巴菲特致合伙人的信（1968年）
①业绩②基金公司

January 22, 1969 

1969年1月22日

Our Performance in 1968 

Everyone makes mistakes.

1968年业绩

谁都有犯错的时候。 

At the beginning of 1968, I felt prospects for BPL performance looked poorer than at any time in our history. However, due in considerable measure to one simple but sound idea whose time had come (investment ideas, like women are often more exciting than punctual), we recorded an overall gain of $40,032,691.

1968年年初，我对巴菲特合伙基金的前景感到前所未有的悲观，但是，去年我们实现了40,032,691美元的总收益。主要是因为我们抓住了一个很简单、很合理的机会，这个机会正好成熟了（投资机会像女人一样，招人喜欢，却难以捉摸）。 

Naturally, you all possess sufficient intellectual purity to dismiss the dollar result and demand an accounting of performance relative to the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. We established a new mark at plus 58.8% versus an overall plus 7.7 % for the Dow, including dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average throughout the year. This result should be treated as a freak like picking up thirteen spades in a bridge game. You bid the slam, make it look modest, pocket the money and then get back to work on the part scores. We will also have our share of hands when we go set.

我相信各位都保持着知识分子的纯洁性，不会把上面的收益数字当回事，而是希望我报告一下相对道指的表现。去年，将股息计算在内，道指的收益率是上涨7.7%，我们的收益率是上涨58.8%，创造了新纪录。大家应该把这个业绩看成是极端异常情况，就像在桥牌中一连抓了13张黑桃，你叫到大满贯，却不动声色，把钱装在兜里，继续打下一局。我们也会有运气不好的时候。 

The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the General Partner and the results for limited partners: 

下面是道指收益率、普通合伙人分成前合伙基金收益率（收益超过6%的部分，普通合伙人提取25%）以及有限合伙人收益率的最新逐年对比情况。 

(1)Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of Partnership activity.

(2)For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the General Partner.

(3)For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of Partnership results allowing for allocation to the General Partner based upon the present Partnership Agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:

(1)根据道指年度涨跌计算，其中包含股息。表格中为合伙基金整年运作的年份。

(2)1957-61年的数据是之前全年管理的所有有限合伙人账户的综合业绩，其中扣除了经营费用，未计算有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。

(3)1957-61年的数据按前一列合伙基金收益率计算得出，按照当前合伙协议，扣除了普通合伙人分成。

下表是累计收益率或复合收益率：

Investment Companies

On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of what were the two largest mutual funds (they stood at the top in size from 1957 through 1966 - they are still number two and three) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.

基金公司

和往常一样，下面是股票投资占95-100%的最大的两只开放式股票型基金（从1957年到1966年，这两只基金是规模最大的，现在是第二大和第三大）以及分散投资的最大的两只封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与合伙基金的收益率的对比情况。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1968 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1967. Estimated for 1968.

(1) 计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。
(2)来源：1968 Moody's Bank&Finance Manual for 1957-1967。1968年数据为估算值。

It is interesting that after twelve years these four funds (which presently aggregate well over $5 billion and account for over 10% of the investment company industry) have averaged only a fraction of one percentage point annually better than the Dow.

12年过去了，这四只基金目前管理50多亿美元的总资产，占基金行业总规模的10%以上，但是按年化复合收益率计算，他们的平均收益率竟然才比道指高零点几个百分点。 

Some of the so-called “go-go” funds have recently been re-christened “no-go” funds. For example, Gerald Tsai's Manhattan Fund, perhaps the world's best-known aggressive investment vehicle, came in at minus 6.9% for 1968. Many smaller investment entities continued to substantially outperform the general market in 1968, but in nothing like the quantities of 1966 and 1967.

前几年高歌猛进的一些基金最近偃旗息鼓了。在投资风格激进的基金公司中，蔡至勇(Gerald Tsai)的曼哈顿基金(Manhattan Fund)最负盛名，但它1968年只取得了亏损6.9%的业绩。1968年，很多规模较小的基金继续大幅跑赢大市，但是与前两年跑赢大市的基金数量相比，就少多了。 

The investment management business, which I used to severely chastise in this section for excessive lethargy, has now swung in many quarters to acute hypertension. One investment manager, representing an organization (with an old established name you would recognize) handling mutual funds aggregating well over $1 billion, said upon launching a new advisory service in 1968:

在往年的信中，每次写到基金公司这部分，我经常斥责基金公司慵懒散慢，现在很多基金公司来了个一百八十度大转弯，变得高度紧张了。有一家基金公司（这家基金公司历史悠久，一说名字各位肯定知道）的基金经理掌管着10亿美元以上的资金，1968年，在发行一只新产品时，他说： 

“The complexities of national and international economics make money management a full-time job. A good money manager cannot maintain a study of securities on a week-by-week or even a day-by-day basis. Securities must be studied in a minute-by-minute program.”

Wow!

“国内国际经济环境日益复杂，资产管理已成为全天候工作。一位称职的基金经理研究证券不能只看每周或每天的情况。研究证券，必须关注每一分钟的动向。”

哇喔！

This sort of stuff makes me feel guilty when I go out for a Pepsi. When practiced by large and increasing numbers of highly motivated people with huge amounts of money on a limited quantity of suitable securities, the result becomes highly unpredictable. In some ways it is fascinating to watch and in other ways it is appalling.

听他这么一说，我每次起身去拿百事喝都感到惭愧。掌管着大笔资金的人像打了鸡血一样，而且这样的越来越多，股票就那些，谁都不知道最后的结果会怎样。这个场面，看起来很热闹，也很吓人。 

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〔译文来源于梁孝永康所编《巴菲特致合伙人+致股东的信全集》〕

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