巴菲特致股东的信（1979年）⑦银行业⑧财务报告⑨未来前景

Banking

This will be the last year that we can report on the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company as a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway. Therefore, it is particularly pleasant to report that, under Gene Abegg’s and Pete Jeffrey’s management, the bank broke all previous records and earned approximately 2.3% on average assets last year, a level again over three times that achieved by the average major bank, and more than double that of banks regarded as outstanding. The record is simply extraordinary, and the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway owe a standing ovation to Gene Abegg for the performance this year and every year since our purchase in 1969.

银行业

这将会是我们最后一次报告伊利诺斯国民银行的状况，而我们也很开心的向各位宣布在Gene Abegg及Pete Jeffrey优秀的领导下，这家银行的获利打破历年来的记录，去年的资产报酬率高达2.3%，约是同业平均的三倍，对于如此优异的表现，实在值得所有伯克希尔的股东再度给予Gene Abegg热烈的掌声，感谢他们自1969年成为伯克希尔一员以来所作的贡献。

As you know, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1969 requires that we divest the bank by December 31, 1980. For some years we have expected to comply by effecting a spin-off during 1980. However, the Federal Reserve Board has taken the firm position that if the bank is spun off, no officer or director of Berkshire Hathaway can be an officer or director of the spun-off bank or bank holding company, even in a case such as ours in which one individual would own over 40% of both companies.

而如同各位所知，1969年通过的银行控股公司法要求我们必须在1980年结束以前将这家银行处份掉，事实上我们曾试图以分割的方式处理，但联邦准备局却坚持若要如此，则伯克希尔不能有任何一位董事或经理人在分割后的银行担任任何职务，即使依照我们这个个案，没有任何一个人同时拥有两家公司40%以上的股份也一样。

Under these conditions, we are investigating the possible sale of between 80% and 100% of the stock of the bank. We will be most choosy about any purchaser, and our selection will not be based solely on price. The bank and its management have treated us exceptionally well and, if we have to sell, we want to be sure that they are treated equally as well. A spin-off still is a possibility if a fair price along with a proper purchaser cannot be obtained by early fall.

在这种情况下，我们只能探询出售该公司80%-100%股权的可能性，但请相信，我们绝对会严格挑选买主，而且价格也不是惟一考量的重点，这家银行与其经营阶层待我们实在不薄，所以即使要卖，我们也要确定能以相同态度回报之。当然如果我们无法在秋天以前以合理的价格找到合适的买主，最后还是有可能以分割的方式解决。

However, you should be aware that we do not expect to be able to fully, or even in very large part, replace the earning power represented by the bank from the proceeds of the sale of the bank. You simply can’t buy high quality businesses at the sort of price/earnings multiple likely to prevail on our bank sale.

同时大家必须明了，我们经由出售这家银行所得的资金将来如果再转投资，其为伯克希尔创造盈余的能力可能永远无法与前者比拟。因此同等优质的产业实在是很难以如此低的本益比取得。

Financial Reporting

During 1979, NASDAQ trading was initiated in the stock of Berkshire Hathaway This means that the stock now is quoted on the Over-the-Counter page of the Wall Street journal under “Additional OTC Quotes”. Prior to such listing, the Wall Street journal and the Dow-Jones news ticker would not report our earnings, even though such earnings were one hundred or more times the level of some companies whose reports they regularly picked up.

财务报告

1979年伯克希尔在纳斯达克上市，这表示在每天的华尔街日报证券版将可以看得到伯克希尔的报价，在此之前，不管是华尔街日报或是道琼工业指数都没有报导我们经营情况，即使我们的获利数百倍于它们常常提及的一些公司。

Now, however, the Dow-Jones news ticker reports our quarterly earnings promptly after we release them and, in addition, both the ticker and the Wall Street journal report our annual earnings. This solves a dissemination problem that had bothered us.

现在当我们按季公布获利状况后，华尔街日报将会立即报导相关讯息，这将帮我们一举解决了长期困扰着我们发布消息的难题。

In some ways, our shareholder group is a rather unusual one, and this affects our manner of reporting to you. For example, at the end of each year about 98% of the shares outstanding are held by people who also were shareholders at the beginning of the year. Therefore, in our annual report we build upon what we have told you in previous years instead of restating a lot of material. You get more useful information this way, and we don’t get bored.

在某些方面，我们的股东是相当特别的一群，这影响着我撰写年报的方式。举例来说，每年结束，约有98%股份的股东会保留他们在伯克希尔的持股，因此每年年报的撰写皆延续前一年度，避免一再重复叙述相同的东西，从而大家可获得一些有用的讯息，而我也不会觉得厌烦。

Furthermore, perhaps 90% of our shares are owned by investors for whom Berkshire is their largest security holding, very often far and away the largest. Many of these owners are willing to spend a significant amount of time with the annual report, and we attempt to provide them with the same information we would find useful if the roles were reversed.

