巴菲特致股东的信（1983年）附录：商誉及其摊销：规则与现实（下）

That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.

这一可能性的存在是因为真实的经济商誉倾向于跟随通胀在名义价值上成比例增加。为了说明这是如何运作的，让我们把 See's 这样的业务和一个更普通的业务 X 做一个对比。1972 年我们并购 See's 时，它在 800 万美元净有形资产之上的盈利是 200 万美元。让我们假定一个普通的企业 X 也有 200 万美元的盈利，但需要 1800 万美元的净有形资产来维持运营。仅凭所需有形资产赚取 11%的回报，这个普通的业务几乎没有经济商誉。

A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes" – even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume – as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.

这样一个企业 X，完全有可能以其净有形资产净值 1800 万美元卖出。与之相反，我们支付了 2500 万美元购买了 See's，即使它没有更多的盈利，而且只有前面普通业务 X 不到一半的实打实的有形资产。难道正如我们的并购价格所暗示的那样，更少的净资产真的会更值钱吗？答案是“是的”，只要你预料到未来是一个持续通胀的世界，正如我们在 1972 年预计的那样，即便两个业务都预期有停滞的业务量。

To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.

要理解为什么少会变多，请想象物价水平翻倍之后对这两个业务的影响。这两者都需要把名义盈利翻倍到400 万美元才能赶得上通胀。这似乎不需要太多的手段：只要卖同样多的数量，把价格翻倍就行了，假设利润率不变，盈利一定翻倍。

But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.

但是关键的是，为了达到利润翻倍，两者恐怕都必须把正常的净有形资产投资翻倍。因为这就是通胀常常强加于商业的经济要求。有好处也有坏处，以美元计的销售额翻倍意味着更多的钱必须马上被用在应收款和库存。固定资产所用的钱对通胀会有较慢的反应，但肯定会有反应。而且，所有这些通胀要求的投资将无法提高投资回报率。这种投资的原因在于维持业务的生存，而不是股东利益的增长。

Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large – a need for $18 million of additional capital.

记住，See's 只有 800 万美元的净有形资产。所以，它只需要投入额外的 800 万美元来支持通胀所强加的资本需求。而普通的业务 X，则有着超过 2 倍的大负担，需要 1800 万美元的额外资本。

After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)

尘埃落定之后，这个普通的业务 X，现在每年盈利 400 万美元，可能仍然价值相当于其有形资产价值，即3600 万美元。这意味着股东投资的每一个美元，只产生了一个美元的名义价值增加。(这与他们把钱加到存款帐户中一样，都是一美元对一美元。)

See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital – over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.

See's 同样也盈利 400 万美元，用我们购买时同样的估值方法评估(逻辑上应该如此)可能价值 5000 万美元。所以 See's 获得了 2500 万美元的名义价值增加，而股东仅仅投入了 800 万美元的额外资本，这相当于每投入 1美元获得超过 3 美元的名义价值。

Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.

记住，即使是这样，See's 的股东也由于通胀被迫付出 800 万美元的额外资本，这也才仅仅是维持真实利润。任何需要一些净有形资产来运营的非杠杆企业(几乎所有的业务都是如此)都会被通胀伤害。对有形资产方面需求很少的企业受到的伤害最小。

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom – held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.

然而这个事实对很多人来说是难以理解的。多年以来，(长于传统短于智慧的)传统智慧认为拥有天然资源，工厂，机器或其他有形资产(“我们信赖的商品”)的企业能够提供最好的通胀保护。其实根本不是这样。重资产企业的回报率通常很低，低到几乎不能提供足够的资本来满足现有业务的通胀需求，没有任何剩余资金来支持真正的增长，分配股息给所有者，或者并购新的业务。

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.

与之相反，在通货膨胀时期积累的大量商业财富来自拥有具有持久价值的无形资产和对有形资产的要求相对较低的特许经营权。在这些例子里，以名义美元计价的盈利大幅增加，这些资金可以用来并购其他的业务。这种现象在电视报业等传媒行业尤为明显。这一行业仅需要很少的有形资产投资，但是却能保持特许经营权经久不衰。在通胀时期，商誉是不断给予的礼物。

But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill – and there is plenty of it around – is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled "No-Will". Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an "asset" just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.

