巴菲特致合伙人的信（1966年）⑥低估类（相对低估）

Generals - Relatively Undervalued

Our relative performance in this category was the best we have ever had - due to one holding which was our largest investment at yearend 1965 and also yearend 1966. This investment has substantially out-performed the general market for us during each year (1964, 1965, 1966) that we have held it. While any single year's performance can be quite erratic, we think the probabilities are highly favorable for superior future performance over a three or four year period. The attractiveness and relative certainty of this particular security are what caused me to introduce Ground Rule 7 in November, 1965 to allow individual holdings of up to 40% of our net assets. We spend considerable effort continuously evaluating every facet of the company and constantly testing our hypothesis that this security is superior to alternative investment choices. Such constant evaluation and comparison at shifting prices is absolutely essential to our investment operation.

低估类（相对低估）

去年，相对低估类取得了此类别设立以来的最高收益，主要得益于一笔投资，它是我们1965年末的规模最大的投资，也是我们1966年末规模最大的投资。我们持有这笔投资以来，它每年（1964、1965、1966）都遥遥领先大市。任何一年的表现都很难说，但是我们认为，把时间拉长到三四年，这笔投资将来取得优异表现的概率非常大。正是因为看好这只股票，而且比较有把握，1965年11月，我在《基本原则》中加入了第七条，允许单笔投资最多占我们净资产的40%。我们投入了大量精力，对这家公司各个方面的评估从未停止，与其他投资的比较从未停止，我们一直在在检验我们的结论是否正确，即这只股票是所有投资里的最佳选择。在我们的投资中，这种持续不断的评估和比较是必须的。

It would be much more pleasant (and indicate a more favorable future) to report that our results in the Generals -Relatively Undervalued category represented fifteen securities in ten industries, practically all of which outperformed the market. We simply don't have that many good ideas. As mentioned above, new ideas are continually measured against present ideas and we will not make shifts if the effect is to downgrade expectable performance. This policy has resulted in limited activity in recent years when we have felt so strongly about the relative merits of our largest holding. Such a condition has meant that realized gains have been a much smaller portion of total performance than in earlier years when the flow of good ideas was more substantial.

我当然希望能这样向各位报告（并告诉大家我对未来很看好）：我们的相对低估类投资包含10个行业中的15只股票，它们都跑赢了市场。我们根本没找到这么多好机会。刚才也说了，我们总是把新机会和已有机会做比较，如果新机会只能降低预期收益，我们不会将就。这几年，我们很看好我们持有的这笔规模最大的投资，没找到更好的，所以我们也没什么新的动作。早些年，好机会层出不穷，那时候实现的收益在总收益中占比较高，现在就少多了。

The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance – some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a long term oriented business such as ours.

在相对低估类中，我们集中投资，所以必然给短期业绩带来巨大的波动，有些波动肯定是令人不快的。我向合伙人报告的周期是一年时间，其实在一年之内，我们有过较大的波动。报告的太频繁不是好事，我们的投资着眼于长远，总盯着短期业绩容易走偏。

Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped-for good long term performance.

就我个人而言，我坚持去年的信中谈分散时所说的理念，在此基础上，我愿意承受短期波动的痛苦（欢乐我都不谈），换取长期收益的最大化。但是，我不愿为了追求更高的长期收益，去承受严重的本金永久损失风险。我想把话说清楚：既然我们选择了集中持股的投资策略，合伙人就应当做好充分准备，我们的表现会有遥遥领先的时候（例如1965年和1966年），也会有远远落后的时候（特别是在市场大涨时），这是我们为了追求出色的长期表现而要付出的代价。

All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that “even five minutes is a long time if one's head is being held under water." This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.

我总是谈长远，一位合伙人对我说“要是脑袋浸在水里，五分钟都太长”。没错，所以我们在投资中对于借钱谨小慎微。1966年，我们从银行借贷的资金远低于合伙基金平均净值的10%。

One final word about the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category. In this section we also had an experience which helped results in 1966 but hurt our long term prospects. We had just one really important new idea in this category in 1966. Our purchasing started in late spring but had only come to about $1.6 million (it could be bought steadily but at only a moderate pace) when outside conditions drove the stock price up to a point where it was not relatively attractive. Though our overall gain was $728,141 on an average holding period of six and a half months in 1966, it would have been much more desirable had the stock done nothing for a long period of time while we accumulated a really substantial position.

关于相对低估类，还有一件事。在这个类别中，我们也经历了对去年业绩有利，但对长期业绩不利的情况。1966年，我们在这个类别中只找到了一个新的大机会。我们是从去年三月份开始买的，但是刚投入了160万美元（当时这只股票一直能买到，但是买到的不多），外界情况就发生了变化，股价被抬高了，这只股票算不上相对低估了。这只股票，我们在1966年平均持有了六个半月，取得了728,141美元的总收益。要是它的价格能一直保持低迷，让我们持续大量买入，那该多好。