此外，约有90%股份的股东其最大的股票投资就是伯克希尔，所以有许多股东愿意花相当的时间在研读每年年报之上，而我们也努力设身处地的提供所有我们认为有用的信息给全体股东。

In contrast, we include no narrative with our quarterly reports. Our owners and managers both have very long time- horizons in regard to this business, and it is difficult to say anything new or meaningful each quarter about events of long-term significance.

相较之下，我们并未花太多时间对每季季报加以着墨，因为所有股东与经营者，皆以长期的眼光来看待这份事业，所以并不是每季都有新的或有重大的事需要报告。

But when you do receive a communication from us, it will come from the fellow you are paying to run the business. Your Chairman has a firm belief that owners are entitled to hear directly from the CEO as to what is going on and how he evaluates the business, currently and prospectively. You would demand that in a private company; you should expect no less in a public company. A once-a-year report of stewardship should not be turned over to a staff specialist or public relations consultant who is unlikely to be in a position to talk frankly on a manager- to-owner basis.

但是当您收到我们的信息时，它将来自您花钱聘请来经营业务的人。你们的董事长坚信，所有者有权直接听取首席执行官的意见，了解正在发生的事情，以及他如何评估当前和未来的业务。你在一家私有公司所要求的待遇，在伯克希尔这家公开公司一点也不会少。在私人公司，你会要求这样做；在一家上市公司，你的期望不应该更低。一年一次的年度报告不应该交给员工专家或公共关系顾问，因为他们不太可能以一个经理人对所有者的视角进行坦率地汇报。

We feel that you, as owners, are entitled to the same sort of reporting by your manager as we feel is owed to us at Berkshire Hathaway by managers of our business units. Obviously, the degree of detail must be different, particularly where information would be useful to a business competitor or the like. But the general scope, balance, and level of candor should be similar. We don’t expect a public relations document when our operating managers tell us what is going on, and we don’t feel you should receive such a document.

我们认为，作为股东，你们有权得到经理人的汇报，就像我们应该得到伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司各业务部门的经理人的汇报一样。显然，详细程度必须有所不同，特别是在信息对商业竞争对手或类似企业有用的情况下。但总的范围、平衡度和坦率程度应该是相似的。当我们的运营经理告诉我们发生了什么事时，我们不希望看到一份公关文件，同样我们认为您也不应该收到这样的文件。

In large part, companies obtain the shareholder constituency that they seek and deserve. If they focus their thinking and communications on short-term results or short-term stock market consequences they will, in large part, attract shareholders who focus on the same factors. And if they are cynical in their treatment of investors, eventually that cynicism is highly likely to be returned by the investment community.

在很大程度上，一家公司往往会吸引同类型的人成为其股东，若公司注重的是短期的成果或是股价的波动，则具有这种特色的投资人便会自动上门成为其股东，而若公司对其股东采取轻蔑的态度，最后投资大众亦会以相同的态度回报之。

Phil Fisher, a respected investor and author, once likened the policies of the corporation in attracting shareholders to those of a restaurant attracting potential customers. A restaurant could seek a given clientele - patrons of fast foods, elegant dining, Oriental food, etc. - and eventually obtain an appropriate group of devotees. If the job were expertly done, that clientele, pleased with the service, menu, and price level offered, would return consistently. But the restaurant could not change its character constantly and end up with a happy and stable clientele. If the business vacillated between French cuisine and take-out chicken, the result would be a revolving door of confused and dissatisfied customers.

菲利普.费雪一位令人尊敬的投资专家与作者，曾比喻一家公司吸引股东的方式，就好比餐厅招揽客户的方法一样，餐厅可标榜其特色，如便利的快餐店、优雅的西餐厅或特别的东方食物等，以吸引同一性质的客户群，若服务好、菜色佳、价钱公道，相信客户会一再上门。然而餐厅却不能时常变换其所强调的特色，一下是法国美食、一下又是外带披萨，最后反而可能导致顾客的忿怒与失望。

So it is with corporations and the shareholder constituency they seek. You can’t be all things to all men, simultaneously seeking different owners whose primary interests run from high current yield to long-term capital growth to stock market pyrotechnics, etc.

同样的，一家公司亦不可能同时迎合所有投资大众的口味，有的要高股利报酬、有的要长期资本成长，有的又要短期股价爆炸性成长。

The reasoning of managements that seek large trading activity in their shares puzzles us. In effect, such managements are saying that they want a good many of the existing clientele continually to desert them in favor of new ones - because you can’t add lots of new owners (with new expectations) without losing lots of former owners.

