巴菲特致合伙人的信（1968年）⑤低估类（基于产业资本视角）⑥低估类（相对低估）⑦套利类

Generals -Private Owner

Over the years this has been our best category, measured by average return, and has also maintained by far the best percentage of profitable transactions. This approach was the way I was taught the business, and it formerly accounted for a large proportion of all our investment ideas. Our total individual profits in this category during the twelve year BPL history are probably fifty times or more our total losses. The cash register really rang on one simple industry idea (implemented in several ways) in this area in 1968. We even received a substantial fee (included in Other Income in the audit) for some work in this field.

低估类（基于产业资本视角）

这些年来，这个类别的平均收益率最高，盈利投资所占百分比也最高。我正是从低估类中领悟了投资的道理。在合伙基金早年，在我们的所有投资机会中，低估类占了很大一部分。在巴菲特合伙基金这12年的历程中，把低估类的每一笔投资都算在一起，我们实现的总利润大概是总亏损的50倍。1968年，我们发现一个行业中存在明显的投资机会（并从多方面加以利用），结果赚了大钱。在利用这个投资机会的过程中，我们因为做了一些工作，还获得了一大笔费用（记录在审计文件中的“其他收入”中）。

Our total investment in this category (which is where I feel by far the greatest certainty regarding consistently decent results) is presently under $2 million and I have nothing at all in the hopper to bolster this. What came through like the Johnstown flood in 1968 looks more like a leaky faucet in Altoona for 1969.

到目前为止，在持续取得良好业绩方面，我对低估类（基于产业资本视角）的确定性最大。但是，现在我们在这个类别的总投资还不到200万美元，而且我一个备选机会都没有。1968年，机会像约翰斯顿水灾奔涌而来。1969年，机会像阿尔图纳市一个水龙头漏出来的水滴。

Generals - Relatively Undervalued

This category produced about two-thirds of the overall gain in 1966 and 1967 combined. I mentioned last year that the great two-year performance here had largely come from one idea. I also said, "We have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment.” It gives me great pleasure to announce that this statement was absolutely correct. It gives me somewhat less pleasure to announce that it must be repeated this year.

低估类（相对低估）

此类投资创造的收益占1966年和1967年总收益的三分之二左右。我在去年的信里说了，这个类别连续两年取得佳绩，主要是因为我们抓住了一个机会。我还说了：“在相对低估类中，无论是看规模，还是看潜力，我们现在没有一只股票能与这只相提并论。”我感到很高兴的是，我去年说的这句话完全正确。我不太高兴的是，今年还是这个情况。

Workouts

This category, which was a disaster in 1967, did well during 1968. Our relatively heavy concentration in just a few situations per year (some of the large arbitrage houses may become involved in fifty or more workouts per annum) gives more variation in yearly results than an across-the-board approach. I feel the average profitability will be as good with our policy and 1968 makes me feel better about that conclusion than 1967 did.

套利类

1967年，我们的套利类投资彻底做砸了。1968年，我们做得很好。我们的投资方法是每年相对集中地只做几笔投资。一些专做套利的大型机构每年同时做50多笔套利。与大量分散的方法相比，我们每年的业绩波动幅度更大。我觉得按照我们的投资方法，平均下来，我们的业绩不会差。1968年，我们的表现比1967年好，我对自己的结论也更有信心了。

It should again be stated that our results in the Workout area (as well as in other categories) are somewhat understated compared to the more common method of determining results computed on an initial base figure and utilizing borrowed money (which is often a sensible part of the Workout business).

这里还是要提醒一下，一般计算业绩的方法是以年初的数字为基准，而且在套利投资中的资金有一部分可以是借来的，按我们的方法计算，我们在套利类投资（其他几类也一样）中的业绩会略微低一些。

I can't emphasize too strongly that the quality and quantity of ideas is presently at an all time low - the product of the factors mentioned in my October 9th, 1967 letter, which have largely been intensified since then.

当前的机会，无论从质量上看，还是数量上看，都是历史新低。我已经说过很多遍了，但还是要说。具体原因我在1967年10月9日的信中讲过了。这个现象是越来越严重。

Sometimes I feel we should have a plaque in our office like the one at the headquarters of Texas Instruments in Dallas which reads: “We don't believe in miracles, we rely on them.” It is possible for an old, overweight ball player, whose legs and batting eye are gone, to tag a fast ball on the nose for a pinch-hit home run, but you don't change your line-up because of it.

德州仪器公司的达拉斯总部挂着一块牌子，上面写着：“我们不相信奇迹，我们创造奇迹。”有时候，我甚至觉得我们的办公室上也应该挂一个这样的牌子。一个棒球选手，岁数大了、身体发福了、脚步慢了、眼神也不好了，作为替补出场，他也可能精确地打出一记本垒打，但是谁都不会因为这个把他当成首发。

We have a number of important negatives operating on our future and, while they shouldn't add up to futility, they certainly don't add up to more than an average of quite moderate profitability.

展望未来，我们面临的是诸多重大不利因素。我们不至于一事无成，但也很难取得良好的收益率。