但是这一结论自然只适用于真正的经济商誉。欺骗性的会计商誉(有很多这样的例子)是另外一码事。当一个过度兴奋的管理层用愚蠢的高价购买一个企业时，你就会看到与前面描述的同样的会计细节。因为它无处可去，愚蠢的出价最终会被记入商誉帐户。考虑到创建该账户缺乏管理自制力，在这种情况下，应该称之为“没有意愿”。无论期限，通常可以观察到 40 年的仪式性摊销。管理层追求刺激的肾上腺素被资本化保留在帐面上作为一项「虚无缥缈的资产」，就像在说这个并购是一个明智的举动。

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If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.

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如果你坚持相信对商誉的会计处理是衡量经济现实的最佳方式，我建议你思考最后一个例子。

Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.

假设一个公司有每股 20 美元的净资产，全部是有形资产。进一步假设公司内部发展了一个绝妙的消费者特许经营权，或者这个公司足够幸运，获得了一些重要的 FCC 最初授予的电视台许可。所以，这个公司于有形资产上盈利丰厚，比如每股 5 美元，或者 25%的回报。

With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.

有这样的经济状况，这支公司的股票可能卖价每股 100 美元或更高。而且还有可能在一个谈判卖出整个业务中获得如此的价格。

Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?

假设一个投资者支付了每股 100 美元购买股票，实际上是用每股 80 美元支付了商誉(正如一个企业并购整个公司时那样)。这个投资者是否应该每年拿出 2 美元的摊销费用(80 美元除以 40 年)，用于计算“真实”每股盈利？如果是这样，新的 3 美元新“真实”盈利是否应该促使他重新思考购买价格？

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We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:

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我们认为经理人和投资者应该从下面两个视角看待无形资产：

1. In analysis of operating results – that is, in evaluating the underlying economics of a business unit – amortization charges should be ignored. What a business can be expected to earn on unleveraged net tangible assets, excluding any charges against earnings for amortization of Goodwill, is the best guide to the economic attractiveness of the operation. It is also the best guide to the current value of the operation’s economic Goodwill.

A、在分析经营业绩时，也就是评估一个业务的内在经济状况时，摊销费用应该被忽略。一个企业在无杠杆的净有形资产上的预期收益(不包括商誉摊销收益的任何费用)，是衡量企业经济吸引力的最佳指南。这也是衡量该业务经济商誉价值的最佳指南。

2. In evaluating the wisdom of business acquisitions, amortization charges should be ignored also. They should be deducted neither from earnings nor from the cost of the business. This means forever viewing purchased Goodwill at its full cost, before any amortization. Furthermore, cost should be defined as including the full intrinsic business value – not just the recorded accounting value – of all consideration given, irrespective of market prices of the securities involved at the time of merger and irrespective of whether pooling treatment was allowed. For example, what we truly paid in the Blue Chip merger for 40% of the Goodwill of See’s and the News was considerably more than the $51.7 million entered on our books. This disparity exists because the market value of the Berkshire shares given up in the merger was less than their intrinsic business value, which is the value that defines the true cost to us.

B、在评估商业投资是否明智时，摊销费用也应被忽略。摊销费用既不应该从业务的盈利中减去，也不应该从业务的成本中扣除。这意味着在任何摊销之前，永远以全部成本查看购买的商誉。更重要的是，并购成本应该被定义为，包含所支付代价的全部内在商业价值，而不仅是其记录的会计价值，不论合并当时所涉及的证券的市场价格，也不管是否允许用合并会计处理。比如，我们在合并 Blue Chip 40%的 See's 和 News 的商誉时，真正支付的代价远超过我们记录在账面上的 5170 万美元。存在这种差异是由于在合并时，伯克希尔股票的市场价值低于其内在商业价值，对我们来说这才是决定真实成本的价值。

Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase – although it’s a good place to look for one.

从视角 A 看似乎是赢家的投资，从视角 B 看却有可能黯然失色。一个好的企业不一定是一个好的投资，虽然好企业是寻找好投资的地方。

We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally ignored.

我们将寻求投资那些用 A 衡量是优秀运营的企业，而且用 B 衡量能产生合理回报的投资。所谓会计的结果将完全被忽略。

At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the $79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.

在 1983 年底，在我们会计帐面上的净商誉是 6200 万美元，包括 7900 万美元标明在资产负债表的资产一侧，以及 1700 万美元负的商誉以冲销我们持有的 Mutual Savings and Loan 的权益价值。

We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.

我们相信净经济商誉远超过这 6200 万美元的会计数字。

* * * * *If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.