巴菲特致合伙人的信（1967年）
③业绩分析④其他事项

January 24, 1968 

1968年1月24日

Analysis of 1967 Results

The overall figures given earlier conceal vast differences in profitability by portfolio category during 1967.

1967年业绩分析

在1967年良好的整体业绩背后，是各个投资类别表现的巨大差异。 

We had our worst performance in history in the “Workout” section. In the 1965 letter, this category was defined as, “...securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity -- sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category, we are not talking about rumors or inside information pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk does not pertain primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in. to a degree). but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected corporate development does not materialize.”

我们的“套利类”出现了合伙基金成立以来最差的业绩。在1965年信中，我是这样定义套利类的：“……套利类投资有时间表可循。套利投资机会出现在出售、并购、重组、分拆等公司活动中。我们做套利投资不听传闻或“内幕消息”，只看公司的公告。在白纸黑字上读到了，我们才会出手。套利类投资有时也受大盘影响，但主要风险不是大盘涨跌，而是中途出现意外，预期的进展没有实现。” 

The streets were filled with upset applecarts - our applecarts - during 1967. Thus, on an average investment of $17,246,879, our overall gain was $153,273. For those of you whose slide rule does not go to such insulting depths, this represents a return of .89 of 1%. While I don't have complete figures. I doubt that we have been below 10% in any past year. As in other categories, we tend to concentrate our investments in the workout category in just a few situations per year. This technique gives more variation in yearly results than would be the case if we used an across-the-board approach. I believe our approach will result in as great (or greater) profitability on a long-term basis, but you can't prove it by 1967.

1967年的意外特别多，我们遭遇的意外特别多。我们平均投资了17,246,879美元，总收益是153,273美元。有的合伙人对数字不敏感，看不出来这个收益有多可怜。套利类去年的收益率是0.89%。我没详细计算，但是我估计，无论过去哪一年，套利类的收益率都没有低于10%的时候。和其他几个类别一样，在套利类中，我们每年也是只集中做几笔投资。与广泛分散相比，我们这么投资，每年的业绩波动幅度会更大。我相信，按照我们的方法，从长期看，我们的收益差不了，1967年一年的情况说明不了什么。 

Our investment in controlled companies was a similar drag on relative performance in 1967, but this is to be expected in strong markets. On an average investment of $20,192,776 we had an overall gain of $2,894,571. I am pleased with this sort of performance, even though this category will continue to underperform if the market continues strong during 1968. Through our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing and Berkshire Hathaway), we acquired two new enterprises in 1967. Associated Cotton Shops and National Indemnity (along with National Fire & Marine, an affiliated company). These acquisitions couldn't be more gratifying. Everything was as advertised or better. The principal selling executives, Ben Rosner and Jack Ringwalt, have continued to do a superb job (the only kind they know), and in every respect have far more than lived up to their end of the bargain.

1967年，我们的控股类投资同样拖累了相对业绩，这种情况在市场强劲上涨时很正常。我们控股类的平均投资是20,192,776美元，总收益是2,894,571美元。我对这样的业绩很满意，只要能继续保持下去，就算1968年市场继续走强，控股类继续落后，也没关系。1967年，我们通过两家控股公司（多元零售公司和伯克希尔哈撒韦）收购了两家新公司，一个是联合棉布商店(Associated Cotton Shops)，另一个是国民赔偿公司(National Indemnity)（及其附属公司国民火灾与海事保险公司(National Fire&Marine)）。我们对这两笔收购再满意不过了。实际情况与我们得知的情况完全相符，甚至更好。本·罗斯纳(Ben Rosner)和杰克·林沃特(Jack Ringwalt)分别是两家公司的总裁，他们把公司卖给了我们，但是仍留在公司做着一流的工作（他们只会这么工作）。无论是从哪个方面看，他们都是说到做到，甚至做得更好。 

The satisfying nature of our activity in controlled companies is a minor reason for the moderated investment objectives discussed in the October 9th letter. When I am dealing with people I like, in businesses I find stimulating (what business isn't ?), and achieving worthwhile overall returns on capital employed (say, 10-12%), it seems foolish to rush from situation to situation to earn a few more percentage points. It also does not seem sensible to me to trade known pleasant personal relationships with high grade people, at a decent rate of return, for possible irritation, aggravation or worse at potentially higher returns. Hence, we will continue to keep a portion of our capital (but not over 40% because of the possible liquidity requirements arising from the nature of our partnership agreement) invested in controlled operating businesses at an expected rate of return below that inherent in an aggressive stock market operation.

