巴菲特致合伙人的信（1963年半年度）③登普斯特风车制造公司

Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company

In our most recent annual letter, I described Harry Bottle as the “man of the year”. If this was an understatement. Last year Harry did an extraordinary job of converting unproductive assets into cash which we then, of course, began to invest in undervalued securities. Harry has continued this year to turn under-utilized assets into cash, but in addition, he has made the remaining needed assets productive. Thus we have had the following transformation in balance sheets during the last nineteen months:

登普斯特风车制造公司(Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company)

在上一封年度信中，我称赞哈里·博特尔(Harry Bottle)是“年度之星”。哈里岂止是年度之星？去年，哈里出色地将效益低下的资产变现，我们随后就把这些现金投资，买了低估的股票。今年，哈里继续变卖效率低下的资产，留下来的资产效益也更好了。经过他 19 个月的努力，登普斯特的资产负债表发生了质变：

I have included above the conversion factors we have previously used in valuing Dempster for B.P.L. purposes to reflect estimated immediate sale values of non-earning assets.

我们以前给登普斯特估值时，针对各个资产负债表项目使用了不同的折价率，不考虑资产的盈利能力，估算它的短期清算价值。

As can be seen, Harry has converted the assets at a much more favorable basis than was implied by my valuations. This largely reflects Harry's expertise and, perhaps, to a minor degree my own conservatism in valuation.

报表中列出了我们使用的折价率。如报表所示，哈里变现资产得到的价值比我的估值高得多。这说明我的估值比较保守，但主要得益于哈里的能力。

As can also be seen, Dempster earned a very satisfactory operating profit in the first half (as well as a substantial unrealized gain in securities) and there is little question that the operating business, as now conducted, has at least moderate earning power on the vastly reduced assets needed to conduct it. Because of a very important-seasonal factor and also the presence of a tax carry forward, however, the earning power is not nearly what might be inferred simply by a comparison of the 11/30/62 and 6/30/63 balance sheets. Partly because of this seasonality, but more importantly, because of possible developments in Dempster before 1963 yearend, we have left our Dempster holdings at the same $51.26 valuation used at yearend 1962 in our figures for B.P.L’s first half. However, I would be very surprised if it does not work out higher than this figure at yearend.

从报表中还可以看出来，上半年登普斯特创造了非常令人满意营业利润（还有大量证券未实现收益）。毫无疑问，经过大刀阔斧的资产精简之后，现在公司的主营业务至少有一般水平的盈利能力了。由于公司经营受季节性因素影响很大，而且有税款抵减，单纯比较 62 年 11 月 30 日和 63 年 6 月 30 日的资产负债表，无法准确推断公司的盈利能力。一方面是经营的季节性因素，更主要的是，年底登普斯特可能还有新进展。今年上半年，我们仍然将它的估值定为 1962 年末的 51.26 美元。今年年底，登普斯特的价值不高于 51.26 美元就怪了。

One sidelight for the fundamentalists in our group: B.P.L. owns 71.7% of Dempster acquired at a cost of $1,262,577.27. On June 30, 1963 Dempster had a small safe deposit box at the Omaha National Bank containing securities worth $2,028,415.25. Our 71.7% share of $2,028,415.25 amounts to $1,454,373.70. Thus, everything above ground (and part of it underground) is profit. My security analyst friends may find this a rather primitive method of accounting, but I must confess that I find a bit more substance in this fingers and toes method than in any prayerful reliance that someone will pay me 35 times next year's earnings.

我再给喜欢基本面分析的合伙人讲个好玩的：合伙基金拥有登普斯特 71.7%的股份，成本是 1,262,577.27 美元。1963 年 6 月 30 日，登普斯特在奥马哈国民银行有个小保险箱，里面存着价值 2,028,415.25 美元的证券。我们拥有这 2,028,415.25 美元的 71.7%，即 1,454,373.70 美元。所以公司土地上面（还有一部分在地下）的所有东西都是我们赚的。我的证券分析师朋友们可能觉得我这个会计方法太原始了，说真的，我还是愿意用我这样数手指头和脚趾头的方法，不愿意痴痴地指望别人明年会给我开出个 35 倍市盈率的报价，还是我的原始方法更靠谱些。