巴菲特致合伙人的信（1966年半年度）②基金公司

Investment Companies:

On the next page we bring up to date our regular comparison with the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.

基金公司

我们一直拿股票投资占95-100%的最大的两只开放式股票型基金（共同基金）和分散投资的最大的两只封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与合伙基金的收益率做对比。以下是最新对比情况。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for first half of 1966.

(1)计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。
(2)来源：1966 Moody's Bank&Finance Manual for 1957-65。1966年上半年数据为估算值。

Proponents of institutional investing frequently cite its conservative nature. If “conservative” is interpreted to mean "productive of results varying only slightly from average experience" I believe the characterization is proper. Such results are almost bound to flow from wide diversification among high grade securities. Since, over a long period, "average experience" is likely to be good experience, there is nothing wrong with the typical investor utilizing this form of investment medium.

机构投资者经常以保守标榜自己。如果他们所谓的“保守”意思是“业绩和平均水平亦步亦趋”，那我没意见。广泛分散投资优质证券，最后取得的业绩差不多就这样。长期来看，“平均水平”也相当不错，普通投资者选择基金没什么不对。

However, I believe that conservatism is more properly interpreted to mean "subject to substantially less temporary or permanent shrinkage in value than total experience". This simply has not been achieved, as the record of the four largest funds (presently managing over $5 billion) illustrates. Specifically, the Dow declined in 1957, 1960, 1962 and the first half of 1966. Cumulating the shrinkage in the Dow during the three full year periods produces a decline of 20.6%. Following a similar technique for the four largest funds produces declines of 9.7%, 20.9%, 22.3% and 24.6%. Including the interim performance for the first half of 1966 results in a decline in the Dow of 27.5% and for the funds declines of 14.4%, 23.1%, 27.1% and 30.6%. Such funds (and I believe their results are quite typical of institutional experience in common stocks) seem to meet the first definition of conservatism but not the second one.

依我之见，保守要这么定义才更合理：“与平均水平相比，承受远远更低的价值损失，无论是暂时的，还是永久的。”按这个定义衡量，从这四只大型基金（目前管理资产超过50亿美元）的历史业绩来看，它们都没做到保守。1957年、1960年、1962年和1966年上半年，道指都下跌了。将57年、60年和62年的下跌累计计算，道指下跌20.6%。按同样的计算方法，四大基金分别下跌9.7%、20.9%、22.3%和24.6%。再把1966年上半年的下跌也算上，道指累计下跌27.5%，四大基金分别累计下跌14.4%、23.1%、27.1%和30.6%。按照上述保守的第一种定义，这几只基金是保守的。按照第二种定义，它们算不上保守。（这几只基金的业绩可以代表机构投资者。）

Most investors would climb a rung intellectually if they clearly delineated between the above two interpretations of conservatism. The first might be better labeled "conventionalism" - what it really says is that “when others are making money in the general run of securities, so will we and to about the same degree; when they are losing money, we'll do it at about the same rate." This is not to be equated with "when others are making it, we'll make as much and when they are losing it, we will lose less.” Very few investment programs accomplish the latter - we certainly don't promise it but we do intend to keep trying. (I have always felt our objectives should be somewhat loftier than those Herman Hickman articulated during the desperate years when Yale was losing eight games a season. Said Herman, "I see my job as one of keeping the alumni sullen but not mutinous.”)

大多数投资者，要是他们能分清上述两种不同的保守定义，他们的投资理念就上了一个台阶。第一种保守可能叫“随大流”(conventionalism)更合适，它的意思其实是说“股市普遍上涨，别人都赚钱时，我们一样赚；别人亏钱时，我们一样亏。”我所说的保守是这样的：“别人赚钱时，我们一样赚；别人亏钱时，我们少亏。”这两个保守不一样。在投资中，能做到第二种保守的，很少。我们保证不了就能做到，但会以追求这种保守为目标。（耶鲁橄榄球队当年输得很惨，曾经在一个赛季里输掉八场比赛，教练Herman Hickman解释说：“我争取把我的工作做好，不把校友们惹火就行，他们不满意就不满意吧。”我始终觉得我们应该有更高的追求。）（译注：引用这句话的原文是I see my job as one of keeping the alumni sullen but not mutinous.这句话是教练Herman Hickman说的。耶鲁橄榄球队很弱，高校之间橄榄球比赛很激烈，教练很难常胜。他这句话是在解释球队成绩为什么那么差的时候说的，意思是，成绩肯定好不了，校友不满意也没办法。只是成绩别太差，别把校友们惹火了就行。）

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year. (2) From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for first half of 1966.

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for first half of 1966.