不能超过合伙基金净值的25%，但是如果出现特殊情况，我可能在短期内破例。

You will note on our yearend balance sheet (part of the audit you will receive) securities sold short totaling some $340,000. Most of this occurred in conjunction with a work-out entered into late in the year. In this case, we had very little competition for a period of time and were able to create a 10% or better profit (gross, not annualized) for a few months tie-up of money. The short sales eliminated the general market risk.

在大家即将收到的审计文件中包含我们年末的资产负债表，从中可以看出，做空的证券总额是340,000美元左右。今年年底我们做了一笔套利，这笔做空交易是做这笔套利同时做的。在这笔投资中，在一段时间里，我们几乎没有任何竞争对手，投入资金几个月就能获得10%以上的收益率（毛利率，不是年化收益率）。在这笔套利中同时做空可以消除大盘下跌的风险。

The final category is I “control” situations, where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. Usually, it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company's stock, and we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation.

最后一类是“控制类”。在此类投资中，我们或是拥有控股权或者是大股东，对公司决策有话语权。衡量此类投资肯定要看几年时间。当我们看好一只股票，在收集筹码时，它的股价最好长期呆滞不动，所以在一年中，控制类投资可能不会贡献任何收益。此类投资同样受大盘影响相对较小。有时候，一只股票，我们是当做低估类买入的，但是考虑可能把它发展成控制类。如果股价长期低迷，很可能出现这种情况。我们经常还没买到足够的货，就涨起来了，我们就在涨起来的价格卖掉，成功完成一笔低估类投资。