在10月9日信中，我讲了为什么要降低我们的投资目标，其中有一个原因是我对控股公司的经营感到非常满意。我打交道的人是我特别喜欢的，我经营的生意是我特别感兴趣的（没我不感兴趣的生意），通过付出也能获得合理的整体投资回报率（例如，10-12%）。要是为了多赚几个百分点，就东一榔头西一棒槌的，太傻了。再说了，本来已经认识了一流的人，和他们合作很愉快，回报率也相当好，就为了回报率再高一些，去惹一肚子气、一身的烦恼，甚至陷入更糟的境地，也不值。出于上述考虑，我们仍然会将一部分资金（按照我们的合伙协议，我们要考虑流动性，所以这部分投资不会超过40%）投资于控股公司，尽管与更激进地在股市中买卖股票相比，这部分投资的预期收益率较低。 

With a combined total of $37,439,655 in workouts and controls producing an overall gain of only $3,047,844, the more alert members of the class will have already concluded we had a whale of a year in the "Generals - Relatively Undervalued" category. On a net average investment of $19,487,996, we had an overall gain of $14,096,593, or 72%. Last year I referred to one investment which substantially outperformed the general market in 1964, 1965 and 1966 and because of its size (the largest proportion we have ever had in anything - we hit our 40% limit) had a very material impact on our overall results and, even more so, this category. This excellent performance continued throughout 1967 and a large portion of total gain was again accounted for by this single security. Our holdings of this security have been very substantially reduced and we have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment.

套利类和控股类共投资37,439,655美元，合计收益仅3,047,844美元。速算能力强的同学早就看出来了，去年我们在“低估类（相对低估）”中取得了巨大的收益。在相对低估类中，我们净平均投资19,487,996美元，总体收益14,096,593美元，收益率是72%。在去年的信中，我说过有一笔投资在1964、1965和1966年遥遥领先大市，因为这笔投资仓位很重（是我们成立以来仓位最大的一笔投资，达到了40%的上限），所以对整体收益影响很大，对相对低估类的影响就更大了。1967年，这笔投资仍然表现优异，这一只股票又为我们贡献了大部分收益。我们已经大幅减持了这只股票。在相对低估类中，无论是看规模，还是看潜力，我们现在没有一只股票能与这只相提并论。 

The "Generals - Private Owner" section produced good results last year ($1,297,215 on $5,141,710 average investment), and we have some mildly interesting possibilities in this area at present.

去年，“低估类（基于产业资本视角）”表现不错（平均投资5,141,710美元，收益1,297,215美元）。目前，在这个类别中，我们有些还算可以的机会。 

Miscellaneous

We begin the new year with net assets of $68,108,088. We had partners with capital of about $1,600,000 withdraw at yearend, primarily because of the reduced objectives announced in the October 9th letter. This makes good sense for them, since most of them have the ability and motivation to surpass our objectives and I am relieved from pushing for results that I probably can't attain under present conditions.

其他事项

今年，我们的初始净资产是68,108,088美元。去年年末，合伙人提现金额为1,600,000美元，主要是因为我在10月9日的信中宣布降低目标。他们这么做合情合理，因为他们大多数都有能力、有意愿超过我们的目标。现在我不必勉强追求在当前环境中可能无法实现的业绩了，我感到如释重负。 

Some of those who withdrew (and many who didn't) asked me, "What do you really mean?" after receiving the October 9th letter. This sort of a question is a little bruising to any author, but I assured them I meant exactly what I had said. I was also asked whether this was an initial stage in the phasing out of the partnership. The answer to this is, “Definitely, no”. As long as partners want to put up their capital alongside of mine and the business is operationally pleasant (and it couldn't be better), I intend to continue to do business with those who have backed me since tennis shoes.

收到10月9日的信后，有些提现的合伙人和我打了招呼（许多什么也没和我说），他们问我：“你说的到底是什么意思啊？”不管写东西的是谁，听到这样的问题，都会感到有些受伤。我告诉他们，我真的没别的意思，就是我写的那些。还有人问我，我是不是打算逐步解散合伙基金。我的回答是“绝对没这个打算”。只要合伙人愿意把自己的资金和我的放在一块，而且我做得很开心（还有什么比这更好的），你们从我还穿球鞋时就支持我，我愿意一直和你们做合伙人。 

Gladys Kaiser has joined us and is doing the same sort of top-notch job that we have long received from Donna, Bill and John. The office group, spouses and children have over $15 million invested in BPL on January 1, 1968, so we have not had a need for NoDoz during business hours.

格拉迪斯·凯瑟(Gladys Kaiser)加入了我们，她和多娜、比尔、约翰一样，做的工作都是一流的。1968年1月1日，合伙基金的所有员工及其配偶和子女在基金中有1500万美元以上的投资。上班时间，我们用不着吃“瞌睡无”（译注：NoDoz，一种含咖啡因的药品）。 

Within a few days, you will receive:
1.A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1967 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.

2.An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (they have again done an excellent job) for 1967, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.

3.A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1968. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.

几天后，各位将收到如下文件：
1.一份包含税收数据的信函，其中列有申报1967年联邦所得税所需的所有巴菲特合伙基金信息。

2.毕马威会计师事务所（今年他们的工作仍然很出色）出具的1967年审计报告，其中包含巴菲特合伙基金的运营数据和财务状况以及合伙人资本账户的信息。

3.一份由我签署的、证明您于1968年1月1日持有巴菲特合伙基金权益的文件，其中的权益数据与审计报告中列出的数据一致。

Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July15th, summarizing the first half of this year.

Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett

如果对信中内容有任何疑问，或者年中遇到任何问题，请随时与我联系。下一封信是上半年总结，各位将在7月15日左右收到。

沃伦E.巴菲特谨上

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〔译文来源于梁孝永康所编《巴菲特致合伙人+致股东的信全集》〕

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