所以我们对于一些公司总是希望自家公司的股票保持高周转率感到疑惑不解，感觉上这些公司好象希望原有的股东赶快厌倦而琵琶别抱、另结新欢，以使得新的股东能够抱着新希望、新幻想赶快加入。

We much prefer owners who like our service and menu and who return year after year. It would be hard to find a better group to sit in the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder “seats” than those already occupying them. So we hope to continue to have a very low turnover among our owners, reflecting a constituency that understands our operation, approves of our policies, and shares our expectations. And we hope to deliver on those expectations.

相反的，我们希望原有股东一直喜欢我们的服务、我们的菜单，而且常常来光顾，我们很难找到比原来的股东更好的新股东来加入我们的行列，因此我们期待公司的股份保持极低的周转率，这表示我们的股东了解并认同公司经营的方向与期待的未来。

Prospects

Last year we said that we expected operating earnings in dollars to improve but return on equity to decrease. This turned out to be correct. Our forecast for 1980 is the same. If we are wrong, it will be on the downside. In other words, we are virtually certain that our operating earnings expressed as a percentage of the new equity base of approximately $236 million, valuing securities at cost, will decline from the 18.6% attained in 1979. There is also a fair chance that operating earnings in aggregate dollars will fall short of 1979; the outcome depends partly upon the date of disposition of the bank, partly upon the degree of slippage in insurance underwriting profitability, and partly upon the severity of earnings problems in the savings and loan industry.

未来前景

去年我曾说过公司的盈余会成长但股东权益报酬率可能会下降，结果正如我所预期，展望1980年亦是如此，而若我预测错误，那表示可能会更惨。换句话说，我们几乎可以肯定的说，公司营业利益除以期初股东权益2.36亿美元(股票投资以原始成本计)所得的报酬率将会比1979年的18.6%下滑，甚至营业利益本身也有可能会比去年减少，其结果取决于何时正式处份银行、保险业核保获利的好坏以及储贷业亏损的严重性。

We continue to feel very good about our insurance equity investments. Over a period of years, we expect to develop very large and growing amounts of underlying earning power attributable to our fractional ownership of these companies. In most cases they are splendid businesses, splendidly managed, purchased at highly attractive prices.

我们对保险事业持有的股票投资依然非常看好，在往后的数年内，我们预期这些部份股权投资将会持续为母公司累积获利，大部份的个案皆属绩优公司且由优秀的人才所管理，而投资的成本更是价美物廉。

Your company is run on the principle of centralization of financial decisions at the top (the very top, it might be added), and rather extreme delegation of operating authority to a number of key managers at the individual company or business unit level. We could just field a basketball team with our corporate headquarters group (which utilizes only about 1500 square feet of space).

本公司有关财务决策一向是属于中央集权，且决策集中于最高当局。但在营运方面却是极端授权予集团子公司或事业体的专业经理人，我们的集团总部占地仅1,500平方呎，约合42坪左右)总共只有十二人，刚好可以组一只篮球队。

This approach produces an occasional major mistake that might have been eliminated or minimized through closer operating controls. But it also eliminates large layers of costs and dramatically speeds decision-making. Because everyone has a great deal to do, a very great deal gets done. Most important of all, it enables us to attract and retain some extraordinarily talented individuals - people who simply can’t be hired in the normal course of events - who find working for Berkshire to be almost identical to running their own show.

也因此在管理上难免会出点差错，但另一方面扁平化的组织却能大幅降低成本并加速决策时程。因为每个人都有很多事可做，所以大家就可以完成很多事。更重要的是这使得我们能请到最优秀的人才来为我们工作，这是一般企业无法作到的，因为这些人就像是在经营自己的事业般尽情发挥。

We have placed much trust in them - and their achievements have far exceeded that trust.

我们对他们寄与相当的厚望，然而他们的表现却远远超出我们的预期。

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
March 3, 1980

沃伦.巴菲特，董事会主席
1980年3月3日

Now, however, the Dow-Jones news ticker reports our quarterly earnings promptly after we release them and, in addition, both the ticker and the Wall Street journal report our annual earnings. This solves a dissemination problem that had bothered us.

In contrast, we include no narrative with our quarterly reports. Our owners and managers both have very long time- horizons in regard to this business, and it is difficult to say anything new or meaningful each quarter about events of long-term significance.

So it is with corporations and the shareholder constituency they seek. You can’t be all things to all men, simultaneously seeking different owners whose primary interests run from high current yield to long-term capital growth to stock market pyrotechnics, etc.

We have placed much trust in them - and their achievements have far exceeded that trust.

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman March 3, 1980

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
March 3, 1980